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The dissertation is primarily an historical and philosophical analysis of Descartes’ 
early, unpublished treatise on scientific method, the Regulae ad directionem ingenii. Ever 
since it first appeared—as a manuscript passed among a small circle of intellectuals—in 
the 1660’s, the text has been shrouded in mystery. When was it written? Why was it 
abandoned? What was the character of the original draft? We will attempt to answer these 
questions, but more importantly, our concern will be whether or not this text stands on its 
own as a significant contribution to the Cartesian corpus. Does it present a coherent 
picture of Descartes’ philosophical thought at a crucial point in its development? Recent 
commentators have made it clear that Descartes’ Regulae is a foundational text in his 
scientific career. It most fully develops Descartes’ early insights into scientific method 
and the nature of explanation. These insights ultimately provide the basis for Descartes’ 
theory of matter: that the physical world is nothing but extension; and wherever there is 
extension, there is matter. These insights will play a central role in the development of 
my thesis. In effect, what I will try to show is that when Descartes addresses the issues of 
method, epistemology, and scientific explanation, he does so in such a way that the 
answers to these questions prejudice Descartes toward a dualistic concept of mind. 
Though the Regulae cannot account for a concept of mind, Descartes’ mature concept of 
mind fits central elements in that work like a missing puzzle piece. 
Descartes’ mature concept of mind is grounded in two claims: that the mind is a 
substance whose existence cannot be doubted, and that it is entirely distinct from material 
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substance. For Descartes, the mind has one principle attribute, thought, of which ideas 
and acts of consciousness are its modes. These claims, like the claims addressed in 
contemporary philosophy of mind, are metaphysical. They answer the questions: what is 
a mind and what can be attributed to it? By contrast, the Regulae is primarily concerned 
with epistemological questions surrounding the scientific method: what counts as truth in 
science? How do we discover true principles? What techniques allow us to discern those 
principles? And how do our mental faculties confirm those discoveries? Moreover, the 
Regulae is firmly set on discarding or overturning the classical, Aristotelian scientific 
method—one that was intimately connected to Aristotle’s metaphysics. Consequently, 
the Regulae is opposed to metaphysics in general and never develops a metaphysics of its 
own. Thus, Descartes’ concept of mind in the Regulae is absent exactly that metaphysical 
foundation. In it, the mind appears solely as an engine of epistemological constraints, 
rather than a product of a metaphysical thesis (i.e., dualism). We do not see the missing 
piece of the puzzle, but we can study its absent contours. When we do, we perceive a 
very different Cartesian mind: not a disembodied soul, but an interface that mediates the 
subject’s most precise (scientific) knowledge of the world.  
In order to elaborate on this concept of mind, I propose to concentrate on three 
topics that demonstrate the nature of such a concept of mind: the mathesis universalis, the 
account of perceptual cognition, and the account of simple natures. These three topics 
certainly do not exhaust the important topics covered in the Regulae, but I do think that 
they are each central to the foundations of what we have been calling his science, but 
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what may be more appropriately called “natural philosophy.” These three topics, then, 
tell the story of why and how Descartes arrived at the principles of his natural 
philosophical system. It is my claim that Descartes’ concept of mind grows out of and is 
naturally fitted to embrace those principles. 
With the mathesis universalis, we will find an elaboration of a method that is the 
basis of Descartes’ analytic geometry. Descartes came to see that arithmetical techniques 
could be applied to geometrical problems in order to discover their solutions. This is the 
source of the algebraic geometry that became Descartes’ pivotal contribution to 
mathematics in 1637, with the publication of La Géometrie. Yet the Regulae, and 
Descartes’ earliest writings on physico-mathematics, make it clear that the mathesis 
universalis was not only a technique for solving purely mathematical problems, but was 
also the foundation of an applied mathematics that would, at least in part, form the basis 
of Cartesian science. Indeed, it is in the application of mathematical techniques to 
understanding physical phenomena that modern physics is born. Descartes was perhaps 
not the most adept practitioner of this application, but he understood what was 
philosophically at stake. He understood that in order to apply mathematical techniques to 
solving problems in natural philosophy (or physics) one had to be able to conceive of any 
physical object entirely in terms of mathematical representation. According to Descartes 
of the Regulae, all physical entities are to be understood only insofar as they admit of 
order and measure, i.e., either discrete or continuous (numerical or geometrical) 
mathematical representation. Thus, there is an implicit metaphysical commitment 
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embedded in Descartes’ proposed method: he conceives of all physical entities as 
admitting of mathematical representation, and only considers them insofar as they are 
mathematically represented. Such a conception rules out the possibility that, for instance, 
sensible qualities, substantial forms, or living souls have any explanatory, or possibly 
even causal, role to play in science. With the idea of the mathesis universalis, we see that 
the epistemological concerns of method and exactness drive Descartes’ basic 
metaphysical theory of matter in general. 
This implicit metaphysical commitment in natural philosophy has an indirect 
implication for Descartes’ concept of mind. Descartes selects mathematical 
representation as the rubric by which all physical entities can be known because he 
understands the essence of thought to be intuition, or as he also calls it in the Regulae 
certain and evident cognition. Nothing is more certain and evident than the principles and 
products of mathematical calculation, so the mathematical representation of physical 
entities renders natural philosophy utterly clear and distinct. Moreover, once the objects 
of pure mathematical representation are identified with the essence of material objects, 
they are easily detached from the sensory impressions of the mind. Thus, in an effort to 
found physical science on certainty, Descartes effectively dissociates the mental from the 
physical. He will admit that our sensory impressions are the effect of underlying material 
(or mathematically represented) causes, but the character of those sensory impressions 
plays no explanatory role in the underlying material cause. So, the material world is 
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explained through a mathematical physics together with a metaphysical theory of matter, 
which is independent of the sensory impressions that compose our mental life.  
Though Descartes’ early insights into applied mathematics show a disposition 
toward substance dualism, the epistemological justification for dualism lies in a brief 
account of perceptual cognition. In Rule XII, Descartes outlines the principles of his later 
scientific theory of perception. In this text, we lack many of the details guiding the later 
theory, though its core principles are already outlined. The theory of perception serves 
two purposes in the Regulae: first, it provides an epistemological foundation for 
Descartes’ theory of natural philosophy; second, it justifies the use of certain 
methodological heuristics by relating them to physical capacities of the brain. The first 
objective is accomplished by accounting for a causal link between our faculties of 
perception and the external world. Thus, Descartes provides a reasonable physical 
explanation for why we ought to trust the evidence provided by our senses. This justifies 
the use of experiment and observation (broadly encouraged in the early Descartes) in 
order to discover the nature of physical phenomena. The second objective will be 
accomplished by attending to the nature of our cognitive faculties of representation and 
imagination, their limitations and strengths. Descartes thinks that we will be assured of 
arriving at truth if we guard against the weaknesses and harness the strengths of our 
cognitive faculties. These strengths and weaknesses are construed physiologically. Thus, 
Descartes’ method of scientific explanation determines the powers and limitations of the 
mind. Nevertheless, Descartes maintains that the active power of the intellect, its capacity 
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to voluntarily move the body and brain, is a wholly spiritual power and cannot be reduced 
to any property of the brain, i.e., it admits of no such physiological explanation. This 
spiritual power is clearly the forerunner of the ego. We see that it plays an essential role 
in the composition of Descartes’ method and its nature is known as something separate 
from and in contradistinction to physical matter. This account of perception suggests 
(without proof) that the active power of the mind is primary and independent. Thus, we 
can understand the wholly spiritual, active power of the mind to provide the basic 
justification for a natural philosophy based on mathematical representation, experiment, 
and observation. 
Finally, we will examine what is perhaps the core of the Regulae, the categorical 
bases of Cartesian science, the simple natures. Again, we find that Descartes 
distinguishes intellectual simples from material simples, which suggests that he considers 
mind and matter to be two different regions of scientific investigation. Moreover, we will 
note that simples are regarded as basic for scientific explanation because of their 
epistemic simplicity. That is, the principles of Cartesian science conform to the 
epistemological character of inquiry. We will illuminate the unique nature of this 
epistemic priority by comparing Descartes’ use of the simple natures to Francis Bacon’s. 
We will see the common search for simple bases of mechanistic science from entirely 
different perspectives. And we will examine how these simple natures function in the 
scientific method, both as bases of explanation, and desiderata of investigation. Given the 
idea that simple natures provide the basis for explaining mental and physical phenomena, 
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one might be tempted to turn to the intellectual simple natures for a sketch of Descartes’ 
early philosophy of mind. Unfortunately, Descartes does not at elaborate in any detail on 
the nature of intellectual simples. It is clear that his primary focus, in the Regulae, is to 
develop an interpretation of the physical world, of natural philosophy, rather than the 
intellectual world. Yet, he holds that intellectual domain apart from the natural world of 
mechanical interaction. This, again, shows a fundamental commitment to dualism, if not 
a developed dualistic theory. 
Considering these three topics will, I hope, convince the reader that Descartes’ 
dualism grows out of his earliest writings on scientific method. I believe that the reason 
for this is the central, active role that the mind plays in setting out the parameters of 
scientific knowledge and pursuing science methodically. Descartes finds this power to be 
primitive, not yielding to a reductive explanation. One might wonder if it is not the fact 
that the mind sets up the very principles of natural scientific explanation that renders it 
intractable under those principles. In any case, we can see that what appears to be a mere 
metaphysical postulate in the later Descartes (the substantial independence of the mind) is 
in fact a necessary consequence of the natural philosophical method employed by the 
early Descartes. 
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Introduction 
 
Thesis 
Most broadly construed, this dissertation is an historical and philosophical 
analysis of the Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Descartes’ early, unfinished, and 
unpublished manuscript of a treatise on scientific method. The text itself has a 
controversial history that makes commentary on it difficult. We do not know when it was 
written; we do not know what it would have looked like had it been completed; and we 
do not know why it was abandoned. Though we will make our best effort to address these 
specific questions, the overriding concern of the dissertation will be whether or not the 
Regulae stands on its own as a central text in the career of Descartes. Is it a real 
contribution to Descartes’ philosophy that presents a coherent picture of the Cartesian 
program at critical time in its development?  
I believe it is, but perhaps not for the suspected reasons. Recent commentators 
have made it clear that Descartes’ Regulae is a foundational text in his scientific career. It 
most fully develops Descartes’ early insights into scientific method and the nature of 
explanation. These insights ultimately provide the basis for Descartes’ theory of matter: 
that the physical world is nothing but extension; and wherever there is extension, there is 
matter.1
                                                 
1 John A. Schuster, Descartes and the Scientific Revolution, Daniel Garber, Descartes’ 
Metaphysical Physics, Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography each develop 
an argument along these lines. 
 These insights will play a central role in the development of my thesis. In effect, 
what I will try to show is that when Descartes addresses the issues of method, 
 2 
epistemology, and scientific explanation, he does so in such a way that the answers to 
these questions prejudice Descartes toward a dualistic concept of mind. Though the 
Regulae cannot account for a concept of mind, Descartes’ mature concept of mind fits 
central elements in that work like a missing puzzle piece.2
Descartes’ mature concept of mind is grounded in two claims: that the mind is a 
substance whose existence cannot be doubted, and that it is entirely distinct from material 
substance. He says that this substance has a principle attribute--thought--and that ideas 
and acts of consciousness are modes of this substance. These claims, like the claims 
addressed in contemporary philosophy of mind, are metaphysical. They answer the 
questions: what is a mind and what can be attributed of it? By contrast, the Regulae is 
primarily concerned with epistemological questions surrounding the scientific method: 
what counts as truth in science? How do we discover true principles? What techniques 
allow us to discern those principles? And how do our mental faculties confirm those 
discoveries? Moreover, the Regulae is firmly set on discarding, or overturning, the 
classical, Aristotelian scientific method—one that was intimately connected to Aristotle’s 
metaphysics. Consequently, the Regulae is opposed to metaphysics in general and never 
develops a metaphysics of its own. Thus, Descartes’ concept of mind in the Regulae is 
absent exactly that metaphysical foundation. In it, the mind appears solely as an engine of 
epistemological constraints, rather than a product of a metaphysical thesis (i.e., dualism). 
We do not see the missing piece of the puzzle, but we can study its absent contours. 
  
                                                 
2 More recently, Lilli Alanen, Descartes’s Concept of Mind and Jorge Secada, Cartesian 
Metaphysics: the Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy, have each indicated that the 
origins of Descartes’ concept of mind, epistemology, and substance dualism lie in the 
Regulae. 
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When we do, we perceive a very different Cartesian mind: not a disembodied soul, but an 
interface that mediates and determines the nature of the subject’s most precise (scientific) 
knowledge of the world.  
In order to elaborate on this concept of mind, I propose to concentrate on three 
topics that demonstrate the nature of such a concept of mind: the mathesis universalis, the 
account of perceptual cognition, and the account of simple natures. These three topics 
certainly do not exhaust the important topics covered in the Regulae, but I do think that 
each is central to the foundations of what we have been calling his science, but what may 
more appropriately be called “natural philosophy.” While the Principia Philosophia is 
surely the most mature and complete elaboration of Descartes’ natural philosophy, the 
Regulae plays an indispensable role in developing the science of discovery underlying 
that natural philosophical system. These three topics, then, tell the story of why and how 
Descartes arrived at the principles of his natural philosophical system. It is my claim that 
Descartes’ concept of mind grows out of and is naturally fitted to embrace those 
principles. 
With the concept of the mathesis universalis, we will find an elaboration of a 
method that is the basis of Descartes’ analytic geometry. Descartes came to see that 
arithmetical techniques could be applied to geometrical problems in order to discover 
their solutions. This is the source of the algebraic geometry that became Descartes’ 
pivotal contribution to mathematics in 1637, with the publication of La Géometrie. Yet 
the Regulae, and Descartes’ earliest writings on physico-mathematics, make it clear that 
the mathesis universalis was not only a technique for solving purely mathematical 
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problems, but was also the foundation of an applied mathematics that would, at least in 
part, form the basis of Cartesian science. Indeed, it is in the application of mathematical 
techniques to understanding physical phenomena that modern physics is born. Descartes 
was perhaps not the most adept practitioner of this application, but he understood what 
was philosophically at stake. He understood that in order to apply mathematical 
techniques to solving problems in natural philosophy (or physics), one had to be able to 
conceive of any physical object as something that could be entirely captured by 
mathematical representation. That is, one had to allow the complete abstraction of any 
given natural body from its sensible qualities. All physical entities were to be understood 
only insofar as they admit of order and measure, i.e., either discrete (arithmetical) or 
continuous (geometrical) mathematical representation. Thus, there is an implicit 
metaphysical commitment embedded in Descartes’ triumph of method: he conceives of 
all physical entities as admitting of mathematical representation, and only considers them 
insofar as they are mathematically represented. Such a conception rules out the 
possibility that, for instance, sensible qualities, substantial forms, or living souls have any 
explanatory, or possibly even causal, role to play in science. With the idea of the mathesis 
universalis, we see that the epistemological concerns of method and exactness drive 
Descartes’ basic metaphysical theory of matter in general. 
This implicit metaphysical commitment in natural philosophy has an indirect 
implication for Descartes’ concept of mind. Descartes selects mathematical 
representation as the rubric by which all physical entities can be known because he 
understands the essence of thought to be intuition or, as he also calls it, certain and 
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evident cognition. Nothing is more certain and evident than the principles and products of 
mathematical calculation, so the mathematical representation of physical entities renders 
natural philosophy utterly clear and distinct. Moreover, once the objects of pure 
mathematical representation are identified with the essence of material objects, they are 
easily detached from the sensory impressions of the mind. Thus, in an effort to found 
physical science on certainty, Descartes effectively dissociates the mental from the 
physical. He will admit that our sensory impressions are the effect of underlying material 
(or mathematically represented) causes, but the character of those sensory impressions 
plays no explanatory role in the underlying material cause. So, the material world is 
explained through a mathematical physics together with a metaphysical theory of matter, 
which is independent of the sensory impressions that compose our mental life.  
Though Descartes’ early insights into applied mathematics show a disposition 
toward substance dualism, the epistemological justification for dualism lies in his brief 
account of perceptual cognition in the Regulae. In Rule XII, Descartes outlines the 
principles of his later scientific theory of perception. In this text, we lack many of the 
details guiding the later theory, though its core principles are already outlined. The theory 
of perception serves two purposes in the Regulae: first, it provides an epistemological 
foundation for Descartes’ theory of natural philosophy; second, it justifies the use of 
certain methodological heuristics by relating them to physical capacities of the brain. The 
first objective is accomplished by accounting for a causal link between our faculties of 
perception and the external world. Thus, Descartes provides a reasonable physical 
explanation for why we ought to trust the evidence provided by our senses. This justifies 
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the use of experiment and observation (broadly encouraged in the early Descartes) in 
order to discover the nature of physical phenomena. The second objective will be 
accomplished by attending to the nature of our cognitive faculties of representation and 
imagination, their limitations and strengths. Descartes thinks that we will be assured of 
arriving at truth if we guard against the weaknesses and harness the strengths of our 
cognitive faculties. These strengths and weaknesses are construed physiologically. Thus, 
Descartes’ method of scientific explanation explains the powers and limitations of the 
mind. Nevertheless, Descartes maintains that the active power of the intellect, its capacity 
to voluntarily move the body and brain, is a wholly spiritual power and cannot be reduced 
to any property of the brain, i.e., it admits of no physiological explanation. This spiritual 
power is clearly the forerunner of the ego. We see that it plays an essential role in the 
composition of Descartes’ method and its nature is known as something separate from 
and in contradistinction to physical matter. This account of perception suggests (without 
proof) that the active power of the mind is primary and independent. Thus, we are invited 
to see the wholly spiritual, active power of the mind as the basic justification for a natural 
philosophy based on mathematical representation, experiment, and observation. 
Finally, we will examine what is perhaps the core of the Regulae, the categorical 
bases of Cartesian science, the simple natures. Again, we find that Descartes 
distinguishes intellectual simples from material simples, which suggests that he considers 
mind and matter to be two different regions of scientific investigation. Moreover, we will 
note that simples are regarded as basic for scientific explanation because of their 
epistemic simplicity. That is, again the principles of Cartesian science conform to the 
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epistemological character of mental inquiry. We will illuminate the unique nature of this 
epistemic priority by comparing Descartes’ use of the simple natures to Francis Bacon’s. 
We will see the common search for simple bases of mechanistic science from entirely 
different perspectives. And we will examine how these simple natures function in the 
scientific method, both as bases of explanation, and desiderata of investigation. Given the 
idea that simple natures provide the basis for explaining mental and physical phenomena, 
one might be tempted to turn to the intellectual simple natures for a sketch of Descartes’ 
early philosophy of mind. Unfortunately, Descartes does not at elaborate in any detail on 
the nature of intellectual simples. It is clear that his primary focus, in the Regulae, is to 
develop an interpretation of the physical world, of natural philosophy, rather than the 
intellectual world. Yet, he holds that intellectual domain apart from the natural world of 
mechanical causes. This, again, shows a fundamental commitment to dualism, if not a 
developed dualistic theory. 
Considering these three topics will, I hope, convince the reader that Descartes’ 
dualism grows out of his earliest writings on scientific method. I believe that the reason 
for this is the central, active role that the mind plays in setting out the parameters of 
scientific knowledge and pursuing science methodically. Descartes finds this power to be 
primitive, not yielding to a reductive explanation. One might wonder if it is not the fact 
that the mind sets up the very principles of natural scientific explanation that renders it 
intractable under those principles. In any case, we can see that what appears to be a mere 
metaphysical postulate in the later Descartes (the substantial independence of the mind) is 
 8 
in fact a consequence of the the limitations Descartes imposes on his early, natural 
philosophical method. 
 
Methodology 
 
This dissertation will take an historical approach. We are interested in where 
Descartes’ ideas came from, how they developed over time, and what historical figures 
could have influenced them. Fortunately for students of early modern philosophy, there 
has been a considerable and substantive debate in the literature concerning 
historiographical approaches to philosophy. Though these discussions have been 
advanced as a general debate concerning the methods and practices of “history of 
philosophy,” the principal players have nonetheless (and perhaps not accidentally) been 
scholars of modern philosophy.3
                                                 
3 History of Philosophy and Analytic Philosophy, Tom Sorrell and G. A. J. Rogers eds. and 
Philosophy and Its History, Jorge Gracia ed. 
 I will not try here to advance any programmatic 
response to the question of methods in the history of philosophy. That would be a project 
in its own right. Here, I only want to provide the reader with some indication of the 
methodological decisions I have made in the course of writing this dissertation. I do not 
think that anything I say here can justify the work that follows, but I think that one should 
make one’s assumptions apparent at the start of any philosophical argument. 
Methodological decisions involve substantive philosophical assumptions and for that 
reason alone they should be made explicit. 
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It is my belief that for most philosophers prior to the twentieth century (and in an 
increasingly diminishing subset of contemporary authors), there is no distinction between 
history of philosophy and philosophy proper. That is not to say that seminal works like 
Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature, or 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, are instances of the kind of philosophy that we would 
today call history of philosophy. Indeed, it is patently obvious that these works introduce 
radically new and influential philosophical ideas, announce original philosophical 
programs, and engage in sui generis philosophical argumentation. What I mean is that 
intrinsic to these works is an engagement with a set of issues and concerns advanced by 
historically prior authors. These works are dialectically historical: they are engaged in a 
dialogue with the history of philosophy. Today, contemporary philosophers are engaged 
in a contemporary dialogue. This is less true on the European Continent, where one still 
finds many contemporary philosophers in dialogue with the history of philosophy. 
However, the vast majority of contemporary philosophers follow the style of what has 
been called “analytic” or “Anglo-American” philosophy. In other words, contemporary 
philosophers are, by and large, interested in philosophical problems that are generated 
and addressed in contemporary philosophy journals. If one is interested in pursuing 
philosophical research in a contemporary setting, it is unavoidable that one engage in 
these contemporary debates, and consequently it is unacceptable for one to be engaged in 
a lengthy (private) historical debate with authors of the past without indexing this debate 
and its conclusions to the contemporary landscape. 
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Fortunately, the historian of philosophy stands at a unique and (perhaps) crucial 
crossroads, at the intersection between the contemporary concerns of today’s 
philosophers and the historical trajectory of philosophical thought. As a consequence, the 
historian of philosophy must meet the competing demands of history and philosophy. As 
it is usually understood, these demands amount to answering two questions: Is this 
interpretation historically accurate? And is this interpretation philosophically true? 
Because most history of philosophy is the history of great philosophical works prior to 
the twentieth century, I believe that the answers to these questions are interdependent. If 
we grant that the greatest works of philosophy have had some purchase on the truth 
(conceived in some non-deflationary sense), then getting our interpretations historically 
accurate will entail getting our interpretations right. The reality, however, is not so clear. 
What counts as “true” in contemporary philosophy is a defensible position on any of the 
problems that are considered central to contemporary debates. What counts as “historical 
accuracy” amounts to satisfying a broad range of conditions: textual, sociological, 
historical (proper), and philosophical. The historical work is broadly hermeneutic: the 
task is to provide an interpretation of historical figures that is consistent with the 
background beliefs of their time. Ordinarily, the historian of philosophy succeeds by 
addressing specific philosophical problems in a very narrow range of historical time, so 
that the broad historical conditions can be satisfied. This is the nature of specialization in 
the field of history of philosophy. 
With respect to the present dissertation, then, we ought to be concerned with the 
issues that are raised in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, and 
 11 
philosophy of mind, since these are the issues that are of direct relevance to the Regulae 
and to Descartes’ (or anybody’s) concept of mind. Descartes’ mature philosophical 
positions on these issues are all too well known (and for that reason perhaps not well 
understood). He founded an enormously influential research program based on a 
mechanistic theory of physical science that was mathematical in nature; he is the 
prototypical substance dualist (though dualism about substances was hardly a foreign 
concept to the medieval scholastics); he is an internalist or individualist about mental 
content; he holds a doctrine of innate ideas and endorses a kind of Platonism about at 
least some concepts; and finally he is one of the founding rationalists of the modern era. 
Clearly, these positions place Descartes at one extreme of most contemporary debates in 
epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. Indeed, Descartes is often 
invoked in contemporary literature as a foil for differentiating one’s own views. 
However, the present dissertation considers a period of time in Descartes’ life before he 
had arrived at his substance dualism, his doctrine of innate ideas, his proof of the 
existence and nature of the cogito, and his proofs for the existence of God. Quite 
remarkably, then, we need not assume that Descartes held any of the aforementioned 
positions commonly attributed to him!  
In fact, however, we will find a good deal of what might be called ‘precursors’ or 
‘foreshadowings’ of these later doctrines in his early work. Still, by focusing on the 
earlier thought, we can remain methodologically agnostic about some of Descartes’ most 
radical theses and instead search for a more nuanced perspective on the very same issues. 
Indeed, we will discover that Descartes’ substance dualism is very closely connected to 
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his philosophy of science. We find that though Descartes is an internalist about some 
knowledge (and perhaps the most fundamental concepts), he readily accepts that there are 
limits to what can be known internally and outlines a number of techniques for justifying 
our beliefs that proceed on independent grounds. He even outlines a program of 
experimental natural philosophy that is downright Baconian! Chapters 3 and 4 will be the 
primary places for addressing these issues, and I hope to show that Descartes’ views 
come from a much more moderate position than many think. In this way, I hope to 
question the historical accuracy of Descartes’ most famous propositions about mind. 
Evaluating Descartes’ concept of mind ought to involve the assessment of issues in 
epistemology and philosophy of science. 
Our historical time period can also be suitably restricted to Descartes’ early 
unpublished work up to around 1630, with reference to historical authors with whom 
Descartes may have been in contact during that time. Fortunately, we have a very good 
idea about this set of authors and thus the boundaries of our historical research is quite 
clear. We know that, while at La Flèche, Descartes would have been exposed to (on the 
philosophical side) a fairly orthodox scholastic philosophy, drawing principally from St. 
Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, with an awareness of the issues presented by 
Nominalism, Neoplatonism, Skepticism, and Stoicism. The textbook commentaries, 
written by the Spanish Jesuits, Francisco de Toledo and a group of authors at the College 
of Coimbra, provide a very good estimation of this philosophical perspective. However, 
we also know that students at La Flèche, being the best and brightest, were also exposed 
to a fair amount of heterodoxy, in the form of the new Gallilean natural philosophy and 
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the anti-Aristotelianism of the Renaissance Humanists. From La Flèche, Descartes went 
on to study law at Poitiers, where he may have been exposed to the works of the learned 
in France, people like Montaigne. Along these lines, we know that Descartes was given a 
copy of Pierre Charon’s La Sagesse, which was nearly as ubiquitous as Montaigne’s 
Essais and would have introduced Descartes to a broad range of Renaissance thought: 
Skepticism, Stoicism, Epicurianism and the like. Finally, it is obvious that Descartes was 
a gifted mathematician (in both pure and applied mathematics). Beginning at La Flèche, 
we can be confident that he cut his teeth on Christopher Clavius’ Algebra, though the 
influence of mentors like Isaac Beeckman, Johann Faulhaber, and Claude Mydorge 
clearly broadened that base of knowledge. With these teachers, we can assume that by the 
mid 1620s Descartes was well apprised of the cutting edge of mathematical thought in his 
day. Fueling Descartes’ critical appraisal of his education at La Flèche, we can indicate 
that Beeckman’s mentor was a known Ramist, and that Ramus’ attempt to reform 
Aristotle’s Organon was well known in both Germany and Holland (where Descartes 
spent many of his formative years). Again, when Descartes arrived in Paris c. 1623-1625, 
we can be assured that he was introduced to a burgeoning intellectual minority that was, 
by and large, anti-Aristotelian and earnestly seeking a new philosophical system that 
would support the emerging mechanistic natural philosophy. 
Having outlined these broad historical parameters, I must say that not all topics 
will receive equal attention. I focus on a number of Renaissance authors in order to 
develop a theory of method, but in the areas of metaphysics and epistemology I will 
spend much more time dedicated to canonical late scholastic authors, especially Aquinas 
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and, even, returning directly to Aristotle’s texts. I think that this is altogether legitimate 
with respect to understanding the background for Descartes’ philosophy. Aristotle, as 
interpreted by the canonical scholastic authorities, was the de facto basis for the 16th 
century commentaries that were the textbooks of the educated class. Moreover, even 
though my historical references cannot pretend to be comprehensive, my aim is to 
provide the contemporary philosopher with an adequate understanding of the history of 
late scholastic philosophy in order to facilitate interpreting Descartes. Indeed, I take this 
to be a very good rule of thumb in the area of historical analyses in philosophy. It is 
utterly necessary to have some idea of the historical context within which an author is 
writing. This context provides the characterization, however minimal, of the absent 
interlocuter of the author’s writing. At the same time, it is nearly impossible, and where 
possible entirely contingent, to prove a direct influence of any prior text on the writing of 
a later one (especially when the texts have different authors). I will frequently refer to 
historical authors without any proof that Descartes was aware of the texts that I invoke to 
help explain his thought. I urge the reader to consider my historical analyses as 
canvassing a broad range of opinions, no doubt missing some critical viewpoints, no 
doubt betraying my own biases, but nonetheless providing a backdrop against which an 
interpretation of Descartes can gain some relief.  
In general, I have tried to discover the roots of the philosophically relevant issues 
that I have come upon. However, I have also recognized a great deal of resources that I 
could not possibly investigate, for lack of time or expertise. In the end, I hope that my 
philosophical instincts have guided me to genuinely interesting areas of investigation, 
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that I have uncovered some potentially enlightening material in these areas, and that I 
have made this material relevant to a study of Descartes. It is in the spirit of a shared, and 
ongoing, investigation that I write this dissertation and offer it to you, the reader. 
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The Ear ly Descar tes: Dating the Regulae and Placing it in the Context of Descar tes’ 
Development 
 
The Regulae ad directionem ingenii is a very strange text among the corpus of 
René Descartes. It is never published, yet was always retained among Descartes’ personal 
papers. On its own, this fact may not seem so unusual, since Descartes chose not to 
publish several of his treatises, most famously his natural philosophical series Le Monde 
(including La Traité de la lumière and L’Homme). However, unlike these texts which are 
frequently discussed in correspondence and whose dates can be reasonably well fixed, 
Descartes apparently never mentions the Regulae by name or topic in any of his extant 
correspondence, and its dates of composition remain heavily disputed.4
 
 Thus, before we 
can engage in an interpretation of the text, we need to be clear about the controversies 
surrounding the composition and content of it. This is especially critical in the case of the 
Regulae because there are those who claim that the Regulae is a heterogeneous collection 
of notes. In particular, several commentators have considered certain passages as entirely 
outside the rest of the treatise. My thesis views the work as a whole and makes use of 
passages throughout the text to illuminate the early connections between Descartes’ 
concept of method and science and his concept of mind. Consequently, some historical 
and textual background is necessary. 
 
                                                 
4 Crapulli, Regulae, xiv. 
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Introduction to the text: historical obscurities 
 
The Regulae first becomes known to the public in the 1660s when it was under 
the care of Claude Clerselier, a friend and frequent correspondent of Descartes’ who was 
responsible for initially publishing two volumes of Descartes’ correspondence. Clerselier 
offered the manuscript to many prominent intellectuals and promised to publish it, though 
he did not accomplish his goal before his death in 1684. He had received the manuscript 
from Descartes along with a trunk full of Descartes’ personal papers and correspondence. 
Before his death as a consequence of a respiratory infection, Descartes had shipped those 
papers from Stockholm, Sweden to Clerselier, under the supervision of his brother-in-law 
Pierre Chanut. The items are listed in an inventory, among which is item F: “Nine 
notebooks bound together, containing part of a treatise of clear and helpful rules for the 
direction of the mind in the search for truth” (AT X, 9). In the years following Descartes’ 
death, the “rules” quickly became a topic of discussion among intellectuals who knew 
that there was more to the story of Descartes’ general scientific method than the 
abbreviated account revealed in the Discours. Even though a published account of the 
Regulae was not forthcoming, several texts of the period bear the influence of the 
unpublished text. The second edition of La Logique ou l’Art de penser—the so-called 
Port Royal Logic—of Arnauld and Nicole, notes that some additions were taken directly 
from the manuscript (AT X, 352). Nicolas Pousson also mentions the Regulae in his 
Remarques sur la Method de M. Descartes (1670), while Nicolas Malebranche’s 
Recherche de la Verité (1674-1675) bears an uncannily similar title.  
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We know that Leibniz diligently studied the text, likely after his visit to Paris in 
1676, since a copy of the manuscript was found among his papers in Hanover with 
handwritten corrections. There is a Dutch translation published in 1684. And Descartes’ 
biographer, Baillet, certainly had the original manuscript in hand when he composed 
sections of the first volume of La Vie de M. Des-Cartes (1691). These works could be 
appended by a much longer list of works in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
that were clearly focused on the issue of outlining a clear and useful method for 
supporting the mind, or the mental faculties, in the discovery of truth and for that reason 
may bear some similarity to the Regulae.5
Though it seems to have inspired a great deal of interest, the manuscript enjoyed a 
very short life. Three copies from the period exist: the Dutch translation published by J. 
H. Glazemaker (called N); in 1701, Charles de Rey publishes a Latin edition in the 
Opuscula Posthuma Physica et Mathematica Cartesii (called A). After the publication of 
the Opuscula, no trace of Descartes’ original manuscript remains. Much later, Foucher de 
Careil discovers a copy among Leibniz’s personal papers in the library at Hanover (called 
H). It was initially thought to have been the lost manuscript (a theory now discredited) 
when it was published along with many other papers in the two-volume set, Lettres et 
opuscules inédits de Leibniz (Paris: 1854).
  
6
                                                 
5 I am thinking, principally, of Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (c. 1662) and 
Mary Astell’s A Serious Proposal to the Ladies (1694-97). 
 Thus, the obscure reference in the Stockholm 
inventory to a now-lost Cartesian manuscript on method opens speculation into the 
nature, content, and importance of these “rules” of method for the Cartesian project. In 
6 For a time, it was thought that H was the original copy because many handwritten notes in the 
margins. These were later found to be the hand of Leibniz (Crapulli, Regulae, introduction). 
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contemporary commentary on the Regulae, mention of the historical obscurities 
surrounding the text is de rigueur, though it was long thought that the text was not 
worthy of serious scholarly attention because central questions about its composition and 
the relevance of its content remained unanswered.7
For instance, when in 1952 J. L. Beck’s published his classic, The Method of 
Descartes: A Study of the ‘Regulae’, the first monograph commentary on the text, he 
chose to ignore the historical questions and instead clearly explicated the philosophical 
content of the Regulae, showing it to be essential to Descartes’ mature philosophical 
thought. The study prompted one prominent reviewer, J. N. Wright, to complain: “Mr. 
Beck is silent on the very points that this reviewer, for one, wants to know, before he can 
decide whether, for example, the Regulae is a ‘rough draft’ and the Discourse 
‘masterpiece’ as Adam would have us believe, or whether one is justified in turning to the 
Regulae for information about what Descartes really meant by intuition and les plus 
simples of the Discourse.”
  
8
                                                 
7 For instance, Charles Adam’s Descartes: sa vie et son oeuvre, 79, does not even discuss it 
among Descartes' works, mentioning only that the rules of the method in the Discourse had 
been developed previously in a small work, the Regulae. 
 In other words, Wright was unsatisfied by Beck’s conceptual 
analysis of the Regulae; he demanded an historical justification of the text’s importance 
as well. By 1964, Wright and others like him would get what they had wished for. In that 
year, Jean-Paul Weber published the first comprehensive textual and historical analysis of 
the Regulae with his La Constitution du texte des Regulae. This microscopic 
investigation of the Regulae advanced the thesis that there is an underlying stratification 
of Descartes’ thought preserved in the unpublished text. Following the indices of these 
8 J. N. Wright “The Method of Descartes,” 78. 
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strata, like a careful archeologist, Weber depicts a detailed development in Descartes’ 
ideas on method from 1618 to 1628.9
In a limited way, the issues raised in Weber’s book are evident to any careful 
student of the text: it is a difficult and incomplete treatise that is at once repetitive and 
vague on central points. When one adds to these conceptual difficulties, the textual 
difficulties and the lack of any firm historical context for the text, interpretation may 
seem intractable. But the historical obscurity of the text coincides with content and claims 
that are provocative and potentially central to understanding Descartes’ scientific project. 
So one is nonetheless compelled to attempt an interpretation.  
 With Weber’s efforts, the textual and 
historiographical issues of the Regulae suddenly came to the fore. This book and the 
debate it provoked made the Regulae an acceptable subject of scholarly attention, though 
it simultaneously placed it under considerable controversy. 
 
Main themes and the plan of the treatise 
 
The project appears to have been intended as a treatise on method and the 
organization of the sciences. It remains the most complete elaboration of Descartes’ 
method, which according to his own testimony is at the heart of his philosophical 
innovation (Discours: AT VI, 16-18; CSM I, 118-120). Throughout, however, one can 
discern a serious consideration of the nature of the mind and what has been translated as 
“native intelligence” (mentis, ingenium). The first rule tells us that the overriding aim or 
                                                 
9 Jean-Paul Weber, La consitution du texte des Regulae. 
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goal of the study is to direct the native intelligence to be able to make solid and true 
judgments on whatever matter may be presented to it (Rule I, title: AT X, 359; CSM I, 9). 
That rule goes on to identify this goal with the achievement of human wisdom (humana 
sapietnia) and in conjunction with this claim Descartes signals his fundamental departure 
from the Aristotelian tradition of science. Whereas the tradition had distinguished the 
sciences according to their subject-matter, considering each science separately, Descartes 
thinks this is a clear error. Instead, he says, the sciences “consist entirely in the 
knowledge acquired by the soul” (AT X, 359; CSM I, 9). Moreover, the second rule tells 
us, all science or pure knowledge is simply “certain and evident cognition” (AT X, 362; 
CSM I, 10). Thus, the sciences are unified by the mind and scientific knowledge is 
attained by satisfying certain cognitive conditions. If these first two rules are considered 
indicative of the general thrust of the treatise, then they clearly point to a fundamental 
connection between the nature of the scientific method and the concept of mind. 
I take these first two rules to represent the purpose and theme of the work 
accurately. However, it is difficult to reconcile this stated purpose with what Descartes 
clearly describes would be the content of the treatise. While drafting the twelfth Rule, he 
apparently settled upon a plan for the work. According to that Rule, the treatise was 
intended to have three parts, containing twelve rules each. The first set of twelve rules, 
which is largely complete, was to explain some of the basic propositions concerning the 
method and provide a detailed analysis of the two mental operations necessary for 
conducting any scientific research, intuition and deduction (Rule III: AT X, 368; CSM I, 
14). The second and third parts were intended to apply these rules to all types of 
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problems, divided into two classes: perfect and imperfect.  This distinction is defined in 
Rule XIII, where Descartes states that every philosophical problem must contain some 
elements that are known and others that are unknown.  Perfect problems are determined 
in every respect by data given, whereas imperfect problems involve some inherent 
obscurity in the nature of the problem in question (AT X, 430-31; CSM I, 51-52). He also 
suggests in Rule VIII that the distinction might be understood in terms of complexity: 
“we divide natures of the latter sort [i.e., composite natures which are put together by the 
intellect] into two further classes, viz., those that are deduced from natures which are the 
most simple and self-evident (which we will deal with throughout the next book [Book 
II]), and those that presuppose others which experience show us to be composite in 
reality. We shall reserve the whole of the third book for an account of the latter” (AT X, 
399; CSM I, 32). Even where we have a clear plan of the work, it is not clear exactly 
what Descartes meant by the proposed divisions.  
Before we entertain some hypotheses on the matter, we ought to review what 
Descartes means by solving problems and how he had hoped to direct the mind better to 
solve different sorts of problems. Descartes’ notion of problem solving bears some 
relation, he says, to the classical syllogism—“this is the sole respect in which we imitate 
the dialecticians” (AT X, 430; CSM I, 51)—since the forms of the syllogism are given 
and the nature of some particular thing can be understood by determining which of the 
syllogistic forms is pertinent. This process is described in detail in Aristotle’s Prior 
Analytics.  However, Descartes is not concerned with terms of a syllogism and the 
familiar problem of “finding the middle term.” Instead, he sees these problems in a much 
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more general, algebraic way. Thus, the formal constraints dictate that problems be 
represented in equations of constants, which designate known quantities, and variables, 
which designate unknowns or dynamic quantities.  This type of reasoning applies to both 
of what he calls perfect and imperfect problems, but in perfect problems, he says, “we 
want [the problem] to be determinate in every respect” (AT X, 431; CSM I, 52). It is 
unclear at this stage what is meant by the distinction between fully determinate and 
partially indeterminate problems. Nonetheless, this “algebraic” problem-solving method 
is central to the Regulae and is perhaps even a precursor of his later metaphysical method 
that he calls analysis. Though in a different sense than Aristotle's “analytics,” Descartes’ 
algebraic method is also analytic. 
Even though it is clear that algebra ought to play a central role in the scientific 
method, it is not clear how to distinguish perfect problems from imperfect ones. In Rules 
XIV-XVIII, Descartes provides examples of perfect problems mainly derived from the 
fields of arithmetic and geometry. It seems that these would be the kind of problems that 
could be determinate in every respect, since one would be dealing with a determinate, 
abstract subject-matter, i.e., number or extension. In Rule XIV, he makes this point 
explicitly: “At this point we should be delighted to come upon a reader favorably 
disposed toward arithmetic and geometry . . . [f]or the Rules which I am about to 
expound are much more readily employed in the study of these sciences (where they are 
all that is needed) than in any other sort of problem” (AT X, 442; CSM I, 58). But 
Descartes also suggests that other kinds of problems could be entirely determinate: “For 
example, someone may ask me what conclusions are to be drawn about the nature of the 
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magnet simply from the experiments which Gilbert claims to have performed, be they 
true or false” (AT X, 431; CSM I, 52). This historical investigation into Gilbert’s claims, 
“be they true or false,” seems to be distinct from the real nature of the magnet, which is 
one notable example of an imperfect problem in the Regulae. That is, when one looks at 
the body of Gilbert’s work, a determinate field of inquiry, the investigation has a 
determinate character, while an investigation into the magnet’s true nature is 
indeterminate.  
One possible explanation of the distinction between perfect and imperfect 
problems is suggested by the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” problem solving 
(Rule VI: AT X, 386; CSM I, 24 and Rule XIX-XX: AT X, 468-69; CSM I, 76). Even 
this distinction is ambiguous, however. The titles to Rules XIX and XX, which were 
never completed, suggest that direct problems are those for which there are as many 
equations as variables, whereas indirect problems have more variables than equations. On 
the other hand, Rule XVIII suggests that finding the root of a given magnitude is like 
division, but requires an “indirect and reverse movement of the imagination” (AT X, 467; 
CSM I, 75). It is not clear how root extraction and division are analogous to problems 
with more variables than equations, but it does suggest that all problems addressed in the 
Regulae would be mathematical in nature. On this reading, the third book of the Regulae 
would have been devoted to more difficult sorts of mathematical operations, e.g., root 
extraction and solving equations with multiple unknowns.10
                                                 
10 This appears to be the position of Henk Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness, 228, who 
holds that the failure of the Regulae amounted to Descartes’ incapacity to resolve problems of 
higher degree than plane and solid problems and to find a suitable geometrical representation 
 Another possibility is that 
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perfect problems are problems in pure mathematics, while imperfect problems are those 
in mixed or applied mathematics. This interpretation works well with the historical 
conception of the mathesis universalis, which was typically divided into pura mathesis 
and mixta mathesis along the lines of the classical distinction between pure and mixed 
mathematics. The former would include only arithmetic and geometry, while the latter 
would include optics, astronomy, mechanics, harmonics, etc. If one takes this route, then 
it may be possible to conceive of the Essais, published along with the Discours, as the 
accomplishment of what was originally intended in the third book of the Regulae.11
In the completed portions of the Regulae, Descartes makes some progress in 
detailing perfect kinds of problems: he provides the solutions to many kinds of 
geometrical and arithmetical problems in Rules XIV-XVIII, and outlines the contents of 
Rules IX-XXI, meant to expand upon this procedure. These are quite useful for 
understanding how the method ought to be applied to mathematics, but Descartes does 
not develop its application to imperfect problems, whether to mathematical problems of a 
higher degree or physical problems, as would seem to be the aim according to Rule XIII. 
And he certainly does not fulfill his promise—what would be the real pièce de résistance 
of the work—to show “how imperfect problems can be reduced to perfect ones.” 
However, he suggests that this would have something to do with the universal relations of 
order and measure: “We can also see how, by following this Rule, we can abstract a 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of root extraction. He also claims that it is possible, on the basis of Rule XVIII, to conceive 
root extraction as an “imperfect problem” insofar as it requires an “indirect movement of the 
imagination and treatment of its solution is deferred” (ibid., 267).  
11 This is the thesis of Bret J. L. Doyle’s dissertation, The Logic of Descartes’ Method, which 
proposes to complete the second book by referring to the Géometrie and the third book by 
referring to the Dioptrique.  
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problem which is well understood from every irrelevant conception and reduce it to such 
a form that we are no longer aware of dealing with this or that subject-matter but only 
with certain magnitudes in general and the comparison between them” (AT X, 431; CSM 
I, 52). When Descartes claims that he can “abstract” from a problem every “irrelevant 
conception” and effectively reduce it to what he calls a perfect problem, it is not clear 
how he would choose to go about it. Is it as simple as saying that every physical problem 
can be abstracted and reduced to a problem in arithmetic and geometry? If I am 
considering, for instance, a magnet, what are the relevant arithmetical and geometrical 
features of the magnet that can be abstracted from that physical object? In order to 
resolve these questions, we will have to turn to Descartes’ conception of the relationship 
between mathematics and the natural world. What kind of world does mathematics 
represent and how does it represent that world to us?12
It is likely that Descartes could not complete the project as it was described in 
Rule XII and that as a consequence there is no definite meaning to the perfect and 
imperfect distinction. Nonetheless, it is clear that the scope of the Regulae is ambitious 
and suggestive. In one form or another, this project of determining the nature of all 
mathematical and physical problems continued to occupy Descartes throughout his life, 
 These are some of the questions 
that will have to be addressed as this dissertation proceeds. 
                                                 
12 This is why I am quite skeptical of the general thrust of Doyle’s thesis. Though simple 
problems in mechanics and harmonics seem to permit the sort of reduction that Descartes is 
talking about, more complex problems will not be so easily reduced. Descartes requires a fair 
bit of metaphysics in order for him to conceive of nature in such a way that it fits his 
mathematical representation of it. He does not come to this until he writes Le Monde. So as a 
historical interpretation about the Regulae, I do not think this will work. Nonetheless, this 
general skepticism should not detract from the excellent work that Doyle has done on the 
Regulae, nor should it undermine his admirable effort to understand the Regulae as if it were a 
complete, coherent treatise. 
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whether in Le Monde, the Discours and the Géometrie, or the Principia Philosophia. By 
this I mean that mathematical techniques applied to a certain representation of the natural 
world appears to pave the way for the characteristic Cartesian metaphysical principles of 
God, the thinking self, and extended matter. These later concepts are quite foreign to the 
Regulae, but the way that Descartes employs these metaphysical principles appears to be 
informed by his early work on method.  
One of the aims of the thesis will be to show that when Descartes’ early 
mathematical and methodological writings are taken as informative of his later 
metaphysical concept of mind, that metaphysical concept takes on a different character. 
While the content of the Regulae is largely devoted to solving mathematical and physical 
problems, the method for solving those problems betrays Descartes’ commitment to a 
certain theory of mind. Conversely, when Descartes’ theory of mind is understood in 
terms of those methodological motivations, I hope that the concept of mind will find 
some purchase in Descartes’ broader and arguably more prominent scientific pursuits. In 
particular, I hope that Descartes’ real distinction between the mind and body will in no 
way appear to be a “splendid non sequitor,”13
 
 or the product of dogmatic dualism, but 
rather it will appear to emerge out of a desire to clearly delimit the range of exact 
knowledge (scientia). This desire prevails in the Regulae, and I think the later concept of 
mind ought to be understood as originating in that desire. 
The controversy over Rule IV and the composition of the text 
                                                 
13 Richard Rorty, Philosophy in the Mirror of Nature, 62n34. 
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My hypothesis concerning the overall aim and cohesion of the Regulae is 
hampered by questions surrounding the text.14
 
 In particular, I have already made use of 
the first two rules in order to explain the content of the rest of the rules and I have 
referred to the mathesis universalis as a key component of my interpretation. This word 
appears in only one passage in the Regulae, in Rule IV. Many commentators see these 
first four rules as expressing an early and outdated notion of method that was later 
revised and thus should not be considered informative of the rest of the text. How could 
there be such radically opposing views of what I claim to be such important texts? 
Mustn’t a coherentist reading of the Regulae defend it against incoherence? We have 
already seen the historical obscurities surrounding the text of the Regulae: the lack of an 
extant manuscript and different versions that exist. Now we need to explain how this 
affects the passages in question. In order to do that, we will need some more precise 
information about the nature of the text. 
Textual Discontinuities 
 
Adam and Tannery have compiled what has become the definitive edition of 
Descartes’ complete works.15
                                                 
14 See Marion, Sur l'ontologie grise, 13-23, for an engaging and thorough historical summary of 
the questionable status of the Regulae. 
  Though all three extant copies of the Regulae (N-the 1684 
Dutch translation; A-the 1701 Amsterdam edition; and H-Leibniz’s copy) were available 
15 The original edition in 11 vols (1886-1894) has seen many editions and is now available in a 
paperback set (11 vols. Paris: Vrin, 1996). 
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to them when they produced vol. X—the volume that contains the Regulae—Adam and 
Tannery chose to follow A with few emendations. Charles Adam regards this text as 
authoritative for several reasons: it was published under the supervision of Jean de Rey, a 
well known Cartesian and one who would have taken the utmost care with unpublished 
texts; Leibniz had his copy of the original along with the published 1701 edition, A, and 
never protested the authenticity of that text; and H is an inferior copy—missing pages, 
and sometimes lines, including many errors that betray a copy hastily made by someone 
who was not trained in mathematics (AT X, 351-7). Thus, Adam and Tannery republish 
A with only a few emendations provided by H. However, the two texts are substantially 
different. Most notably, a section from Rule IV (AT X, 374.16-379.14) and another from 
Rule VIII (AT X, 393.22-396.26) are displaced in H. The section from Rule IV, an 
autobiographical segment treating the mathesis universalis, appears as an appendix, while 
the section from Rule VIII, which gives two examples of the method, is annexed to the 
end of that Rule in Leibniz’s copy. The similarity between the two segments of Rule IV 
has prompted several to suggest that one is the draft of the other, though one need not 
conceive of them as such.16
                                                 
16 It is entirely possible to consider the two sections to be two independent, working drafts of the 
same concept, called a “universal method” on the one hand and a “mathesis universalis” on the 
other. The most thorough treatment of the drafting thesis is provided by Pamela Kraus’ “From 
Universal Mathematics to Universal Method: Descartes’ “Turn” in Rule IV of the Rules,” 
159-74, though her reasoning is dubious. Marion, Sur l’ontologie grise, 145 argues for 
parallelism between the two sections and claims that they refer to essentially the same topic. 
 Additionally, Rule VIII at 396.15, Rule XII at AT X, 428.20 
and Rule XIII at AT X, 434.6 contain obvious lacunae, suggesting that Descartes may 
have been in the habit of writing a partial draft and continuing to another section with the 
aim of returning to develop his ideas further.  
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Moreover, in several places Descartes seems to repeat material already covered. 
Rule VIII is again characteristic of this. In the section that is annexed to the end of the 
Rule in Leibniz’s copy, Descartes undertakes to explain the method by way of “the finest 
example of all [omnium noblissimum exemplum]” (AT X, 395.17-396.25). In this 
example, he suggests that one undertake to “examine all truths for the knowledge of 
which human reason is adequate,” a practice everyone should undertake at least “once in 
his life [semel in vita].” This topic is broached again in the following two paragraphs (AT 
X, 396.26-397.26), “we ought once in our life carefully to inquire as to what sort of 
knowledge human reason is capable of attaining”; and it is illustrated by analogy with the 
blacksmith, who must first fashion the tools he will subsequently use in his craft. The 
same subject occupies the final four paragraphs of the Rule (AT X, 397.27-400.11): “But 
the most useful inquiry we can make at this stage is to ask: What is human knowledge 
and what is its scope? We are at present treating this as one single question, which in our 
view is the first question of all that should be examined ... This is a task which everyone 
with the slightest love of truth ought to undertake at least once in his life.”17
                                                 
17 This repetition is noted in Adam and Tannery, Appendix B to the Regulae, AT X, 485-86. They 
conclude that, “Assez souvent Descartes, après avoir exposé une première fois sa pensée, la 
reprend ainsi, et la développe point par point avec insistance: il n'y aurait donc pas lieu de 
s'étonner, dans le cas particulier.” What they do note as surprising, however, is that the final 
section, which most closely develops the themes of the first, contains “une différence 
capitale,” namely, that in the first case Descartes describes only two faculties pertaining to the 
intellectus, imagination and sense-perception, but in the second case, he adds memory. I might 
append to this remark what is noted a bit further down, namely, that the latter section in Rule 
VIII repeats a disctinction that is articulated in Rule XII, suggesting that this section might 
have been embellished with Rule XII in mind. 
 Chapter 2 §3 
will treat the interpretation of these issues in detail.  
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In other places, Descartes repeats some of the basic tenets of the method. Rules 
V-VII treat the fundamental heuristics of the method—reducing complex things to their 
simple components, recomposing these simples in an orderly way, and then enumerating 
these components to be certain of completeness—yet these same components are again 
reiterated in Rules IX-XI. Moreover, Rule VII ends with the claim that “the remainder of 
the treatise will be confined almost entirely to explicating in detail what we have so far 
covered in general terms” (AT X, 392; CSM I, 28). Yet Rule XII begins by repeating the 
same phrase, “This Rule sums up everything that has been said above, and sets out a 
general lesson the details of which will be explained as follows” (AT X, 410-1; CSM I, 
39).18
Rule XII also repeats the terminology of the “simple natures,” previously 
mentioned in Rule VI, but gives them a very different meaning. In Rule XII, the simple 
natures are said to divide among intellectual, material or composite (AT X, 419; CSM I, 
44), while in Rule VI they are those terms that are “absolute” and “simple in the highest 
degree” as distinct from other, relative, natures (AT X, 383; CSM I, 22). This difference 
in definition suggests a development in Descartes' terminology. Notably, Rule VIII refers 
to a “natural power” as the “final and most absolute term of a series” (AT X, 395; CSM I, 
29) as well as to “simple natures” which “must all be either spiritual or corporeal, or 
 Are these sections additional examples of redrafting?  
                                                 
18 In my translation, I follow Crapulli and the Hanover and Glazemaker editions, which correct 
Adam and Tannery, reading erunt explicanda for erant explicanda. J-L Marion, Règles, 224 
outlines the two sides of the issue, but chooses to follow Adam and Tannery, interpreting the 
inverted claim as an indication of “le caractère pédagogique de lent exercice.” While Marion's 
claim is reasonable as a general comment about the Regulae, it seems clear to me that Rule 
XII is in fact the most explicit and detailed enumeration of Descartes’ general categories of 
investigation. Thus it makes sense to read the claim, quae in particulari erunt explicanda, hoc 
pacto as a description of what follows. 
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belong to each of these categories,” referring the former to Rule VI and the latter to Rule 
XII (AT X, 399; CSM I, 32). Rule VIII also states the thesis that we can successfully 
enumerate all of human knowledge according to two categories, “for the question ought 
to relate either to us, who have the capacity for knowledge, or to the actual things it is 
possible to know” (AT X, 398; CSM I, 32), which is repeated in Rule XII (AT X, 411; 
CSM I, 39). It is possible that Rule VIII is a piecemeal combination of material, some 
composed at the time of Rules V-VII, others composed at the time of Rule XII.19
Given that the treatise was never completed, it is possible that its draft form 
preserves a progression of Descartes’ thought. For instance, it is clear that Rules IX-XI 
relate the heuristics of the method to particular examples, reinforcing and clarifying what 
was already covered in Rules V-VII. Sometimes this reference is explicit: “when we 
think of the process of deduction as we did in Rule Three, it does not seem to take place 
all at once . . . [b]ut if we look on deduction as a completed process, as we did in Rule 
Seven, then it no longer signifies a movement but rather the completion of a movement” 
(AT X, 407-8; CSM I, 37). Again, that Rule continues: “Rule Nine dealt only with mental 
intuition; Rule Ten only with enumeration. The present Rule explains the way in which 
these two operations aid and complement each other” (AT X, 408; CSM I, 38). It is clear 
from these passages that Rule X attempts to develop and refine the kernel of method 
 
                                                 
19 These are only a fraction of the many textual breaks that Weber proposes, but in my mind they 
are the only relatively definitive ones. Weber, La constitution, suggests breaks at virtually 
every topical change. This may be useful for the purposes of outlining the material, but it is 
hyperbolic for the purposes of dating. For comparison, J-L Marion, Règles, contains extensive 
internal and external annotations to the Regulae, highlighting all potential internal references. 
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described in Rules V-VII.20
Giovanni Crapulli (1966) is the most recent commentator to have carefully 
reviewed the extant manuscript editions, in preparation for his critical, bilingual edition 
of the Regulae, which presents both the original Amsterdam edition and the Glazemaker 
translation side by side. Crapulli’s judgment is instructive, though it is not uncontested.  
He does not think that it is possible, on the basis of the text alone, to conclude that it was 
wrtten in stages. But he also claims that none of the three manuscripts we currently have 
was copied directly from the original: “three manuscripts . . . but none of them depends 
directly on the original.” Crapulli reasons that this is the case based on a large number of 
errors that the three texts have in common.
 In these ways, the rough nature of the text does admit of 
internal reference from which one could potentially see a development in Descartes’ 
thought, which could imply stages of composition.  
21
                                                 
20 There are many such internal references throughout the Regulae and it would be instructive to 
examine each of them carefully to determine how and in what way they demonstrate a 
development in Descartes’ thought on method, during the composition of the text. 
 Whatever the status of the three extant 
manuscripts—whether copies or copies of copies of the autograph edition—the most 
important question is obviously whether or not the Regulae can be conceived of as a 
21 Crapulli, Regulae, xxii. Furthermore, Crapulli concludes that the Hanover manuscript bears 
many traits of a copy hastily made from the original by a copyist who may not have known 
Latin very well (ibid.,xxv-xxviii). Adam has argued that the Hanover manuscript was copied 
directly from the original, while he suggests that the Amsterdam edition and Dutch translation 
were produced off of a common copy (AT X, 353). Heinrich Springmeyer, in his commentary 
on the Latin text of the Regulae, prefacing the German translation, Regeln, xii-xvii, poses 
several important questions of Crapulli’s assertion here: It is possible that the many common 
mistakes one finds in the three manuscripts were not that of a forth copy, but of Descartes 
himself, who never properly revised the text for publication. On the other hand, it is entirely 
possible that Clerselier, the authors of the Port Royal Logic, or someone else may have 
modified the text in some way that affected the extant copies. Finally, Baillet’s free paraphrase 
of the text does not allow us to make any inference back to the original despite the fact that 
Baillet surely had a copy of the original before him. Thus, Springmeyer doubts the necessity to 
posit a fourth text between the original and the three we now possess.  
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coherent whole even though it is so obviously fragmented. More specifically, the 
dislocated sections from Rules IV and VIII naturally prompt one to ask whether these 
excerpts were originally separate notes that Descartes appended to the treatise after 
having written it or whether Leibniz’s copy is an aberration from the original. Some 
twentieth-century authors have sided with H, against Adam and Tannery, judging the 
sections from Rules IV and VIII to have been separated in the original. 
 
The Weber Thesis 
 
In 1964, Jean-Paul Weber’s La consitution du texte des Regulae—apparently the 
achievement of decades of research—proposed that the extant manuscripts reveal a 
progression of thought that can be discerned through scrupulous textual analysis. Weber 
takes the prerogative to dissect the text of the Regulae at every change of topic and theme 
in order to leave no rock unturned. In effect, Weber unravels the text of the Regulae, 
leaving only strands of thought without coherence, and then he tries to build that 
coherence back into the text through a story about the “development” of Descartes’ 
thought. The textual divisions are too numerous to list, but when Weber pieces those 
strands back together, he concludes that there are ten (10) distinct stages of thought 
preserved in the text, spanning the period from October 1619 to 1628, from Ulm, 
Germany to Holland, through Paris and contemporaneous with Descartes’ many travels. 
He labels each of these stages and lists the Rules that correspond to them.22
                                                 
22 See Ch. 9, Weber, Composition, 194-206, for a review of the history of the Regulae. 
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On the face of it, Weber’s textual analysis may seem thorough and perhaps 
justified by the questionable status of the text. Weber begins with the premise that the 
text has to be unraveled to be understood, combined with a belief that the various strands 
of the text will correspond to historical stages of development. We can imagine Weber as 
the meticulous archeologist of the text, carefully holding apart each delicate strand, 
stretching it out, and indexing it to a time-line of historical events. Most commentators 
since have recognized that Weber is forced to stretch the limits of his interpretation 
farther than the text can reasonably support. Nonetheless, when John Schuster revised the 
Weber thesis for his dissertation (Princeton-History of Science), something 
approximating the Weber thesis became a fairly standard reading of the composition of 
the rules.23
At its core, Weber’s thesis hinges on his interpretation of the term, mathesis 
universalis. Weber regards the mathesis universalis as equivalent to what he calls 
“universal mathematics.” 
  
24 This fact remains unchanged in Schuster’s revision.25
                                                 
23 Most notably, Gaukroger, Descartes, 89-131, offers a detailed biographical sketch of how the 
Weber thesis fits into Descartes’ early intellectual development. Cf. Garber, Descartes’ 
Metaphysical Physics, 12-6 and 30-44, and “Descartes and Method in 1637” in Descartes 
Embodied, 33-84, where, again, the Weber thesis is criticized for being “too fine-grained,” but 
the essential claims are upheld. Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine, 212n criticizes the 
Weber/Schuster thesis (again in a footnote), claiming that this reading relies too heavily on 
“the principle of charity,” confusing what Descartes ought to have thought for what he 
actually did. Detractors seem to prevail in the Francophone literature, following Jean-Luc 
Marion, but these critiques are somewhat hushed: Jean-François Courtine, Suarez et le système 
de la métaphysique, 484-95; Gilles Olivo, Descartes et l'essence de la vérité, 59-60 and 70-
1n1; and, as an instructive example, Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, Descartes, biographie, nowhere 
mentions Weber though her account of Descartes’ life and works maintains 1625-1628 for 
dating the Regulae. 
 That 
24 I think this translation fails on purely linguistic grounds: ‘mathesis’ is not equivalent to 
‘mathematica’ either in its use or its definition. It is a transliteration of the Greek, meaning the 
act of learning or a way of acquiring knowledge. In Latin, it is closely related to ‘scientia’ 
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this term hardly makes any sense already prejudices the reader against the mathesis. What 
would it mean for mathematics to be universal if it isn’t already? How could one 
differentiate universal mathematics from ordinary mathematics? And what does 
mathematics, even a universal mathematics, have to do with the broader scientific 
method? Weber takes the extreme position that: “at the moment that one turns to 
philosophy [which he identifies with the ‘méthode universelle'] it is necessary that one 
breaks from, distances oneself from, ‘universal mathematics’ [mathesis universalis].”26
                                                                                                                                                 
(Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon). Thus, ‘mathematics’ and ‘mathesis’ seem to be 
two strictly distinct concepts: the former a subject of study, while the latter includes a concept 
of the technique or mode of studying that is potentially broader than mathematics itself. 
Frederick Van de Pitte, “Dating Rule IV-B,” 387, suggests that the confusion over mathema, 
as a mathematical science, amounts to a category mistake. David Rapport Lachterman, The 
Ethics of Geometry, on the other hand, takes the well-formulated position that mathesis is “the 
measure of scientia, of epistêmê. That is, how it is we can come to know something, how we 
learn or ought to learn, determines the character and claims of the science we come to know” 
(175). In either case, they seem to be two distinct terms. This is corroborated by the fact that 
Descartes employs both terms independently in certain passages. 
 
Thus, according to Weber, whatever universal mathematics is, it is not the same thing as 
a universal method. The latter, Descartes tells us in the Discours (Pars 2), he discovered 
while shut in his stove-heated room during the onset of winter, 1619. Weber coordinates 
this discovery with the historical event of Descartes’ famous three dreams of November 
19, 1619, and claims that the three dreams announce a kind of epiphany, a new path to 
follow in establishing science on firm foundations. Since the mathesis universalis must 
be discarded or surpassed upon the discovery of a universal method, Weber reasons, 
25 John Schuster, “Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis”, 43: “Universal mathematics [mathesis 
universalis] somehow subsumes and is superior to properly mathematical fields only. There is 
no claim to mathematicize all knowledge (whatever that might mean) and subordinate it to 
universal mathematics; nor is it even hinted that in some metaphorical sense all knowledge is 
to be rendered ‘mathematics-like’ and commanded through a suitably extended notion of 
universal mathematics.” 
26 Weber, La constitution, 10. 
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Descartes must have written the passage containing the mathesis universalis before 
having had his three dreams.27 In other words, Weber’s claims regarding the constitution 
of the text of the Regulae seem to be driven by a prior interpretation of what the text 
means.28
On its own, that ought not entirely disqualify Weber’s thesis. The hermeneutics of 
textual interpretation suggest that such a circular relationship between philological or 
historiographical and philosophical issues need not be vicious. Indeed, it is impossible to 
arrive at a firm historical account of a text without engaging in interpretation, and vice 
versa (I believe). However, the historical facts do not demand the reading that Weber 
proposes. Indeed, I will claim that specifically mathematical issues are intertwined with 
questions about a universal method in the sciences throughout the 1620s. Though 
Descartes clearly envisioned something analogous to the mathesis universalis as early as 
1619, this concept finds its first, definite, and recorded articulation only in 1628, again in 
conversation with Beeckman. Throughout the intervening period, according to Descartes’ 
testimony and his extant writings, issues of method and mathematics continued to be at 
the forefront of his mind. Thus, even if ‘mathesis universalis' means something like 
‘universal mathematics,’ this would not imply that it preceded or was discarded after 
Descartes’ discovery of a universal method.  
 This argument is the cornerstone of Weber’s book. However, it is obviously 
circular. 
                                                 
27 Cf. Discours de la méthode AT VI, 11-12; CSM I, 116-117. 
28 Frederick Van de Pitte, “Descartes' Mathesis Universalis,” 155-156 calls Weber’s reasoning 
circular, for just this reason. 
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Moreover, subsequent research into Descartes’ early mathematical and scientific 
studies has forced a modification of Weber’s claims. In Rule VIII, Descartes provides 
“one or two examples” to illustrate the method, the first example treats the method for 
finding the angle of refraction in the anaclastic, the second example is called the “finest 
example of all” and describes someone who undertakes to investigate every truth that can 
be known by the human intellect, an endeavor that Descartes claims anyone with a real 
interest in science should undertake “once in his life” [semel in vita].29 The discovery of 
the anaclastic line—or the curve that refracts all parallel rays of light to a single point—is 
a critical moment in the history of Descartes’ scientific work. The discovery of this line 
was a significant achievement with potential applications to optics, where it would 
eventually lead to grinding lenses for telescopes and glasses. It is essentially based on the 
discovery of the sine-law of refraction. In Rule VIII, this discovery is championed as a 
paradigm for the method of scientific discovery. Interestingly, this passage, like the one 
in Rule IV, is inverted in Leibniz’s Hanover manuscript, appearing at the end of the 
Rule.30
                                                 
29 The locution “semel in vita” is a central concept for Descartes. It is repeated three times in Rule 
VIII (AT X, 395.20, 396.29 and 398.2), each time in reference to the one who truly desires 
scientia undertaking an examination of the sciences as a whole. In later writings (Meditatione 
I, AT VII, 17.5; Principia I §1, AT VIII-A, 5.5), this trope recurs in reference to the need to 
doubt all previously held opinions. Clearly there is a relationship between these diverse uses 
across Descartes’ corpus (see D. Garber, “Semel in vita: The Scientific Background to 
Descartes' Meditations” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, 81-116). Weber reasons that the 
three references in Rule VIII occur in sections that he dates to successive periods:81-108, 
especially 107. However, it seems that such a chronological distinction lacks a foundation in 
the text. 
  
30 This fact suggests to me that the displacement of the passage was due, not to notation of 
Descartes’, but to the direction of Leibniz, whose interest in the concept of mathesis preceded 
his acquaintance with Descartes, as is evident in his De Arte Combinatoria (1668), and 
continued to be a recurring theme in his writings up to the mid 1690s. 
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Though the passage ought not to be understood as an accurate record of the 
process by which the sine-law was discovered, it was probably written during the time 
that Descartes discovered that law.31 Fortunately, we have a number of sources to 
corroborate the time of this discovery. The subject is taken up in Descartes’ conversations 
with Beeckman in the fall of 1628 upon arrival in Holland, and a solution to this problem 
is subsequently recorded in Beeckman’s journal (October 8, 1628), so it is certainly prior 
to that date. The result also appears in Descartes’ Dioptrique and, perhaps most 
importantly, in a letter from Mydorge retained in Marin Mersenne’s correspondence. This 
letter, in particular, establishes that Descartes’ optical achievement occurred in Paris, 
with Mydorge, between 1625-1626. 32
                                                 
31 In this vein, Schuster’s calling it a “cover story” is overblown, “Descartes’ Mathesis 
Universalis,” 58. 
 Descartes’ resolution of the anaclastic problem and 
his discovery of the sine law of refraction are directly related to Mydorge’s own proposed 
solution. Though Pierre Costabel presents several stages to Descartes’ understanding of 
this problem, suggesting that it was not entirely resolved until after discussions with 
Huygens and Golius in 1635, it appears that Descartes’ initial forays into the question, of 
which the passage from Rule VIII is an example, date to Descartes’ work with Mydorge 
in Paris around 1626. Costabel’s argument reinforces what is found in Descartes’ letters, 
in a marginal note to his letter to Golius, 2 February 1632 (AT I, 239), and in the letter to 
Huygens, December 1635 (AT I, 335-6), both of which refer the work in optics back to 
1625-26 with Mydorge. Weber identifies the passage in Rule VIII with phase three of the 
32 Costabel, Démarches originales de Descartes savant, 63-76; see Correspondance du P. Marin 
Mersenne, v. I, 404-414. 
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universal method (phase one including Rule IV-A) and suggests a date of 1621 for its 
writing.33
Furthermore, Weber’s thesis seems strained when one considers not only the 
words ‘mathesis universalis’ but also recurrences of its definition as a general science of 
order and measure. There are two other occurrences of this trope in the Regulae. When 
Descartes demonstrates the application of his method to general relations between things 
in Rule XIV, he proposes that problems will be most easily solved if they can be clearly 
represented by figures. He continues, “if we are to explain which of all the available 
figures we are going to make use of here, we should know that all the relations which 
may possibly obtain between entities of the same kind should be placed under one or 
other of two categories, viz., order or measure [nempe ad ordinem, vel ad mensurem]” 
(AT X, 451; CSM I, 64). Again, in Rule XVI, the same categorization recurs, this time in 
relation to solving geometrical problems. In that rule, Descartes proposes to simplify 
geometrical problems by reducing square and cubic roots to the relations between lines. 
However, this kind of abstraction can also be reversed, he says, if the problem may be 
solved easier using the numbers themselves, rather than their relations as represented by 
line segments. This is possible, Descartes argues, because of the transitive relation that 
exists between numbers and their relations, i.e., “the dual function which numbers have, 
which is, as we have already mentioned, sometimes to express order, sometimes measure 
[modo ordinem, modo mensuram]” (AT X, 457; CSM I, 68). This passage refers directly 
back to the first and it seems to indicate that the general relations of order and measure, 
 This is obviously incorrect. 
                                                 
33 Schuster, “Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis,” 58-59. 
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i.e., mathesis universalis, underlie Descartes’ application of the method to solving 
“perfect” problems in Rules XIV-XVIII.34
If Weber’s proposal is to be retained, it ought to bear the weight of our best 
historical evidence. Unfortunately, that evidence seems to strain and bend Weber’s thesis. 
His reconstruction, though detailed in its dissection of the text of the Regulae, is cursory 
at best in reference to external historical events, other early works, or potential external 
influences on Descartes’ thought. He relies heavily on Descartes’ autobiographical 
account in the Discours, Baillet's paraphrase and reconstruction of the three dreams as 
reported by Descartes presumably in 1619, and Descartes’ correspondence with 
Beeckman, also in 1619. These reference points are insufficient to make the claims that 
Weber wishes to make. Furthermore, the story of those pivotal years in 1619-1620 can be 
 Weber sees these passages as having been 
written between March and April, 1623. He sees this as a period during which Descartes 
develops the ideas on method, discussed in Rule VIII. The fact that Descartes is still 
considering something equivalent in definition to the mathesis universalis at the time he 
is working out his universal method seems to undermine Weber’s thesis. But if we 
consider that Rule VIII dates to 1626-1627, then we cannot see these passages as having 
been written in 1623. Weber’s entire time-line must be pushed back, even farther from 
the original insight into the mathesis universalis? Does this stretch the text beyond its 
breaking point? 
                                                 
34 Again, Schuster seems aware of the problem, concluding that Descartes takes up the proposal 
of a “universal mathematics” in a more rigorous and systematic way, aimed at legitimizing 
and founding a mechanistic natural philosophy. See below. 
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explained without dragging the Regulae into the mix.35
Nevertheless, we should be cautious not to throw out the proverbial baby with the 
bathwater. Weber’s analysis calls attention to a crucial period in Descartes’ intellectual 
development, roughly from the time he meets Beeckman in 1618 to his retreat from the 
Paris intellectual scene in 1628. Moreover, the imperfect text that remains shows a 
progressive construction, which alludes to some of the decisive changes in Descartes’ 
thought in the 1620s. This development is central to understanding the ultimate trajectory 
of his mature thought of the late 1630s and 40s: with respect to the present thesis, 
specifically the discovery and articulation of the metaphysical nature of the mind.  
 I believe that what Weber gains 
in explanatory power by splitting the Regulae so finely is far outweighed by what he 
loses in not conceiving of the text holistically. 
 
From Descartes’ intellectual crisis, 1619-1620, to the Regulae 
 
The thesis that many of the Rules date to the period of 1619-1620 does not begin 
with Jean-Paul Weber. Gaston Milhaud (1921) notes that, following the publication of 
Adam and Tannery’s edition of Descartes’ complete works, several commentators began 
to hypothesize about the dating of the Regulae, suggesting that much of it was composed 
around 1619.36
                                                 
35 See the informative and comprehensive historical work by Edouard Mehl, Descartes en 
Allemagne (1619-1620). 
 The reasons for this are fairly straightforward: Adam and Tannery's 
volume X of the Oeuvres complètes finally presented scholars with Descartes’ early 
36 Milhaud, Descartes savant, 47-63. 
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unpublished works in a complete volume and in context (they include the longer 
unfinished treatises, elements from the biographies of Baillet and N. Poisson, Nicole and 
Arnauld’s Port-Royal logic, Van Schooten’s explication of Cartesian algebra, Leibniz’s 
notebooks, and Descartes’ correspondence, all of which lend to an overall picture of 
Descartes’ early work). These elements enable one to judge for oneself about the 
historical connections between these works. Second, Baillet had already provided the 
narrative that incorporated Descartes’ autobiographical account of his discoveries in 
method and science from the Discours with the critical events early in Descartes’ life. 
Thus, it is a natural step to follow Baillet's interpretation, using the texts provided by 
Adam and Tannery to reconstruct a textual picture of what Descartes could have written 
during that crucial turning point from 1619-1620. 
 
Beeckman and the scientia penitus nova 
 
When John Schuster took up the Weber thesis again, he distanced himself from 
Weber’s textual methods of interpretation and turned to a much more conceptual 
argument about the progressive composition of the Regulae. His reading formed the basis 
for a thorough and impressive dissertation on the historical emergence of Descartes’ 
natural-philosophical theory from 1618 to 1634. In that work, Schuster recognized the 
historical difficulties discussed earlier, regarding the passage from Rule VIII and the 
discovery of the sine-law of refraction. Principally for this reason, Schuster plucks the 
passages from Rule VIII out of their context in Weber’s analysis and joins them to what 
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Schuster considers to be Descartes’ more mature consideration of method in Paris, 1625-
1628. Schuster supposes that the first two paragraphs of Rule VIII were written during 
the early period, but he sees the discussion of the sine-law of refraction and the repeated 
attempts to articulate the method as self-reflective examination one ought to undertake 
“once in his life” as associated with a much later project that would legitimize Descartes’ 
mathematical method of discovery with a new teaching on epistemology.37
In order to understand why Schuster sees these periods as so different, we will 
first have to look at Descartes’ work with Beeckman and the influence of this work on his 
nascent natural philosophy. When Descartes meets Isaac Beeckman in 1618, he begins to 
apply himself to problems in natural philosophy (or the physical sciences) where he could 
put his mathematical acumen to use. We know that Descartes first met Isaac Beeckman in 
Breda, November 10, 1618, where they developed a close working relationship and a 
mutual admiration.
 According to 
Schuster, Descartes came to Paris in 1625 with a draft of his treatise, containing Rules I-
XI, excepting the passages already mentioned from Rule VIII. In Paris, he confronted a 
different set of problems that forced a new direction.  
38
                                                 
37 Schuster, “Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis,” 58-59. 
 After their chance meeting, Descartes was introduced to the 
potential physical applications of mathematics. According to Schuster, “Beeckman was 
virtually the first man in Europe to dream of what was to become the new ‘mechanical 
philosophy’ of the seventeenth century, a combination of classical atomism with the 
38 Their meeting is recorded in Baillet, La Vie, I, 42-44, “à sa façon” (AT X, 48) through an 
improbable story where Descartes is able to solve a classical mathematical problem posted in 
the streets of Breda. Another less dramatic though equally coincidental story about their 
meeting is provided by Lipstorp in his Specimina Philosophiae Cartesianae (1653) (see AT X, 
47-8).  
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belief that atoms (or corpuscles) move according to mathematical-mechanical laws.”39 As 
a monument to Descartes’ admiration for Beeckman, he offered him his Compendium 
Musicae on New Year’s Day, 1619, which contained Descartes’ resumé of a classical 
area of applied mathematics.40 During their time together, in Breda in the fall and winter 
of 1618, Beeckman proposed to Descartes two physical-mathematical problems which he 
subsequently solved and which Beeckman recorded in his journal: one of these concerned 
the continuous acceleration of a free-falling body, the other treated the “hydrostatic 
paradox,” which shows that fluid bodies can exert a pressure on the bottom of a container 
that is greater than their total weight.41
In the beginning of January 1619, Beeckman returned to Middleburg from Breda, 
where Descartes remained until April of that year. During this period, there are six letters 
between the two men (five from Descartes and one from Beeckman).
 These two texts are quite interesting from the 
standpoint of the history of ideas, being the first recorded attempt by Descartes’ to apply 
mathematically determined mechanics to specific problems of natural philosophy, though 
at times they also demonstrate the young mathematician’s carelessness.  
42
                                                 
39 Schuster, “Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis,” 48. Gaukroger, Descartes, 70 contains a virtually 
identical sentiment, which seems to be supported by the judgment of Cornélis de Waard, 
editor of Beeckman’s Journal; though it must be remarked that Descartes was in no way an 
“atomist.” 
 The most 
suggestive of these letters is Descartes’ letter to Beeckman, March 26, 1619 (AT X, 154-
40 Gaukroger, Descartes, 74. Rodis-Lewis, Descartes, 29 suggests that Descartes received in 
return the little parchment notebook, noted as “element C” in the Stockholm registry, from 
Beeckman (that notebook bearing the date January 1, 1619). 
41 AT X, 67-78; Gaukroger, Descartes, 80-9. Rodis-Lewis, Descartes, 29-30, proposes that 
Descartes worked out the solutions to these problems in early 1619, after Beeckman had 
departed for Middleburg. 
42 The whole relationship between Beeckman and Descartes, including a detailed discussion of 
their correspondence is found in Cole, Olympian Dreams, 114-128. 
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60; CSM III, 1-3), where Descartes proposes that with the aid of his “new compasses,” he 
has found a way to divide an angle equally into three parts and has devised a way to solve 
three types of cubic equations.43
Let me be quite open with you about my project. What I want to produce is not 
something like Lull's Ars Brevis, but rather a completely new science [scientia 
penitus nova], which would provide a general solution of all possible equations 
involving any sort of quantity, whether continuous or discrete, each according to 
its nature. . . . This is of course a gigantic task, and one hardly suitable for one 
person; indeed it is an incredibly ambitious project. But through the confusing 
darkness of this science I have caught a glimpse of some sort of light, and with 
the aid of this I think I shall be able to dispel even the thickest obscurities.
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These discoveries prompt Descartes to exclaim that he will inaugurate a “completely new 
science [scientia penitus nova].” In the margin, Beeckman writes “a general art that 
would find the solution to any inquiry [Ars generalis ad omnes quaestiones solvendas 
quaesita].”45
                                                 
43 The compasses and their use are recorded in Leibniz’s notes, the Cogitationes Privatae: AT X, 
238-241, cf. La Géometrie, AT VI, 388-392. 
 The compasses that prompt Descartes’ enthusiasm are indeed important 
since they allow Descartes to derive the roots of cubic equations by determining the 
“mean proportionals” between given line segments (or, in contemporary language, the 
geometrical mean of a given series of numbers) and they allow for the trisection of any 
angle. These two fundamental discoveries, which were vexing problems in classical 
44 AT X, 156-158. I have omitted some very important mathematical claims from this letter, but 
these will be addressed in detail in the following chapter. 
45 This statement suggests that at least Beeckman equated the scientia penitus nova with an ars 
generalis, which would indeed be close to a mathesis universalis. Weber, Schuster and 
Gaukroger see this scientia penitus nova as the precursor of the mathesis universalis, which in 
turn, they claim, is surpassed by the universal method, of which the three dreams are 
harbingers. The argument here is not whether these texts bear traits that link them to a 
mathesis universalis. Indeed, I will argue that this concept is in many ways a long-standing 
focus of Descartes’. Rather these links are not sufficient to warrant dividing the Regulae as 
they do. 
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mathematics, remain essential to Descartes’ ultimate solution of nth degree polynomials 
in the Géometrie.  
Schuster and Gaukroger see in the proportional compass the core of the ordo et 
mesura that define the mathesis universalis: “Descartes’ enthusiastic desire to transcend 
the immediate geometrical or algebraic statement of problems, and to reduce them to 
common forms of relation among proportional magnitudes, was to have great 
significance for the genesis of universal mathematics [mathesis universalis] and for its 
content.”46 It is true that these issues can be linked to the mathesis universalis, and indeed 
doing so will illuminate how Descartes conceived his method for finding truth in the 
sciences in its earliest stages.47 If these compasses provided acceptable constructions 
(which they would not), then Descartes had potentially solved every vexing classical 
problem save squaring the circle.48
                                                 
46 Schuster, “Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis”, 51; cf. Gaukroger, Descartes, 95-9. 
 However, there is no good reason simply to identify 
the solution to two mean proportionals with the compasses mentioned in Descartes’ letter 
to Beeckman of March 26, 1619. In fact, there is good reason to suggest that these 
compasses are only the most rudimentary beginnings of Descartes’ response to those 
47 Sasaki, Descartes’ Mathematical Thought, Vol. 237 in the Boston Studies in the Philosohpy of 
Science (Boston: Kluwer, 2003), Ch. 3, 95-157, provides an excellent summary of Descartes' 
mathematical work during this time and its relation to his broader vision of discovering a 
general method for the sciences. 
48 Ibid., 242-43. It seems that Descartes’ initial discovery in 1619 would have followed upon his 
careful study of Simon Stevin’s Arithmetica. In fact, the mesolabe compass appears to be 
closely related to some classical constructions reported in that work. For instance, 
Erastothenes had proposed a machine for solving the problem of duplicating the cube (or 
finding the first of two mean proportionals). This machine involved a series of squares and 
their diagonals, which would slide along a frame and the diagonal would cut the side of the 
square in a proportion to the previous side (see Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics, 258-
60). However, Eratosthenes' compass worked very poorly since it was difficult to maintain a 
constant ratio of movement between the moving parts. Descartes’ compass remedied this 
problem. 
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questions and that the passages treating this issue in the Regulae display a more advanced 
understanding of the issue. 
These nascent insights, combined with the three dreams, undoubtedly provide the 
reason why Descartes of the Discours relates his discovery of method back to the period 
of time, in late 1619, when he quietly reflected on his thoughts in the stove-heated room. 
However, these letters and notes are far from Descartes’ final word on the translation of 
geometrical problems to algebraic equations, solving mean proportionals, or the 
significance of proportional magnitudes for geometrical problem solving. It appears that 
Descartes’ thought on these matters remains unresolved until after he is able to determine 
a general solution to the Pappus locus problem, c. 1632. Thus, there is no reason to date 
Descartes’ comments in the Regulae that refer to these issues back to 1619. Indeed, after 
the dreams, Leibniz records that Descartes had promised on February 23, 1620 that 
“before the end of November I shall head for Loreto [Italy, home of the Santa Casa di 
Loreto].... At all events I will complete my treatise before Easter, and if I can find 
publishers, and I am satisfied with what I manage to produce, I shall publish it” (AT X, 
218; CSM I, 5).49 Descartes does not actually complete the pilgrimage until 1623 and 
clearly no treatise was published, so this passage provides some indication that 
Descartes’ youthful promises were frequently unfulfilled.50
                                                 
49 Rodis-Lewis, Descartes, 49-56, disputes Adam’s correction of the Foucher de Careil text, 
reading along with Careil September 23 instead of February 23. I do not find her arguments on 
this convincing. 
 It is known that Descartes 
50 Rodis-Lewis, Descartes, 58, dates the pilgrimage to 1623, on the occasion of the death of 
Descartes’ godmother's husband, M. Sain, in Châtellerault. This is why Descartes travels 
across the Alps to reach Italy. As for the “treatise,” it is difficult to tell. Element C of the 
Stockholm inventory contained: the Parnassus, a text on mathematics; the Olympica; some 
writings on algebra; some writings on the sciences; Democrita; Experimenta, which is at least 
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traveled to the Duchy of Pfalz-Neuburg, where he spent much of the winter of 1619-
1620.51 By the summer, Descartes is in Ulm where he meets with the eminent 
mathematician Johann Faulhaber and probably spends June through September working 
on algebra, with close attention to Peter Roth’s Arithemetica Philosophica.52
Schuster takes some of these biographical details as justification for his 
characterization of Descartes’ philosophical discovery in 1619-1620. His proposal has 
gained more currency in the literature since he reduces Weber's many proposed strata of 
the text of the Regulae to three decisive periods: one prior to November 10, but after 
April 23, when Descartes’ first entertained the idea of a “universal mathematics” 
[mathesis universalis], the second during the winter of 1619-1620, after the three dreams 
 It is quite 
probable that Descartes’ marginal note to the Olympica on November 11, 1620, the 
anniversary of his three dreams, indicates his growing understanding of algebraic 
equations, courtesy of his work with Faulhaber.  
                                                                                                                                                 
partially preserved in Baillet, La Vie, II, 102-3; and Praembula, an introduction to wisdom and 
the fear of God. Many of the mathematical and physical fragments are preserved by Leibniz in 
the Cogitationes Privatae, and any one of these works or all of them together could have been 
conceived of as a draft of a “treatise.” 
51 Frédéric de Buzon, “Un exemplaire de la Sagesse de Pierre Charron offert à Descartes en 
1619,” has shown that Descartes received a dedicated copy of Pierre Charron’s La Sagesse 
(1607 edition) from an older member of the Society of Jesus, P. Molitor. The inscription 
indicates a close familiarity and supports Descartes’ pious reaction to his three dreams. La 
Saggesse was a work that was as popular as Montaigne's Essais during the beginning of the 
17th century, see Michel Adam, “René Descartes et Pierre Charron,” 467-83. It is interesting 
that none of the proponents of Weber's thesis refer to this fact, since Charron's influence is 
apparent on the Regulae. It is quite possible that Descartes carefully studied this text during 
the winter of 1619-1620 and may have written notes reflecting on how it might apply to his 
own thought. However, Charron was a central figure of discussion in Paris in the 1620’s and 
these earlier thoughts were probably reinvigorated at that time and then incorporated into the 
Regulae. 
52  Manders, “Algebra in Roth, Faulhaber and Descartes,” 186. See also, Ivo Schneider, Johannes 
Faulhaber, 1580-1635: Rechenmeister in einer Welt des Umbruchs (Basel: Birkhâuser, 1993); 
and Manders, “Descartes et Faulhaber,” Archives de philosophie, 58 (1995), Bulletin cartésien 
XXIII, 1-12. 
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when Descartes attempts to work out a universal method, and a final period in Paris from 
1625-1628 when Descartes’ interest in optics moves him toward a natural-philosophical 
grounding for and expansion of a real conception of “universal mathematics.”53 He 
argues essentially that Descartes’ initial foray into universal mathematics coincides with 
his work on physico-mathematical issues with Beeckman. On his reading, the three 
dreams of November 10, 1619 interrupt this project with a sudden vision of the universal 
method, which reaches beyond the scope of his earlier mathematical work. During the 
period of 1619-1620, Descartes is supposed to have composed the vast majority of Rules 
I through XI, devoted to mapping out a plan of the universal method. However, after 
Descartes’ arrival in Paris, Schuster claims, he returns to the early mathematical 
concerns, this time fueled by a challenge to skepticism and an expanded account of the 
epistemological function of the mind (which Schuster rightly links to Descartes’ research 
in optics). This final version of the “universal mathematics” includes “the main lines of 
his dualist metaphysics,” presented in Rules XII through XXI, and, Schuster claims, “the 
composition of his first system of corpuscular-mechanical natural philosophy Le Monde 
(1629-33).”54
                                                 
53 John A. Schuster, “Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis: 1619-28,” see especially p. 81n4 where 
Schuster outlines the claims relevant to Weber’s thesis that he upholds. 
 Thus, Schuster reasons, the section of Rule IV, containing the phrase 
‘mathesis universalis’ and annexed to the end of Leibniz’s Hanover manuscript, stands 
alone as an early expression of the universal mathematics; he then claims that Rules I-III, 
IV-A, and most of V-XI were composed shortly after the three dreams, in the winter of 
1619-20 in order to articulate the program of a universal method; finally, Schuster 
54 Ibid., 41-42, quoted text from 42, see also 55-57. Cf. Gaukroger, Descartes, 111-112. 
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concludes that Descartes undergoes a “massive shift” in his thought, while reworking 
sections of Rule VIII in conjunction with his experimental work on optics, in order to 
arrive at an account of “mental function and perception, which—in the first instance—
would ground an elaborated version of universal mathematics.”55
 
 While Schuster’s 
account is certainly more straightforward than Weber’s, his reading ultimately implies a 
much more drastic chronological break in the writing of the Rules (a hiatus of five or six 
years) and concentrates an enormous amount of the text into the winter of 1619-20. It 
appears that Descartes would have had plenty of projects underway during that time (see 
element C of the Stockholm inventory), some of which may have developed the basic 
principles of the Regulae, but should not be considered to be identical with that text. So it 
is unlikely that Schuster’s story adds much historical credence to Weber’s theory of a 
serious discontinuity in the text of the Regulae. 
The famous three dreams (November 10, 1619) 
 
The only surviving account of Descartes’ three dreams and the short work that 
they provoke is Baillet’s. Baillet consistently interprets the early events in Descartes’ life 
through the lens of the Discours and the case of the three dreams follows this method.56
                                                 
55 Schuster, ibid., 59. Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine, 212n15 criticizes Schuster for not 
sufficiently justifying a conceptual distinction between “universal mathematics” and 
“universal method” in the early Descartes. 
 
56 For instance, when discussing Descartes’ enthusiasm for reading classical texts at La Flèche, 
Baillet paraphrases the Discours, “Il s'était persuadé que la lecture des bons livres est comme 
une conversation avec les plus honnête gens des siècles passés qui en ont été les auteurs” 
(Baillet I, 20; cf. Discours, AT VI, 5); or when it concerns the study of philosophy, “Dès ce 
temps-là [the winter term 1609-1610], il s'aperçut que les syllogismes et la plupart des autres 
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This is problematic for a couple of reasons: First, Descartes himself states that his 
autobiographical account is “only a story, or if you prefer, a fable” meant to provide 
some “examples worthy of imitation” (AT VI, 4; CSM I, 112). Second, the Discours is 
written in 1637, as a prelude to Descartes’ first published works, presenting the merits of 
his method for finding truth in the sciences (as the full title states).57
This well-known reference to the small stove-heated room (la poêle), where he 
stayed during the onset of winter is a central point of reference for Baillet (AT VI, 11; 
CSM I, 116). Descartes tells us that he had returned from his stint with the volunteer 
gentleman’s army to participate in the festivities surrounding the coronation of the 
Emperor—Ferdinand II, which took place in Frankfurt from July 20 to September 9. 
Baillet claims that, from the middle of October 1619, Descartes retained winter lodging 
 The 
autobiographical account that opens the Discours must be seen in the context of this aim, 
i.e., as a justification of the validity of the method, grounded in Descartes’ own life 
experiences. For these reasons, it would be difficult to read too much of this account back 
into Descartes’ actual biography. In particular, there is almost no credibility in reading 
Descartes’ claim that, all in one day, while meditating in his stove-heated room, he 
conceived of the necessity to radically doubt his prior beliefs and then to reconstruct 
these beliefs according to a four-step method. 
                                                                                                                                                 
instructions de la logique de l'école servent moins à apprendre les choses que l'on sait, ou 
même à parler sans jugement de celles qu'on ignore, qui est l'effet qu'on attribue à l'art de 
Raimond Lulle” (Baillet I, 24 ; cf. Discours, AT VI, 17); this is followed immediately by 
quoting at length the four maxims of the method (BailletI, 24-25; AT VI, 18-19) and the 
maxims of provisional morality (Baillet I, 25; cf. Discours, AT VI, 23-25). Indeed, the theme 
of moral maxims guiding the events of Descartes’ life is one that resounds throughout Baillet's 
story about the young Descartes. 
57 Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire la raison et chercher la vérité dans les sciences. 
Plus la dioptrique, les météores, et la géométrie, qui sont des essais de cete méthode. 
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in the Duchy of Pfalz-Neuburg, on the border of Bavaria in an area north of the 
Danube.58
                                                 
58 Baillet I, 77-78. It was widely thought, following C. Adam, Descartes, 18, that Descartes’ poêle 
was in fact in Ulm (cf. Cottinghams' notes in CSM I, 4n1 and 116n1), but Frédéric de Buzon 
has provided documentary evidence that places Descartes in Neuberg at the time, in agreement 
with Baillet (de Buzon, “Un exemplaire de la Sagesse de Pierre Charron offert à Descartes en 
1619,” Bulletin cartésien XX, 1-3). 
 According to Descartes’ own account in the Discours, which is summarized in 
Baillet, this period of time afforded him adequate solitude and freedom from distraction 
in order to reflect on his thoughts. From this time of introspection, he tells us, he 
discovered several important things: First, most structures are more beautifully and 
orderly constructed if they are “the works of one man” (AT VI, 11; CSM I, 116). This 
suggests to Descartes that, like other architectural works, the sciences themselves ought 
to be designed with a unified vision. Second, he “reflected that we were all children 
before being men” and during that formative period we were variously ruled by our 
appetites and our teachers, “which were often opposed to each other, and neither of 
which, perhaps, always gave us the best advice” (AT VI, 13; CSM I, 117). In other 
words, opinions rest on dubious foundations, which suggests to Descartes that in order to 
achieve an ordered and perfected understanding of truth in the sciences, “I thought I 
could not do better than undertake to get rid of them, all at one go, in order to replace 
them afterwards with better ones, or with the same ones once I had squared them with the 
standards of reason” (AT VI, 13-14; CSM I, 117). What follows is Descartes’ account of 
how to reconstruct those demolished opinions, using the insights he has gleaned from 
arithmetic and geometry and following the four-part method he has outlined for himself. 
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Baillet links this period of introspection in the poêle to Descartes’ three dreams, 
recounted in the short work, the Oplympica, and dated November 10, 1619 (AT X, 179 
and 216). It is not clear in the Discours what link exists between the poêle and the three 
dreams, except that they occur within the same period time in the fall and beginning of 
winter, 1619.59
We have noted that after having left for the city of Fankfurt at the end of 
September, 1619, where he had attended the coronation of the Emperor, he 
stopped on the border of Bavaria for the month of October, and that he began his 
stay in the countryside by locating winter lodging. . . . Thus, having secured 
lodging he remained the entire day, alone, shut in the stove-heated room, where 
he had complete leisure to reflect on his thoughts. At first, it was nothing but the 
preludes of imagination: but it progressed by degrees, by passing from one 
thought to another, just as he felt an increase in the pleasure his mind found in the 
train of his thoughts.
 However, Baillet recounts Descartes’ three dreams in a way that weaves 
them intimately into his reflections in the poêle. Notably, the conceptual apparatus 
supporting this interpretation is Descartes’ own physiological theory of passions and their 
influence on thought. Baillet begins Bk. II, Ch. 1 with the following account of that day: 
60
 
  
Here, Baillet sets up a scenario in which Descartes is affected only by his own internal 
thoughts; and he places this time of self-reflection in its historical locale. The period of 
self-reflection will not only lead to the discovery of a method in the sciences, but it also 
                                                 
59 John R. Cole, Olympian Dreams, 61-64, argues in an interesting fashion that because Saint 
Martin's Eve, which occurs on the 10th of November, traditionally inaugurates the “onset of 
winter,” which detained Descartes in his quarters where he “stayed all day shut up alone in a 
stove-heated room” (AT VI, 11; CSM I, 116), there is a chronological link between that 
fateful night and the time of solitary contemplation. Scholarly consensus tends to follow 
Baillet (see Gilson, Discours: Texte et commentaires, 156). 
60 Baillet I, 78: Nous avons remarqué qu'après avoir quitté sur la fin de Septembre de l'an 1619 la 
ville de Francford, où il avoit assisté au couronment de l'Empereur, il s'arrêta sur les frontières 
de Baviére au mois d'Octobre, et qu'il commença la campagne par se mettre en quartier 
d'hiver.... S'étant ainsi assurée il demeurait tout le jour enfermé seul dans un poêle, où il avoit 
tout le loisir de s'entretenir de ses pensées. Ce n’était d'abord que des préludes d'imagination: 
et il ne devint hardi que par degrés, en passant d'une pensée à une autre, à mesure qu'il sentait 
augmenter le plaisir que son esprit trouvait dans leur enchaînement. 
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represent the preludes to an imagination (the dreams themselves). Baillet tells us that 
these thoughts augment through a kind of intellectual pleasure. The connection between 
pleasure and imagination can be made by way of Descartes’ theory of the passions. In the 
Passions de l’âme, Descartes distinguishes two kinds of imagination, one which is the 
product of our will, and the other which comes from the body, either through real 
perceptions or mere fantasy. In the case of mere fantasy, Descartes describes the 
“illusions of our dreams and also our day-dreams" as arising simply “from the fact that 
the spirits, being agitated in various ways and coming upon the traces of various 
impressions which have preceded them in the brain”(Part I, §21: AT XI, 344; CSM I, 
336). These agitations recall former images, whose trace remains on the flesh of the 
brain, in turn producing the images of dreams. Baillet understands these traces in terms of 
a chain of thought (enchaînement) and thus justifies uniting this theory of the passions 
with the image of a “chain of reason,” that step by step movement of the mind, which is 
so central to Descartes’ method (cf. definition of “deduction,” Rule III: AT X, 369-70; 
CSM I, 15).  
We find some reinforcement for this theoretical background in Descartes’ 
Cogitationes Privatae (the notes and aphorisms recorded in Leibniz’s notebooks, which 
were probably written by Descartes in 1619-1621) where he claims: first, that “in the 
minds of all of us there are certain elements which once aroused, however slightly, 
produce strong emotions [sunt quaedem partes in omnium ingeniis, quae, vel leviter 
tactae, fortes affectus excitant]”; and, later in the same paragraph, “In moving from one 
passion to another, we move through intermediate passions [transitus a passione in 
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passionem, per vicinas]” (AT X, 217; CSM I, 4). Here one can see a rudimentary theory 
of the passions and the suggestion that passions could be linked to one another. In effect, 
Baillet provides a very “Cartesian” interpretation of the dream events and their 
significance.61
By framing Descartes’ period of introspection in the poêle in terms of this theory 
of imagination and the passions of the soul, Baillet provides some theoretical justification 
for linking the three dreams of the Olympica with the vision of a universal method in the 
sciences. If this were the case, then we could tie the discover of a universal method to a 
specific date, to quote Baillet: “He tells us that on the 10th of November, 1619, having 
gone to sleep filled with enthusiasm, and completely preoccupied by the thought of 
having found that day the foundations of a wonderful science, he had three consecutive 
dreams that were extraordinary enough for him to imagine that they had come from 
above.”
 
62
                                                 
61 However, the Cartesians were not at all happy with Baillet’s interpretation, fearing that it was 
“bound to render [Descartes] and his philosophy ridiculous,” according to Malebranche. 
Apparently, Huygens and Leibniz concurred, fearing that, “The passage in which he relates 
how his brain was over-stimulated and in a fit state for visions, and his vow to Our Lady of 
Lorette, shows great weakness; and I think it will appear so, even to Catholics who have rid 
themselves of superstition.” Quoted in J. Maritain, The Dream of Descartes, 16. 
 The italicized phrases translate text presumably written by Descartes and 
62 Baillet La Vie I, 81: “Il nous apprend que le X de novembre 1619 s'étant couché tout rempli de 
son enthousiasme, et tout occupé de la pensée d'avoir trouvé ce jour-là les fondements de la 
science admirable, il eut trois songes consécutifs, mais assez extraordinaires pour s’imaginer 
qu’ils pouvaient lui être venus de haut.” Gaukroger, Descartes, 105, equates Descartes’ 
discovery of a marvellous science with his engagement with the Rosecrucian mathematician, 
Johannes Faulhaber: “It is, I believe, this vision [Faulhaber and Descartes’ shared vision of the 
broader applications of mathematics], which marks the beginning of [Descartes’] general 
theory of ‘method,’ to which Descartes is referring in the statement that he has discovered the 
‘foundations of a marvellous science’ (mirabilis scientiae fundamenta).” Cole, Olympian 
Dreams, Appendix III, 214-26 provides the clearest refutation of Paul Arnauld’s 1957 thesis 
of a Rosecrucian influence on Descartes’ account of the three dreams, on which Gaukroger’s 
conjecture is based. Even the still broader thesis that Descartes’ dreams emerged out of his 
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earlier quoted in Baillet when he describes the physical presentation of the Olympica. 
That text, he says, begins with the phrase “November 10, 1619: I am full of enthusiasm 
and I am working out the foundations of a wonderful science [X Novembris 1619, cum 
plenus forem Enthousiasmo, et mirabilis scientiae fundamenta reperirem]” (AT X, 179). 
Leibniz records the brief note that “In November 1619, I had a dream involving the 
Seventh Ode of Ausonius which begins Quod vitae sectabor iter” (AT X, 216; CSM I, 4). 
This refers to the third dream and confirms the date. A marginal note, which is indicated 
in Baillet and also recorded by Leibniz, suggests that the anniversary of that event also 
had significance for Descartes: “In the year 1620, I began to understand the foundation of 
a wonderful discovery [Anno 1620, intellegere coepi fundamentum inventi mirabilis]” 
(AT X, 216; CSM I, 3).63
These questions have been the fodder for countless pages on Descartes’ dreams 
and their interpretation.
 What is the foundation (fundamentum) of this wonderful 
science? What is this wonderful science? And why does Descartes claim to have only 
begun to understand its basis a year later? Moreover, what is the relationship between the 
dreams, the method, and this wonderful discovery? 
64
                                                                                                                                                 
work with Faulhaber is contradicted by Manders, “Algebra in Roth, Faulhaber and Descartes,” 
186, who concludes that “The evidence, taken together, suggests (pace Schneider) that 
Descartes was in Ulm and in extended contact with Faulhaber, probably from June to 
September 1620.” It is possible that Faulhaber had some influence on the anniversary 
comment that Descartes was “beginning to understand the basis of his wonderful discovery,” 
but not on the dream episode itself. 
 The text of the Olympica is now lost, though it is clearly listed 
63 Only this second marginal phrase is included in the Stockholm inventory, AT X, 7; Baillet 
inverts the words “coepi” and “intelligere” with no consequence for its meaning (AT X, 179; 
Baillet, La Vie I, 50). 
64 Henri Gouhier, Les premières pensées de Descartes was the first extended study of these 
dreams. More recent studies have been proposed by proposed by J-L Marion, Questions 
cartésiennes, I, 7-36; Gregor Sebba, The Dream of Descartes; and Cole, Olympian Dreams, 
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as part of the Stockholm manuscripts (element C: AT X, 7). Baillet’s text is generally 
believed to have been paraphrased from the original.65 I have shown that Baillet presents 
this material in such a way that links it to the discovery of method, related in the 
Discours. But the dreams, when read on their own, are highly allegorical, written in a 
stylized fashion and contain no indication of a “universal method” for the sciences.66
                                                                                                                                                 
especially 6-11 which contains a good review of the literature, much of which is not cited 
here. 
 
Nonetheless, Weber, for one, takes the November 10th date as a cornerstone for his 
interpretation, maintaining that in the brief period from the spring of 1619 to the end of 
that year, Descartes moved successively through three distinct stages, conceiving first an 
“entirely new science” based on proportional relations that Descartes had proposed to 
easily solve using compasses. Weber then claims that this receives some minor 
modifications before producing the text on the mathesis universalis of Rule IV-B in the 
weeks before the dreams. But that stage is quickly abandoned after those dreams reveal 
65 Cole, Olympian Dreams, offers a good appraisal of Baillet's authority in this regard, Ch. 2 and 
Appendix II. The basic argument is that “Adrien Baillet's work is bad history by almost any 
standards. . . . Paradoxically, this bad historian’s badness is the good fortune of working 
scholars. Baillet swallowed the Olympica whole, but he neither chewed much nor digested at 
all” (43). In the Appendix II, Cole examines many passages in Baillet that are also represented 
in extant texts, such as the Cogitationes Privatae and the Regulae where we can compare 
Baillet’s paraphrase with the original Latin. In these cases, Baillet proves to be a reliable 
paraphraser. In a somewhat confused way, Adam and Tannery caution that Baillet “a une 
façon à lui de traduire les textes, en les amplifiant toujours et y ajoutant force défaits de so 
crû,” yet they conclude that the “Olympica renferme des circonstances si particulières et des 
détails si singuliers, qu'il [Baillet] ne semble pas avoir rien inventé” (AT X, 175).  
66 Milhaud, Descartes Savant, 54 warns against accepting Baillet's judgment: “On ne trouve 
évidemment rien dans les songes des Olympica qui autorise à parler de synthèse ou d’analyse, 
d’énumération complète, d’induction, de natures simple, et plus généralement on ne saurait 
penser à ces règles savantes, à ces démarches compliquées, qui seront formulées avec plus ou 
moins précision soit dans le Discours de la Méthode, soit dans les Regulae.” The third dream, 
with its obscure references to a “way of life [vitae iter]” and the dictionary that presents the 
sciences in an orderly way but then changes its form, have suggested some connections to the 
“method.” But this hypothesis requires a great deal of charitable interpretation on the part of 
the reader. 
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the possibility of a truly universal method.  Ultimately, Weber claims that the first four 
rules would have been completed almost immediately after the three dreams, rendering 
them a “complete treatise” in their own right. By early 1620, he has Descartes finishing 
almost all of Rules I-VIII and parts of Rule XIII.67 Weber reinforces this interpretation by 
indexing each of the three stages to specific passages in Descartes’ interpretation of his 
dreams in Olympica: the mathesis universalis and scientia nova correspond to the past, 
the universal method corresponds to the present, and the enthusiasm of Rule IV-A 
corresponds with Descartes’ vision for the future.68
When taken as a whole, the dreams do clearly record a pivotal point in Descartes’ 
life where, as Gregory Sebba paraphrases the words of Descartes, “the spirit of Truth 
descended upon him to give him the mission to philosophize.”
  
69
                                                 
67 Weber, La constitution, 42ff., cf. the complete resume of the stages in Ch. 9, 194-206. Another 
slight complication for the Weber thesis is found in the fact that Weber claims Rule IV-A 
clearly indicates the enthusiasm that would have followed Descartes’ dreams. However, as 
noted above, Descartes says that the night before the dreams he was “full of enthusiasm [cum 
plenus forem enthusiasmos],” not after the dreams. Indeed Baillet records, “Son enthousiasme 
le quitta peu de jours aprés; et quoique son esprit eût repris son assiéte ordinaire, et fût rentré 
dans son prémiere calme” (AT X, 187). If we follow Weber’s logic relative to the “tone” of 
the text, Rule IV-A should have corresponded to the time before the dreams. 
 This seems to be the one 
point on which most commentators agree: the dreams convince Descartes of the value of 
a life spent pursuing philosophy. It is possible that this pivotal event was a “mystical 
crisis” and an experience of sudden religious conviction. This might in turn demonstrate 
something more general about philosophical discoveries, namely, that they represent “a 
search for a system of rational thought that satisfies the memory of a unique physical 
68 Weber, La constitution, 41-4. 
69 Respectively: Milhaud, Descartes Savant, 47-63 and Sebba, The Dream of Descartes, 5. 
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experience of the same form.”70 Or perhaps these dreams emerge out of a moment of 
indecision, where Descartes is caught between two opposing forces: “Isaac Beeckman 
was trying to lure him into a scholarly retreat; Joachim Descartes [his father] was trying 
to force him into the law.”71 If not a personal dilemma, it may have been a professional 
dilemma: “the tension between the audacity of ambition and the fear of not being able to 
succeed alone corresponded to an excitement no longer limited to mathematics but 
embracing his model of a unification of all science.”72 It might even be the case that 
“What the dreams reveal in 1619 would result in the awakening of the cogitatio.”73 In 
some measure, the dreams represent a crisis in Descartes’ life and intellectual 
development. They coincide with his first glimpse of the possibility of unifying the 
sciences, which becomes the focus of his philosophical vocation. Yet all hypotheses are 
in fact sustainable without positing that any of the actual text of the Regulae was written 
at this time. It seems most likely that the shorthand of Descartes’ autobiographical 
account in the Discours points to this period of time during which he likely discovered 
the principles of his method, though the maturity of the text of the Regulae and its 
contents mitigate against positing that the text of that work was actually written during 
this turbulent period.74
                                                 
70 Sebba, The Dream of Descartes, 7-8. 
 
71 Cole, Olympian Dreams, 170. 
72 Rodis-Lewis, Descartes, 33. 
73 Marion, Questions cartésiennes, I, 32: “La révélation des rêves de 1619 aurait donc pour 
résultat l'éveil de la cogitatio.” 
74 This is essentially the conclusion of Rodis-Lewis, 37-8: “There has been much discussion about 
that exciting discovery and much thought about the method. It could not have been the 
articulation of the rules, since Descartes said he needed 'enough time' to seek them out 
[Discours, AT VI, 17]. It was rather the principle of such rules, the subordination of all sure 
knowledge to a self-evidence such as existed in mathematics.” Cf. Chikara Sasaki, Descartes' 
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The beginnings of Descartes’ algebra and the mesolabe compass 
 
One of the most important problems in the early development of Descartes’ 
mathematical thought was the problem of finding two “mean proportionals” between 
given line segments. This problem came from antiquity because it was known that a 
general method of constructing two mean proportionals would allow one to double the 
area of a cube, the length of whose side is known.75
In Rule VI, Descartes introduces this problem as an instance of the general 
problem of determining “the proportions or relations between things,” which, he says, 
“encompasses the essential core of the entire science of pure mathematics [quod unum 
totius scientiae purae mathematicae summam complectitur]”(AT X, 385; CSM I, 23). As 
 Geometrically, we can think of mean 
proportionals as the mean of a geometrical series, where the relationship between each 
term is multiplicative. For this reason, mean proportionals can also be understood as the 
roots of equations with variables of a power greater than one. When we look at 
Descartes’ approach to this problem, we see marked differences between the Regulae and 
the 1619 letter to Beeckman.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Mathematical Thought, 149-57. Though Sasaki does not think any of the Regulae was 
composed in 1619, he does suggest that Descartes “could have already possessed his plan of a 
reformed algebra capable of serving as an algebraic analysis,” which is why he calls these 
dreams “mathematical.” 
75 The reduction of the problem of duplicating the cube to the problem of finding two mean proportionals is 
attributed to Hippocrates of Chios (470-410 BCE). The reduction is explained as follows: “if for a given 
line segment of length a it is necessary to find x such that x3 = 2a3, line segments of lengths x and y 
respectively may be sought such that a:x = x:y = y:2a; for then a3/x3 = (a/x)3 = (a/x)(x/y)(y/2a) = a/2a = 
1/2” (from Francois Rivest and Stephan Zafirov: 
http://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~cs507/projects/1998/zafiroff/) 
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we will see in the following chapter, the mathesis universalis would have been 
understood to govern the principles of pure mathematics, i.e., arithmetic and geometry, 
while mixed mathematics, or applied fields of mathematics, would depend on those. Yet, 
when Descartes refers to the proposed solution to mean proportionals, does he refer to his 
compasses? No. Instead, he demonstrates how a series of proportional magnitudes can be 
constructed easily by multiplying each member of the series by the proportion: “For 
example, say the thought occurs to me that the number 6 is twice 3: I may then ask what 
twice 6 is, viz., 12; I may, if I like, go on to ask what twice 12 is, viz., 24, and what twice 
24 is, viz., 48, etc.” (AT X, 385; CSM I, 23). This establishes the nature of the relation 
between each number in the series, but the problem of finding the mean proportional 
requires that, given the numbers 3 and 12, for instance, one is able to determine that the 
magnitude in equal proportion larger than 3 and smaller than 12 is 6. Finding the solution 
to this sort of problem is “indirect” (AT X, 386-87; CSM I, 24); this language clearly 
recalls that of Rule XVIII (see above) where finding the intermediate mean proportional 
is a kind of division that requires an “indirect movement of the imagination.” 
Lachterman has suggested that the notion of a serial arrangement of simples is 
connected to the serial movement of the mind along a sequence of intuitions, i.e., the 
mental process of deduction, which would serve to connect this passage with Descartes’ 
understanding of the two main functions of the intellect in solving problems.76
                                                 
76 Ethics of Geometry, 182. 
 Clearly, 
the connection to Rule XVIII suggests that Rule VI is hinting toward some multiplicative 
understanding of the roots of equations, such that this might be an oblique way of 
 63 
explaining his algebraic method. However, when Descartes refers to the possibility of 
splitting up the problem of finding three mean proportionals into three problems of 
finding one mean proportional each, he realizes that there might be a shorter method: “the 
thought immediately strikes us that this problem can be split up and made easier: first we 
look for the single mean proportional between 3 and 48, viz., 12; then we look for a 
further mean proportional between 3 and 12, viz., 6; then another between 12 and 48, 
viz., 24” (AT X, 386; CSM I, 24). This heuristic suggestion does not seem to coincide 
with a general algebraic method for finding roots, like what one finds in book three of the 
Géometrie. However, one thing that is clear is that Descartes has already transitioned 
from conceiving of the solution to geometrical problems through mechanical means, i.e., 
compasses and the like, to thinking of the solution to these problems in arithmetical 
means. The thought in Rule VI betrays an attention to what we might call number theory 
and its application of the problem of mean proportionals. It suggests that Descartes was 
working out an arithmetical, or numbers-based, solution to a classical geometrical 
problem. This is the crucial insight of the mathesis universalis, i.e., to think of magnitude 
in general and thus equally applicable to both arithmetical and geometrical magnitude. 
Therefore, it appears that these rules mark an intermediary stage, somewhat more 
advanced than the compasses proclaimed to Beeckman in 1619, but somewhat less 
sophisticated than the method proposed in the Géometrie. 
During the period in which Descartes was apparently working out the specifics of 
his algebraic method for solving geometrical problems (such as the mean proportionals), 
he also seems to have discovered, with the help of Claude Mydorge, a geometrical 
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solution to the problem of finding two mean proportionals. By geometrical solution in 
this case, I do not mean a reversion to the compasses devised in 1619, but I mean an 
acceptable geometrical construction, using only a straight line and the conic sections. 
This solution is reported in Beeckman’s journal after their meeting in the fall of 1628 
(AT X, 342-44). This rather ingenious solution proposes finding two mean proportionals 
by the intersection of a circle and a parabola. The classical mathematician, Menaechmus, 
had proposed a solution involving the intersection of two parabolas, which appears to be 
most closely related to Descartes’.77 By the time of the Géometrie, the parabola becomes 
Descartes’ favored means of construction. Pierre Costabel has shown that this 
construction owes its discovery to Descartes’ work with Hardy and Mydorge in Paris c. 
1625, since Mydorge provides a proof of the construction in correspondence with 
Mersenne.78
                                                 
77 See Heath, A history of Greek Mathematics, II, 253-55. 
 Though Beeckman presents the solution in his journal using the Greek 
analysis and synthesis to describe the stages of solution, his use of these terms indicates 
the rather loose sense in which they were understood. In the next chapter, when I refer to 
analysis, I generally understand this to be identical to algebra, whereas synthesis 
corresponds to geometrical construction. However, in Beeckman’s journal the “analysis” 
provides the construction, albeit using as its point of departure the well-known sit jam 
factum, while the “synthesis” provides a proof of the construction. If modern algebra, the 
techniques of which Beeckman was relatively unfamiliar, were used, then the proof 
would be supplied in the algebraic analysis and would not need to be restated. 
78 Demarches originales de Descartes savant, 49-52. Mersenne goes on to reproduce a proof of 
this construction, which was proposed by Roberval, in his Harmonie Universelle II, VI, 408-
11 (see Marion and Costabel, Les Règles, Annexe III, 309-13). 
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Nonetheless, the continued interest in this problem, from Descartes’ letter to Beeckman 
up to Mersenne’s Harmonie Universelle (1635) and Descartes’ Géometrie (1637), 
demonstrates its centrality as a mathematical discovery and application of algebra as well 
as the continued development and refinement of the solution. In fact, Costabel has 
suggested that Descartes was quite late to arrive at a real solution to the problem, 
suggesting that it only occurred to him after his solution of the Pappus problem.79
Whatever the exact date of Descartes’ true discovery of the solution to the 
problem of finding two mean proportionals, his statements in the Géometrie state 
conclusively that he had not found a satisfactory solution in 1619, despite the enthusiasm 
expressed to Beeckman. Though he may have tried to arrive at a satisfactory solution by 
way of the mesolabe compass, he rejects this as a possibility in the strongest language. 
While commenting on the curves generated by that compass, Descartes says: 
 
However, because the curved line AD is of the second degree, and one can find 
two mean proportionals by the conic sections [i.e., by the intersection of a circle 
and parabola], which are of the first degree; and moreover because one can find 
four or six mean proportionals by lines that are not as complex as are AF and AH, 
it would be an error in Geometry to use them there. And it is also an error, from 
the other side, to apply oneself uselessly wanting to construct some problem by 
lines more simple than their nature permits. (AT VI, 443-44, my emphasis)  
 
At the time of the Géometrie, Descartes recognizes that even if he had been able to 
provide an algebraic equation for the curve described by the mesolable compass, this 
solution would not even be acceptable. Instead, only those solutions provided in the 
simplest means possible, and in the Géometrie he means by that “using the lowest 
possible degree of equation or curve,” are admissible (I will discuss the notions of 
                                                 
79 Demarches originales de Descartes savant, 52 and Marion and Costable, Les Règles, 312. 
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simplicity and acceptability in detail in Chapter 2 §2). Later in that treatise, he articulates 
this restriction in algebraic terms: “when considering these difficulties [of two mean 
proportionals or the trisection of an angle] they may always be understood by equations 
that are only as great as the square of the square or the cube”(AT VI, 471). Thus, by the 
time of the Géometrie, not only has Descartes found a real solution to the problem of 
finding two mean proportionals and trisecting the angle, but he has also disqualified as 
inadmissible the use of the compasses proposed to Beeckman in 1619. We should thus 
not see these as adequate instruments for finding the solution to these problems. 
Nevertheless, this does not entirely dismiss the importance of the letter to 
Beeckman. Indeed, what is so remarkable about that letter is that it very much frames the 
central mathematical problems that will preoccupy Descartes for at least the next 15 
years. Indeed, what Descartes does in that letter is he links the solution to the problem of 
finding mean proportionals to a project of determining an “entirely new science, which 
would provide a general solution of all possible equations involving any sort of quantity, 
whether continuous or discrete, each according to its nature.” What is more, this science 
of a “mathesis universalis,” as he will later identify it, ought to entail a proper division in 
kind between the various problems involving continuous quantities. This division in kind 
already seems to bear the traits of the distinction between “geometrical” and 
“mechanical” curves, which is articulated in the Géometrie. All of this will be discussed 
in detail in the following chapter. It is sufficient to note here that though Schuster and 
Gaukroger rightly associate the issues related to the mathesis universalis with the letter to 
Beeckman of March 26, 1619, this no more suggests that Descartes wrote the passage on 
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the mathesis universalis from Rule IV at that time than it would suggest that Descartes 
wrote significant portions of the Géometrie at that time. 
 
Optics and epistemology 
 
In a related way, Schuster argues from Descartes’ discoveries in optics to the 
claim that there is a “massive shift” or dramatic break between the later rules and the 
earlier ones. He states that, in Rule XII, Descartes presents his first elaboration of the 
nature and operation of the mental faculty in direct opposition to a particularly prevalent 
interpretation within the Aristotelian tradition. Schuster claims that Descartes simplifies 
the traditional picture somewhat by positing “first, the natural light of reason, or vis 
cognoscens, which is the unique and purely spiritual agency of the cognitive apparatus 
and which carries out intuition and deduction” to which he contrasts “certain loci in the 
brain where mechanically delivered corporeal impressions or patterns are registered, thus 
providing the content of sensation, imagination and memory.”80
Since there is good prima facie reason to think that an achieved mechanization of 
the theory of vision lies behind the physiology of rule 12 and is implicitly 
maintained as their complement ... Descartes’ entire teaching in rule 12, both 
explicit and implicit, will be termed the ‘optics-psychology-physiology nexus’, or 
‘o-p-p nexus’ for short. It is on the basis of the o-p-p nexus that the truth of the 
operations of universal mathematics [mathesis universalis] will be grounded, as 
well as the ontological reference of its objects.
 He concludes that this 
basic epistemology now founds the previously incomplete vision of a mathesis 
universalis and provides the possible link to a complete metaphysical system. 
81
                                                 
80 Schuster, “Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis,” 59. 
  
81 Ibid., 62. While it is true that in many ways Rule XII substantiates what was only sketched in 
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As we have seen in other cases, Schuster’s historical reasoning turns out to be a bit two-
dimensional. I will discuss the nature of Descartes’ theory of perception and its relation 
to an epistemological justification for the project of the Regulae in Chapter 3. For now, I 
want to take note of Schuster’s tendency to locate all of Descartes’ optical work in Paris, 
1625-1628. First of all, while Descartes was traveling in Germany, he probably made his 
way to Prague in order to visit the one-time home of Tycho Brahe and Johann Kepler. It 
is likely that at this time, Descartes first became acquainted with Kepler’s optics, Kepler 
being the first to teach him about optics, according to his own testimony.82
                                                                                                                                                 
earlier Rules and “by the time he composed rule 12 Descartes had already devised the core of 
his mature mechanistic theory of light as a mechanical impulse instantaneously conveyed 
through a continuous optical medium,” it is a much different thing to suppose that this is 
roughly the same as what is presented in Le Monde or the Dioptrique (ibid., 61). It is clear that 
Descartes begins to understand the sine-law of refraction in 1626 while working with 
Mydorge. See Pierre Costabel, Démarches originales, 63-76, on the anaclastic line and its 
relation to the Dioptrique. However, it is one thing to understand that mathematical relation 
and another to have a workable mechanistic theory of light. This kind of project only finds 
expression in the letters of the early 1630’s and is subsequently incorporated into the Discours 
and the Dioptrique. Again, if Descartes possessed the basic elements of his theory of light and 
refraction while he was working with Mydorge in Paris, then why did the leaked copy of his 
Dioptrique in 1636 cause such a stir with Mersenne and Fermat? See letters October 5 1637 
(AT I, 450-4); November 1637 (AT I, 463-74); and January 25, 1638 (AT I, 499-504). This 
debate over the nature of refraction, prompted by Mersenne giving Fermat a copy of the 
Dioptrique would seem strange if the core of Descartes’ theory of light were established with 
Mydorge in 1625-1628.  
 Secondly, the 
physiological claims that are central to Descartes’ developed account of perception 
depend on anatomical observations and a theory of the circulation of the blood and 
animal spirits that were both heavily indebted to Harvey, and thus  would not have been 
part of Descartes’ body of knowledge until after 1629, i.e., after his return to Holland and 
82 “Kepler a esté mon 1er maistre en Optique” (AT II, 86). This claim occurs in the context of a 
letter to Mersenne, March 31 1638, in which Descartes vehemently denies that his discovery 
of the sine-law of refraction derives from his reading of Kepler. For the relation between this 
claim and Descartes’ biography see Milhaud, Descartes Savant, 102 and Rodis-Lewis, 
Descartes, 51. 
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his cessation of work on the Regulae. Thirdly, as I have remarked above, Descartes does 
not seem to have resolved the problem of designing lenses that would use the sine-law of 
refraction in order to magnify images until c. 1632. Schuster’s tendency to identify 
Descartes’ mature conclusions with his initial insights is apparent again. While I agree 
that Rule XII provides the first sketch of a Cartesian epistemology and metaphysics 
tailored to the nature of the method central to that work, I cannot support Schuster’s 
conclusions. Moreover, if Schuster believes that “[i]n rule 12 Descartes develops a theory 
of psychology and perception that will provide the basis for the logical machinery 
[worked out in detail in rules XIV-XVIII] of universal mathematics,” then it is difficult to 
understand why he does not advocate a coherentist reading of the Regulae.83
It seems that the real rationale behind Schuster’s position in support of Weber is 
encapsulated in his claim that “the reason Descartes devised the elaborate machinery of 
lines and rectangles in rules 12 to 18 was legitimatory and not procedural or heuristic.”
 It would 
seem, according to Schuster’s own conclusions, that universal mathematics is the general 
method of the Regulae.  
84 
Schuster’s reasoning is driven by a theory about the history of science (likely influenced 
by Paul Karl Feyerabend), which would hold that an author’s explicit claims about 
method are to be seen as rhetorical schemes devised to legitimate scientific practice. In 
contrast, he claims that the real, implicit, structure of science often runs counter to these 
claims and cannot be legitimized by methodological theory.85
                                                 
83 Ibid. 59ff., see also 64-9. 
 While the legitimacy thesis 
84 Ibid. 71. 
85 Cf. Schuster, “Whatever Should We Do with Cartesian Method? Reclaiming Descartes for the 
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itself is doubtful, it certainly does not justify adopting Weber’s thesis. Though it is 
inevitable that theoretical commitments will influence one’s interpretation of history, this 
prejudice should not explicitly inform one’s historical interpretation. Philosophical 
history must be philosophical, but it must still be historically accurate.  
 
Descartes’ Notebooks, 1619-1623 
 
When one examines the period of 1619-1621, after Descartes’ last communication 
with Beeckman, during his travels through Germany, the time surrounding his three 
dreams, and his work with Faulhaber, it appears that Descartes is grappling with a 
number of issues related to mathematics and method. The chief texts that can be 
confidently dated to this era are given curious titles (Preambula: Initium Sapientia Timor 
Domini, Democritica, Experimenta, Parnassus, and Olympica). Leibniz has recorded 
most of the philosophical and mathematical writings from this period in his Cogitationes 
Privatae.86
                                                                                                                                                 
History of Science,” in Voss, Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, 195-
223. 
 There one also finds several cryptic aphorisms that refer to more general 
concerns. For instance, Descartes says, “Knowledge is like a woman: if she stays faithful 
to her husband, she is respected; if she becomes common property, she will be despised 
[Scientia est velut mulier: quae, si pudica apud virum maneat, colitur; si communis fiat, 
86 Some commentators make divisions in this text according to Descartes’ titles (especially, Cole, 
Olympian Dreams), but I cannot verify these with the Adam and Tannery text. Perhaps 
Foucher de Careil’s edition contains some more divisions not recorded there. Adam and 
Tannery were unable to find the original text and thus were forced to employ a great deal of 
effort to remedy the many defects of de Careil's edition, AT X, 207-12. So it would seem 
difficult to come to any definitive conclusion about the original breaks in the text. 
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viliscit]” (AT X, 214; CSM I, 2). He also writes, “The sciences are currently masked; by 
which I mean that if their masks were removed, they would appear in their full beauty 
[Larvatae nunc scientiae sunt: quae, larvis sublatis, pulcherrimae apparerent]” (AT X, 
215; CSM I, 3). In addition to these curious reflections on the nature of knowledge, 
Descartes puts forward some statements that seem to presage the Regulae. He writes, “In 
my youth, when I was shown an ingenious discovery, I used to wonder whether I could 
discover its principles before reading the author’s account. This practice made me realize 
that I was using certain rules [Iuvenis, oblatis ingeniosis inventis, quaerebam ipse per me 
possemne invenire, etiam non lecto auctore; unde paulatim animadverti me certis regulis 
uti]” (AT X, 214; CSM I, 2). Again, he writes, “The pronouncements of the wise can be 
reduced to the fewest so-called general rules [Dicta sapientum ad paucissimas quasdam 
regulas generales possunt reduci]” (AT X, 216; CSM I, 4). Likewise, in what appears to 
be a proposed treatise, Descartes adopts a pseudonym, Polybius, that he will use again in 
the dialogue,La recherche de la vérité. The text is called Thesaurus Mathematicus (A 
Mathematical Treasure Trove), and it begins with the claim that it will treat “the true 
means for resolving all the difficulties in this science [vera media ad omnes huius 
scientiae difficultates resolvendas]” (AT X, 214; CSM I, 2). This claim is clearly 
consistent with Descartes’ enthusiasm for his scientia penitus nova, which he proclaimed 
to have embarked on in March 1619, and it will prefigure similar claims that Descartes 
will make to Beeckman in 1628 regarding his algebra.  
In another passage, Descartes claims, “For each of us there is a set limit to our 
intellectual powers which we cannot pass. Those who, through lack of intelligence, 
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cannot make discoveries by employing first principles, will still be able to recognize the 
true worth of the sciences, and this will enable them to arrive at a correct judgment of the 
value of things” (AT X, 215; CSM I, 3). The first part of the passage seems to be 
consistent with the prescription of Rule VIII, that we not extend our knowledge beyond 
the limits of our intellectual capacities (AT X, 396 and 399-400; CSM I, 30 and 32-33). 
But the second part seems to contradict his warnings against accepting the authority of 
others, which renders it a somewhat ambiguous antecedent to the Regulae. In the same 
vein, the unity of the “light of reason” or the “pure cognitive power,” which are the focal 
points of Rule I and XII respectively, are only vaguely and ambiguously foreshadowed 
by the following aphorism: “There is a single active power in things: love, charity, 
harmony” (ibid.). These texts provide some indications that during the time just before 
and after his three dreams, Descartes was perhaps concerned with devising rules for 
resolving problems in mathematics, that he saw the broader implications of these rules for 
a general theory of science, and that he sought a unified explanation of that science.87
However, other passages from the same notebooks demonstrate a rather 
sophomoric way of thinking when compared to the Regulae. Descartes seems at this time 
to be entranced by the power of metaphor and mystical insight to reveal the truth of the 
sciences. In a segment apparently intended to introduce the account of his three dreams 
Descartes writes:  
  
It may seem surprising to find weighty judgments in the writings of the poets 
rather than the philosophers. The reason is that the poets were driven to write by 
enthusiasm and the force of imagination. We have within us the sparks of 
knowledge, as in a flint: philosophers extract them through reason, but poets force 
                                                 
87 Milhaud, Descartes Savant, 60-61. 
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them out through the sharp blows of imagination, so that they shine more brightly. 
(AT X, 217; CSM I, 4).88
 
 
This high praise of the imagination as a vehicle for truth is consistent with Descartes’ 
“enthusiasm” surrounding his three dreams, but the Regulae presents a much more 
measured assessment of that mental faculty. Indeed, the above passage seems difficult to 
square with Descartes’ sharp criticism of merely probable knowledge. In these passages, 
Descartes was not in the mood for critical reflection, he was enchanted by the possibility 
that “the things which are perceivable by the senses are helpful in enabling us to conceive 
of Olympian matters.” He clarifies:  
There are more wet things than dry things, and more cold things than hot, because 
if this were not so, the active elements would have won the battle too quickly and 
the world would not have lasted long. (AT X, 218; CSM I, 5) 
 
Again: 
Man has knowledge of natural things only through their resemblance to the things 
which come under the senses. Indeed, our estimate of how much truth a person 
has achieved in his philosophizing will increase the more he has been able to 
propose some similarity between what he is investigating and the things known by 
the senses. (AT X, 218-9; CSM I, 5)89
 
 
These statements do not seem consistent with, for example, Rule VI—a rule that contains 
“the main secret of my method”—which “instructs us that all things can be arranged 
serially in various groups, not in so far as they can be referred to some ontological genus 
(such as the categories into which philosophers divide things), but in so far as things can 
                                                 
88 A paraphrase of the same text is found in Baillet, La Vie, I, 85; AT X, 187. 
89 It is true that at the end of his Principia Philosophia, Descartes triumphantly proclaims to have 
explained all phenomena of nature that can be perceived by the senses, as if this were the aim 
of the entire treatise (see Part IV, §199: AT IX-B, 323; CSM I, 285-6). But it is a long way 
from here to there, and this aphorism implies a much more naïve view of that aim. Whereas 
here Descartes speaks of knowledge based on a “resemblance” of things as they come under 
the senses, the nature of things in the Principia is based on Descartes’ metaphysical principles 
and their combination to produce perceived phenomena. 
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be known on the basis of others” (AT X, 381; CSM I, 21). But the ontological genera of 
the “philosophers” are divisions based on the categories of things according to the 
elements (fire, water, earth, and air) and secondary qualities, i.e., on analogy with things 
perceived by the senses.90
The reference to simple natures is also useful for dating the composition of the 
Regulae. Descartes refers to simple natures in three places in the Regulae that indicate at 
least two different concepts of the meaning of the term. In Rule VI, he refers them to a 
“series” of absolute and relative terms and in Rule XII, he divides them into intellectual, 
corporeal and common notions. A passage in Rule VIII (a passage that also uses the term 
‘mathesis’ and can be confidently dated to c. 1626) also employs the language of absolute 
and relative terms of a series: the simple term arising after a series of questions related to 
 In the Regulae, Descartes insists that scientific knowledge is to 
be founded on “simple natures,” which are the basic intuitive starting points of scientific 
all demonstrations (AT X, 381-2; CSM I, 21). Simple natures have no analogy with 
sensory experience and are fundamentally different than perceived qualities. This 
distinction is even more vivid if one turns to Rule XII, where Descartes talks about the 
perception of colors “in abstraction” from the way they appear in objects, but only insofar 
as they are present in some “shape” (AT X, 413; CSM I, 40-41). It appears that in 1619-
1620 Descartes still entertained the possibility that the basic metaphysical components of 
the world could be made intelligible through perception. This belief would have been 
discarded and surpassed in the composition of the Regulae, a text which is infused with 
an ontology very different from what could be derived from sense-perception.  
                                                 
90 See Aristotle, Categories Bk. 4-5, 8 on the definition of secondary qualities or secondary 
substances as that which is differentiated by sense perception. 
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the nature of the angle of refraction, Descartes says, but “he must know what a natural 
power in general is—this last term being the most absolute in the series” (AT X, 395; 
CSM I, 29). Now, it is quite probable that Descartes begins using the terminology of the 
“simple natures” following his introduction to Francis Bacon’s Novum Organon 
published in 1620 (though it is also possible that he may have picked up the term 
elsewhere; it is used in a passing way in both Francisco Toletus’ commentary on De 
Anima and in the Coimbrian commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics—these issues will be 
treated in detail in Chapter 4).91
But even if the influence of Bacon, via Mersenne, were doubted, the Cogitationes 
Privatae show that while Descartes may have conceived of a method of reducing things 
to their causes by way of an ordered and serial relation between terms, he had not yet 
sufficiently established a concept of orders and relations that was independent of the 
classical ontological genera and elements. Proof of this hypothesis can be found in 
Descartes’ critical review of Lambert Schenkel's De arte memoria where he objects to 
Schenkel's “profitable nonsense [lucrosas nugas]” and posits his own method, the “true 
art of memory,” based on the correct order [recto ordine]: 
 The more likely source, however, is Bacon, since it is 
Bacon who makes the simple natures a thematic concept in scientific inquiry. For the 
moment, it is sufficient to establish that Descartes probably encountered Bacon’s writings 
via Mersenne, whose La Vérité des sciences of 1624 engages with Bacon’s critique of the 
Aristotelian syllogism.  
                                                 
91 Etienne Gilson, Index Scholastico-Cartésien, 201. 
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This order consists in the following: that the images formed should be 
reciprocally dependent on one another. If he omits this here, I do not know [what 
is the use of his art]; or rather, I consider that this is the key to all mysteries.  
 
I have thought out another way: either out of images of interconnected things new 
images can be obtained which are common to all images, or at least one can make 
one image out of all images like it. One should not only consider the relation to 
the proximate image, but also to other images, such that the fifth is related to the 
first by means of a stake driven into the ground, the image in the middle by means 
of a ladder by which they descend, the second by means of an arrow fired towards 
it and the third in some analogous way reasonably related either truly or falsely by 
means of signification. (AT X, 230) 
 
This strange passage reflects a serious reflection on Schenkel’s De arte memoria and, 
though it is critical of that treatise, it demonstrates that Descartes is still convinced by the 
idea that the true order of things could be obtained through the relations between 
symbolic images. Indeed, Descartes’ interest in classical mneumonic techniques and their 
relation to Ramon Llull, beginning in 1619, will play a significant role in forming his 
concept of the mathesis universalis (this will be discussed in Chapter 2). It is quite likely 
that Descartes’ response here to Schenkel with his suggestion that his method would 
provide the clavis totius mysterii, provides the germ of the artis secretum of Rule VI. 
However, it is equally important to understand the differences between this formulation 
and that of the Regulae. Here Descartes relies on a vague, symbolic and allegorical 
relation between images as a means to disclose the true order of things, whereas Rule VI 
insists on the inference obtained between logical terms (absolute and relative terms, and 
their dependence relation). Indeed, Descartes’ focus here on images and their symbolic 
relations resembles his admiration of poetic enthusiasm and symbolic allegory in the 
Cogitationes Privatae for disclosing the nature of things.  
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Nevertheless, Descartes does seem to be consistently preoccupied with practical 
issues in physics, mathematics, optics, and music during this time. In addition to the 
problem of free-falling bodies and the hydrostatic paradox, which were copied into 
Beeckman’s Journal and also appear in the Cogitationes Privatae in a slightly more 
developed form (AT X, 219-22 and 228), Descartes records other physical-mathematical 
problems (AT X, 222-26 and 230-31), applications of his treatise on music (AT X, 227), 
a treatment of gnomons (AT X, 229-30), an explanation of the use of several compasses 
for solving various problems (AT X, 232-42) and some experiments treating the nature of 
light and its refractive properties (AT X, 215-6 and 242-3). Just these issues seem to be 
the focus of Descartes’ studies during his stay in Germany. And he clearly augments his 
understanding of them while working with Faulhaber; remnants of this debt also appear 
in his notes. His Thesaurus Mathematicus contains a strange dedication to “learned men 
throughout the world and especially the celebrated brothers of the Rose-Croix [totius 
orbis eruditis & specialiter celeberrimis in G. (Germania) F. R. C. denuo oblatus]” (AT 
X, 214; CSM I, 2); and he refers a series of mathematical and navigational concepts to 
Peter Roth’s Arithmetica Philosophica and to Benjamin Bramer, also a German 
mathematician whom he undoubtedly met through Faulhaber (AT X, 241-2). It is clear 
that this time was important for Descartes’ development, his thoughts on mathematics 
and science, and the relationship between mathematics and knowledge more generally. 
Perhaps even more importantly, as a prelude to the Regulae, sometime between 
1620 and 1623, Descartes writes the De Solidorum Elementis, a study of solid bodies and 
their geometrical properties (Element M in the Stockholm inventory, a copy of which was 
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also found among Leibniz’s notes).92
                                                 
92 See Costabel ed. Exercise des éléments solides, preface. Sasaki, Descartes’ Mathematical 
Thought, 145-148 treats the issue of dating this manuscript extensively and concludes that it 
must have been composed between 1619-1623. He also proposes that this work is tied to 
issues prompted by Faulhaber (ibid., 124). 
 That text includes a proof of the so-called Euler 
characteristic of solid geometrical bodies, which is a topological invariant establishing 
the ratios of between vertices, edges, and faces of solid geometrical objects. This would 
indicate a continuation of Descartes’ attempt to resolve problems in mathematics by 
applying his method; and it would also indicate a certain measure of success in this 
endeavor. During the period from 1620-1623, Descartes probably composed another, 
now lost, treatise simply called Algebra (Stockholm inventory, item D, AT X, 8). This 
may have been the source of the “specimen” that Beeckman records in his Journal in 
1628, but it likely also served as the foundation for, particularly, Rules XV-XVIII, which 
show how to illustrate and solve simple algebraic problems with geometrical 
representations. It is likely that these mathematical writings mark the end of Descartes’ 
work on “pure mathematical problems” and the beginning of his research into the 
foundations of those mathematical discoveries. This development in Descartes’ thought 
would seem to be confirmed by a noteworthy letter to Mersenne, written in the midst of a 
series of letters clarifying the contents of his Géometrie and Dioptrique, where he recalls, 
“as you know, it has already been over 15 years since I claimed to have abandoned 
Geometry, and I would not take the time to solve any problem unless it were at the 
request of a friend” (AT II, 95). Such a claim may refer to the completion of the lost 
treatise on algebra, the beginning of the Regulae, or the solution of the problem of 
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finding two mean proportionals.93
It is much more likely that these historical considerations explain why Rule IV-B 
is framed in the language of an autobiographical retrospective upon an earlier time, even 
though the Weber thesis would have it written earliest. Descartes opens the passage with, 
“When I first applied my mind to the mathematical disciplines,” and continues, “Later on 
I wondered why,” “But I have come to think,” and “I began my investigation by 
inquiring,” etc. (AT X, 374-6; CSM I, 17-9). The key phrase, “It was these thoughts that 
made me turn from the particular studies of arithmetic and geometry to a general 
investigation of mathesis” (AT X, 377; CSM I, 19) echoes the sentiment of Rule IV-A. 
That section clearly describes Descartes as moving away from purely mathematical 
interests: “if one attends closely to my meaning, one will readily see that ordinary 
mathematics is far from my mind here, that it is quite another discipline I am expounding, 
and that these illustrations are more its outer garments than its inner parts” (AT X, 374; 
CSM I, 17). It is quite probable that these references to a time of completing pursuits in 
mathematical problem solving and beginning an investigation into the philosophical core 
of those mathematical insights point to the time c. 1623 when Descartes’ had completed 
De Solidorum Elementis, drafted a treatise on algebra, and began his pilgrimage to 
 In any case, the reference to 1623, along with the 
textual pieces I have cited, make Weber’s thesis that a universal theory of mathematics 
was dispensed with and surpassed in November 1619 highly improbable. 
                                                 
93 Sasaki, Descartes’ Mathematical Thought, 3-4, takes this to refer to the core principles of 
Descartes’ Géométrie, citing the importance of the lost treatise on Algebra. Baillet, La Vie, I, 
111-12, identifies this with the commencement of the Regulae, specifically, Descartes’ claim 
to have moved beyond the largely useless “bagatelles” (trifles) of problem-solving in 
Arithmetic and Geometry, as declared in both sections of Rule IV. 
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Loreto. Though not decisive, it is instructive that Baillet uses this very historical context 
to introduce his paraphrase of Rule IV.94 In that same passage, he relates Descartes’ 
abandonment of specifically mathematical studies with the discussion of a ‘mathesis 
universalis.’ Crapulli takes this to indicate that Rules IV-A and IV-B were actually 
unified as a common rule in the autograph edition that Baillet had before him at the 
time.95
Little is known about Descartes’ exact whereabouts from the end of 1621 to the 
beginning of 1625. In 1622, he is certainly back home in Rennes, where he authorizes his 
brother to sell an inherited estate, from which he had gained the title “du Perron” (AT I, 
1-2). After that, he is in Paris on March 21, 1623 (AT I, 3) and then he probably 
undertakes the pilgrimage to Loreto, which he had promised himself to do on February 
23, 1620. In late 1624, he returns to France and moves to Paris, where he will stay, with 
few interruptions for the next three years. Thus the extant manuscripts from the period of 
1619-1623, when coupled with biographical information about Descartes’ whereabouts 
cast serious doubt on the Weber-Schuster thesis that the vast majority of the Regulae was 
 Thus, it seems that Descartes’ testimony would reason against his having 
abandoned mathematics (even a “universal mathematics”) in 1619. Moreover, the 
possibility that Baillet’s representation of Rule IV is consistent with the original 
autograph copy strikes at the very heart of the Weber-Schuster thesis that Rule IV-B 
should be considered heterogeneous to the rest of the Rule, composed before the three 
dreams in 1619. 
                                                 
94 Baillet, La Vie, I, 111-115. 
95 Crapulli, Regulae, 86n11. 
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composed during that time. In the next section, I will propose an alternate hypothesis 
about the dates and composition of the rules. 
 
A case for the composition of the Regulae during Descartes’ stay in Paris, 1625-1628 
 
While it is possible that Descartes began work on the Regulae as early as 1623 
and it is quite likely that he made ample use of his personal notebooks, some written as 
early as 1619, I propose that we return to the original, judicious reasoning of Adam and 
Tannery, when they suggest that the Regulae was composed between 1625 and 1628, 
marking only its termination c. 1628 with any certainty (Appendix C, AT X, 486-88). By 
dating it to this time period, we are able to suggest that it represents a certain 
development in Descartes’ thought, which originally provided the impetus for Weber’s 
thesis, but we can also maintain that there are no drastic chronological breaks in the 
composition of the rules. This judgment would align itself with Crapulli’s scrupulous 
review of the extant manuscripts: “Did Descartes draft the treatise of the Regulae several 
times? Neither the examination of variations, nor the form of the treatise allows us to 
respond affirmatively to that question. . . . The author seems, in effect, to have used some 
fragments and notes from a prior time without arriving at a complete and unified draft.”96
                                                 
96 Crapulli, Regulae, xxi. 
 
Moreover, I believe that we ought to adhere to a kind of Hippocratic principle of 
hermeneutics: in interpreting a text (and the date of its composition), first, do no harm! 
Indeed, it is evident that the Weber thesis has done a great deal of harm to the 
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interpretation of the Regulae. I do not mean to say it has done more harm than good, 
since it is the first and one of the most careful studies of the text. Yet, it is incontestable 
that Weber’s thesis has prevented most commentators (with a few notable exceptions97
 
) 
from advancing a coherent and complete reading of the Regulae, erring on the side of a 
cautious appraisal of the unity of the text. When I advance my own proposal in this 
section, it will be my expressed aim to maintain as much continuity as possible in the text 
and to refrain from asserting more than I can reasonably support historically and 
textually. 
Mersenne’s intellectual circle in Paris, c. 1625 
 
Apart from the discrepancies between the philosophical outlook of the Regulae 
and Descartes’ early notes, observed in the previous section, there is good reason to think 
that the entire thrust and aim of the treatise grows out of Descartes’ engagement with the 
intellectual climate in Paris, where he lived from 1625-1628. The treatise presents itself 
as an attempt to legitimate scientific knowledge in a way that sharply diverges from 
Aristotelian syllogistic reasoning as the vehicle for its legitimacy. This is a distinct 
characteristic of the climate in Paris in the 1620s and part of the reason why I think it is 
most plausible that the Regulae was written there. While Schuster acknowledges an 
influence of Mersenne’s circle on Rules XII through XXI, this influence can be seen from 
the very first rules.  
                                                 
97 Most notably, Marion, Sur l’ontologie grise, and more recently, Bret J. L. Doyle, The Logic of 
Descartes’ Method. 
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In the 1620s, Mersenne was concerned primarily with combating naturalism and 
panpsychism, while legitimizing the rising mechanistic conception of the world in terms 
of a Christian natural theology. Though not a systematic philosopher, Mersenne was 
intimately involved in the scientific and philosophical community of 17th century such 
that his works stand as a kind of encyclopedic compendium of contemporary views.98 His 
first work Questionnes celeberimae in Genesim (1623) represents just this kind of 
thinking. Its primary aim is to prove the existence of God against the disbelief of the 
atheists. Even Mersenne’s proofs for the existence of God are closely aligned with 
mathematics and mechanical philosophy, arguing for instance that the proportion and 
elegance of numbers, as well as the many properties of geometrical objects demonstrate 
intelligent design.99
In 1624, with La Vérité des science contre les sceptiques ou pyrrhoniens, 
Mersenne set his aim more directly at Pyrrhonism which had gained some traction as a 
philosophical theory following Montaigne’s Essais and Charron’s La Sagesse, both of 
which revived many elements of Hellenistic natural and moral philosophy.
  
100
                                                 
98 Consider this assessment from Robert Lenoble, the eminent commentator on Mersenne, 
Mersenne ou la naissance de la mechanisme, 4:  “Si Mersenne, en effet, n’a pas été un 
philosophe de premier plan, il est éminemment représentatif de la pensée moyenne du public 
instruit de son temps, et son itinéraire philosophique est celui de toute cette génération, qui 
quitte la Scolastique pour le Mécanisme.” 
 Again, 
Mersenne’s 1624 work collects a variety of mathematical and scientific results that he 
claims are so certain they withstand the skeptics’ attacks on truth. Indeed, for Mersenne, 
99 Of the 35 proofs for the existence of God in Quaestiones in Genesim, proofs 15-22 are based on 
knowledge attained through the sciences. 
100 Other examples of a concerted religious attack on the kind of skepticism one finds in Charron 
and Montaigne, cited in Michel Adam, “Réné Descartes et Pierre Charron,” 74, are: P. 
Garasse, La doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps (1623) and La somme théologique 
des vérités capitales de la religion chrestienne (1625). 
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the truths of mechanical natural science, mathematics, and philosophy are not really 
distinct from the truth revealed by faith. For him, the truths of science reinforce Christian 
belief. Thus, his project of Christian apologetics is consistent with his defense of 
mechanism. As Lenoble succinctly puts it, for Mersenne, “the first heresy is error.”101 
Nonetheless, for Mersenne, science is not merely propaedeutic to faith, but exists in its 
own right, according the empirical and mathematical strength of its demonstrations: “… 
the science of which he speaks is no longer a speculation on natures [as in Aristotle] but a 
science of phenomena and constructive laws.”102
It is noteworthy that Rule IV-B, the controversial starting point for Weber’s 
thesis, bears a marked resemblance to a passage from Mersenne’s La vérité des sciences, 
which discusses the necessary prerequisites for gaining knowledge in geometry. There, 
Mersenne lists some thirty-one books all of which, he claims, contribute to our 
knowledge of “analysis,” the true method of mathematics. Chief among these works are 
Pappus, Diophantus, Simon Stevin and Viète. With the possible exception of Viète, each 
of these authors plays an important role in the Regulae, particularly in the contentious 
 Another philosopher of that circle, 
Pierre Gassendi, whom Mersenne would meet in 1623, published Animadversiones 
contre Aristoteles in that same year. This treatise employs the resources of skepticism and 
mechanical philosophy to argue against the authority of the Aristotelians. Thus, the direct 
confrontation with Aristotelianism, an engagement with skepticism and an effort to 
legitimate the emerging mechanical philosophy were all features of Mersenne’s circle in 
Paris, to which Descartes would be introduced as early as 1623, but certainly after 1625. 
                                                 
101 Lenoble, Mersenne, 234. 
102 Ibid. 273. 
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passage of Rule IV-B, where Pappus and Diophantus are named as providing “traces of 
the true mathesis.” In this passage, however, Descartes claims that this true mathesis was 
later suppressed by its inventors who “feared that their method, just because it was so 
easy and simple, would be depreciated if it were divulged”(AT X, 376; CSM I, 19).103 
Descartes notes that this original method, which would have elaborated how to discover 
scientific principles, has begun to be revived under the name “algebra,” though he 
immediately criticizes this science for its barbaric name and its incomprehensible 
figures.104 At the end of the passage in La Vérité des sciences, Mersenne appeals to God 
for “certain new Archemedes” who would carry the mathematical sciences “to their final 
perfections.”105 According to the judgment of Cornélis de Waard, Descartes is intended 
as one of those “new Archimedians.”106 De Waard follows Baillet who determines that 
Descartes had first traveled to Paris for a few months in early 1623 where he supposes 
that he met Mersenne, who was so impressed by his mathematical acumen that he 
referred to him in the book he was then working on.107
                                                 
103 This discussion surely recalls Descartes’ statements elsewhere concerning the method of 
analysis, in contrast to synthesis, which is the true geometrical method, but was begrudgingly 
concealed by its first practitioners, Second set of replies to the Meditationes: AT VII, 155-6; 
CSM II, 110-1. 
 The passage in question, which 
104 The reference to “algebra” here is probably a reference to Christopher Clavius, Algebra (1608) 
and Descartes’ studies with Faulhaber rather than to Viète, whom he denies having read, see 
letter to Mersenne February 10, 1939: AT I, 524. In fact, analysis is generally taken to be 
identical with the method of algebra. Viète's algebra being distinguished between “analysis 
infinitorum” and “analysis finitorum.” 
105 Mersenne, La Vérité des Sciences, 750. 
106 Correspondance du P. Mersenne, I, 287-304. 
107 Baillet, I, 106ff. Baillet, however, claims that Descartes and Mersenne had initially met at La 
Flèche (ibid., 21), though this has been proven to have been impossible: Rodis-Lewis, 
Descartes, 57. Charles Adam suggests that Descartes could have met Mersenne in 1620, while 
in Paris, Descartes, 20. This is also improbable because it appears that Descartes was in 
Germany in 1620. Cornélis de Waard suggests that Descartes meets Mersenne in 1623. This is 
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presents analysis as the true method of mathematics, surely bears traits similar to 
Descartes’ discussion of mathesis in Rule IV-B. It would not be unreasonable to suggest 
that Descartes’ own thought on the subject would date to the same period, though this is 
purely conjectural.108
We should not conclude from these observations that Descartes agrees with 
Mersenne or Gassendi, or that he is simply echoing their writings. Instead, it is during 
this time and engaging with this set of issues that Descartes seems to find his own 
philosophical voice. For instance, while Mersenne parades various mathematical proofs 
and scientific results in front of the reader as if the sheer mass of demonstrations were 
enough to establish their certainty, Descartes will not accept this kind of utilitarian basis 
for truth. Instead, the central criterion for truth, from the Regulae onward, is clarity and 
distinctness of intuitions. This criterion rests on a philosophical claim about the nature of 
human knowledge and its sources, rather than the beneficial results of human industry. 
Nonetheless, the topics of concern are the same, even if their treatment is different. This 
would seem to suggest that Descartes wrote his Regulae as a way of articulating his own 
philosophical voice in response to the pertinent issues to which he was introduced in 
Paris. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
based on a letter posted from Paris and preserved by Baillet, March 21, 1623 (AT I, 3-4). 
Baillet records that Descartes was in Paris for several months before departing for Italy. 
During this time he could have met Mersenne, but it is certain that by 1625 Descartes knew 
Mersenne. 
108 In fairness, Beeckman’s Journal does contain reference to many of these same writers in 
connection with Mathesis, see AT X, 29. Apparently the professor at Leyden, Rudolf 
Snellius—not to be confused with Willebrod Snell van Rolien who discovered the sine-law of 
refraction—gave Beeckman these references. Though Beeckman may have conferred some 
knowledge of that tradition, Descartes would not have known Snellius since he died in 1613.  
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Nowhere is Descartes’ unique engagement with Aristotlianism and the 
foundations of modern science in the Regulae more evident than in Jean-Luc Marion’s 
groundbreaking work, Sur l'ontologie grise de Descartes. Marion takes the strange 
textual and historical situation of the Regulae, what he calls a “texte sans texte,” as an 
opportunity to consider Aristotle as its putative interlocuter.109 Though Descartes 
certainly could have gained a perspective critical of Aristotle in reaction to his schooling 
at La Flèche, this does not seem to be the focus of his work with Beeckman or Faulhaber. 
Without summarizing the details of Marion’s work, one can easily see that the topics of 
the first few rules are oriented in direct confrontation with Aristotelianism. Rule I 
introduces a general idea of knowledge [scientia], and asks whether there are various 
kinds of knowledge and how knowledge in general is to be acquired.110 In direct contrast 
to the prevailing Aristotelian understanding, Descartes claims that the sciences should not 
be distinguished by the different kinds of objects they study, rather, “the sciences as a 
whole are nothing other than human wisdom, which always remains one and the same, 
however different the subjects to which it is applied, it being no more altered by them 
than sunlight is by the variety of the things it shines on” (AT X, 360; CSM I, 9).111
                                                 
109 Marion, Sur l’ontologie grise, 13. Marion’s suggestion is aided by the fact that there is in fact 
no trace of reference to the Regulae in Descartes’ correspondence. In short, the text appears, 
long after Descartes’ death, without any historical point of reference. Though Marion's work is 
practically canonical at this stage, it is obvious that the present effort is precisely to determine 
the historical point of reference for the Regulae. 
 The 
110 The verb ‘scio’ from which ‘scientia’ is derived, is simply “to know” in its most general sense. 
However, when used in a philosophical context it means “knowledge in the strict sense” and is 
thus close to what we mean by “science.” However, it is not necessary for ‘scientia’ to be a 
body of knowledge, or a field of knowledge, as distinct from a way of knowing. That is why 
Descartes says that scientia “consists wholly in the cognition of the mind [scientias, quæ totæ 
in animi cognitione consistunt]” (AT X, 359; CSM I, 9). 
111 Marion, Sur l'ontologie grise, sees in this first rule two important features of the entire 
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Aristotelian picture of many different kinds of sciences is derived from, Descartes claims, 
an inappropriate analogy between the sciences, which depend only on the intellect, and 
the arts, which require habituation of bodily faculties. This rule demonstrates, in a 
preliminary way, the characteristic Cartesian response to the proliferation of scientific 
disciplines, disputations and philosophical argumentation, namely, that nothing matters 
more than “good sense [bona mente]” (AT X, 360; CSM I, 9) for the advancement of 
wisdom and for giving human beings the capacity to judge well about any of life's 
contingencies (cf. Discours, AT VI, 1-2; CSM I, 111). Furthermore, this good sense is 
cultivated by being aware of the generality and purity of scientific knowledge, which is 
determined only by the clarity of the intellectual light. 
Rules II and III continue this line of reasoning by distinguishing the method 
advocated in the Regulae from the syllogistic reasoning of the “scholastics.” Rule II aims 
at discrediting all probable cognition, preferring instead only “what is perfectly known 
and incapable of being doubted” (AT X, 362; CSM I, 10). Descartes sees the “probable 
syllogisms” of the “schoolmen” as only useful in training young men to sharpen their wit, 
but not in expanding scientific knowledge. This sentiment is echoed by the better-known 
passage of Rule X: 
But to make it even clearer that the aforementioned art of reasoning contributes 
nothing whatever to knowledge of the truth, we should realize that, on the basis of 
their method, dialecticians are unable to formulate a syllogism with a true 
conclusion unless they are already in possession of the substance of the 
conclusion, i.e., unless they have previous knowledge of the very truth deduced in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Regulae: first, that the certainty of the sciences is founded on “l'unique producteur de certitude 
... l'intellect même,” 30; second, in its divergence from the Aristotelian classification of the 
sciences by their objects, he sees “la destruction entière et systematique du primat 
aristotélicien de l'ousia,” ibid., 31-2. 
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the syllogism. It is obvious therefore that they themselves can learn nothing new 
from such forms of reasoning, and hence that ordinary dialectic is of no use 
whatever to those who wish to investigate the truth of things. Its sole advantage is 
that it sometimes enables us to explain to others sophisms which are already well 
known. It should therefore be transferred from philosophy to the sophists 
themselves. (AT X, 406; CSM I, 36-37)112
 
 
This is a strong objection to the syllogistic justification of knowledge prominent in the 
schools. In contrast to this, Descartes reinforces the claim that perfect knowledge is 
indubitable, which is why disputatious arguments should not be pursued and it is the 
reason why “out of all of the sciences so far devised, we are restricted to just arithmetic 
and geometry if we stick to this rule” (AT X, 363; CSM I, 11). Descartes continues to 
differentiate his own project from the Aristotelian one in Rule III, where he claims that 
“we ought to investigate what we can clearly and evidently intuit or deduce with 
certainty, and not to what other people have thought or what we ourselves conjecture” 
(AT X, 366; CSM I, 13).113
                                                 
112 The heritage of Peter Ramus should be evident in this statement. 
 This warning announces Descartes’ preliminary attempt to 
undermine arguments from authority. First, he claims that “we would always be uncertain 
which [ancient writer] to believe, for hardly anything is said by one writer the contrary of 
which is not asserted by some other” (AT X, 367; CSM I, 13), a claim that is echoed in 
the Discours (AT VI, 2; CSM I, 114-5). Second, the knowledge obtained from authority 
would be useless if one were not able to reproduce the arguments that legitimate it. 
113 The world ‘intueri’ literally means “to look, gaze at,” which is why Marion takes the bold step 
to translate 'intueri' by ‘régarder’ (Marion and Coastabel, Les Règles, Annexe I, 295-302). 
Marion, Sur l'ontologie grise, goes on to claim that “intuitus mentis reprend du nous tes 
psyches” of Aristotle in three ways “extrêmement précis”: first, intuition is a sense closely 
aligned with touch; second, and as a consequence, intuition apprehends its object directly and 
before any predicative possibility of true or false, i.e., intuition by definition cannot be false; 
and third, the appropriate objects of intuition are first principles. Nonetheless, Marion 
concedes that this analogy does not imply a complete semantic symmetry between the two 
words, 48-49. 
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Philosophical arguments only have historical value, unless they can be sustained by the 
very same intuitions and deductions that once demonstrated them to be true (AT X, 367; 
CSM I, 13). In these two rules, one sees Descartes argue against the legitimacy of 
traditional authors, in favor of a concept of knowledge in general, on analogy with 
mathematics, that is sustained by intuition and deduction, and concerns only what can be 
known with certainty. In fact, he foreshadows a central argument of the Meditationes, 
that the only sure way to defeat skepticism is by attending to what is simple, easy, and 
evident: “Men of learning are perhaps convinced that there is very little indubitable 
knowledge, since, owing to a common human failing, they have disdained to reflect upon 
such indubitable truths, taking them to be too easy and obvious to everyone. But there 
are, I insist, a lot more of these truths than such people think—truths which suffice for the 
sure demonstration of countless propositions which so far they have managed to treat as 
no more than probable” (AT X, 362; CSM I, 10-1). This sentiment is again echoed in 
Descartes’ discussion of the mathesis universalis, which he claims had previously been 
disdained because “everyone thinks the subject too easy” (AT X, 378; CSM I, 20). It is 
also repeated in Rule V with the reduction of complicated terms to simples (AT X, 379; 
CSM I, 20) and in Rule X, which advocates that one ought to “first tackle the simplest 
and least exalted arts, and especially those in which order prevails” (AT X 404; CSM I, 
35). One can see that these themes are present throughout the Regulae and remain 
paramount throughout Descartes’ writings. Such observations only confirm that these 
Rules should be read together, as advancing a clear and mature vision that is 
characteristic of Descartes’ thought. 
 91 
Additionally, the mathematics of Rules XV-XVIII show a clear influence of 
Viète’s modern algebraic notation of letters with raised powers for unknowns, which 
would imply that these were not written between 1618-1623, when Descartes was still 
accustomed to using the German Cossic notation (which is preserved in the Cogitationes 
Privatae, the Physico-Mathematica, etc.). This was the notation used by Beeckman and 
the German mathematicians. Though Descartes denies having even seen the cover of 
Viète's book (AT I, 524) it is likely that his work with Mydorge and Hardy introduced 
him to Viète’s technical innovations. Moreover, if, as I have suggested in the previous 
section and will further discuss in the following Chapter, Rules XV-XVIII are closely 
connected with the idea and definition of the mathesis universalis, then it is likely that we 
can conceive of the Regulae as presenting Descartes’ new theory of mathematics, 
informed not only by his work with the German mathematicians, but also the Parisian 
mathematicians. It is also likely that for this reason the treatise on algebra was abandoned 
in favor of its updated version, the Regulae. These historical observations serve to 
reinforce the original judgment of Charles Adam, that the Regulae was composed in 
Paris, from 1625-1628. 
 
A proposed schema for the composition of the text 
 
With this evidence in favor of dating the composition of the Regulae to the period 
of Descartes’ stay in Paris, 1625-1628, let us return to the text in order to examine its 
distinct elements and try to establish, by a merely probable conjecture, in what order they 
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might have been composed. In this section, I will draw on some of the textual difficulties 
discussed at the beginning of the chapter. My aim now is to try to impose a bit of order 
on the chaos. In order to do that, I need to outline the distinct elements of the Regulae. 
First, we can confidently begin with the block of text from Rule I to Rule IV-A 
(AT X, 359-374.15), which even Weber maintains was written as a whole.114
                                                 
114 La Composition, 47. 
 These first 
four Rules announce the plan of a universal method in the sciences. The method is to be 
based on the “certain and evident” cognition of the natural light of reason. Its paradigm is 
the certainty of arithmetic and geometry, consisting “entirely in rationally deduced 
arguments” (AT X, 365; CSM I, 12), which is identified with the basic cognitive 
operations of intuition and deduction. The entire thrust of these first Rules is to establish 
a method that is sure to be free from error and to allow the cognitive capacities to arrive 
at truth. Next, we should set apart the text of Rule IV-B (AT X, 374.16-379.14). This 
portion introduces the concept of a mathesis universalis, which is the name of the new 
science that will treat problems only insofar as they can be represented in terms of 
relations of order and measure. Rules V-VII, Descartes tells us, “ought not to be 
separated, since we ought to think of all of them together and as all equally contributing 
to the perfection of the method” (AT X, 392; CSM I, 27). These Rules outline a more 
concrete vision of the method as a process of reducing complex problems to simple 
elements and ordering and arranging those simples according to the way that they are 
known. Rule VIII must be divided into three distinct sections, though the first two 
paragraphs may also be considered apart from the rest of the Rule (VIII-intro, 392.10-
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393.21; VIII-A, 393.22-396.25; VIII-B, 396.26-397.26; VIII-C, 397.27-400.11).115  Next, 
I believe that there is no reason to separate Rules IX-XI because these three Rules focus 
on the nature of the method and the application of the mind to solving problems. 
Moreover, Rule XI is explicitly aligned with the previous two Rules: “Rule IX dealt only 
with mental intuition; Rule X only with enumeration. The present Rule explains the way 
in which these two operations aid and complement each other; they do this so thoroughly 
that they seem to coalesce into a single operation...” (AT X, 408; CSM I, 38). While we 
should consider Rule XII alone, I see no reason to separate it topically as Weber does.116
                                                 
115 This Rule is the first instance of Weber’s hyperbolic dissection of the text. Paragraph divisions 
and changes in topic are not sufficient to warrant the claim, which Weber makes, that they are 
composed at different times. 
 
The only passage that could easily be set apart from the rest of the Rule is the concluding 
passage, after the lacuna, where Descartes announces the proposed plan of the work 
(Rule XII-plan, AT X, 429-430; CSM I, 50-51). Otherwise, the topics addressed in Rule 
XII are announced at the beginning (especially, the division between an examination of 
“ourselves the knowing subjects” and “the objects of knowledge,” AT X, 411; CSM I, 
39). Thus, there is no reason to separate these topics from each other for the purposes of 
understanding the chronology of composition. I will refer to the entirety simply as Rule 
XII. Rules XIII, XIV, and XV-XVIII can be considered each on its own, or they can all 
be considered together. I think it makes little difference, since these Rules clearly set out 
the program of abstracting the relations between variables in a given problem, depicting 
those relations clearly before the mind, and then arriving at a solution. Rule XVII makes 
this explicit, referring to the “preceding four Rules (XIII-XVI)” as sharing a common 
116  La Composition, Ch. 7 and 8. 
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purpose, to show us “how to abstract determinate and perfectly understood problems 
from particular subjects” (AT X, 459; CSM I, 70). These Rules represent the most mature 
formulation and concrete implementation of the method; they are the ripened fruits of the 
entire Regulae.  
We are thus left with about 11 reasonable divisions in the text. Now we must try 
to draw some tentative conclusions about the possible chronological relations between 
them. First of all, we should examine the explicit internal references made to previous 
Rules. Unfortunately, Rules I-VII make no explicit reference to previous Rules, so we are 
unable to clearly distinguish a chronology for I-IV-A, IV-B, and V-VII on that basis. 
Rule VIII, however, makes a number of references to Rules V-VII. In VIII-intro, 
Descartes refers to “the preceding three Rules” (AT X, 392; CSM I, 28), while VIII-A 
refers to Rules V and VI by name (AT X, 394; CSM I, 29). That section also refers to 
Rules I and III, so we can confidently date VIII-intro and VIII-A after I-IV-A and V-VII. 
Likewise, Rules XI refers to Rules III and VII (AT X, 407-408; CSM I, 37), suggesting 
that Rules IX-XI were composed after I-IV-A and V-VII. Rule XII-plan divides the plan 
of the work into three sections of twelve Rules each, so we can be fairly confident that 
when Descartes wrote that section as part of the twelfth completed Rule. It is possible 
that it was composed some time after the rest of Rule XII, or it is also possible that 
Descartes wrote this section first and then worked out the details of Rule XII. Rule XII 
also makes explicit reference to Rule VIII with respect to the notion of “simple natures,” 
which is likely a reference to Rule VIII-C, but this connection will be better explained in 
what follows. Rule XIII refers to Rules V, VI, and VII, while Rule XIV refers to Rule 
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XII. I think we can be confident that Rules XIII-XVIII were written after Rule XII, and 
also after Rules V-VII. This leaves us with the following certainties: Rules I-IV-A and V-
VII were written before Rule VIII-intro, VIII-A, IX-XI, XII, and XIII-XVIII; Rules XIII-
XVIII were written after Rule XII. We are still unclear about the relationship between 
Rules I-IV-A and V-VII and Rules IX-XI to Rules XII-XVIII. Moreover, we have little 
insight into the chronology of Rule IV-B, VIII-B, and VIII-C. 
In order to address these lingering uncertainties, we should turn to the content of 
the Rules and ask whether there are any clear topics that unite certain Rules to others, or 
any implicit references to other Rules that would help fix their chronology. In particular, 
we are looking for a way to determine the chronological relations between Rules I-IV-A, 
IV-B, V-VII, VIII-intro, -A, -B, -C, and IX-XI.  Both conceptually and on the basis of 
internal references, it seems that Rules XII-XVIII were probably composed last, and there 
is no need to doubt that the order of composition is any different than the order in which 
they are presented.117
If we start backward, from Rule XII, to determine the contextual and topical 
references to other Rules, we find an interesting connection. While I have described the 
 The following chapters will make ample use of these Rules in order 
to demonstrate Descartes’ most technically sound conception of his algebraic method of 
discovery, its relationship to the mental processes of intuition and imagination, and the 
connection between solving problems in pure mathematics and applying those solutions 
to problems in natural philosophy. There is no hard and fast argument for this thesis, but I 
think it is a reasonable and relatively uncontroversial interpretation. 
                                                 
117 In this regard, I agree with Schuster’s analysis, “Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis,” 55-73, 
especially 58. 
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explicit reference to Rule VIII in the body of Rule XII as ambiguous, I think that a 
careful look at this reference will yield an important distinction. When Descartes 
explicitly refers back to Rule VIII, he claims that now he has shown what are the simple 
natures, which were only mentioned in the prior Rule: 
... [T]here are no other ways accessible to human beings to arrive at certain 
cognition of the truth than evident intuition and necessary deduction. Thus, in the 
same way, [we have shown] what the simple natures are, which Rule VIII 
mentioned. (AT X, 425; CSM I, 48) 
 
This reference is difficult to analyze because of the nature of Rule VIII, to which it refers. 
As I have mentioned, Rule VIII appears to be composed of an introduction and three 
sections, each treating roughly the same topic. Moreover, Rule VIII-A was displaced in 
Leibniz’s copy of the text, provoking the idea that perhaps it had been discarded in favor 
of a more mature formulation. Adam and Tannery initially proposed the thesis that Rule 
VIII was a redrafted Rule, culminating in VIII-C. They note a number of parallel topics 
discussed. In particular, an enumeration of the cognitive faculties and the application of 
those faculties to different kinds of problems (Appendix B to Regulae, AT X, 485-86). 
VIII-C states that one may divide any question into two parts “for the question ought to 
relate either to us, who have the capacity for knowledge, or to the actual things it is 
possible to know” (AT X, 398; CSM I, 32). When Descartes turns to “us, who have the 
capacity for knowledge,” he claims, “while it is the intellect alone that is capable of 
knowledge, it can be helped or hindered by three other faculties, viz. imagination, sense-
perception, and memory.” Adam and Tannery note that this list adds memory to a similar 
list from VIII-A, a difference of “capital” importance (AT X, 486; cf. AT X, 395-96). If 
we continue to examine that section of text, however, we will discover another aspect of 
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capital importance.  When Descartes turns to “the things themselves,” he notes that they 
can be divided into “simple and complex or composite natures”: 
Simple natures must all be either spiritual or corporeal, or belong to each of these 
categories. . . . All these points will be explained at greater length in Rule XII, 
where it will be demonstrated that there can be no falsity save in composite 
natures which are put together by the intellect. (AT X, 399; CSM I, 32) 
 
Indeed, Rule XII follows this outline so exactly that it seems impossible to conceive that 
this section of Rule VIII was not composed at the same time as Rule XII. 
Given the clear evidence of a chronological link between Rule VIII-C and Rule 
XII, what should we conclude about the other sections of Rule VIII? To begin with, Rule 
VIII-intro is so closely aligned with the “preceding three Rules” that it seems difficult to 
separate it from them chronologically (AT X, 392.14; CSM I, 28). In effect, the first 
paragraph of Rule VIII simply elaborates the plan of Rules V-VII, while the second 
paragraph integrates those heuristics with the overriding aim of the treatise, outlined in 
Rules I-IV-A. Rule VIII-A introduces two examples that are said to illustrate the 
application of the method to particular problems. The first example is the discovery of the 
sine-law of refraction as the solution to the problem of how to construct a lens that 
refracts all rays of light to a single point. This example uses the term ‘mathesis’, 
contrasting it with the empirical knowledge of the physical sciences. For this reason, it 
ought to be closely linked to Rule IV-B. The example also utilizes the technique of 
“reduction to the most simple term,” which it refers explicitly to Rule V and describes the 
relation between those terms as “absolute” or relative, referring back to language from 
Rule VI. The fact that Descartes applies the very same language used in previous Rules to 
a concrete problem, whose solution we know Descartes discovered c. 1626, should be the 
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clearest indication that these Rules were composed during roughly the same period of 
time. I will not insist that Rule IV-B and Rule VIII-A were composed at the same time as 
Rule V-Rule VIII-intro, but I will insist that they were composed at nearly the same time 
and that they ought not be separated drastically.  
Finally, Rule VIII-B introduces a very interesting analogy in order to describe the 
relationship between the method and the mental faculties. He claims, “our method in fact 
resembles the procedures in the mechanical crafts, which have no need of methods other 
than their own, and which supply their own instructions for making their tools” (AT X, 
397; CSM I, 31). This short section surely stands out as a vivid example of the nature of 
method, but it is difficult to relate to the other Rules chronologically. I propose that it is 
closely aligned with Rules IX-XI, each of which also expand on the nature of the method 
by comparing components of it to the various mechanical and educational arts. Rule IX 
finds that “mental intuition” can be compared to “ordinary vision,” and just as “craftsmen 
who engage in delicate operations . . . acquire through practice the ability to make perfect 
distinctions between things” so, too, our mental intuition should be trained to make fine 
distinctions between things and not to attempt to focus on problems that are too complex 
or too general (AT X, 400-01; CSM I, 33). Rule X elaborates on this theme of training 
our minds well.  In that Rule, he contrasts the puzzles and mathematical games that 
interested him as a young man with the syllogisms of dialecticians. Whereas the former 
are certainly trivial, “nothing in these activities remains hidden and they are totally 
adapted to human cognitive capacities, they present us in the most distinct way with 
innumerable instances of order, each one different from the other, yet all regular” (AT X, 
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404; CSM I, 35). In contrast, the dialecticians prescribe certain “forms of reasoning” that 
encourage our mental powers come to rely on them and take a break “from considering a 
particular inference clearly and attentively.” As a consequence, “truth often slips through 
these fetters, while those who employ them are left entrapped by them” (AT X, 405-06; 
CSM I, 36). Finally, Rule XI describes the way that enumeration can shore up the 
deficiencies of deduction, which is “a kind of movement of the mind” that “in a sense 
depends on memory” (AT X, 407-08; CSM I, 37). This Rule describes enumeration as a 
mechanical exercise, like learning your multiplication tables, that actually helps you 
perceive the true relations between things. It also refers back to the problem of 
determining the relations between different magnitudes in a series, the central topic of 
Rule VI. Descartes says that, while these relations are sometimes difficult to perceive 
initially, “we acquire the habit of distinguishing at a glance what is more, and what is 
less, relative, and by what steps the relative may be reduced to the absolute” (AT X, 409; 
CSM I, 38). I suggest that these three Rules were composed, along with Rule VIII-B in 
order to explicate and expand on the heuristics of method developed in Rules V-VII. 
Again, I believe this suggestion makes the most sense of the passages in question without 
any hard and fast evidence to come to a certain conclusion. 
If my analysis is correct, then it seems that Rules IV-B-XI demonstrate the 
greatest variability in composition. Rules I-IV-A show a clear and unified plan for the 
entire treatise, while Rules XII-XVIII go the furthest to actually working out the details 
of what Descartes’ method would look like. By contrast, Rules IV-B-XI show that 
Descartes had considerable difficulty squaring his lofty, thematic vision with the 
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technical details of the proposed method. As a consequence, these Rules preserve the 
“drafts” or “layers” of Descartes’ effort to work out that connection. It does appear that 
by the time Descartes writes Rule XII he has a fairly clear conception of how the method 
ought to be united with an epistemological and metaphysical view of the world that 
would support the lofty goals set in the first four Rules. I believe that this is why he took 
the effort to try to reintegrate the most mature vision of the method into Rule VIII. This 
would also indicate the centrality of Rule VIII for understanding the entire project. (A 
point I will rely on in the next chapter.)  
To sum up this historical schema for the composition of the Rules let me propose 
seven stages of composition. In the first stage, Descartes sets out a plan for a universal 
method that would provide a foundation of the sciences on the paradigm of mathematics, 
Rules I-IV-A. Next, Descartes sets out the basic heuristics of this method, Rules V-VII 
and VIII-intro. At this stage, Descartes makes a series of false starts, in an attempt to 
advance that ambitious project. The whole treatise is geared toward the application of an 
algebraic technique to solving problems in natural philosophy, but in trying to get from 
his grand vision of a universal method to the technical application of it, Descartes 
hesitates. I suggest that at some point Descartes redrafts Rule IV-A with an explicit 
reference to the mathesis universalis, hoping this concept will do the trick of uniting the 
technique with the vision. In Rule VIII-A, he tries to demonstrate the utility of the 
methodological heuristics by championing his discovery of the sine law of refraction. 
That section also mentions the word ‘mathesis’, so it can be reasonably correlated with 
Rule IV-B. Next, Descartes tries a different tack, this one more analogical than technical. 
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Here, Descartes drafts Rule VIII-B and Rules IX-XI with a view to explaining the nature 
of method and its heuristics on analogy with the crafts and mechanical sciences. These 
efforts are not conclusive; they do not really unify the treatise yet. The treatise is finally 
unified when Descartes discovers the preliminary epistemological and metaphysical 
bases of his method in Rule XII. Now, Descartes redrafts Rule VIII, resulting in Rule 
VIII-C in order to align that Rule with the new foundation for the method. Sometime near 
the drafting of Rule XII, Descartes outlines a plan of the whole treatise, confirming that 
indeed this Rule is the long sought-after linchpin. Once Rule XII is in place, the rest of 
the Rules are written as a fairly straightforward explication of the discoveries announced 
there. 
This theory is completely conjectural, though it is my best guess. The single point 
that I want to emphasize right now is the central importance of Rule XII, VIII, and IV. 
Others have noticed the importance of Rule XII, but it is particularly central to my thesis. 
Chapters 3 and 4 will be entirely based on an exposition of themes in Rule XII. Those 
chapters reflect my belief that this Rule is the linchpin of Descartes’ Regulae. Indeed, I 
think that Descartes could not have conceived of the Regulae as a treatise before having 
discovered the epistemological and metaphysical insights in Rule XII. These insights are 
foundational for the real, technical developments of the work. 
 
After the Regulae: its relevance for scholarship 
 
 102 
Having outlined what the treatise is about, its purpose, contents, and 
discontinuities, I now need to address its incompleteness. Why did Descartes abandon the 
Regulae? Indeed, if they are so central to his development, why aren’t they completed 
and published? There is no definitive answer to this question. Descartes’ choice to move 
on to other projects could have arisen from some fatal flaw in the design of the Regulae. 
It could have been the result of a technical difficulty, like the completion of his algebra or 
the application of his mathematical method. Or, as Descartes himself suggests in a letter 
to his friend Mersenne, perhaps he simply had arrived at additional insights, so rewarding 
that he thought it would be more fitting to simply make a fresh start (AT I, 137-38; 
CSMK, 21). Since this dissertation is interested in exploring the philosophical content of 
the Regulae as it relates to Descartes’ mature work, we ought to pause for a moment to 
consider what happened when Descartes abandoned his treatise on method. Why did he 
do so? And how will this affect our reading of the text? 
 
Descartes’ retreat from Paris to Holland 
 
Even though Descartes clearly profited from his stay in Paris, through his 
collaboration with Mydorge and Mersenne, he ultimately preferred the solitary life. This 
is no doubt one of the reasons why he retreated to Holland in 1628. In 1631, he writes to 
Balzac, an acquaintance and correspondent, that even in his small retreats to the 
countryside around Paris, he could not find a comfortable mode of life: “there I always 
lacked an infinite number of conveniences that one only finds in the city; and even the 
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solitude that I sought there, I never found wholly perfect.” By contrast, in Holland, 
everyone else was so occupied with commerce that “I would go out walking every day 
amidst the confusion of so many people, with as much freedom and relaxation as you 
could find in your private garden. I consider the men that I see there as no more than the 
woods and trees that one encounters in your forest, or the animals there that one passes 
by” (AT I, 203). In Holland, Descartes enjoyed not only the liberty of solitude, but also, 
he tells us, freedom from war and the pure and fresh air which he thought increased his 
mental productivity. He claims these benefits in a prelude to his Discours and Essais, 
where he concedes a great obligation to the king for living “under the aegis of his military 
power [à l'ombre de ses armes]” (letter to Huygens, June 12, 1637: AT I, 638; CSM III, 
59-60).118
Before leaving Paris, however, Descartes would experience an event that not only 
had an impact on his life, but also certainly fueled the legend that surrounded his name. 
Likely in November of 1627, Descartes would join a group of well known scholars 
outside Paris at the Cardinal Pierre de Bérulle’s residence, the former founder of the 
Augustinian order of Oratorians (of which Mersenne was a member). These scholars 
were gathered on the occasion of a speech to be given by a M. de Chandoux, who was 
apparently a mechanistic natural philosopher, professing knowledge of chemical 
 Aside from a couple of months’ return to Paris and the final few months of his 
life in Sweden, he would remain in the Netherlands the rest of his life. 
                                                 
118 This letter accompanies a previously written letter in which Descartes asks Huygens, friend of 
the royal court in Holland, to present his Discours and Essais to the King, the French 
Ambassador and the Cardinal of Richelieu (AT X, 636). 
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alchemy, who incidentally was beheaded in 1631 for selling counterfeit money.119 It was 
not so much the buffoonery of this speech that impressed the attendants—in fact, Baillet 
reports that the speech was universally well received—but it was the eloquence of 
Descartes’ rebuttal that deserved the greatest mention. Apparently, Descartes announced 
that the foundations on which everything Chandoux had proposed could be easily 
undermined by posing some simple skeptical questions. It is not clear that he had yet 
stumbled upon the power of hyperbolic doubt because Baillet reports that he criticized “a 
dozen other similar arguments that carried its listeners to recognize it as a merely 
probable truth,” an argument which is consistent with the Regulae’s interdiction against 
“probable syllogisms.”120 Nonetheless, Descartes’ eloquence and the reasoning behind 
his speech greatly impressed everyone in attendance, especially the Cardinal, who 
subsequently requested a personal meeting with Descartes and suggested to him to 
publish something on the subject.121
                                                 
119 Rodis-Lewis, Descartes, 68. 
 While the specifics of this discussion are not 
known—most of what is recorded had been passed along by word of mouth—there is no 
doubt that the episode in a certain sense defines Descartes departure from Paris: it sets the 
120 Baillet, La Vie I, 162. Gaukroger, Descartes, 183-86, doubts that Descartes had any interest in 
skepticism at this time 
121 See Baillet, La Vie I, 160-166; and Rodis-Lewis, Descartes, 67-69, doubts that the Cardinal 
was very interested in Descartes working on “mechanics and medicine” as reported by Baillet. 
It is Rodis-Lewis who presents a cogent argument for dating the episode to November 1627, 
Baillet records August 1628. Menn, Descartes and Augustine, 46-50, describes this as the real 
philosophical turning point in Descartes' career. I think that he places too great an emphasis on 
the distinction between the early and late writings of Descartes and concedes too much real 
influence on Descartes’ later writing from the Cardinal Bérulle. This concession operates in 
support of Menn’s general thesis that Descartes’ turn toward providing a metaphysical 
foundation for physics coincides with his incorporation of Augustinian philosophy, since 
Bérulle was instrumental in the revival of Augustinianism in the seventeenth century. 
 105 
stage for his celebrity, and the sanction of his ideas by the Papal nuncio could certainly 
have encouraged his metaphysical speculations that occupy his first year in Holland. 
While the date of the event at Cardinal Bérulle's is disputed, it is known that 
Descartes was in Holland by October of 1628, since Beeckman records his conversations 
with Descartes in his journal, dating them October 8, 1628 (AT X, 331). These 
conversations record a very different kind of interest, also characteristic of this period in 
Descartes’ intellectual life. In his conversations with Beeckman, Descartes returns to 
many of the same issues that had occupied their earlier work together, from 1618 to 1620. 
Descartes tells Beeckman that in Paris he had discovered a general form of algebra, “by 
which he arrives at a perfect knowledge of Geometry, and with which it is possible to 
complete all human understanding” (AT X, 331-32). As I have noted above, sections of 
this specimen of Descartes’ algebra are also found in Rules XV and XVIII, where 
Descartes conceives of numbers as line segments and their multiplication as 
parallelograms. Beeckman records the algebraic notation using Cossic signs in his 
journal, whereas the Regulae show that Descartes had already adopted the simpler, 
modern alphabetical system with raised powers for designating knowns, unknowns and 
their multiplication. Beeckman’s journal also records Descartes’ account of the sine-law 
of refraction, to which he makes reference in Rule VIII. There are some notes on musical 
chords and the properties of an ellipse are also explained. On February 1, 1629, at 
Dordrecht, Beeckman records a method for discovering mean proportionals using the 
intersection of a circle and a parabola (AT X, 342-44). This solution is featured in the 
Géometrie Bk. III (AT VI, 469), where Descartes deduces his real coup de gräce of that 
 106 
work, a general form for solving quadratic equations of any degree. All of this suggests 
that Descartes had returned to Holland from Paris with some important discoveries in the 
area of mathematics and the sciences. He seems to suggest to Beeckman that these fruits 
of his labors might actually constitute what he had set out to discover in 1619, namely, “a 
completely new science.” To the extent that these results match up with the Géometrie 
and Dioptrique, Descartes may have not been far off the mark in his self assessment. 
 
The early metaphysical thoughts (c. 1630) and the beginnings of a system of 
natural philosophy 
 
Apart from the task of relaying his recent accomplishments in geometry and 
optics to Beeckman, Descartes tells Mersenne in 1630 that for the first nine months of his 
time in Holland, he had done nothing other than to establish the foundations of his 
physics on metaphysical truths (AT I, 144; CSM III, 22). This famous remark comes in 
response to a theological question posed by Mersenne, from which Descartes demurs, on 
grounds that it “is beyond [his] mental capacity.” Though he resists entering into 
theological questions, he claims that it is “rather metaphysics that ought to be examined 
by human reason” (ibid.). Furthermore, he states, “I would not have been able to discover 
the foundations of physics if I had not looked for them along that road.” And he 
concludes that he has “found how to prove metaphysical truths in a manner which is 
more evident that the proofs of geometry” (ibid.). Adam and Tannery index these 
comments to Descartes’ letter to Gibeuf, on July 18, 1629, where Descartes mentions “a 
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little treatise” that he has begun while in Holland and hopes to finish in two or three 
years, though “perhaps in the end I shall decide to burn it, or at least not let it out of my 
hands or those of my friends without giving it careful scrutiny: If I am not clever enough 
to produce something worth while, I shall at any rate try to be astute enough not to 
publish my shortcomings” (AT I, 17; CSM III, 5-6). There is no indication of the contents 
of this “little treatise” in the letter to Gibeuf, but the caution expressed at the end of the 
letter indicates that it would cover a controversial subject.122
It is possible that Descartes had been emboldened by the affirmation he had 
received from the Cardinal Bérulle and allowed himself to contemplate metaphysical 
questions upon his retreat to Holland. The claim that he has found “how to prove 
metaphysical truths in a manner which is more evident that the proofs of geometry” bears 
a trope that will recur in the Discours de la méthode, where he concludes that “it is at 
least as certain as any geometrical proof that God, who is this perfect being, is or exists” 
(AT VI, 36; CSM I, 129). Does this suggest that by 1628 Descartes had arrived at a proof 
for the existence of God, understood as the foundation of physics? Perhaps. This would 
be one of the key elements that would move Descartes beyond his work in the Regulae 
and on to other projects. 
  
In Descartes’ April 15, 1630 letter to Mersenne, he also notes that he had begun to 
study Chemistry and Anatomy together, the combination of which would lead to 
Descartes’ theory of matter, which was in turn fundamental to his Traité de la lumière 
                                                 
122 Rodis-Lewis, Descartes, 78-83, takes this occasion to hypothesize about the contents of the 
treatise. Her conclusions are instructive. It seems most likely, pace the editors of CSMK, that 
the “little treatise” was Le Monde, some of the contents of which were expanded and 
published in the Dioptrique and Météors (CSMK, 21n1). 
 108 
and Traité de l’homme. After announcing these pursuits, Descartes writes the following 
very illuminating passage: 
Perhaps you find it strange that I have not persevered with some other treatises I 
began while I was in Paris. I will tell you the reason: while I was working on them 
I acquired little more knowledge than I had when I began them, and when I tried 
to take account of this I was forced to start a new project, rather larger than the 
first. It is as if a man began building a house and then acquired unexpected riches 
and so changed his status that the building he had begun was now too small for 
him. No one could blame such a man if he saw him starting to build another house 
more suitable to his condition. (AT I, 137-38; CSMK, 21) 
 
Given the insights of this chapter, we can confidently assess this passage. The treatises 
are likely the Regulae and perhaps the Algebra or other lost treatises. The fact that 
Descartes claims, “while working on them I acquired little more knowledge than I had 
when I began them” would confirm his testimony from the Discours that locates all of his 
methodological and mathematical insights to the period of 1619-1620. We have seen how 
this time can indeed be understood as the origin of much of the Regulae, even though it is 
most likely that the treatise itself was composed while in Paris. Given the new insights 
into the nature of matter and the workings of the human body, Descartes is convinced that 
the Regulae would be better discarded in favor of a grander project on the nature of all 
matter in the universe and its relation to human cognition, Le Monde, which would 
include La Traité de la lumière and La Traité de l’homme. The Regulae makes only the 
most vague appeals to the nature of matter and its effects. Certainly, empirical 
observations, like those indicated to Mersenne in 1630 would have greatly enhanced 
Descartes’ relatively superficial understanding of issues in natural philosophy in the 
Regulae. (This notwithstanding the enormous importance of that text for understanding 
the principles of Descartes’ natural philosophy.) Thus, Descartes’ return to Holland 
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marks not only a turn toward the metaphysical foundations of his natural philosophy, but 
also a turn to more sophisticated empirical observations. 
If that is the case, these letters confirm Descartes’ testimony in the Discours. At 
the end of Part Three, Descartes claims that he would not have embarked on this project 
of achieving his vision of unifying the sciences through a universal method if “I had not 
noticed that some people were spreading the rumor that I had already completed it.” He 
claims ignorance for the cause of this rumor: “If I contributed anything to it by my 
conversation, it must have been because I confessed my ignorance more ingenuously than 
is customary for those with a little learning, and perhaps also because I displayed the 
reasons I had for doubting many things which others regard as certain.” Is it possible that 
the “rumor” to which Descartes refers is the aftermath of the Chandoux interrogation, 
when Cardinal de Bérulle urged him to publish something on the subject? If so, it locates 
the historical time of Descartes’ first expression of his method of doubt and the 
effectiveness of this method for arriving at a solid foundation for his physics. In the 
Discours, Descartes continues: 
But as I was honest enough not to wish to be taken for what I was not, I thought I 
had to try by every means to become worthy of the reputation that was given me. 
Exactly eight years ago [from 1636/7, i.e., 1628/9] this desire made me resolve to 
move away from any place where I might have acquaintances and retire to this 
country, where the long duration of the war has led to the establishment of such 
order that the armies maintained here seem to serve only to make the enjoyment 
of the fruits of peace all the more secure. Living here, amidst this great mass of 
busy people who are more concerned with their own affairs than curious about 
those of others, I have been able to lead a life as solitary and withdrawn as if I 
were in the most remote desert, while lacking none of the comforts found in the 
most populous cities. (AT VI, 30-1; CSM I, 126) 
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These words clearly recall the letters to Huygens and Balzac regarding Descartes’ 
assessment of his expatriation to Holland. If these testimonies are thus taken at face 
value, then the opening statement of Part Four, concerning “the first meditations that I 
had there [in Holland]” might in fact be accurate. In this case, it seems that in the winter 
of 1628-1629, Descartes discovered the power of doubt for arriving at the proofs for the 
existence of the soul, the independence of the mind from the body, and the existence of 
God, which in turn were to serve as the foundations of his physics. 
It is not an incredible leap of reasoning for Descartes to have discovered these 
metaphysical foundations of his physics at that time. In Rule XII, when he is working out 
how to link knowledge of simple natures in order to arrive at an understanding of the 
nature of physical things, he provides several examples of necessary conjunctions of 
simple natures. A conjunction is necessary, he says, “if one of them [the simples] is 
somehow implied (albeit confusedly) in the concept of the other so that we cannot 
conceive either of them distinctly if we judge them to be separate from each other” (AT 
X, 421; CSM I, 45). The necessary conjunction of simple natures is what we might call, 
pace Kant, an analytic a priori inference. This is then precisely the kind of reasoning that 
one finds in geometrical proofs. Among Descartes’ examples, he cites “that 4 and 3 make 
7, the composition is a necessary one, for we do not have a distinct conception of the 
number 7 unless in a confused sort of way” (AT X, 421; CSM I, 46).123
This necessity applies not just to things which are perceivable by the senses but to 
others as well. If, for example, Socrates says that he doubts everything, it 
necessarily follows that he understands at least that he is doubting, and hence that 
 He continues: 
                                                 
123 In point of fact, Kant calls this kind of combination synthetic a priori for his own reasons, 
Critique of Pure Reason, 144, B15-6. I bracket this issue entirely for the moment. 
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he knows that something can be true or false, etc.; for there is a necessary 
connection between these facts and the nature of doubt.... Again, there are many 
instances of things which are necessarily conjoined, even though most people 
count them as contingent, failing to notice the relation between them: for example 
the proposition, “I am, therefore God exists,” or “I understand, therefore I have a 
mind distinct from my body.” (AT X, 421-2; CSM I, 46)124
 
 
These roughly sketched examples are clearly not the same as the proofs for the existence 
of the self, the mind’s distinctness from the body, or the existence of God found in the 
Discours, but they serve to show that Descartes’ thought in the Regulae had advanced to 
such a stage that it was not impossible for him to discover those proofs as early as 1629, 
in his first few months in Holland.125
These are critical discoveries for Descartes and they constitute the beginning of 
his mature metaphysics. Nonetheless, they should not be taken to be utterly distinct from 
his mathematical and physical investigations. It must be remembered that Descartes 
spends considerable time, at least between October 8, 1628 and February 1, 1629, 
explaining his discoveries in geometry and optics to Beeckman. Furthermore, despite the 
well-known letters to Gibeuf and Mersenne that mention his newly discovered 
metaphysical principles, the vast majority of Descartes’ correspondence, which far 
 
                                                 
124 These comments echo those of Rule III, which provides the following examples of intuition 
and deduction: “everyone can mentally intuit that he exists, that he is thinking, that a triangle 
is bounded by just three lines, and a sphere by a single surface, and the like. . . . The self-
evidence and certainty of intuition is required not only for apprehending single propositions, 
but also for any train of reasoning whatever. Take for example, the inference that 2 plus 2 
equals 3 plus 1: not only must we intuitively perceive that 2 plus 2 make 4, and that 3 plus 1 
make 4, but also that the original proposition follows necessarily from the other two” (AT X, 
368-9; CSM I, 14-5). 
125 For confirmation of the claim that there is a marked difference between Descartes' passing 
remarks that ‘everyone can mentally intuit that he exists’ and that ‘I understand, therefore I 
have a mind distinct from my body,’ see Descartes’ letter to Clovius (AT III, 247-48), where 
Descartes distinguishes his concept of the ‘I’ from St. Augustine’s on the basis of its role in 
his metaphysical system. Such a distinction could be just as easily extended to the early 
Descartes of the Regulae. 
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exceeds these minor remarks, remains focused on explaining issues in optics, 
mathematics, and physics. Ferdinand Alquié was perhaps the first to outline the 
development of Descartes’ thought in terms of a sharp distinction between his early 
investigation into mathematical exercises and his later metaphysical discoveries.126 This 
line of interpretation has been repeated often by some of the most eminent commentators 
on Descartes’ intellectual development. Daniel Garber evokes a kind of dualism between 
Descartes problem-solving in mathematics and system-building in metaphysics: “When 
Descartes ceased to be a problem-solver and became a system-builder, it is not surprising 
that the method, central to his early thought, would become obsolete.”127 Even Gary 
Hatfield suggests that there is a rather sharp distinction between Descartes’ early 
mathematical and methodical writings and his later metaphysics.128 Stephen Menn 
follows Garber, regarding the change in Descartes’ philosophy as one from “preparatory 
mathematical exercises” to “philosophical construction.” He seems to read this change 
along the lines of Descartes’ project in mathesis universalis, arguing that Descartes had 
originally sought an avenue to the unification of the sciences from the mathematical 
disciplines, but then realized that this was insufficient and pursued a metaphysical ground 
for this unification instead.129
                                                 
126 Ferdinand Alquié, La découverte métaphysique de l'homme chez Descartes. 
 Stephen Gaukroger presents a much more integrated 
account of the period of 1629-1630, viewing the metaphysical discoveries, on which 
Descartes exercised most of his thought, in the context of his work on optics and 
127 Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, 50. Cf. Garber, “Descartes and the Method in 1637,” 
in Descartes Embodied; and Peter Dear, “Method and the Study of Nature.” 
128 Gary Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations, 16. 
129 Menn, Descartes and Augustine, 50. 
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mathematics. However, this line of reasoning seems to operate to the detriment of 
Descartes’ metaphysics, when it leads to Gaukroger’s claim that “Descartes’ 
[metaphysical] project is ultimately directed towards metaphysical legitimation of his 
natural philosophy, which is resolutely Copernican.”130 As with all of the preceding 
cases, it is easy to see Descartes’ metaphysical discoveries as radically heterogeneous 
from his earlier work on mathematics and method.131
                                                 
130 Respectively, Gaukroger, Descartes, ch. 6: “A New Beginning, 1629-1620,” 187-224 and 355. 
It is a bit shocking to read Gaukroger’s “intellectual biography” of Descartes and to find only 
10 pages devoted to a discussion of the Meditations. 
 Indeed, we have seen that 
Descartes’ own testimony is vastly weighted in favor of that interpretation. Yet, the 
Discours also presents both of these critical periods in Descartes’ life, one beginning in 
1619 with the discovery of a universal method in the sciences, the other in 1629 with the 
discovery of metaphysical principles, as ingredient to that work. The rules of the method, 
introduced in Part Two are meant to provide the procedure for rebuilding the edifice of 
knowledge after its destruction. If one brackets for a moment the importance of the 
provisional morality, Part Four then presents the metaphysical principles discovered in 
1629 as the cornerstones of this new structure. Thus, even in 1637, Descartes presents his 
project of methodical problem-solving as intimately related to the “system-building” or 
“philosophical construction” that is meant to follow the demolition rendered by 
hyperbolic doubt. More to the point, however, even if the Regulae is the house 
abandoned in favor of the castle, the construction certainly utilizes the same plot of land, 
and to extend the metaphor, the same topological survey. It is the Regulae that advances a 
131 J. L. Beck, The Method of Descartes, offers a notable exception, reading Descartes' method as 
generally continuous from the Regulae to the Meditaitons 
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theory of science fitted to our cognitive capacities, defines the nature of matter as that 
which can be expressed in clearly perceived figures, and outlines an algebraic method of 
comparing unknown entities to known entities. These elements are instrumental in the 
production and completion of the system, the castle so to speak. 
While it has been noted that the Discours cannot be taken as an entirely accurate 
portrayal of Descartes’ intellectual development, it should be taken as a sketch of 
Descartes’ own vision of his philosophical project. In other words, Descartes sees his 
philosophical project in the Discours as one that abandons the particular disputations of 
the schools in favor of a complete eradication of former philosophical principles, a 
process that lays the ground bare for a new philosophical paradigm. This philosophical 
paradigm is governed by three principle discoveries: one is the four-step method for 
achieving truth in the sciences, the second is the provisional moral code for human action 
and the third is the discovery of the metaphysical principles of the existence and nature of 
the self and God. However, acknowledging that Descartes’ vision of a unified project for 
attaining truth in the sciences does not alleviate the responsibility of making precise 
distinctions about Descartes’ actual philosophical claims.  
Though the Regulae is a treatise composed in order to outline the basic method 
for achieving scientific truth and it is the most explicit discussion of its kind, there is no 
single “method” in Descartes’ philosophy.132
                                                 
132 Daniel Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen, Descartes and Method, presents a very clear outline of 
these distinctions. 
 The method of hyperbolic doubt which 
thrusts the cogito into the foreground as that which legitimates Descartes’ metaphysics is 
absent from that early work. Second, it is not clear whether Descartes’ proposed method 
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of geometrical analysis, which is said to govern the Meditationes, is the same as the art of 
discovery or “true analysis” that is treated in the Regulae as ingredient to the mathesis 
universalis (though I think that they are probably related). Third, the very specific 
methods applied to mathematics and natural philosophy—on the one hand, a method of 
solving algebraic equations that transposes them into geometric constructions, on the 
other hand, an experimental and inductive method—must be distinguished from a general 
sense of method. Finally, even the four-step method discussed in the Discours finds no 
articulation as clear and precise in the Regulae, though it does seem to point back to that 
work. These issues must be treated carefully when discussing Descartes’ “method.” Thus, 
when the Regulae is considered as an antecedent to the later work, particularly in terms of 
our present concern--Descartes’ concept of mind--the nature of this antecedence must be 
made precise. What aspects of the method, elaborated in the Regulae, function to 
generate the priority that Descartes’ later metaphysical writing gives to the mind? What is 
the connection between method and mind in Descartes? 
The fact that Descartes’ discovery of the metaphysical principles of physics did 
not impede his research into optics, mathematics, and natural philosophy suggests that 
these concepts could be more or less seamlessly interwoven with his early conception of 
the method appropriate to those scientific investigations.133
                                                 
133 This is the sense in which Descartes’ natural philosophy is a “metaphysical physics.” 
 It does not appear that 
Descartes completely abandoned those early thoughts on method; rather, they were 
retained and incorporated into the mature writings. The task of the dissertation will be to 
develop a concept of the mind in the Regulae that itself fits seamlessly into Descartes’ 
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mature metaphysical writings. I will argue that this concept of mind is governed by 
Descartes’ attention to scientific truth, which is achieved through careful adherence to a 
mathesis universalis. This notion of scientific truth coordinates Descartes’ insight into the 
metaphysical and epistemological importance of his theory of cognition. In the end, the 
notion of the cogito as a fundamental metaphysical principle originates in the concept of 
scientific knowledge that he articulates in Rule I: “For the sciences as a whole are 
nothing other than human wisdom, which always remains one and the same, however 
different the subjects to which it is applied, it being no more altered by them than 
sunlight is by the variety of the things it shines on” (AT X, 360; CSM I, 9). 
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 Mathesis Universalis, Method, and Mathematics: The Or igins of Descar tes’ Theory 
of Matter  and its Distinction from Mind 
 
In the preceding chapter, we found that the central concern of Descartes’ early 
work is with developing a technique to solve mathematical problems, which would apply 
to problems in natural philosophy. Initially, he imagined a universal method that would 
unite the various sciences. We have already heard intimations that this method will 
somehow relate to Descartes’ concept of mind. In this chapter, we begin to be more 
specific about the connection between this early focus on mathematics and method and 
the origins of Descartes’ concept of mind. This chapter will approach that issue much 
more directly from the perspective of the ‘mathesis universalis’ as it relates to Descartes’ 
method of discovery in the sciences. Though the term has been widely debated and has 
received many different interpretations, I will argue that ‘mathesis universalis’, for 
Descartes, is essentially connected to the development of a method that applies the 
intellectual powers to solving problems that are mathematical in nature. Descartes seems 
to operate under the assumption that a kind of mathematical or algebraic method is the 
paradigmatic method for science in the general sense (scientia). This method is, in 
essence, Descartes’ idiomatic response to what was a general theme of the 16th and 17th 
centuries, i.e., a rediscovery of the classical dialectic, “method of analysis,” or “art of 
discovery” in the sciences. He weaves this historically contemporary search for a 
universal art of discovery in with his knowledge of mathematics to propose a workable 
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technique for solving problems in natural philosophy with the use of arithmetic and 
geometry. 
At first blush, there does not appear to be any reason to claim that Descartes’ 
investigation into the method appropriate to the mathematical disciplines—even when it 
is given the glossy title of a ‘mathesis universalis’—would inform Descartes’ concept of 
mind.134
                                                 
134 I concede this difficulty despite the testimony, for example, of Beck, The Method of Descartes, 
111: “ The rules we are in search of, that is, the Method, are found by a careful reflection upon 
the human mind in its natural unperverted state, by a study of its procedure when it functions 
purely and its natural power of grasping the truth is not corrupted or hampered by ‘prejudices’. 
The human mind, so far as it functions in accordance with its nature, cannot fail to think truly. 
If then we wish to acquire knowledge, the one vital condition is that our thinking should be the 
thinking of the human intelligence in so far as it is functioning according with its own 
nature.... For to reflect upon the procedure of the human intellect, in so far as it follows its 
own nature in its thinking, is to reflect upon the conditions of truth.” 
 First of all, at least for the mature Descartes, the mind is a thing, a res cogitans 
and, what is more, a distinct and independent substance. Neither mathematics, arithmetic, 
geometry, or method could be considered a “thing” in this sense. These are subject 
matters, disciplines, or modes of investigation. While the ontological status of the objects 
they study may be an interesting question, they themselves are not things. Second, the 
mind would seem to have a privileged status relative to method or mathematics, since in 
some way they are activities or operations of the mind. Thus, the concept of mind would 
seem to operate on a different ontological level than mathematics or method, both of the 
latter depending on the former. Why would they, rather than any other mental activity or 
objects of thought, be particularly illuminating with respect to the metaphysical nature of 
the mind? Moreover, what kind of analogy could exist between this substance, mind, and 
its activity or operation? Though it is often assumed that Descartes’ notion of method and 
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his preference for the mathematical sciences bears some relation to his concept of mind, 
this assumption ought to be justified.  
This chapter attempts to outline such a justification by way of a historical 
investigation into the use and meaning of the mathesis universalis. This historical 
overview will furnish a narrative, describing the origins of the term ‘mathesis 
universalis’, its connections to Renaissance theories of method, and its implications for 
seventeenth century mathematics, in order to inform the interpretation of Descartes’ use 
of that term. The observations noted in the first section will demonstrate that Descartes’ 
interest in the mathesis unversalis is part of a larger engagement in a tradition of logic, 
memory art, encyclopedism, and an investigation of the true method of discovery in the 
sciences. This tradition sought to recover the lost method of discovery in Plato and 
Aristotle, what they called simply ‘dialectic’. Prior to the time when Descartes began 
working on the Regulae, however, algebra presented itself as a new influence on 
discussions of scientific method. Around the turn of the seventeenth century, it was 
thought that this mathesis universalis, which was frequently identified with algebra, could 
provide that hidden key to the scientific method. Descartes’ response to the enthusiasm 
about existing algebraic methods is measured, but his devotion to the basic 
epistemological tenets of that tradition is central to the Regulae. I will examine the 
particular places where Descartes uses the term ‘mathesis universalis’ and thus propose 
an interpretation of how this concept is understood in the context of Descartes’ 
philosophy. (One claim will be that, in fact, Descartes’ understanding of ‘mathesis’ 
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changes over time.) To understand the central features of Descartes’ mathesis universalis, 
Leibniz will offer an important point of comparison.  
The second section will then apply the discussion of the mathesis universalis to a 
general understanding of Descartes’ method in the Regulae and the relationship between 
method and the genesis of Descartes’ concept of mind. There is an important sense in 
which the ‘mathesis universalis’ is the central concept governing the Regulae: it 
determines the basic principles of the method. Furthermore, that work provides a crucial 
link between Descartes’ initiation into philosophical research in 1619 and his first 
published treatise, the Discours and Essais (1637). With the Discours and the Essais, 
Descartes locates his method at the heart of his natural philosophy and metaphysics. 
There, he substantiates some of the provisional theses of the Regulae through his 
demonstration of the existence and nature of the mind as well as the existence of God. 
We see in the Discours, for instance, that the method bears an intimate relation to the 
mind as the first principle of Descartes’ metaphysics; and we see that the conception of 
the physical world as subject to geometrical measurement yields Descartes’ unique vision 
of mechanistic natural philosophy. These doctrines of the Discours and Essais bear a 
direct lineage to the mathesis universalis of the Regulae. However, Descartes’ vision of 
the possible scope of a purely mathematical method is not entirely commensurate with 
his natural philosophical practice: we will see that he is forced to make certain 
fundamental assumptions about the nature of the physical world (that prove to be 
unjustified) and he implicitly imports an empirical method of observation without 
formally integrating this method into his philosophy of method. 
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Mathesis universalis: a brief history of the term 
 
Part of the reason for the great deal of confusion that surrounds the interpretation 
of the ‘mathesis universalis’ in Descartes’ work is that he rarely mentions the concept and 
describes its meaning only once in his entire corpus, in the infamous Rule IV-B. As I 
have described in previous chapter, this passage has been questioned for its relevance to 
the work as a whole. Apart from this historically contentious passage, Descartes gives the 
reader few resources with which to understand the concept. Additionally, the historical 
roots of this concept reach as far back as Plato and Aristotle, though the term ‘mathesis 
universalis’ only emerges as a thematic subject of study in the 16th century. By the 17th 
century, it seems to achieve some prominence as a description of the general application 
of the method of algebra to resolve problems in both arithmetic and geometry, serving as 
the title for at least two Cartesian textbooks on geometry. Leibniz finally makes it one of 
the real focal points of his philosophy; and it is Leibniz’s understanding that has had the 
most enduring influence on subsequent philosophical treatments of the term. For this 
reason, I think it is necessary to survey, in the broadest way possible, the general history 
of the term, from its classical beginnings to its contemporary interpretation, in order to 
glean a coherent philosophical concept of what ‘mathesis universalis’ means.135
                                                 
135 The principle studies of the ‘mathesis universalis’ are the following: L. Liard, “La méthode et 
la mathesis universale de Descartes,” the earliest treatment of the concept, which essentially 
sees it as integrated with a concept of universal method; Jean-Paul Weber, La Constitution, 
especially Ch. 1, which lays the groundwork for interpreting the mathesis universalis as a 
‘universal mathematics’ and consequently understands this to be strictly distinct from a 
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Though the “historical survey” seems to trace an elliptical path, it will illuminate 
the broader philosophical context within which one can understand Descartes’ project in 
the Regulae. There are several important threads of this history that must be disentangled 
in order to appreciate the precise ways in which Descartes’ concept of method and 
mathesis emerge from a historical context but also inaugurate something new. I take the 
view that the mathesis unviersalis is one of the primary ways that Descartes’ articulates 
his concept of method in the Regulae. Though there are others, this concept seems best to 
capture the technical aspects of the method; though it is certainly not a comprehensive 
articulation of ‘method’ in the Regulae, it holds a place of prominence among many 
different presentations of “the” method.136
                                                                                                                                                 
universal method; Giovanni Crapulli, Mathesis Universalis, provides a complete survey of the 
16th century use of the term, together with very helpful appendices including excerpts from 
sources that are otherwise difficult to find; Jean-Luc Marion, Les Règles, Annexe II, 302-9, 
which claims that the passage in Rule IV-B represents Descartes’ answer to a specific 
contemporary problem that pertained directly to his current research on method and also 
provides a number of classical and early modern source references; Frederick Van de Pitte, 
“Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis,” and more recently, “The Dating of Rule IV-B and 
Descartes’ Regulae ad directionem ingenii,” in both cases Van de Pitte argues that Descartes 
makes a clear distinction between mathesis and mathematica, the former closely related to the 
method;  Pamela A. Kraus, “From Universal Mathematics to Universal Method: Descartes’ 
‘Turn’ in Rule IV of the Regulae,” who argues for an early dating of Rule IV-B, principally on 
the basis of her interpretation of the metaphor of the seed and fruit, which recurs in both 
sections; and Jûrgen Mittelstrass, “The Philosopher’s Conception of the ‘Mathesis 
Universalis’ from Descartes to Leibniz,” which takes the broad historical conception of the 
mathesis universalis as a general science, on analogy with arithmetic and geometry, but with 
broader applications; John Schuster, “Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis,” whose interpretation 
is treated extensively in Ch. 1; and Chikara Sasaki, Descartes’ Mathematical Thought, Part II,  
287-417, who takes a broad historical view and understands the mathesis universalis to be 
intimately connected with algebra and with Descartes’ concept of a method of discovery in the 
sciences. 
 One of the benefits of construing the mathesis 
136 For instance, Dan Garber, “Descartes’ Method in 1637,” 38-39n8 holds that such an 
identification is not warranted. His comment appears to be directed toward Marion, Les 
Règles, 144-47n18, who argues that the ‘mathesis universalis’ of Rule IV-B is convertible 
with the ‘methodus’ of Rule IV-A. My claim is most precisely in contradistinction to the 
theses of Weber, Schuster, and Kraus, op. cit. To be clear, mathesis universalis is not a 
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universalis in light of Descartes’ method and his early discoveries in mathematics is that 
one will be able to understand how each of these three concepts serves to highlight the 
primacy of self-conscious thought, or mind, in determining the nature and extent of 
scientific knowledge. The justification for this claim depends on the historical resources 
from which Descartes’ concept of method emerged. First, Descartes’ focus on the 
appropriate method for scientific investigation reflects a 16th century focus on dialectic 
and the method of discovery as it related to education and the appropriate categorization 
of the sciences. However, that once venerated tradition had lost its lustre in by the late 
Renaissance period for two reasons: (1) it had become identified with rhetoric in the 
Ciceronian tradition and (2) the political context in which rhetorical virtue was praised 
had gradually disappeared. Thus, when the 16th century reformers sought to reinvigorate 
a true method of discovery—dialectic—they saw their project as radically diverging from 
the Aristotelian tradition. Coincidentally, the 16th century also saw a resurgence of the 
Galenic empirical method of scientific investigation and a deepening interest in solving 
classical problems in geometry. As a consequence, the mathematical and scientific 
methods began to become intertwined; the ‘mathesis universalis’ is one of the fruits of 
this union. In mathematics, Christopher Clavius and François Viète championed algebra 
as the true art of discovery that had been hidden for so many centuries. In this way, the 
‘mathesis universalis’ also came to be roughly identified with algebra, both as a method 
of discovery and a domain of study. Thus, by the time of Descartes’ Regulae, he states 
                                                                                                                                                 
methodus any more than it is a mathematica. Nonetheless, there is an important synthesis of 
these three concepts in the Regulae such that Descartes’ understanding of each depends on the 
others. 
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his purpose as a search for the true method in the sciences, but he discards traditional 
dialectic as “merely probable syllogisms” whose conclusions, he claims, are disputed and 
whose demonstrations produce no new knowledge. Instead, Descartes’ hails a new 
method of comparison (essentially algebraic), which he distinguishes from other 
contemporary algebraic efforts. In order to understand this tension in Descartes’ 
writings—his simultaneous search for a method of discovery and his neglect of 
dialectical reasoning—it is necessary to reexamine the historical development that 
precedes Descartes’ Regulae and makes possible his claims in that work. Ultimately, 
Descartes’ interpretation of the mathesis universalis as a general method of discovery in 
the sciences rests on an epistemological claim about what counts as scientific truth. 
 
Dialectic and rhetoric in classical philosophy 
  
When Descartes refers to dialectic, dialecticians or their principle tool, the 
syllogism, in the Regulae, it is—with one notable exception—negative. He uses some 
variant of dialectic six times (AT X, 365, 372, 405-406 and 430; CSM I, 12, 16, 36-37 
and 51) and syllogism five times (AT X, 363, 389, 406, 430 and 439; CSM I, 11, 26, 36-
37, 51 and 57). Dialectic is said to be “of little use” or “useless,” while syllogisms are 
thought not to produce new knowledge, but only to sharpen the wit while failing to 
advance the search for truth. The two principal passages in which Descartes treats 
dialectic and the syllogism are found in Rules II and X. In Rule II, Descartes’ primary 
target is “probable syllogisms.” These, he charges, are “made for controversies,” 
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uncertain, and produce disputed conclusions. On the basis of this assessment of dialectic, 
he discards all syllogistic reasoning and claims to rely only on “arithmetic and 
geometry,” which are by contrast “so pure and simple that they make no assumptions that 
experience might render uncertain” (AT X, 363-66; CSM I, 11-12). Rule X adds to the 
claim that dialectical syllogisms are uncertain a further claim that even when one does 
demonstrate by means of the syllogism, this type of demonstration offers nothing new. 
He says, “to make it even clearer that the aforementioned art of reasoning contributes 
nothing whatever to knowledge of the truth, we should realize that, on the basis of their 
method, dialecticians are unable to formulate a syllogism with a true conclusion unless 
they are already in possession of the substance of the conclusion” (AT X, 406; CSM I, 
36-37). Thus, according to Descartes, dialectical syllogisms are either uncertain or trivial; 
this is why he repeatedly claims that they are of no use to the present investigation.  
There is one passage in which Descartes refers to dialect and syllogistic reasoning 
in a somewhat favorable light. In Rules XIII an XIV, he compares his “method of 
comparison” to the syllogistic method of “finding the middle term.” The sense in which 
this analogy works and the sense in which it breaks down will be treated in a subsequent 
section. Briefly, the “method of comparison” that Descartes acknowledges is similar to 
the syllogistic method is essentially Descartes’ algebraic method, given a broad 
application to both mathematical and physical problems. 
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 Dialectic in Aristotle 
On the basis of the Regulae alone, a careful reader might be persuaded by 
Descartes’ forceful rejection of the syllogism as an invalid method of discovery. 
However, there is an important sense, at least in Aristotle, in which the dialectical 
syllogisms do produce new knowledge and are, in fact, one means of arriving at first 
principles for scientific demonstration. In order briefly to explain the nature of 
syllogistical reasoning and the sense in which it produces scientific knowledge, it will be 
helpful to return to Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical 
Refutations. First of all, dialectic is but one kind of syllogistical reasoning for Aristotle. 
One common misunderstanding of Aristotle’s dialectic—one that Descartes propagates 
when he pejoratively refers to “probable syllogisms”—is that dialectic presumes to 
reason from what is merely probable to what is necessary. Of course, this would be 
invalid. However, it is not what Aristotle has in mind either. He differentiates dialectic 
from demonstration by the fact that dialectic makes an appeal to an interlocuter or to 
common or reputable opinions (endoxa) in order to establish its premises, whereas a 
demonstration makes no such appeal, but simply “lays them down.” The result is that, 
whereas the veracity of dialectical deduction depends on the veracity of the solicited 
opinions, demonstration demonstrates absolutely (Pr. An. I, 1 24a 21-4; cf. Pos. An. I, 2).  
The paradigmatic case of dialectic is one of a scholastic disputation—a kind of 
cross-examination procedure—where one student attempts to demonstrate the falsity of 
another’s claim by showing that the premises that his opponent holds lead to a 
contradiction. This disputatious sparring can be extended to more general kinds of 
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investigation where, for instance, one appeals to common or reputable opinions (endoxa) 
in order to reason to puzzles (aporia). This is precisely the sense in which dialectic is 
useful for scientific investigation: “it is through reputable opinions about [the sciences] 
that [syllogisms] have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most 
appropriately, to dialectic; for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to 
principles of all inquiries.”137
One could construe Aristotle’s Organon as a textbook intended to prepare young 
philosophers in the art or skill of dialectic so that they could go on to engage in true 
scientific investigations. Indeed, the topoi of the Topics catalogue the various forms of 
argumentation commonly used in this sort of rhetorical exercise.
 
138 The numerous forms 
would be difficult to employ without rigorous and consistent training. In this sense, these 
mental exercises seem designed to pass on a kind skill (technê) for investigating scientific 
truths that must be learned through practice rather than understood by means of 
demonstration. Thus, scientific investigation, insofar as it utilizes dialectic, depends on a 
prior assumption of technical expertise on the part of the scientist, i.e., a practical skill 
rather than just the understanding of a formal system. With this arsenal of arguments, 
forms of inference, and a catalogue of common and reputable opinions on a variety of 
subjects, Aristotle proposes to arrive at first principles by way of dialectical reasoning.139
                                                 
137 Aristotle, Topics I.2, 101b 1-3: trans. by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge in The Complete Works. 
 
138 The variety of topoi are far too numerous to list here, even provisionally. H.G. Zekl's 
“Ausführliche Inhaltsübersicht,” cviii-cxvi, lists hundreds of variations.  
139 Some classical examples of the use of a dialectical-type reasoning in order to arrive at 
scientific truths are found in the following texts: (concerning natural philosophy) Physics I and 
IV; and De Anima I and II, 1-2; (concerning first philosophy) Metaphysics I, IV; and 
(concerning practical philosophy) Rhetoric I, 1-2; Nicomachean Ethics I and IX, 4; and 
Eudemian Ethics VII, 6. 
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From a post-Cartesian critical perspective—one which we take for granted in 
contemporary philosophy—it seems impossible to reason dialectically, beginning with 
beliefs or opinions (no matter how commonly held and no matter how “skillful” the 
scientist) to arrive at any sort of scientific first principles. In contemporary science, there 
is no putative connection between ordinary opinion and scientific truths. Though it may 
be possible (and perhaps even desirable) to link scientific truths to “folk” beliefs, we 
certainly do not begin from what the folk suppose to be the case in order to arrive at first 
principles of scientific demonstration.  
Thus, the question remains, how does Aristotle accomplish the move from 
opinion to truth, where the former depends on the testimony of the senses or of the 
opinions of others and the latter is intended to be necessarily true? By and large, 
commentators adopt the strategy, pace G.E.L. Owen, of understanding endoxa as another 
sort of phainomena and they claim that, like all elements of experience, opinions admit of 
degrees of certainty and thus are applicable to scientific reasoning insofar as they suit the 
matter under investigation.140
                                                 
140 G.E.L Owen's classic paper, “Tithenai ta phainomena” [Reprinted numerous times]. T. Irwin 
Aristotle’s First Principles has been the gold standard of a response to this issue, but the 
proposed contemporary solutions to the problem are too numerous to list. 
 The advantage of construing opinions as general features of 
experience is that the process of moving from opinion to first principles is just the 
process of induction—not that this frees it from difficulty. Sifting through puzzles to find 
principles is not unlike sifting through the range of everyday experience in order to arrive 
at some general lessons about that experience. Of course, for Aristotle, the former is no 
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less dependent on a certain kind of training and the acquisition of a certain skill than the 
latter. It is the Topics that are meant to furnish the exercises for acquiring that skill. 
 The art of discovery in Aristotle’s science depends on an epistemological faith in 
perceptions and in the opinions passed down through a particular linguistic tradition. 
While these are some of the general features that define Aristotle’s “scientific method,” 
he appropriates the terminology of dialectic and method from Plato, for whom the 
methodos is that by virtue of which one can be said to have a sound knowledge of any 
skill, and it is through the methodos that the skill is taught to others. For Plato, the one 
who masters analysis (diaresis) and synthesis (synagôgê) is called the dialectician.141 
While Aristotle uses the Greek methodos sparingly, its sense is derived from its much 
more common root, hodos (literally, ‘way or path’), according to which the meta-hodos 
indicates that which is ‘after the way’ or, perhaps more idiomatically, ‘in pursuit of the 
way’ or ‘in pursuit of truth’. In Aristotle, as I have noted above, there is a connection 
between methodos and technê. This is reflected most notably in the Stoic conception of 
method, expressed by Zeno when he defines methodos as technê estin hexis 
hodopoiêsis.142
                                                 
141 The principal text in this matter is the Phaedrus. See Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of 
Method, 40. 
 In this sense, methodos is clearly an acquired capacity of the human being 
that enables a certain kind of production. The stoic conception of the methodos highlights 
the sense in which there is a system of rules governing the appropriate direction of the 
mind such that, when exercised together, they direct one toward ends useful in life. 
Though there is an implicit sense of ‘utility’ and even ‘production’ in hodos, since the 
142 Quoted in Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method, 43. 
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way seems to be tied to an ‘end’, the Stoics seem to have made this sense an explicit 
feature of the method. They framed a set of informal rules or prescriptions that enabled 
one to achieve katalepsis, i.e., the strong sense impressions that defy doubt. Cicero 
translates katalepsis by perceptio and the linguistic similarity between perceptio and 
praeceptio (‘a set of rules’) created some confusion, which historically served to 
reinforce the prescriptive or rule-bound nature of the methodical technique.143
 
 
Dialectic in the Latin world 
Most of the Latinate philosophers eschewed transliterating methodos by 
methodus, preferring instead the Latin expressions ars, via et ratio to describe the rational 
technique by which one arrives at scientific demonstrations.144
                                                 
143 Ibid. 11-13. 
 Only Galen, in the 
Hippocratic medical tradition, and Boethius, in his commentary on Aristole’s Topics 
(where he describes its contents as providing a methodum invenire), prefer the 
transliteration, methodus. For Galen, the method concerned primarily a ‘method of 
healing’ by which the doctor would arrive at a diagnosis of the disease and a prescription 
of the cure by means of a progressive distinction between like and unlike qualities. He 
thus divides method into three components, analysis (the reductive stage of dividing like 
from unlike), synthesis (where these elements are coordinated with a systematic 
understanding of the human body and disease), and definition (by which the essence is 
144 Massimiliano Savini, Le développement de la méthode cartésienne dans les Provinces-Unies 
(1643-1665), contains a very nice summary of these issues in section 2.1. 
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named).145
 Without a coherent and well-defined ‘method of discovery’ with which to 
comprehend Aristotle’s dialectical techniques expounded in the Topics, the mere 
rhetorical application of those techniques held sway. Moreover, the crucial concept that 
does the work in scientific discovery for the Latinate commentators seems to have been 
the hexis or dispositio brought about in the soul of the student, rather than the logical 
structure of the syllogism. Thus, dialectical deduction, or dialectical reasoning, was 
gradually pushed to the periphery of scientific discovery. The syllogism seems to have 
been thought to be useful in education, since it organized the premises and conclusions in 
a clear manner, but did not reflect the true nature of discovery. Thus, much of the 
tradition would have agreed with Descartes’ assessment that one is “unable to formulate a 
syllogism with a true conclusion unless [one is] already in possession of the substance of 
the conclusion,” though this is clearly not an accurate depiction of the use of deduction in 
Aristotle. When, in the Late Middle Ages, the humanists would again take up Aristotle’s 
topoi and methodus with renewed vigor, they vehemently rejected the eristic use of 
dialectic in disputations: “The aim of disputation, so the Humanists argued, was simply 
the ‘silencing of one’s opponent’, and the gaining of glory for the winner. Of what 
 Unfortunately, Galen’s eclectic and rather loose use of terminology did not 
lend his conception of method any lasting influence in medieval philosophy. Cicero was 
the preferred source such that, for instance, Aquinas continues to employ the via, ratio, 
and processus in favor of methodus. 
                                                 
145 Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method, 13-24; see also Wilhelm Risse, “Zur Vorgeschichte 
der cartesischen Methodenlehre,” 272. 
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possible use could this practice be to other arts?”146
[E]ven though we know other people’s demonstrations by heart, we shall never 
become mathematicians if we lack the intellectual aptitude to solve any given 
problem. And even though we have read all the arguments of Plato and Aristotle, 
we shall never become philosophers if we are unable to make a sound judgment 
on matters which come up for discussion; in this case what we would seem to 
have learnt would not be science but history. (AT X, 367; CSM I, 13) 
 On a deeper philosophical level, 
Descartes will reject any dialectical reasoning out of hand, not because it employs a 
faulty form of reasoning but because it relies on the authority of others. In Rule III, he 
claims 
 
This characterization of science, namely, that it rests on the capacity to make sound 
judgments on whatever matter presents itself as opposed to relying on the opinions of 
others, is a central feature of Descartes’ rejection of dialectical reasoning. His claims 
neglect the role of developing a technical expertise such as was required for Aristotelian 
dialectic. Certainly, for Aristotle, developing technical expertise in argumentation is not 
merely a matter of rehearsing the arguments of others. Nonetheless, Descartes’ 
preference for the mind’s grasp of truth and its capacity to make true judgments as the 
basis for scientific knowledge would mitigate against a method founded in any way on 
the opinions of others (whether reputable or authoritative). 
 
 Order and method in the 16th century: an ars brevis 
 
Some sixteenth century renaissance humanists saw fit to return to the concept of 
methodos as a real method of discovery even though others rejected the “barbaric” 
                                                 
146 Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method, 77. 
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transliterations of Greek in favor of a truly Latinate rendering of Aristotle’s meaning.147
 
 
However, these Latinate purists were fighting a losing battle as the philosophical 
importance of the concept of method necessitated a word to identify it. In this context, 
Peter Ramus emerged as a controversial but central figure of reform in scholastic 
education who returned to the Galenic use of methodus as a means to describe the true 
nature of reasoning about scientific matters.  
Peter Ramus, 1515-1572 
Unlike Galen’s tripartite division Ramus proclaimed the unity of the method of 
dialectic, as the “art of arts” and the “science of the sciences.” The reason for this is that 
Ramus believed dialectic to describe the structure of reasoning of the mind itself. For 
him, dialectic could be divided into two categories: invention and judgment. The latter 
involved the use of the syllogism, the collocation of various experiences (this is where he 
locates method), and the conjunction of these with a true understanding of God’s nature. 
Insofar as Ramus believed dialectic to describe something essential about the way the 
human mind thinks and judges, he considered his project to be one of reforming the 
tedious and burdensome tradition of scholastic education in favor of a simple, clear, and 
concise art that would illuminate the true categories of things without the proliferation of 
forms of deduction.  
In understanding the purpose of dialectic to provide a concise method of 
instruction, Ramus is echoing a tradition of Aristotelian commentary, such as what one 
                                                 
147 Ibid. 60-63. 
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finds in Augustinus of Nifo and Albert the Great. These commentaries identify dialectic 
as an ars brevis, or concise compendium of learning, intended to lead one to discover 
scientific truth.148
Ramus’ anti-Aristotelianism, which would eventually lead to the interdiction of 
his lectures by the faculty of the Sorbonne, seems to have arisen out of practical, 
pedagogical concerns.
 Additionally, Ramus follows both Johann Sturm and Agricola whose 
reforms of logic suggested a reform of Aristotle’s Organon as a project that would supply 
the basic method of investigation in the sciences. Whether or not these reformers actually 
improved upon the existing scholastic textbooks is up for question, but it is their vision 
with which we are concerned, insofar as this ushers in a new perspective on method and 
the science of discovery. 
149
                                                 
148 See Savini, La Développement de la méthode cartésienne, 35-36. 
 His most influential work, the Scholae dialecticae (1569), was a 
textbook of sorts for the young student in the schools (scholae). Ramus seems to have 
understood his project in terms of distinguishing the true nature of dialectic as the method 
of discovery appropriate to reason from its unfortunate confusion with rhetoric and 
grammar. He claims, “Aristotle caused the greatest confusion when he made invention 
the first part of rhetoric, which is false, because invention belongs to dialectic [Aristoteles 
summae confusionis author fuit: inventionem rhetoricae partem primam facit, falso ut 
antea docui, quia dialecticae propria est].” For Ramus, Quintilian only made matters 
worse: “It is amazing how ignorant Quintilian was of the nature of dialectic: he 
confounded dialectic and rhetoric; he did not realize that invention, disposition, and 
149 Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 39, writes, “Ramus was getting 
down to the business of teaching after his degree, and his anti-Aristotelianism developed as a 
result of a practical pedagogical situation rather than as a result of intellectual insight.” 
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memory belong to dialectic, and that rhetoric is concerned only with elocution and action 
[miror Quintilianum dialecticia tam nudum esse, qui dialecticam ipsam cum rhetorica hic 
confusum non potuerit agnoscere, cum dialecticae sunt inventio, dispositio, memoria; 
rhetorica tantum elocutio et actio].”150 Walter J. Ong identifies the antecedent of this 
distinction between rhetoric and dialectic with Agricola’s “humanistic” logic that would 
supplant Peter of Spain’s formal logic by the middle of the 16th century. According to 
Peter of Spain, there was only one logic, namely, dialectic, “the art of arts and the science 
of sciences.” By contrast, Agricola pronounced a more definite restriction, distinguishing 
the use of loci—the topoi of Aristotle—as dialectical, while rhetoric was concerned only 
with “ornamentation.” Ong writes, “This limitation of loci to dialectic is the critical 
Renaissance divorce in the chronologically uneasy union of rhetoric and dialectic.”151
Ramus also exhibits another renaissance trend in the interpretation of Aristotle’s 
dialectic, i.e., to internalize the process of dialectical reasoning so that it is understood 
psychologically. He alters the notion of “natural dialectic” to govern principally a way of 
thinking, even though the classical notion of dialectic was fundamentally connected with 
 
Above all, Ramus’ concern seems to be to dissociate the true method of discovery from 
all of the “useless” rhetorical trappings that only serve to ornament arguments and cloud 
the organization of Aristotle’s system. Clearly, this project represents a return to the Stoic 
ideal of method as something useful for life; and this same concern motivates Descartes’ 
criticism of dialectical syllogisms as “of little use.” 
                                                 
150 Petrus Ramus, Rhetoricae distincitones in Quintilianum (Paris, 1559), 43, quoted in Rossi, 
Logic and the Art of Memory, 99. 
151 Ong, Ramus, 102. 
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speech and “dialogue.” Correlatively, the “art of dialectic” becomes “teaching of 
discourse” (doctrina dissendi), teaching a way of thinking rather than a style of public 
disputation. Ramus characterizes Aristotle’s principles of scientific discovery according 
to the clarity of their presentation and the ease of apprehension. He does not base his 
notion of science on the rigors of “proof” but on the sense in which scientific claims 
follow evidently and methodically from an order. In a certain measure, Ramus’ 
internalization of dialectic as a method of reasoning rather than a method of disputation 
ushers in a formally “subjective” method as opposed to the formally “objective” 
syllogism.152 Even though Ramus conceived of himself as a great innovator who would 
overturn Aristotle, he still relied heavily on Aristotle’s categories for his understanding of 
the proper order in the sciences and his grasp of logic was more significant for its 
conceptual extension as a general science than for its rigor.153
                                                 
152 This is the claim of Wilhelm Risse, “Vorgeschichte der cartesischen Methodenlehre,”281-83. 
However, I disagree with his much stronger claim that “Damit hat Ramus die vier Regeln des 
cartesischen Discours formuliert” by virtue of his categorization of Aristotle’s principles of 
dialectic.  
 Nonetheless, his 
153 Ong, Ramus, 188, summarizes the complexities of Ramus’ position relative to Aristotelian 
logic as follows: “What happened here is plain. As a humanist, Ramus wishes to forget about 
formal logic and to exalt at the expense of formal logic every other type of discourse. He is 
not, however, the Italianate Rhinelander Agricola, but a Parisian arts professor, heir to the 
residue of what was once a highly sophisticated tradition of formal logic. Laboring in the 
wake of this formal logical tradition with a good deal of oratorical vigor but with little or no 
real insight of his own, he is drawn to think of all discourse as though it consisted of nothing 
but operations in formal logic. However, what Ramus retains of this formal logic is not real 
skill as a logician but only a blind drive toward a quantified approach to mental activity. In his 
case this drive has become a crude mechanistic of diagrammatic view of this activity, warped, 
moreover, by Agricola’s preoccupation with the individual arguments found in the places to 
the point where it thinks habitually of concepts only as unit-pieces. The proposition as such is 
not adverted to, and syllogistic is made to serve the purpose of chucking a unit piece or 
‘argument’ into a question.”  
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reinvigoration of dialectic serves as an important antecedent to the method of discovery 
that becomes thematic in the seventeenth century.  
 
Giordano Bruno, 1548-1600 
 Ramus, like other 16th century reformers, saw his reform of education and his 
introduction of a new method in light of a systematic reform of the disciplines and their 
organization. Above all, the reform was meant to condense the material for education into 
easily and quickly comprehended units. This focus on brevity, ease and facility were 
paramount for the utility of the method.154
It is our intention, with the approval of the divine will, to follow a methodical 
path, and one which can correct the defects, fortify the weakness, and aid the 
natural power of memory, so that anyone (as long as they possess adequate 
powers of reason and a modicum of judgment) can make progress in it.... This art 
is not as laborious as those of our predecessors (whose inventions have inspired 
us to greater efforts), and through our daily meditations we have made significant 
advances in the art, in terms of its ease, certainty, and brevity.
 Systematic reform and methodical study are 
characteristic of another figure of the late 16th century, Giordano Bruno. He appears to be 
motivated by the same pedagogical concerns of Ramus, namely, to make knowledge of 
true ideas accessible to anyone willing to exercise their reason and judgment carefully 
and attentively.  
155
 
  
                                                 
154 Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method, 71-73. 
155 Giordano Bruno, Opera Latina, II, I, 215. Intentio nostra est, divino annuente numine, 
artificiosam meodicamque prosequi viam: ad corrignendum defectum, roborandam 
infirmamitatem, et sublevandum virtutem memoriae naturalis: quatenus qualibet (dummodo 
sit rationis compos, et medicris particeps iudicii) proficere possit in ea... Quod quidem ars non 
habet a seipsa, neque ex eorum qui praecesserunt industria, a quorum inventionibus excitati, 
promoti sumus diuturnam cogitationem ad addendum, tum eis quae faciunt ad facilitatem 
negotii atque certitudinem, tum etiam ad brevitatem. Quoted in Rossi, Logic and the Art of 
Memory, 86. 
 138 
Bruno’s Platonic assumptions about the nature of reality enabled him to have a great deal 
of optimism that this effort would produce the desired results. Yet his belief about the 
structure of reality often manifests itself in a strange emphasis on symbolism and magic. 
For Bruno, logic, the intellectual ideas, mental images and symbolism were all connected 
in what Paolo Rossi has called his “imaginative logic.” That is, he transposes the 
metaphysical substratum or logical subjectum from its existence as an independent reality 
to an “imaginative form.” This imaginative form seems to be understood in a way that is 
analogous to the “formal” property of mental images that inform the loci of the 
mnemotechnical tradition (the topic of the next section). As we will see, Bruno’s logic is 
a logic of the order of things in the same way that the classical memory art conceived of 
its mnemonic ordering of things to be related to the real order of things by way of a 
similarity between mental images and the things themselves. Bruno conceived his logic 
to be broader than formal logic, however, since it bypasses the typical difficulty of 
correspondence between logical ideas and actual entities. From a taxonomy of 
imaginative forms or logical places, Bruno conceived of the myriad (some 130) 
categories that could be generated out of a combination of a few basic elements in a way 
analogous to alchemical and magical practices.156
 
  
  Johann Heinrich Alsted, 1588-1638 
These same concerns can be seen in the early 17th century in the writings of J. H. 
Alsted. Alsted matriculated at Marburg under the direction of the great encyclopedist 
                                                 
156 See Rossi’s, “The Imaginative Logic of Bruno,” in Logic and the Art of Memory, Ch. 4. 
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Rudolph Goclenius. He was also a member of the faculty at Herborn, which was a 
Calvinist reformist school with a Ramist leaning; and he became the teacher of 
Comenius, who himself would be one of the key figures to introduce the idea of a 
universal science and universal language to England.157 His Encyclopedia (1630) and 
Methodus theologicae (1614-22), both dense multi-volume texts, represent his massive 
effort to provide an encyclopedic account of a broad range of disciplines. His first 
philosophical publication, the Systema mnemonicum  (1609), is a testament to his 
prodigious work. Of that work Howard Hotson remarks, “In the dedication of the 
Systema mnemonicum, Alsted claimed to have buried himself ‘from earliest youth to the 
year of judgment’ in the literature of mnemonics and to have completed the work ‘for my 
own use by the continual toil of eight years’. The enormous size of the work—over 1,700 
pages in all—the prefatory list of 600 authors consulted, and the range of topics it 
contains jointly support this claim.”158
                                                 
157 On the influence of Comenius in England see Rossi, Logic and the Art of Language, 146, 152-
6; and for a general overview of the importance of Alsted for British philosophy, see Howard 
Hotson, Johann Heinrich Alsted, Introduction. 
 When writing on method, Alsted tends to follow 
Ramus by equating the art of investigation with logic, and a reform of the latter with a 
pedagogical purpose. Additionally, Alsted represents the influence of Neoplatonism on 
this period of thought with specific reference to Augustine. He conceives of the faculty of 
memoria in a way analogous to Augustine’s discussion of that faculty in De Trinitate 
Bks. IX-XI (a conception that will also be seen in Llull, see below), namely, that it is one 
element in a triune representation of the divine in the human being (according to the 
doctrine of imago dei). Alsted refers to Augustine in the context of his Panacea 
158 Hotson, Johann Heinrich Alsted, 40. 
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philosophica, where he claims that the human being had perfect access to philosophical 
knowledge in Eden; but after the fall, he claims, the three faculties, memoria, 
intelligentia, and voluntas, were each clouded by original sin and thus are in need of 
artificial support, specifically through the kind of reform of the sciences and application 
of the memory arts that Alsted proposes.159 The restoration of these faculties, along with 
an understanding of the subject matter appropriate to them, is accomplished through the 
cycle of courses expounded in Alsted’s encyclopedia. On the one hand, there are 
interesting theological implications for Alsted’s view. Though Alsted himself was a 
professed Calvinist, his suggestion that human industry could potentially overcome the 
deficiencies imposed by original sin suggests that one could overcome one’s fallen state, 
a view that resembles Pelagianism. On the other hand, Alsted’s notion of a panacea 
philosophica evokes old magical and alchemical leanings. That tradition held that the 
cosmic order of elements had a direct bearing on terrestrial events such that there might 
be a combination of elements, a magic potion or snake oil, capable of resolving any 
human infirmity. Alsted’s panacea philosophica suggests that his reform of logic and 
pedagogy could serve such a purpose, i.e., provide a “panacea” for philosophical 
education. However, this implication of Alsted’s philosophy put him at odds with the 
prevailing church doctrine.160
                                                 
159 Ibid.,  66-69. 
 The strange mixture of magical and alchemical 
superstitions, writings on logic, method, and the reform of the scientific disciplines that 
one finds in Alsted tokens a long history of vaguely occultist writings on the art of 
memory, in which one of the central figures was Ramon Llull. 
160 Ibid.,  Ch. 3, 95-143. 
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 The art of memory, method, and Ramon Llull (1232-1315) 
  
In 1666, nearly forty years after Descartes was writing the Regulae, Leibniz 
writes an early sketch of a general philosophical project called Dissertatio de Arte 
Combinatore, which served as the equivalent of his Habilitationschrift, i.e., his first 
major work through which he sought a place in the faculty of the University of Leipzig 
(though without success).161
                                                 
161 Dissertatio de Arte Combinatore in qua ex Arithmeticae fundamentis Complicationum ac 
Transpositionum Doctrina novis praeceptis exstruitur, et usus ambarum per universum 
scientiarum orbem ostenditur; nova etiam Artis Meditandi seu Logicae Inventionis semina 
sparguntur. Praefixa est Synopsis totius Tractatus, et additamenti loco demonstratio 
Existentiae Dei, ad Mathematicam certitudinem exacta, in Philosophische Schriften, IV, 27-
104. See “Introduction,” by Gerhardt, 3-5, for the biographical background and a general 
summary of the work.  
 That work outlined his plan for codifying a general science, 
based on mathematics, which would perform a kind of linguistic calculus that Leibniz 
called an ars combinatoria. He indicates that this combinatorial art would relate to all 
kinds of knowledge, proving to be a general art of scientific discovery. The work opens 
with reference to Ramon Llull’s Ars Magna, as the progenitor of this idea and reproduces 
one of the “Llullian circles,” a mechanical device that represented all of the potential 
predicates pertaining to a particular subject matter. The predicates were to be combined 
in order to produce concepts corresponding to any possible thing, whose nature would 
then be identified by the system of classification governing the predicates. This circle 
seems to have some relevance for Leibniz’s ars combinatoria which he outlines in the 
treatise. This short treatise provides the historical point of departure for understanding 
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Leibniz’s interest in the mathesis universalis. When Leibniz acquires a copy of 
Descartes’ Regulae and studies algebraic geometry, he begins to link the original 
combinatorial art to his early ideas of calculus. With this connection, Leibniz articulates a 
complete notion of the mathesis universalis that approaches something like a formal 
ontology. 
 
  Llullian influences on Descartes and Leibniz 
Briefly, Leibniz’s combinatorial art has as its goal the discovery of complex 
propositions about number, relation and quantity, the division of the species and their 
subalternate divisions, and various arguments and propositions related to these 
divisions.162 The primary influence for this project appears to come from Llullian 
sources, such as the 16th and 17th century commentaries of Agrippa, Bruno, Alsted and 
the esoteric ecyclopedist Althanius Kircher. Additionally, in the introduction to the 
project (a section Leibniz titles, Cum Deo!), Leibniz refers to Descartes and the concept 
of a ‘mathesis universalis’, via Franz Schooten’s Principia matheseos universalis (which 
he misidentified in the passage as elementa matheseos universalis), a mid-17th century 
textbook introduction to Cartesian geometry.163
                                                 
162 See the synopsis of De Arte Combinatore in Philosophiche Schriften, IV, 30, especially, “De 
arte Combinatoria Lullii, Athanasii Kircheri, nostra, de qua sequentia...” 
 It does not appear that Leibniz was very 
well informed on Cartesian geometry at this time (the combinatorial art does not display 
any signs of Descartes’ algebraic method); this influence would become central only after 
Leibniz’s travels to Paris in the 1670s.  
163 Philosophische Schriften, IV, 35. At this time, Leibniz could not have been aware of 
Descartes’ Regulae, discovering that text only after 1676, upon his visit to Paris. 
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For the purposes of the Dissertatio, Leibniz clearly links together the idea of a 
universal science with mathematics: he elaborates a technique for determining the nature 
of all things according to the paradigm of arithmetic and geometry and suggests that this 
would involve a classification of entities by a symbolic notation and a calculus of 
combination. To aid in this project, he devises several tables of combination and 
predication.164 These tables are organized according to different kinds of combinations, 
either combining two predicates, three, four and so on (Leibniz writes these as 
com2natio, com3natio and com4natio).165
Not incidentally, these issues appear to have been influential for the young 
Descartes’ vision of his philosophical project. In Chapter 1, I showed the importance of 
the “entirely new science [scientia penitus nova]” as it pertained to Descartes’ 
philosophical development and his work with Beeckman.
 The idea that it was possible to devise a system 
of classification that would reproduce any possible combination of elements present in 
things clearly owes its origin to Ramon Llull.  
166
                                                 
164 Ibid. 40, 42, 53, 84-5, 91-3, and 99-101. 
 In the letter to Beeckman of 
March 26, 1619 in which Descartes first expresses the outline of this project, he is careful 
to distinguish it from the Llull’s Ars Brevis (AT X, 156; CSM III, 2). Also, in the 
Discours de la méthode, when Descartes refers back presumably to this same period of 
time, he again suggests that although logic, geometrical analysis and algebra had much to 
offer his plan of a discovering a general method in the sciences, his would be nothing like 
165 See Paolo Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory, 177-9, for a concise summary of Leibniz's 
method in De Arte Combinatore. 
166 Sasaki, Descartes’ Mathematical Thought, 267-269, conjectures that Descartes came to know 
about Adrian van Roomen's discussion of mathesis universalis while in the Netherlands in 
1618-1619. He coordinates this concept with the scientia penitus nova of March 1619. 
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“the art of Lully, for speaking without judgment about matters of which one is ignorant” 
(AT VI, 17; CSM I, 119).  
This negative assessment of Llull appears to be directly related to one of 
Descartes’ personal experiences, which he also relates to Beeckman in 1619. “Three days 
ago,” he says, “I had a conversation about Llull’s Ars Parva [sic] with a learned man 
whom I met in an inn at Dordrecht. He boasted that he was able to apply Llull’s method, 
and to do this so skillfully that he could talk for a whole hour on any subject you cared to 
mention; and if he was required to talk for a further hour on the same topic, he would find 
fresh things to say, and could even continue for twenty-four hours at a stretch” (April 29, 
1619: AT X, 164-5; CSMK, 4-5). In the letter, Descartes seems to have a measured 
appraisal of the man, calling him loquacious [loquax], possessed of bookish learning 
[eruditio utpote a libris hausta], who seemed to rattle things off the tip of his tongue 
rather than from within his mind [in extremis labris potius quam in cerebro versabatur]. 
However, Descartes also seems genuinely intrigued, asking Beeckman to look into the 
matter for him (since Beeckman possessed a copy of Agrippa’s commentary on Llull) 
and to tell him whether or not there was anything of intellectual substance in the books of 
Llull or his commentator, Agrippa. In particular, Descartes is searching for certain “keys” 
to knowledge that Llull’s art is supposed to contain. The so-called ‘keys’ were thought to 
be like a code that would enable one to translate symbols into elements and thus 
understand the underlying structure of nature (not unrelated to Cabbalism). 
Beeckman does write back to Descartes, though perhaps not in the detail that one 
would hope for. He tells Descartes that if he would stay a few days in Copenhagen, 
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talking to the learned men there, he could find out more. Then he proceeds to recite, from 
memory, what he says he had read superficially several years before. He does not recall 
having discovered any “keys” such as the old man suggested in Agrippa’s commentary. 
However, he does describe the structure of the book, and he includes a description of a 
typical Llullian circle, which he says could enable one, given any topic, to speak for 
many hours on the subject. In the end, Beeckman does not appraise this technique too 
highly, suggesting that it could enable one to say many ridiculous things that have little 
bearing on the matter in question. If there is any value in the technique, he concludes, it 
lies in the mental powers of the speaker, not the art itself (Beeckman to Descartes, May 6, 
1619: AT X, 167-69). It is likely that this exchange is what Descartes refers to in the 
Discours.  
At the very least, it is noteworthy that he would recall such a seemingly minor 
event so many years later as he introduces his first great work. It is clear from Descartes’ 
letter that the interest in Llull originates with Beeckman, though based on the date of one 
of Beeckman’s journal entries on Llull, the influence may have gone the other 
direction.167
                                                 
167 Adam and Tannery surmise that Beeckman wrote this entry following the receipt of Descartes’ 
letter, since it falls between two dated entries, the 2nd and 14th of May: AT X, 63nb. 
 Beeckman’s journal records an entry on Llull's art, “with which one can 
cultivate Logic [cum colata Logica],” where he outlines the structure of Llull’s Ars 
Brevis, by which, he claims, one could easily be lead to the highest knowledge of all 
things [ut breviter doceat summam omnium rerum]. By the end of his entry, he arrives at 
a more conservative estimation of the art of Llull, which, he claims, the true logic of 
Peter Ramus has deprived of any sustained utility [Logicae vero Ramae alius est scopus 
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(esti videri possit hanc arte Llullii aboleri)] (AT X, 63-5). It ought to be noted that one of 
Beeckman’s teachers, Rudolph Snell, the father of Heerborgh Snell—who would 
discover the sine-law of refraction—was a Ramist. This may account for Beeckman’s 
quick dismissal of Llull in favor of Ramus.  
Though these particular cases do not give one much in the way of an 
understanding of Llull’s art, nor in terms of a substantial understanding of how it relates 
to Descartes’ early work, they do indicate precisely the set of issues to which Llull’s art 
was applied and, moreover, they suggest some philosophical connection between 
Descartes’ understanding of his early project of determining a universal science, an Ars 
brevis, and the mathesis universalis. Additionally, Descartes’ interest in another author in 
the Llullian tradition corroborates these potentially incidental remarks on Ramon Llull. In 
Chapter 1, I quoted at length an excerpt from Descartes’ Cogitationes Privatae where he 
comments on a book by Lambert Schenkl, De arte memoriae.168
                                                 
168 The full title, quoted on AT X, 251, is De Memoria liber secundus: in quo est Ars Memoriae, 
ex ipso D. Thomas Aquinate, Doctore Angelico, Aristotele, M.T. Cicerone, F. Quinctiliano, 
Philosophorum et Oratorum Princibus, ac huius etima artis fontibus, aliisque, compendiose 
absoluteque et collecta, et latiore explicatione explicata (1595). 
 In that short 
commentary, he describes the book as providing a reduction from things to their causes 
(per reductionem rerum ad causas), which are to be known by virtue of the fact that they 
are passed through the imagination by impressions easily formed there (Qui enim 
intelliget causas, elapsa omnino phantasmata causae impressione rursus facile in 
cerebro formabit). Even though he reports that the book provides the clavis totius 
mysterii, he ultimately rejects its conclusions and suggests another method whereby 
images are related in a more simple and easily recalled order. I have contrasted these 
 147 
proposals with the Regulae to show that they represent a much more obscure and 
probably early conception of order and the successive relation between things and their 
causes. Nevertheless, Descartes’ sustained interest in these issues is confirmed in what is 
clearly a serious engagement with a text in classical memory art. Moreover, I would add 
that there is likely some connection between the clavis totius mysterii sought here and the 
ars secretum of Rule VI (AT X, 381), where the relationship between thing and cause is 
expressed as a series of absolutes and relatives, beginning with the “most simple 
natures.” This suggests that Descartes conceived of the method of the Regulae as a final 
response to these issues.  
Nicolas Poisson, who possessed some of the original manuscripts (some of which 
now lost) of Descartes’ personal writings on method, quotes from one such fragment: 
“Indeed, here all the sciences are brought together, such that no more perfect combination 
is possible, from which the others spontaneously follow and the whole of which one can 
apprehend as if it were an encyclopedia [Quippe sunt concatenatae omnes scientiae, nec 
una perfecta haberi potest, quin aliae sponte sequantur, et tota simul encyclopedia 
apprehendatur]” (AT X, 255).169
 
 So, it seems that Descartes was thoroughly engaged in a 
project of creating a unifying method that would encapsulate the principles of the 
sciences in a sequential and ordered system throughout the 1620s. The interest and public 
disagreement he professed in Ramon Llull was part of distinguishing his project from 
notable historical antecedents. 
                                                 
169 Quoted from Poisson, Commentaire ou remarques sur la Méthode de René Descartes (1670). 
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 Llull and the art of memory 
Llull himself (1232-1315), it seems, was a polymath; he wrote in Latin, Arabic 
and Catalan, and expressed a desire to organize and catalogue knowledge in a variety of 
different subjects with the objective of grounding this knowledge in the existence of God. 
His circles and mneumonic techniques were designed to allow the believer a means for 
convincing non-believers of God’s essential connection to natural phenomena. Llull’s art, 
which relied predominantly on an account of the elements and their connection to the 
divine names or attributes, bore none of the trademarks of classical mnemonics (elaborate 
images, relation to rhetorical practices, the many rules governing its practice, etc.), 
however, it did apply a general memory art to a theory of causation and ultimately a 
metaphysical picture of the world.170
Whereas Llull emphasizes only meditation and repetition, rather than the 
elaborate Ciceronian mnemonic techniques involving images and places, he joins this 
notion of memory art to an ordering of the various categories of being in such a way as to 
reinforce a parallel between cognition and creation. In order to disclose the principles of 
the sciences, he employed various mechanical instruments and symbols that catalogue 
and categorize various domains of knowledge. In the most celebrated instance, Llull 
designed mechanical wheels, instruments of concentric circles, around which he would 
designate a series of seven predicates or principle attributes of God: bonitas optima, 
 By indexing the predicates of God, i.e., God’s 
names and attributes, to the elements, Llull grafts his art of memory to an investigation of 
metaphysical principles.  
                                                 
170 See Frances Yates, “The Art of Ramon Lull: An Approach to it through Lull's Theory of the 
Elements” in Lull and Bruno, I, 9-77. 
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magnitudo maxima, veritas verissima, aeternitas aeternalissima, virtus virtuossima, et 
perfectio perfectissima; these are indicated by the letters of the alphabet B C D E F G H I 
and K. The three chief elements of these principles are God’s goodness, greatness, and 
truth. These three elements, along with the seven principles and their negations, allow 
one to combine the various names of God, the combinations of which have direct 
application to the nature of things through God’s causal efficacy in creation. Llull claims 
of his Ars Magna, “And in this way this book will be constructed; in other words, it will 
be an art for discovering the truth of these predicates [Et per istum modum liber iste erit 
artificiatus, sive erit ars ad inveniendum veritates de praedictis].”171 The divine names 
are supposed to relate to the terrestrial, natural world through a theory of astrological 
causation. For Llull, there seems to be a causal connection between the nature of the 
planets, their affinity for certain elements, and the existence of specific properties in 
terrestrial things. This influence of the stars and planets on terrestrial things is based on a 
doctrine of “similitude,” whereby the nature of the celestial bodies is impressed on 
terrestrial bodies as a seal into wax.172 In Llull’s system, the principles of causation are a 
modified list of the divine attributes. In effect, it is this causal dependence of one sphere 
of being (the heavens) on another (earth and earthly bodies) that enables Llull to propose 
that the human intellect can attain knowledge of higher grades of being.173
One of Llull's most important contributions to the history of ideas is his effort to 
categorize the various levels of being and the elements. In addition to the circles of 
  
                                                 
171 Ramon Llull. Opera Latina, I, 334. 
172 Frances Yates, Lull and Bruno, “The Art of Ramon Lull: An Approach to it through Lull’s 
Theory of the Elements,”19-20. 
173 Ibid.,  41-42. 
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predicates, Llull also represented the connection of the sciences in terms of a tree of 
science (arbor scientiae). In his Arbre de scientia, which Frances Yates has called the 
“Forest Encyclopedia,” Llull demonstrates the connection of the sciences by representing 
the particular sciences, as well as logical relations and real elements, by a tree, or even at 
times a forest of trees. This taxonomy of the elements of things and the sciences was 
intimately related to classical rhetorical and logistical devices that were designed to help 
one memorize and access a wide variety of information easily, since they helped to order 
that information such that it could accommodate the mnemonic techniques.174 In essence, 
the art of memory was intended to bridge the gap between the internal structure of 
thought (logic) and the external nature of reality (metaphysics). The memory art was 
meant to apply logical principles to the ordering of things in reality and therefore to lead 
one to a real knowledge of things in the most expedient way possible.175
 
 
 Classical memory art 
Thus, the Llullian art of memory represents a revival of the rhetorical practices of 
the Latin classical authors like Cicero and Quintillian, combined with a resurgent 
Neoplatonic mysticism that cast this technique in a very different form.176
                                                 
174 See Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory, 36-55, for a complete discussion of the connection 
between the tree of knowledge and encyclopedism and the art of memory. 
 As the story 
175 “Sciendium est igitur, quod haec Ars est et Logica et Metaphysica ... sed in duobus differt ab 
aliis duabus, videlicet in modo consideradin suum subjectum et in modo principiorum. 
Metaphysica considerat res, quae sunt extra animam, prout conveniun ratione entis; logica 
etiam considerat res secundem esse, quod habent in anima ... Sed haec Ars tanquam suprema 
omnium humanarum scientiarum indifferenter respicit ens secundum istum modum eet 
secundum, illlum,” Introductoris artis demonstrativae, Mainz. ed., vol. III, p. 1; quoted in 
Yates, Lull and Bruno, 56. 
176 See Frances Yates. The Art of Memory, esp. Ch. 1-3. 
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goes, this ancient art extends back to the Greek poet Simonides. After Simonides had 
recited a poem at a large banquet, the ungrateful host suggested that while he would pay 
half the fee for this entertainment, the poet’s muses should pay the other half (it seems 
that Simonides was one of the first poets to have requested payment for his craft). Just at 
that moment, Simonides received a messenger telling him to meet someone outside the 
banquet hall. While there was no one to be found outside, Simonides’ happened to exit 
the building just as it collapsed, killing everyone inside. Apparently, the bodies were so 
badly mangled that Simonides was the only one able to identify them based on his 
excellent memory of their positions around the table. This surprising capacity for 
recollection lead the poet to suggest that he had developed a technique to remember 
things, based on the ordered arrangement of places, to which he could assign names, 
events, people or images.  
Aristotle acknowledges that this art of memory is closely related to the use of 
dialectic in scientific investigations. For instance, he says, “For just as in a person with a 
trained memory, a memory of things themselves is immediately caused by the mere 
mention of their ‘places’ [topoi], so these habits too will make a man readier in reasoning 
[logismos], because he has his premises classified before his mind's eye, each under its 
number.”177
                                                 
177 Ibid. VIII.14, 163b 27-31. 
 Aristotle seems to have acknowledged that the activity of remembering, or 
recollection, is a sort of investigation. This is why he claims that though memory may be 
shared with animals, recollection is the property of human beings alone, who have the 
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capacity for deliberation, or logical inference, of which recollection is a species.178 For 
Aristotle, the nature of recollection as a mode of investigation is also what necessitates an 
order in the series of things to be recalled, because the recollection is sought through a 
chain of inferences or a “succession of movements,” beginning from a “starting-point,” 
which he says “explains why it is that persons are supposed to recollect sometimes by 
starting from ‘places’.”179 Additionally, this art of memory seemed to provide a necessary 
complement to dialectical deduction as something that would aid in scientific discovery. 
Aristotle makes it clear that induction relies on the capacity of memory and the ordered 
representation of experience.180
This seems to be the inspiration for Cicero, whose discussion of the art of 
memory in his De Oratore is instructive: 
 
He [Simonides] inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty would select 
places [loci] and from mental images of the things they wish to remember and 
store those images in the places, so that the order of the places will preserve the 
order of things [ordo rei], and the images of the things will denote the things 
themselves, and we shall employ the places and images as a wax writing-tablet 
and the letters written on it.181
 
 
Thus, the technique gives an account of the relation between images and things (like the 
impressions on a wax writing-tablet) and the order that is given to these images, which in 
turn facilitates recollection of the true order of the things themselves. Though the actual 
applications of this mnemonic technique are obscure to the contemporary thinker 
                                                 
178 Aristotle, On Memory, 453a 11-3. 
179 Ibid., 451b 11-452a 17. 
180 Post. An. II, 19 suggests a link between perception, memory and induction, while Pr. An. II, 23 
claims that there are only two ways of acquiring belief, deduction or induction (or 
enumeration as he also calls it). 
181 Cicero, De Oratore II, lxxxvi, 351-4, quoted in Yates, The Art of Memory, 2. 
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(sometimes these are related to architectural structures, where different rooms or places 
in rooms are meant to designate things to be remembered; sometimes bizarre images are 
conjured up—human representations with symbolic accoutrements—in order to prompt 
the individual’s memory), it is clear that some art or technique was devised in order to 
shore up the deficiencies of the memory to make one more apt to reason or speak well. 
Paolo Rossi supplies many sources which indicate that, in fact, the “places” were to be 
thought of on analogy with matter, while the “images” were considered the forms. Thus, 
if someone were familiar with a certain location, say a house or abandoned building, 
these same loci could serve as the template for many different arguments or speeches to 
be remembered.182
As time wore on and the settings in which rhetorical skill and good memory were 
highly praised disappeared, the art of memory began to lose its relevance.
 
183
                                                 
182 For a clear discussion of the practical techniques of this art see Yates, The Art of Memory, Ch. 
1, 1-26 and Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory, 6-24.  
 As a 
consequence, when for example Thomas Aquinas takes up the issue of memory with 
reference to Cicero, it is subsumed under prudence, as one of its parts. Though Aquinas 
refers back to the pseudo-Ciceronian text Ad Herennium de arte rhetorica, which was the 
primary Latin source for the art of memory, it seems that he revives these mnemonic 
techniques principally in service of moral action. It is useful, Aquinas claims, to train the 
memory since prudence concerns judgments about contingent things, and thus is 
183 Yates, ibid., 53, puts it this way: “In the barabarized world, the voices of the orators were 
silenced. People cannot meet together peacefully to listen to speeches when there is no 
security. Learning retreated into the monasteries and the art of memory for rhetorical purposes 
became unnecessary, though Quintillianist memorising of a prepared written page might still 
have been useful.” 
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advanced through experience, which is simply the combination of many memories. Thus 
the better one remembers, the better will be one’s collective experience of many 
particular events, and thus the better one will be able to apply the rule of reason to any 
given contingent event.184 This capacity to remember and to perform the techniques of 
memory depends, for Aquinas, on the capacity to reproduce an image, or phantasm, that 
adequately represents the thing to be remembered. In his commentary on Aristotle’s De 
Memoria, Aquinas concludes that “it is necessary, if we wish to facilitate the 
remembering of intelligible reasons to bind them to certain phantasms [which are 
corporeal in nature], as [pseudo-]Cicero teaches in his Rhetoric. Nevertheless memory is 
placed by some in the intellectual part, insofar as memory is understood to be every 
habitual conservation of those things which pertain to the intellectual part of the soul.”185
The ordered succession of memories and the necessity for a starting-point of 
investigation all serve to connect Aristotle’s theory of memory, the encyclopedic 
taxonomy of knowledge that emerges with Llull, and the era just prior to Descartes. 
Because order in one’s thoughts aids recollection of the thing sought, Aristotle says, 
“accordingly things arranged in a fixed order, like the successive demonstrations in 
 
The epistemological implications of this view, as it can be contrasted with Descartes, will 
be treated in Chapter 3. The important point to realize here is that, while Aquinas retains 
the psychological and metaphysical account of memory as it is given in Aristotle, he sees 
the art of memory as generally necessary for acquiring prudence and not for the rhetorical 
and educational purposes for which it was conceived by Cicero and Quintilian.  
                                                 
184 Summa Theologica, II, q. 49, a. 1. 
185 On Memory and Recollection, Lsn. 2, §326, 15. 
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geometry, are easy to remember, while badly arranged subjects are remembered with 
difficulty.”186 From this, Aquinas concludes in his commentary, “Therefore, to remember 
or recollect well, we can learn four useful lessons from the foregoing. First one must be 
careful to reduce to some order what one wishes to retain; then one must apply the mind 
profoundly and intently to those things; next one must frequently meditate (on them) in 
order; finally one must begin to recollect from the starting point.”187
 
 Thus, the classical 
origins of the art of memory already indicate that the technique for discovering truth in 
the sciences proceeds most easily when knowledge is reduced to its simple components 
and these are subsequently ordered and arranged like the demonstrations of mathematics. 
Clearly, there are important implications of these insights for Descartes’ Regulae. 
 Llullian ontology 
While, in a certain sense, the dissociation of dialectic from rhetoric spelled the 
end of the rhetorical significance of the memory art, that art would reemerge in a 
different form in the sixteenth century. According to Rossi, “The absorption of memory 
into logic and the identification of the problem of method with that of memory gave rise 
to the concept of method as a classification of reality, a notion which became vitally 
important to European thought in succeeding centuries.”188
                                                 
186 Ibid. 452a 1-3, trans. J. I. Beare in Complete Works of Aristotle. 
 Both Bruno and Alsted 
attempted to bridge the gap between logic and reality by introducing concepts that are 
really outside the realm of science. In this way, they draw on the metaphysical and 
187 Aquinas, On Memory and Recollection, Lsn. 5, §371, 39. 
188 Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory, 101. 
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alchemical elements of Llull’s system. Frances Yates is the most well known 
commentator to have traced the central elements of Bruno’s thought to the Hermetic 
tradition, occultism, and astrology.189 Yates has been criticized, in particular, by Rita 
Sturlese for an overemphasis on the magical and mystical elements in Bruno’s thought to 
the detriment of a focus on its technical utility.190
 This is all the more evident in Llull insofar as his resurrection of the art of 
memory coincides with a certain strain of Augustinian and Neoplatonic metaphysics, an 
influence that Yates understands to come from John Scotus Eriugena.
 Nonetheless, Bruno’s philosophical 
writings show a clear lineage with the writings of Ramon Llull and thus fit within a 
tradition of Cabalism and occultism. Additionally, Bruno’s application of the memory art 
to scientific understanding utilizes decidedly Neoplatonic themes: the shadows or “ideas” 
of the mind, an intellectual ascent from darkness into light, a presumed order and unity to 
all things, and a metaphysical correspondence between ideas perceived by the mind and 
the nature of reality.  
191 Two elements of 
this connection ought to be noted. First, Llull’s emphasis on the centrality of the divine 
names, or divine attributes, as the first principles and the standard of order for the 
universe has a clear Neoplatonic heritage, most immediately from Pseudo-Dionysus. For 
instance, Scotus Eriugena calls the divine names “primordial causes”: they are, he says, 
“what the Greeks call ideas.”192
                                                 
189 Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. 
 Second, Llull believed that by means of the divine names 
and their combinations, an ars combinatoria of the sort that Leibniz refers to, one could 
190 Rita Stulese, “Introduction” to Giordano Bruno, De umbris idearum. 
191 Yates, “Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena,” in Lull and Bruno, 78-125. 
192 Cited in Yates, ibid., 85. 
 157 
ascend the levels of being in order to attain higher knowledge. This notion of ascension 
through mnemonic technique, according to the interconnection of things in divine 
creation is variously imagined in terms of a great tree (the Arbor Scientiae) or a ladder 
(the scalae intellectus of the Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus). Moreover, 
ascension up to the vast treasure trove of the memory resembles the famous passage from 
Augustine’s Confessions, Bk. 10.193 The Augustinian influence is reinforced through 
Llull’s distinction between memory, intellect, and will as a symbolic expression of the 
persons of the Trinity: the new logic of combination represents the intellect, his mystical 
writings represent the will, and the mnemotechnical system unites them by means of its 
vast classification and codification of the elements.194
                                                 
193 Cf. Augustine, Confessiones, X, VIII, 1: “Transibo ergo et istam, naturae meae, gradibus 
ascendens ad eum, qui fecit me, ubi sunt thesauri innumerabilium imaginum de cuiusccemodi 
rebus sensis invectarum”; compare to Descartes, Rule V, AT X, 380: “et saepe adeo inordinate 
difficilimas examinant quaestiones, ut mihi videantur idem facere, ac si ex infima parte ad 
fastigium alicuius aedisicii uno faltu conarentur pervenire, vel neglectis scalae gradibus, qui 
ad hunc usum sunt destinati, vel non animadversis.” 
 Thus, Llull’s art, while still a 
technique to aid the memory, is simultaneously a technique of investigation of the nature 
of things, understood according to their relations to the elements and the divine attributes; 
and this technique provides a means for ascending to the most general forms of 
knowledge by way of the connection between first principles and the things themselves. 
Moreover, the ascension of knowledge is made possible because, for Llull, the nature of 
the intellect mirrors the nature of God, and hence the structure of God’s creation. In this 
way, Llull’s project represents the aim to develop a total system of knowledge, a 
“pansophia” as it came to be known in the 16th and 17th centuries, by means of what 
194 Yates, “The Art of Ramon Lull,” in Lull and Bruno. 
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Paolo Rossi calls a “specular” doctrine of reality, i.e., a presupposed “correspondence 
between words (termini) and things (res), between logic and ontology.”195
  
 Clearly this 
mystical unity of knowledge through the participation of the human intellect in the divine 
intellect and thereby from the ideas or images in the intellect to the products of creation 
exceeds what one could legitimately ascribe to Aristotle or Aquinas. Nonetheless, it 
demonstrates the gradual dissolution of the Aristotelian method in education and as a 
standard of scientific certainty. These elements together suggest a growing interest in the 
possibility of a universal method, one that would emerge in explicit contrast to 
Aristotelian dialectic and would arrange the sciences according to a clear order such as 
would be fitting for human mental capacities.  
Mathesis universalis, algebra and the ars analytice 
 
Though mathematical education had been largely neglected in the Middle Ages, 
the sixteenth century reformers expressed a renewed interest in the study of and 
education in geometry. In 1564 Conrad Dasipodius, a teacher of mathematics at Johann 
Sturm's university, prepared a Greek and Latin edition of Euclid's Elements with an 
accompanying preface and made this a central part of the educational program there, 
while Ramus endowed a chair exclusively for mathematics at the University of Paris and 
urged others to do the same. These reformers much preferred the simplicity and 
                                                 
195 Rosssi, Logic and the Art of Memory, 61; cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, Bk. IX-X. 
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uncontroversial nature of geometrical proofs to the disputatious syllogisms.196 Above all, 
the question of the method of the geometers drove interest in the field. The clarity and 
utility (especially in medical science) of geometry were obvious, but how the ancient 
geometers were able to arrive at their demonstrations remained obscure. Toward the end 
of the sixteenth century, Dasipodius and no less than Christopher Clavius attempted (in 
vain) to render Euclid's Elements in syllogistic form.197 It is, in fact, impossible to render 
the Elements in syllogistic form because Euclid’s geometrical proofs depend on the 
‘auxiliary construction’ or ‘supposition’ of features that are only accidental to the object 
under consideration. In other words, Euclid’s demonstrations are per accidens and never 
per essendi as is required for an Aristotelian demonstrative syllogism.198
It is in this context that the term mathesis universalis emerges as a philosophical 
concept. In a general sense, the terminology is used to describe a novel approach to 
mathematics that was recognized in classical geometry but not exploited as such. Alsted 
was one of the key figures of the early 17th century to employ the idea of a mathesis 
universalis in a meaningful way. Alsted introduces his Methodus admirandorum 
mathematicorum (1613) by stating that this book will teach one the wonders of 
mathematics, containing techniques by which one can attain a universal mathesis 
[Isagoge in libros admirandorum mathematicorum, continens technologiam, adeoque 
  
                                                 
196 Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method, 83-86. 
197 Ibid. 86-92. 
198 I borrow this argument from Bret J. L. Doyle, The Logic of Descartes’ Regulae. Section 2.3.3 
presents a thorough treatment of Clavius’ attempt to render geometrical arguments in the 
syllogism and Descartes’ consequent rejection of syllogistic reasoning from scientia. 
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matheseos universae oeconomiam].199 For Alsted, “general mathematics is a science that 
treats of quantity in its common meaning [mathematica generalis est scientia, tractans de 
quantitate communiter].”200 Though this definition of a “general mathematics” suggests 
that it is only applicable to abstract quantity, for Alsted, mathesis seems to govern a 
broader range of applications. For instance, he relates mathesis to Aristotle’s Organon, 
suggesting that it is the means by which any philosophical knowledge is discovered.201
 
  
 Aristotle and the idea of “universal mathematics”  
While classical mathematics recognized the possibility of designing a general 
science of mathematics applicable to abstract magnitude, i.e., both discrete (arithmetical) 
and continuous (geometrical) magnitude, not until the 16th century was this possibility 
actively explored. It was suggested that the ratio or proportional relation that exists 
between both kinds of magnitude could make a general science of abstract magnitude 
possible. Aristotle suggests that some Ancient Greek philosophers held the opinion that 
there was such a “universal mathematics” in his Metaphysics: 
One might indeed raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals 
with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical 
sciences are all alike in this respect—geometry and astronomy deal with a certain 
particular kind of thing—while universal mathematics applies alike to all. We 
answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, 
natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, 
the science of this must be prior and must be the first philosophy, and universal in 
this way, because it is first.202
                                                 
199 J.H. Alsted, Methodus admirandorum mathematicorum (1613) in Crapulli, Mathesis 
Universalis, Appendice IV. 
 
200 Ibid., 19-20. 
201 Ibid.: “Quia adeo sunt excellents, ut sine nemo philosophi titulo guadere possit.” 
202 Metaphysics, 6.1, 1026a 23-31, trans. W.D. Ross. Cf. Metaphysics 9.7, 1064b 6-14: “One 
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The problem in Aristotle is raised with respect to the possibility of a science of being in 
general, what Aristotle called first philosophy and would later become ontology. This is 
the reason for his conclusion that first philosophy will either be a kind of physics or a 
kind of theology. But the reference to a “universal mathematics” suggests that certain 
Greek thinkers had entertained the possibility of a general science of mathematics on 
analogy with which one might conveive of first philosophy. Of course, just as Aristotle 
poses the question with respect to first philosophy, the central question for a proposed 
universal mathematics would be: to what does that science apply?  
One difficulty immediately presented to any science of magnitude in general is 
the incompatibility of the supposed principles of the science. Plato suggests a unity 
between the mathematical sciences in Bk. VII of the Republic when he treats the 
education of the guardians by suggesting that the best kind of education will have 
something to do with “calculation and number” because these help to determine the one 
apart from the many (525a). Socrates suggests a further alliance between arithmetic and 
geometry when he calls geometry “the study adjoining [the science of calculation and 
number]” (526c). However, Plato also recognizes that the mathematical sciences depend 
                                                                                                                                                 
might raise the question whether the science of being qua being is to be regarded as universal 
or not. Each of the mathematical sciences deals with some one determinate class of things, but 
universal mathematics applies alike to all. Now if natural substances are the first of existing 
things, natural science must be the first of sciences; but if there is another entity and 
substance, separable and unmovable, the sciences of it must be different and prior to natural 
science, and universal because it is prior.” St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in Aristotelem 
et alios, “In Libro Metaphysicorum,” p. 446, n. 26, states that the term “universal” here does 
not really apply to mathematics, since for him mathematical entities always pertain to some 
particular genre of being. However, Averroës introduces the term scientia universalis into his 
commentary, Commentarium in Metaphyiscorum in Aristotelis Opera Omnia, Vo.l. VIII: 
Metaphysicorum libri XIII (Venetiis, 1562), f. 146v, suggesting to some readers the possibility 
of a truly universal science of mathematics. 
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on hypotheses and “are unable to give an account of them” (533c). Aristotle seems to 
offer some explication for what is meant by those unaccounted for hypotheses of 
mathematics: “in some cases what a thing is is immediate and a principle; and here one 
must suppose, or make apparent in some other way, both that they are and what they are 
(which the arithmetician does; for he supposes both what the unit is and that it is).”203
However, for Aristotle, the starting points of arithmetic and geometry are distinct 
and as a consequence there can be no universal, or common, mathematics. This follows 
from the Aristotelian principle that “one cannot prove anything by crossing from another 
genus.” To illustrate this famous dictum, he says that one cannot prove “something 
geometrical from arithmetic”: he goes on to explain “one cannot apply arithmetical 
demonstrations to the accidentals of magnitudes, unless magnitudes are numbers.”
 
Thus, both arithmetic and geometry presuppose certain basic concepts, such as the unit, 
point, line, or plane, which are axiomatic, or definitional, and cannot be proved.  
204
                                                 
203 Posterior Analytics, II.9, 93b 24-26. 
 The 
reason for this is that, for Aristotle, what is demonstrated must not only depend on the 
axioms, or premises, from which it follows, but also the “underlying genus” to which it 
pertains. That is, the extremes—the subject and predicate of what is to be demonstrated—
must be of the same genus as the middle term. Otherwise, for Aristotle, the demonstration 
would not demonstrate what the thing is essentially, but what it is accidentally, or by 
some adduced property that does not belong to the essence of the thing. In short, the 
prohibition against a general science of magnitudes follows from the fact that there is no 
genus of ‘abstract magnitude’ for Aristotle. For him, universal mathematics rests on a 
204 Ibid. I.7, 75a 38-39. 
 163 
“category mistake” in the strictest sense of the term because scientific explanations must 
demonstrate what a thing is by virtue of the category, and more specifically the genus, to 
which it belongs.205 Moreover, Aristotle was surely aware of the incommensurability 
problem of numerical and continuous magnitudes. This follows from the existence of 
irrational magnitudes; and the Pythagoreans were well aware of the existence of these. 
Consider the diagonal of the unit square (√2): it is incommensurable to any rational 
number, and incommensurable with the unit itself (cf. Plato’s Meno 82a-85c).206
 
 
 Mathesis universalis in the sixteenth century 
In the sixteenth century, however, several thinkers appear to have explored this 
notion of “universal mathematics” as a genuine science (sometimes it is referred to as a 
‘mathematica generalis’ (Alsted), ‘aliqua scientia mathematica communis’ (Benedictus 
Pererius), ‘prima mathematica’ (Adriaan van Roomen), or ‘scientia communis’ 
(Alessandro Piccolomini)) of quantity or proportional relations between magnitudes in 
general.207
                                                 
205 Now, there remain some important relations between the various mathematical sciences, for 
Aristotle. For example, he suggests that some mathematical sciences are related as type to 
token, such as optics to geometry, mechanics to solid geometry, harmonics to arithmetic, or 
star-gazing to astronomy. Some are united in name or by virtue of their explanation such that 
it is up to the empirical science to know the fact and the mathematical science to know the 
reason why: such is the case for mathematical and nautical astronomy, mathematical and 
acoustical harmonics, optics and the study of the rainbow, and geometry and medicine, 
Posterior Analytics, I.13, 78b 34-79a 16. 
 Notably, Adriaan van Roomen’s Apologia pro Archimede (1597) describes 
206 Doyle, The Logic of Descartes’ Method, Chapter 1.3 argues for incommensurability as a 
driving force behind Aristotle’s rejection of a universal mathematics. 
207 Consider the conclusion in Crapulli, Mathesis Universalis, 146: “la scienza comune alle 
discipline matematische sembra addirittura perdere la sua specifica caratterizzazione 
matematica, pre per assumere quella più generica di un ordine di considerazione più pertinenti 
all metafisica.” 
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exactly what is meant by the mathesis universalis in a section in which “An Idea of a 
Kind of Universalis Matheseos, which We Shall Call Prima Mathesis, Is Proposed [Idea 
quedam universalis Matheseos, quam nos primam vocabimus Mathesin, proponitur].” As 
the title of this section indicates, van Roomen understands Prima Mathematica seu Prima 
Mathesis on analogy with first philosophy and he claims, “it is called ‘First’ because 
under it are assumed the subjects of all the other sciences and further it proves the 
principles of the others if they need demonstration [ea dicitur, Prima quia subiecta 
omnium reliquarum sub se comprehendit scientiarum, quinimo et reliquarum demonstrat 
principia si demonstratione egeant].”208 Further, he details the constituent elements of 
what he calls a “mathesis universalis.”209 He divides “general mathesis [universa 
mathesis]” into “true mathematics [vera mathematica]” and “that which is like 
mathematics [quasi mathematica],” the latter of which includes things like architecture 
and the military arts.210
                                                 
208 Translation following Chikara Sasaki, “Descartes as Reformer of the Mathematical 
Disciplines,” Descartes et le Moyen Age, 40. 
 The true mathematics is further distilled into a “pure mathematics 
[pura mathematica]” as distinct from “mixed mathematics [mixta mathematica],” which 
includes Astronomy, Geodesics, Music, and Optics. Pure mathematics is finally reduced 
to “mathesis universalis,” which is to be distinguished from “mathesis specialis,” i.e., 
arithmetic and geometry.  
209 Van Roomen, Apologia pro Archimede (1597), Ch. VI-VIII in Crapulli, Mathesis Universalis, 
Appendice III. 
210 This list of categorization has lead Sasaki to suggest that “in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries ‘universa mathesis’ was in general distinguished from ‘universalis mathesis’. The 
former term meant ‘mathematics as a whole’, whereas the latter usually denoted ‘a 
mathematical discipline common to arithmetic and geometry.’” (“Descartes as Reformer of the 
Mathematical Disciplines,” 41) 
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This is the first recorded use of the exact phrase ‘mathesis universalis’ and it 
suggests that van Roomen conceived of it as an independent science that would capture 
the essence of the various mathematical disciplines, i.e., a science of mathematics as such 
on analogy with first philosophy.211 The table of classification in van Roomen also 
suggests a hierarchy of the mathematical sciences, where purity is correlated with 
abstraction from physical applications. For example, mathesis universalis is a component 
of “pure mathematics,” which also includes arithmetic and geometry but does not include 
“mixed mathematics” like astronomy, music and optics. In the end, van Roomen appends 
a kind of calculus to the abstract notion of mathematical science, the mathesis universalis. 
He calls this technique the supputatrix, or logistikê or even Arithmopraxia. Apparently 
this technique or calculus would deal not only with numbers, but it would be a very 
general kind of calculation whose operations would be at the same time readily apparent 
to anyone.212 The term “logistics” refers back to the formal logic of the High Middle 
Ages, which is what Peter of Spain called his logic.213
Moreover, van Roomen’s understanding of the mathesis universalis, insofar as it 
is an abstract science of quantity as such, wrests mathematics free from its association 
 In this way, van Roomen’s initial 
use of ‘mathesis universalis’ appears against the background of a recategorization of 
mathematical knowledge, the mathematical disciplines, and the method of discovery 
appropriate to mathematics. 
                                                 
211 He says, “Inscribemus autem scientiam hanc nomine primae mathematicae, seu primae 
matheseos, ad similitudinem primae philosophiae.... Ita et haec prima mathematica versatur 
circa subiecta omnium scientiarum mathematicum, et puram et mixtum.” 
212 Sasaki, Descartes’ Mathematical Thought, 351, equates this concept with a nascent idea of 
algebra. 
213 Ong, Ramus, 55-74. 
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with a particular genre of being. For Aristotle, as we have seen, mathematics is the study 
of quantity and measure, but quantity and measure of some particular thing, some 
underlying substance, whether number, length, or solid bodies. Moreover, for Aristotle, it 
makes a difference with reference to which kind of thing one is demonstrating. The 
possibility of a kind of mathematics as such, a universal or first mathematics, suggests 
that there is a kind of mathematical science that is not tied to some particular substance, 
but would pertain either to an abstract substance or to a substance that is the super-genus 
of different kinds of things. In other words, the mathesis universalis, in contrast to 
Aristotle’s understanding of mathematics, is the first gesture toward conceiving of 
mathematics as a formal system.214
 
  
 Barozzi’s translation of Proclus 
This gradual abstraction and formalization of the science and method of 
mathematics from particular entities accords well with the introduction of Francesco 
Barozzi’s widely distributed Latin translation of Proclus’ commentary on Euclid’s 
Elements (1570). This work represents the other side of the coin from van Roomen and 
Alsted’s project, in terms of a general inquiry into a formal system of mathematical 
knowledge. Frederick Van de Pitte has made this important distinction: in the case of the 
former, he says, mathesis universalis is assumed to be a kind of mathematical science, a 
                                                 
214 Benito Pereira, De communibus omnium rerum natrualiam principiis (Rome, 1576), interprets 
mathematics as that which is easily abstracted from all material specificity and indeterminacy 
is thus the most easily understood and clearly comprehended. But it is not, for that reason, the 
highest scientific knowledge, indeed, for Pereira, it is the lowest, since it is so easily abstracted 
from the things themselves. 
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subject matter, under which the various specific mathematical sciences would be 
incorporated; in the case of the latter, mathesis is linked to a way of learning, an 
epistemological process. This is apparent, for instance, when Proclus refers back to 
Plato’s doctrine of reminiscence and dialectic, whereby first principles are attained 
through a kind of inward reflection on the nature of ideas.215
When Barozzi published his translation, he appended an introduction and 
commentary that are instructive. In the prologue, he divides the term “universalis 
mathesis” into “intelligible things [res mente] (ta onta)” and “thought [ratione perceptas] 
(dionoêta).” Thus, he understands mathesis unversalis to refer to the objects of 
mathematical knowledge as well as the manner of thinking appropriate to mathematical 
objects. In some sense this mitigates Van de Pitte’s strict distinction between Barozzi and 
 Thus, in a historical sense, 
Proclus is more indebted to Plato’s epistemological theory of mathematical truth than to 
Aristotle’s concern for the ontological range of mathematics, understood as a discipline 
related to a particular subject matter. Nonetheless, the mathematical epistemology of 
Proclus’ commentary is also rooted in an abstraction of the mathematical sciences from 
their concrete determination by particular substances in much the same way as van 
Roomen’s and Alsted’s rejection of the Aristotle’s view of mathematics served to liberate 
mathematics to be an abstract universal science. The former treats the epistemological 
features of abstraction, i.e., how one comes to know the principles of such a formal 
system, while the latter describes the metaphysical range of a proposed mathesis 
universalis. 
                                                 
215 Frederick Van de Pitte, “The Dating of Rule IV-B,” 386-87. 
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van Roomen, but it does not diminish the importance of recognizing that such a 
distinction is operative in the tradition of writing on mathesis universalis. Indeed, Barozzi 
will focus greater attention on the “thought” appropriate to mathematics, indicating his 
epistemological concerns. For Proclus, mathematics is a mediating science between the 
sensible and the knowable and in this way related to imagination. When Proclus refers to 
the famous passage in Bk. VI of Plato’s Republic, where mathematical “hypotheses” are 
seen as the “stepping-stones” from images, on analogy with the sensible world, to the 
intelligible world of ideas, Barozzi comments that “[i]t is thus some kind of universal 
science of mathematics, according to which all the mathematical disciplines are included 
... and to which the other sciences refer as though it were the principle of them [est autem 
una quaedem universalis mathematica scientia, sub se comprehendens omnes simul 
mathematicas disciplinas ... denique ad eam ipsam tanquam principalem referentur].”216 
Corrado Dasipodio adds another layer of commentary to Barozzi’s text, saying that the 
mathematical sciences “hold an intermediary place between the indivisible, simple things, 
and composite things [medium obtinere locum inter impartibiles, et simplices, et 
compositas].”217
                                                 
216 Dasipodio, Scritti matematici (1564) in Crapulli, Mathesis Universalis, Appendice I, 166. 
 Here Barozzi and Dasipodio, by way of their commentary on Proclus, 
assert that the mathesis universalis serves a function in cognition that is akin to the role of 
mathematics in Plato, namely, to carry the mind from the physical world of sensible 
reality to a mental world of ideas, from complex physical entities to simple and 
indivisible ideas. Moreover, when Barozzi classifies the mathematical sciences, now 
understood as species of the mathesis unversalis, he divides them according to the 
217 Ibid. 
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distinction between thought (noêta) and perception (aisthêta): arithmetic and geometry 
stand on the side of pure thought, while astronomy, mechanics, optics, geodesics (the 
science of measuring surfaces and volumes) and logistics (the science that deals with 
numbering things, not numbers themselves) are all classified on the side of perception.218
 
 
Here again, van Roomen’s classification of the disciplines of mathematics is correlated 
with the faculties of the intellect as described by Proclus. 
 Viète, algebra, and the analytic art 
While these references indicate a concern for a general science of mathematics at 
the turn of the 17th century, François Viète, who probably drew his greatest influence 
from Diophantus and Peter Ramus (though he was also an acquaintance and sometimes 
adversary of van Roomen), concretized this abstract notion with a workable technique 
that he called the “new algebra.” For Viète, the new algebra was explicitly and directly 
related to the ancient notion of “analysis,” the hidden art of discovery that the ancient 
geometers apparently used to reach first principles of demonstration: “There is a way for 
Mathematics to inquire and search for the truth, which is said to have been first found by 
Plato, and which he called “Analysis” (analypsis). Here it is defined as the supposition of 
what is sought as given because of the truth of the given.”219
                                                 
218 Crapulli, Mathesis Universalis, Appendice I, 159. See Thomas Heath, A History of Greek 
Mathematics, I, for a clarification of the classical division of mathematics. 
 Viète’s description of 
219 La nouvelle algèbre de M. Viète, traduction en Français par J. L. Sieur de Vaulezard (Paris, 
1630), Ch. 1. Latin edition, Fransisci Vietae Opera Mathematica, ed. By Franz van Schooten 
(Lugduni Batavorum, 1646), In Arten Analyticen Isagoge, Ch. 1: “Est veritatis inquirendae via 
quaedam in mathematicis, quam Plato primus invenisse dicitur, a Theone nominata Analysis, 
et ab eodem definita, adsumptio quesiti tanquam concessi per consequentia ad verum 
concessum.” 
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analysis here recalls the classical notion, defined by Pappus of Alexandria: “For in 
analysis we suppose that which is sought to be already done, and we inquire from what it 
results, and again what is the antecedent of the latter, until we on our backward way light 
upon something already known and being first in order. And we call such a method 
analysis, as being a solution backwards (anapalin lysin).”220 It seems that Viète’s 
reference to Plato is, like the passage from Proclus, a reference to the ascension of 
mathematical knowledge up to first principles by way of hypotheses, i.e., supposing what 
is sought as already done. In the Republic, Socrates finds that because the mathematical 
sciences take their hypotheses as given, they are unable to reach metaphysical truths that 
are only attainable by dialectic.221 Nonetheless, the turn of the seventeenth century 
mathematicians follow Proclus in outlining a general method of discovery, an ars 
analytice, where the mathematical sciences provoke an ascension of thought from 
complex, sensible particulars up to simple, intelligible, and abstract concepts.222
                                                 
220 Pappus, Mathematical Collection, quoted in J. Hintikka and U. Remes, The Method of 
Analysis, 8. 
 Algebra 
was understood to provide just that method; it would link arithmetic and geometry by 
using symbols to denote unknown quantities and a method of transforming equations in 
order to isolate and determine those unknowns according to what is known.  
221 Plato, The Republic (511a): “However, a soul in investigating [the intelligible form] is 
compelled to use hypotheses, and does not go to a beginning (archê) because it is unable to 
step out above the hypotheses. And it uses as images those very things of which images are 
made by the things below, and in comparison with which they are opined to be clear and are 
given honor.” 
222 I am uncertain how either Viète and/or Proclus responded to the issue of the unexamined 
“hypotheses,” or if they refer to dialectic. Are the elements of mathematics 
definitional/axiomatic? Is there any awareness of the limitations of this? As a result, what is 
the scope of this system? 
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Viète’s new algebra produced perhaps the first formal mathematical system: it 
defined a set of mathematical elements, basically on analogy with geometrical objects, 
and defined the nature of the operations to be performed on those elements, i.e., addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, division, and root extraction.223
Though this law seems strange to a contemporary reader, it is based on an 
extension of the geometrical principle of multiplying and dividing to algebra. For 
instance, if a line segment is to be multiplied by another, the result is not a line, but a 
parallelogram. Likewise, if the parallelogram is multiplied again by a line segment, the 
result is a parallelopiped. One can see that in dealing with extended magnitudes, the 
operations of multiplication and division result in a change in dimension. While there is 
 The new algebra was divided 
into three distinct techniques: “zetetics” was the art of translating geometrical problems 
into algebraic equations; “poristics” provided the means for transforming equations; and 
“exegetics” or “rhetorics” developed the means for deriving solutions of unknown 
quantities. Algebraic symbols and the manipulation of equations allowed Viète to arrive 
at equations for the desired curves, mean proportionals, or planar points in order to solve 
classical geometrical problems. However, his science of algebra was fairly restricted 
because he stipulated that one could only perform operations or transformations on 
magnitudes of the same degree. The degree of a magnitude was determined by its power 
(x is of the first degree, while x2 is of the second). He called this restriction the “law of 
homogeneity.”  
                                                 
223 Henk J. M. Bos, Redifining Geometrical Exactness, 2001), 148-51, outlines the formal 
characteristics of Viète's new algebra. Understanding the ontological status of that formal 
system depends on how one responds to the issue of hypotheses. 
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no apparent dimensional change in the arithmetical analogs to these calculations, Viète 
felt it necessary to prevent the possibility of comparing two magnitudes of different 
dimensions, thus instituting the law of homogeneity. Viète’s adherence to this law reveals 
the extent to which the ontological status of mathematics is cashed out in geometrical 
figures and not an independent concept of number.224 As Henk Bos remarks, “Viète did 
not see his algebra, which was to be the essential tool in his analysis, as a technique 
concerning numbers, but as a method of symbolic calculation concerning abstract 
magnitudes.”225
At the time of the Regulae, it seems to me that Descartes too did not have an 
abstract concept of number as an entity whose existence could be clearly and distinctly 
perceived without the aid of the imagination. This can be seen for instance in Rule XIV, 
where Descartes outlines the difference between abstract mental conceptions (which can 
be conceived by the pure intellect, but have no real, i.e., specific, instantiation) and what 
he calls “real” or “particular” ideas. The latter are formed through the aid of the 
imagination. With respect to the concept of number, Descartes says, “[I]f something 
 I take this to mean that, in fact, Viète did not have a rigorous 
mathematical concept of number, but only a loose concept of “abstract magnitude” (the 
subject matter of mathesis universalis), which he ultimately understood to refer to 
geometrical constructions. 
                                                 
224 Though Descartes eliminates the need for the law of homogeneity by appealing to the generic 
concept of a unit, he still does not entirely wrest himself from the legitimating force of 
geometrical magnitude for mathematical objects. This can be seen in his inability to treat 
equations with imaginary or irrational roots (i.e., those kinds of numbers that cause problems 
for geometry). 
225 Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness, 147. Cf. 121, where he defines mathesis universalis as 
“the concept of [abstract] magnitudes [i.e., those that remain undetermined as either number or 
measure] ... [and] the notion that the operations on such magnitudes could be treated 
abstractly.” 
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concerning number is sought, we imagine some subject which is measurable by way of 
many units. The intellect of course may for the moment reflect on only this multitude; 
nevertheless we must beware that [the intellect] does not on this basis reach a conclusion 
in which the thing numbered has been excluded from what was considered [merely 
abstractly]” [si de numero sit quaestio, imaginemur subjectum aliquod per multas 
unitates mensurabile, ad cujus solam multitudinem livet intellectus in praesenti reflectat, 
cavebimus tamen ne inde postea aliquid concludat, in quo res numerata a nostro 
conceptu exclusa fuisse supponatur] (AT X, 445; CSM I, 61).226 Thus, even though the 
mathesis universalis gestures toward a formal theory of mathematics, Viète and Descartes 
of the Regulae are unable to concede something like a formal “concept of number,” even 
on the vaguest analogy with what Frege, Husserl, or Cantor propose at the turn of the 20th 
century.227
Despite its restricted scope, Viète’s algebra remained a real instantiation of the 
general science of a mathesis universalis insofar as it was applied to a concept of 
“abstract magnitude,” however loosely conceived. Furthermore, his hopes for this science 
were high. He famously closes his In Artem Analyticem Isagoge, his introduction to the 
new algebra, with the claim that “the analytic art, endowed with its three forms of 
zetetics, poristics and exegetics claims for itself the greatest problem of all, TO LEAVE 
NO PROBLEM UNSOLVED [Denique fastuosum problema problematum ars Analytice, 
 
                                                 
226 Cf. his criticism of “some philosophers” who are “so subtle that they have even distinguished 
quantity from extension” (AT X, 442; CSM I, 67). 
227 The best argument for this is provided by Henk Bos, “The Concept of Construction and the 
Representation of Curves in Seventeenth-Century Mathematics,” in Lectures in the History of 
Mathematics, 23-36, where Bos takes geometrical construction to be the essential criterium for 
adequate solution to mathematical problems as they are envisaged in the 17th century. 
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trplicem Zetetices, Poristices, et Exegetices formam tandem induta, jure sibi adrogat, 
quod est, NULLUM NON PROBLEMAM SOLVERE].” This claim is generally consistent 
with Descartes’ own claims regarding his scientia penitus nova and his algebra, even 
though Descartes was probably in no way acquainted with Vietean algebra until after 
1623 and maintained that he had never even seen the cover of that book.228
It’s not that I would only like to truly believe that the authors are truly learned, 
but I do have enough good spirit to be an accurate judge of the contents of this 
book, nor to respond to what you have asked me about Pappus. For it would be 
quite necessary to go beyond the conic sections and solid figures in order to 
resolve this problem for any number of given lines. Any man who would claim 
nullum non problema solvere must solve this as well, and I think that I have 
solved it. (Letter to Mersenne, 3 May, 1632: AT I, 245) 
 He did, 
however, obtain a copy of Viète’s Ad Logisticen Speciosam from Mersenne, which he 
calls in a letter to Mersenne “book of analysis.” As might be expected, Descartes’ opinion 
of this book is reserved, to say the least: “Between us, I do not see what would be of any 
great utility [in the book].” What is perhaps most interesting about his remarks is the way 
he responds to Viète’s call nullum non problema solvere: 
 
It is perhaps disingenuous of Descartes not to have recognized the “great utility” of 
Viète’s proposed translation of geometrical problems into modern algebraic notation. 
But, with reference to the Pappus locus problem, he is quite right that it is necessary to go 
beyond solid problems, or the conic sections, in order to derive a solution for the problem 
for greater than four lines. In fact, to have moved beyond Viète’s capacity to solve this 
type of problem is precisely the crowning achievement of Descartes’ Géometrie. 
Nonetheless, in the book that Descartes refers to as the book of analysis, Viète articulates 
                                                 
228 In Artem Analyticem Isagoge in Opera Mathematica; for Descartes' denials see AT X, 156-7 
and 331-32. 
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a version of his new algebra as a kind of logistica speciosa and defines the operations of 
the new algebra for adding, subtracting, multiplying, dividing, and finding the mean 
proportionals (i.e., roots of equations) for abstract quantities. These operations are 
defined more geometrico, given postulates and their corollaries and deducing theorems 
from these.229
With Viète’s new algebra, seventeenth century thinkers were presented with an 
answer to two vexing questions from the history of mathematics: What is the subject 
matter of a universal method of mathematics? Magnitude in general. What is the method 
of analysis, or the true method of discovery in mathematics? Algebra. In fact, it seems to 
me that these answers were so compelling that the algebraic method was a much more 
promising science for discovering first principles than the confused dialectic of Aristotle 
and Ramus. The name of dialectic had been sullied by its association with rhetoric, 
alchemy, mysticism, and magic so that it had no real promise for science. Though the 
“law of homogeneity” represents a remnant of the problem of incommensurability, the 
method of the mathematical sciences seemed much more secure with Viète. 
 This is noteworthy because when Leibniz writes his fullest treatment of the 
mathesis universalis, he refers back to Viète’s “special logistics” and proposes to expand 
this into a “general logistics.”  
 
 
 
 Certainty as the standard of truth 
                                                 
229 Ad Logisticen Speciosam in Opera Mathematica. 
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 Several commentators have noted one other historical antecedent to Descartes’ 
concept of mathematics and the importance of the mathematical method for universal 
science that we will turn to briefly. Whereas Aristotle had recognized only the most 
powerful demonstrations [potissimae demonstrationes] as the standard of scientific 
certainty, some late 16th century philosophers began to question this thesis, suggesting 
instead the concept of certainty [certitudine] as the standard of truth. Piccolomini, in his 
Commentarium de certitudine methematicarum (1547), advanced the controversial thesis, 
against Averroës, that the dignity of mathematics lies in “primo gradu certitudinis” not in 
“ratione demonstrationem potissimarum.”230 As I have already noted, the requirements of 
the syllogism for scientific demonstration in Aristotle ensured that it was impossible to 
render even the a priori, deductive geometry of Euclid in that form. Thus, Piccolomini 
advocated certainty rather than the syllogistic form as the mark of mathematical truth. 
The characteristic certainty of mathematics is affirmed by Benedictus Pererius (1535-
1610), who agrees that mathematics, by virtue of its abstraction is more certain than any 
other science. However, according to Pererius, it does not for this reason attain the status 
of scientific truth. On the contrary, Pererius claims that the mental abstraction of 
mathematics from the things themselves renders mathematical knowledge empty.231
                                                 
230 Crapulli, Mathesis Universalis, 34 ff. See also Savini, La développement de la méthode 
cartésienne, Ch. 2.2. 
 
However, Descartes will arrive at a position closer to Barozzi than Pererius on this 
231 Savini, La Développement de la méthode cartésienne, 55 ff. Jean-Luc Marion, Descartes’ 
Metaphysical Prism, trans. by J.L. Kosky (Chicago: U Chicago Press, 1999), 43-47, has also 
noted the importance of Pererius for Descartes, in the sense that he inverts the Suarezian 
distinction between first philosophy and metaphysics. For Pererius, as for Descartes, first 
philosophy represents the most universal science, while metaphysics represents a special 
science, specifically a study of the nature of God and the soul. 
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matter, since he will hold that the clear and distinct ideas of mathematics, precisely 
because they are abstracted from all material nature, constitute the foundations of a 
universal science. It is, indeed, this concept of mathematical certainty that will make 
arithmetic and geometry the cornerstones of the universal scientific method in the 
Regulae. 
 
 Descartes’ use of mathesis in his writings and Leibniz’s interpretation 
 
When Descartes approaches the problem of determining an appropriate method to 
investigate the truth of things, in Rule IV-A, he contrasts his aim with the “blind 
curiosity” of mortals, who “direct their minds down untrodden paths, in the groundless 
hope that they will chance upon what they are seeking, rather like someone who is 
consumed with such a senseless desire to discover treasure that he continually roams the 
streets to see if he can find any that a passer-by might have dropped” (AT X, 371; CSM I, 
15-6).232
                                                 
232 Cf. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Bxiv: “This is how natural science was first brought to the 
secure course of a science after groping about [Herumtappen] for so many centuries.” For 
Kant, it is Francis Bacon who first alighted upon the methodical foundation for the natural 
sciences. However, Kant finds that Bacon falls short of founding metaphysics on an equally 
firm foundation. I would suggest that Descartes succeeds where Bacon falls short though we 
will have a chance to revisit this in the fourth chapter. There, the method of discovering the 
relations that exist between “simple natures” will be explored in both Bacon and Descartes. 
 Descartes finds that chemists, even most geometers, and many philosophers are 
guilty of exhibiting such “blind curiosity.” It is by virtue of this that he rates them “more 
fortunate than diligent” even if they happen to have discovered some truths. In one 
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stroke, Descartes has differentiated his science, a methodical science, from the Llullian 
alchemists, the Aristotelian dialecticians, and preceding geometers. 
In contrast to these former efforts, Descartes’ Regulae can be understood as an 
attempt to outline a clear and concise universal method, essentially an algebraic method, 
that would treat any kind of subject matter whatsoever. This method is most clearly 
articulated as the “method of comparison,” which in Rule XIII he compares to the 
dialectical method, though without invoking the relation between the middle term and its 
extremes: 
First, in every problem there must be something unknown; otherwise there would 
be no point in posing the problem. Secondly, this unknown something must be 
delineated in some way, otherwise there would be nothing to point us to one line 
of investigation as opposed to any other. Thirdly, the unknown something can be 
delineated only by way of something else which is already known. (AT X, 430; 
CSM I, 51-52) 
 
Presumably, the method Descartes has in mind here is to express the knowns and 
unknowns in an equation that clearly demonstrates the relation between said terms. 
However, it is clear by the language in this passage that this method could have a much 
broader application to scientific investigations in general, rather than strictly 
mathematical problems. This ambiguity is confirmed when Descartes follows the 
description above with the claim, “These conditions hold also for imperfect problems” 
(ibid.). The paradigmatic cases of imperfect problems are physical problems, such as the 
nature of the magnet, where the relationship between knowns and unknowns cannot be 
determined sufficiently (AT X, 439; CSM I, 57). The method of comparison, when 
applied to the combination of physical “natures,” which are the causes of perceived 
effects, Descartes claims, will explain “whatever it is possible for the human mind to 
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attain in this matter” (ibid.). This is the sense in which I take Descartes’ Regulae to 
express the greatest fulfillment of Descartes’ vision for a scientia penitus nova, which he 
outlined for Beeckman in 1619. 
 
 Mathesis in the Regulae 
I think that one must understand Descartes’ use of the concept of mathesis 
universalis in Rule IV-B in light of his overarching desire to outline a general method for 
scientific discovery. Though the literature on Descartes’ use of mathesis universalis 
exhibit a spectrum of opinions on its meaning, the date of composition of the passage in 
which it appears, and its significance for his philosophy as a whole, one issue that 
consistently arises is the appropriate translation or definition of the mathesis unversalis as 
it is used by Descartes. Those who have looked at the issue from the perspective of 
mathematics (especially Schuster, Bos, and Sasaki) refer to the mathesis universalis as a 
general mathematical science and identify it with the emerging technique of algebra, an 
analysis that lends itself to the translation “universal mathematics.”233
                                                 
233 Schuster, op cit.; Bos, Redifining Geometrical Exactness, 121, 125 and 261-3; and Sasaki, op 
cit. 
 The reasoning 
behind their decision is sound, though I would add that the investigation into a general 
algebraic method of discovery in mathematics, as is seen in Viète, should also be 
coordinated with a general interest in outlining an ars inveniendi, i.e., a method for 
discovering first principles of science, which is broader than specifically mathematical 
problem-solving. Moreover, this art ought to be understood in light of a renaissance of 
the ancient concept of analysis, with all of its connections to the epistemological and 
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metaphysical issues raised by Plato’s concept of mathematics.234
Despite the fact that there is good reason to understand ‘mathesis’ as a distinct 
though related concept to ‘mathematica’, the standard English and French translations of 
the Regulae make no such distinction, translating both by mathematics or la 
mathématique. Since these translations give the reader no indication of the subtle changes 
 Thus, while the 
mathesis universalis has direct pertinence for the mathematical sciences, it is certainly 
embedded in a grander vision. Moreover, Descartes’ own remarks seem to indicate 
clearly that the method of comparison, algebra, and the mathesis universalis could 
reasonably be extended to include a kind of universal method in the sciences, or a general 
art of discovery (the ars generalis ad omnes questiones solvendas quaesita that 
Beeckman annotates to Descartes’ scientia penitus nova). Finally, van Roomen and 
Alsted, who are the first to describe the mathesis unversalis in the context of a 
classification of the sciences, make it clear that this concept is distinct from special 
mathematics, a distinction that should not be obscured by translation. I think that the 
similarity between mathesis and mathematics demonstrates the extent to which the 
mathematical method, specifically algebra, had emerged (since Viète) as a legitimate 
method of discovery in the sciences. Insofar as the dialectical method had become 
adversely identified with scholastic disputations, a litany of syllogistic forms, and 
rhetoric, it no longer provided a legitimate method of discovery. Descartes reflects this 
historical tendency.  
                                                 
234 Both Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, 181-83, and John 
Schuster, Descartes’ Mathesis Universalis,” 44, suggest that Descartes’ comments on mathesis 
universalis have a direct connect to his reading of Barozzi’s translation of Proclus. 
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in Descartes’ vocabulary, they exacerbate the difficulties already inherent in interpreting 
the controversial passage in Rule IV. The controversial section of that rule begins with a 
retrospective look back on Descartes’ first studies in mathematics. He complains to the 
reader that though he had read many accounts of problem-solving in classical 
mathematics, “they did not seem to make it sufficiently clear to my mind why these 
things should be so and how they were discovered” (AT X, 375; CSM I, 18). This is why 
he calls these mathematical problems “childish and pointless,” “trifles,” and having 
“more to do with our eyes and imagination than our intellect” (ibid.). Indeed, this disdain 
for ordinary mathematical problem solving seems to echo Rule IV-A, where he claims to 
no longer be dabbling “in trifles” (the Latin here is identical: nugara), and that ordinary 
mathematics is but the “outer garments” of the true method expounded there (AT X, 373-
4; CSM I, 17). In fact, Descartes claims that it is only when he questioned why the 
“founders of philosophy would admit no one to the pursuit of wisdom who was unversed 
in mathesis” (i.e., in reference to the alleged motto over Plato’s academy, “No one 
ignorant of geometry may enter”) that he began to discover a secret art, a true Mathesis, 
which would provide a real method of discovery. Though Descartes does not mention 
analysis directly, he does cite Pappus and Diophantus and he states that “the method 
seems to me to be none other than the art which goes by the barbaric name ‘algebra’” 
(AT X, 377; CSM I, 19).235
                                                 
235 Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness, 97: “Algebra entered geometry through its use in the 
analysis of problems and from c. 1590 the development of this analytical use of algebra can be 
identified as the principal dynamics within the early modern tradition of geometrical problem 
solving.” Cf. 10n17 
 Moreover, this algebraic method, Descartes indicates, is a 
contemporary attempt to revive the ancient art of discovery that was suppressed by its 
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practitioners: “They may have feared that their method, just because it was so easy and 
simple, would be depreciated if it were divulged; so to gain our admiration, they may 
have shown us, as the fruits of their method, some barren truths proved by clever 
arguments” (AT X, 376-7; CSM I, 19). This was the standard view of analysis at the 
time: namely, that it was a method of discovery that had been suppressed in favor of the 
clever, but empty, arguments provided by synthesis, which give no indication of how the 
principles themselves were discovered, and were possible only after one had acquired the 
knowledge sought. When Descartes complains that the present “algebra” is overwhelmed 
by a “multiplicity of numbers and incomprehensible figures” (ibid.), he is referring to the 
German Cossic algebra (rather than Viète's), whose notation is indeed cumbersome, 
boardering on incomprehensible, at least to the modern reader.   
Thus, Rule IV-B introduces the mathesis unvivesalis alongside algebra, a true 
reform of which we are told would also enable one to come to possess all of human 
knowledge (imo qua ad omnem cognitionem humanam pervenire potest: Beeckman's 
journal, October 8, 1628: AT X, 332). However, the identification between Descartes’ 
algebra and mathesis should not lead one to identify ‘mathesis’ and ‘mathematica’. 
Rather, I believe that Rule IV-B presents a consistent distinction between the two.236
                                                 
236 For readers of the Cottingham translation, here are the locations of each use of 'mathesis' in 
Rule IV and the translated phrase in which it appears: ln. 24: “the founders of philosophy 
would admit no one to the pursuit of wisdom who was unversed in mathematics [ut primi olim 
Philosophiae inventores neminen Matheseos imperitum ad studium sapientiae vellent 
admittere]”; 376, ln. 4: “they were familiar with a kind of mathematics quite different from the 
one which prevails today [qumdam eos Mathesim agnovisse valde diversam a vulgari nostrae 
aetatis]”; 376, ln. 19: “also enabled them to grasp the true ideas in philosophy and 
mathematics [Philosophiae etiam et Matheseos veras ideas agnoverint]”; 376, ln. 21: “Indeed, 
one can even see some traces of this true mathematics, I think, in Pappus and Diophantus [Et 
quidem huius verae Matheseos vestigia quaedam adhuc apparere mihi videntur in Pappo et 
 Of 
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the eleven times ‘mathesis’ is used in the passage, it is twice called “Mathesis 
Universalis,” once referred to in terms of “a general investigation of things related to 
mathesis [generalem quandam Matheseos investigationem]” in contrast to arithmetic and 
geometry and three times called the “true mathesis [vera Mathesis].” By contrast, 
“mathematica” is used four times in the passage, three times in the plural and always with 
reference to the mathematical disciplines, twice with reference to the “parts of 
mathematics [partae mathematicae].” Thus, it seems that Descartes is drawing a 
relatively sharp distinction between mathesis, which indicates a general science of 
investigation that is truly at the heart of the various mathematical disciplines, and 
mathematics, which serves to designate those particular disciplines in a way that is 
entirely consistent with the use of that term in van Roomen and Alsted. This is again 
confirmed by the explicit definition of mathesis universalis in that Rule:  
I came to see that the exclusive concern of mathesis is with questions of order or 
measure and that it is irrelevant whether the measure in question involves 
numbers, shapes, stars, sounds, or any other object whatever. This made me 
realize that there must be a general science which explains all of the points that 
can be raised concerning order and measure irrespective of subject-matter, and 
that this science should be termed mathesis universalis—a venerable term with a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Diophanto]”; 377, ln. 9: “which I believe the true mathematics ought to have [qualem in vera 
Mathesi debere esse supponimus]”; 377, ln. 11: “It was these thoughts which made me turn 
from the particular studies of arithmetic and geometry to a general investigation of 
mathematics [Quae me cogitationes cum a particularibus studiis Arithmeticae et Geometriae 
ad generalem quamdam Matheseos investigationem revocassent]”; 377, ln. 17: “since the 
word 'mathematics' has the same meaning as 'discipline' [nam cum Matheseos nomen idem 
tantum sonet quod disciplina]”; 377, ln. 22: “what relates to mathematics and what to other 
disciplines [quidam ad Mathesim pertineat, et quid ad alias disciplinas]”; 378, ln. 1-2: “the 
exclusive concern of mathematics is with questions of order and measure [illa omnia tantum, 
in quibus ordo vel mensura examinatur, ad Mathesim referri]”; 378, ln. 8-9, “Mathesis 
Universalis”; and 379, ln. 4: “Mathesis Universalis.” When Descartes refers to “rapports et 
proportions” in the Discours de la méthode, a concept parallel to the “ordo et mesura” that 
identifies mathesis universalis in the Regulae, he distinguishes it from “common 
mathematics,” though he does not explicitly relate it to mathesis: AT VI, 20; CSM I, 120. 
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well-established meaning—for it covers everything according to which these 
other mathematical sciences are called parts [quod aliae scientiae mathematicae 
partes appellentur].  (AT X, 377-78; CSM I, 19) 
 
In this central passage, the only place where Descartes explicitly defines ‘mathesis 
unversalis’, it is clear that he conceives of it as a general science of order and measure of 
which the specific mathematical sciences, e.g., optics, mechanics, astronomy, geometry 
and arithmetic, are tokens. 
When this passage is related to Rule VIII, a Rule that we have seen is central for 
interpreting the Regulae, it becomes evident that this science of mathesis universalis 
responds directly to the question concerning the investigation of the nature and scope of 
all human knowledge. Though it is not the case that all of human knowledge admits of 
“order and measure” and as a consequence cannot simply be identified with the mathesis 
universalis, there is some good evidence that Descartes, at least in the Regulae, was 
attempting to reduce all of human knowledge to what could be ordered and measured. In 
order to illustrate this, I will refer here briefly to a series of citations that will be 
discussed in more detail in the final section of this chapter. Descartes states in Rule II 
that, of the sciences devised thus far, “we are restricted to just arithmetic and geometry if 
we stick to this Rule” (AT X, 363; CSM I, 11). Moreover, his notion of scientific 
knowledge is founded on intuition and deduction, which themselves rest on the “simplest 
things” and the necessary inference from these to other propositions (Rule III). One has 
access to these simple things, he claims, through a “step by step,” orderly reduction of 
complex propositions to their simple components (Rule V). Finally, Rule VIII states that 
the limits of human knowledge are coextensive with what can be easily conceived. 
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Descartes assures the reader that there are limits to human cognition, things that are 
“beyond the bounds of human knowledge” (AT X, 396; CSM I, 30) or exceed “the grasp 
of the human mind” (AT X, 400; CSM I, 32-3); an inability to understand these things 
does not demonstrate a lack of intelligence, but simply the limits of human reason itself. 
The same Rule introduces the principle that “there is no truth or falsity in the strict sense, 
except in the intellect” (AT X, 396; CSM I, 30). Insofar as scientific knowledge concerns 
what is either true or false, then this knowledge would lie wholly within the bounds of 
what can be conceived clearly and distinctly by the intellect. These passages suggest that 
Descartes does conceive of the mathesis universalis, a general science of order and 
measure whose principles are utterly transparent to anyone, as roughly coextensive with 
human knowledge in the strict sense (scientia). 
It is thus not surprising that Descartes invokes the term ‘mathesis’ in Rule VIII. 
There it is used in a puzzling way, however, in reference to the example of how one 
ought to discover the principle of refraction exemplified in the anaclastic line. For the 
purposes of that example, Descartes introduces someone “whose studies are confined to 
mathematics.” He claims that though this person will see that “the determination of this 
line depends on the ratio [proportione] of the angles of refraction to the angles of 
incidence ... he will not be able to find out what this ratio is, since it has to do with 
physics rather than with mathesis [cum ad Mathesim pertineat, sed ad Physicam] (AT X, 
393-4; CSM I, 28-9). It is possible that Descartes is drawing a distinction between 
‘mathesis’ in the narrow sense, as that which applies only directly to the proportions and 
relations of arithmetic and geometry, and ‘mathesis universalis’, which would extend 
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such an understanding to other sciences. After all, Rule IV-B does acknowledge that 
optics and mechanics are “parts of mathematics” (AT X, 377; CSM I, 19); and it appears 
that the mathesis unversalis is what allows these various parts to be called mathematical. 
However, in Rule VIII the key physical notion that cannot be discovered by the 
mathematician has to do with “the nature of the action of light,” or more generally what a 
“natural power [potentia naturalis]” is (AT X, 394-5; CSM I, 29). Understanding the 
natural philosophical concept potentia naturalis is certainly not within the provenance of 
a science of “order and measure.” Additionally, it does not seem to be the kind of 
knowledge that would be “utterly transparent” or available to “intuition.” Rather it is 
something that can only be inferred on analogy with other intuitions and requires 
empirical investigation.  
When Descartes finally addresses some of the issues concerning the nature of the 
action of light in his Optics, he does so by way of several analogies: the nature of sight is 
understood in terms of the way a blind man uses his walking sticks to “see” in front of 
him, the action of grapes in a wine vat demonstrate the instantaneous motion of light 
through the plenum, and the action of a ball as it bounces off of a wall demonstrates the 
property of refraction (AT VI, 83-90; CSM I, 153-56). Even more to the point, 
determining the sine law of refraction requires introducing a constant, called the 
“refractive index,” that is specified by the kind of material through which light is being 
refracted. This constant cannot, in principle, be discovered by pure, abstract, 
mathematical reasoning; it requires experimental observation. Thus, Descartes’ 
distinction between mathesis and physics does not undermine the epistemological claim 
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that all knowledge, in order to be certain and evident, must be reduced to a proportion 
between ordered magnitudes. Rather, it simply states that some problems require the 
introduction of magnitudes or constants that must be determined empirically. The 
mathesis universalis tells us what we ought to look for, but in some cases it cannot also 
tell us what we will find. 
In this way, the passage demonstrates the limitations of the project of a mathesis 
unversalis as it is applied to problems in the physical sciences. This same limitation is 
apparent in Rule XII, where Descartes appears to allow for a kind of scientific knowledge 
that would be reached by experiments, along the lines of Bacon’s method of induction in 
the New Organon. This can be seen most clearly in Descartes’ discussion of the “nature 
of the magnet,” where again he undertakes to explain the method for treating this difficult 
topic with the aim of outlining “the whole of human knowledge” (AT X, 427; CSM I, 49-
50). While it was noted above that the nature of the magnet could be disclosed by means 
of the method of comparison, this passage indicates that experimentation will also be 
necessary in order to disclose its true nature. Thus, there are two methods implicitly 
operative here: one that is mathematical, which involves creating a comparison or 
proportion between knowns and unknowns, and the other that is empirical, which allows 
one to determine certain knowns empirically.237
Just as Descartes turned toward establishing the metaphysical foundations of his 
physics in 1629, he also embarked on a concerted effort to outline his physical science, 
  
                                                 
237 We will have occasion to return to this passage in the following chapter and assess in what 
way it can be taken as a “paradigmatic” case of Descartes’ method as Dan Garber, “Descartes 
and Method in 1637,” in Descartes Embodied, 33-51, esp. 34-39, claims. 
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writing Le Monde. These efforts lie beyond the scope of what was accomplished in the 
Regulae. Perhaps they lie beyond the scope of what Descartes was able to achieve in 
terms of the mathesis universalis. Insofar as they invoke the techniques of analogy and 
experimentation, they seem to rely on resources outside the realm of a formal science of 
abstract magnitude. Indeed, Descartes’ investigations into natural philosophy proper will 
require that he admit of other methods of discovery (principally Baconian in nature). The 
experimental method does not, however, eliminate the importance of the mathesis 
universalis; rather, the nature of those experiments is determined by the requirements of 
mathesis. 
 
 Mathesis in Descartes’ mature writings 
When Descartes begins his definitive work on metaphysics and the foundation of 
his physics, the Meditationes, he once again returns to the language of mathesis in 
describing at least one aspect of that metaphysical picture. In a letter to Hogelande of 
February 8, 1640, Descartes identifies Mathesis with scientific knowledge, which he says 
is “the ability to resolve all problems, and moreover to discover by one’s own industry 
[humano ingenio] everything that can be known by the human mind” (AT XII, 2). This 
letter would seem to support the reading of the mathesis universalis as united with a 
general project for outlining all that can be known by the human intellect. In another 
letter in that same year, however, Descartes refers to mathesis in order to distinguish it 
from physics, though he also claims that the two are operative in putting together 
arguments that establish scientific knowledge [Nam certe neque nomen eius a quo Theses 
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illae factae sunt, ad me scriptum fuit, neque etiam nomen scientiae quam docet, etsi vel 
Physicam esse vel Mathesim facile ex argumento conijciam] (to P. Hayneuve, 22 July, 
1640: AT III, 98-9). Finally, also in 1640, in a letter to Mersenne of August 30, Descartes 
refers three times to mathesis. It appears that Descartes wrote this letter in response to an 
exchange with Fr. Bourdin, who had been critical of his Géometrie (see AT III, 105-19). 
Descartes defends his Géometrie against Bourdin by appealing to the very same qualities 
that had made arithmetic and geometry paradigmatic for scientia in the Regulae: 
mathematical reasoning rests on certain experience, it cannot contain any falsity and its 
demonstrations are easy easily encompassed by the ordinary power and learning of the 
human mind [Talia enim sunt ea quae scripsi, ut, cum non aliis quam Mathematicis 
rationibus, aut certa experientia nitantur, nihil falsi possint continere, quod non facile fit 
tam ingeniosis et doctis evidenti demonstratione refellere] (AT III, 173).  
Van de Pitte argues that Descartes was introduced to the terminology of the 
mathesis universalis around 1640 through two texts that he had been given in 1639: 
Amos Comenius’ Pansophia Prodromus and Peter Wallis’ Idea Mathematica, both of 
which employ that concept.238
                                                 
238 Van de Pitte, “Dating Rule IV-B,” 378-82. The key link for Van de Pitte is the Greek spelling 
of matheseôs (with the omega) that is employed by Mersenne in his letter to Descartes, and is 
also employed by Descartes to Hogelande in his letter of August 8, 1640. On this basis, Van 
de Pitte argues for dating Rule IV-B to around 1640. To be fair, the primary aim of Van de 
Pitte's article is to argue against Weber's dating of 1619 for the passage. However, I think he 
goes too far.  
 As I have shown in the previous section, these two works 
by Comenius and Wallis fit within the general project of outlining a true method of 
discovery in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. As a result, the existence of these 
texts and Descartes’ introduction to them in 1640 do not represent anything novel for 
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Descartes, rather they fit within a general range of concerns that had occupied him since 
as early as 1619. 
There is another good reason not to accept the most contentious conclusion of 
Van de Pitte, namely that Rule IV-B was written around 1640 during the preparation for 
the Meditationes: the Regulae ought to be read as a coherent text and not as a piecemeal 
construction over time. There seems to be no better reason to claim that Rule IV-B was 
written after 1640 than to claim, as Weber does, that it was written before November 10, 
1619. The reason for declaring sections of the Regulae to have been written at radically 
different periods of time ought to be supported through textual arguments, and there are 
none available. Nonetheless, what Van de Pitte’s article does demonstrate is the close 
connection between Descartes’ use and understanding of ‘mathesis’ and that of those 
contemporary to him, in this case Comenius and Wallis. Indeed, Comenius was a student 
of Alsted and was instrumental in introducing the ideas of a universal science (a panacea 
philosophica) and a universal code or language to England; Wallis was principally a 
mathematician (an influence of Newton’s), but he also demonstrated an interest in the 
ideas of a universal science or universal language. Thus, these two works fit into the 
overall picture of the mathesis universalis that has been outlined above; and it is quite 
possible that Descartes reincorporates that vocabulary into his later writing as a response 
to these texts. Moreover, Van de Pitte’s research demonstrates a reintroduction of this 
terminology in Descartes’ later work and thus provides an important link between 
Descartes’ youthful vision of a universal science modeled on mathematics and his mature 
metaphysical system, in which mathematics also plays an important role. 
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Whatever the motivation behind the references present in Descartes’ later work, 
they link Descartes’ concept of a mathesis to his mature thought.239
                                                 
239 Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry, 124-205, presents probably the most sustained 
interpretation of the role of the mathesis universalis in linking Descartes’ Géometrie to his 
metaphysics. 
 In Meditations V and 
VI, this link is made most definite. There, Descartes refers several times to “the object of 
pure mathesis [purae Matheseos objectum]” or an “abstract mathesis [abstractam 
Mathesim].” In Meditation V, he clearly refers back to his early conception of a mathesis 
universalis, as it relates to certain and infallible knowledge: “... even before, when I was 
completely preoccupied with the objects of the senses, I always held that the most certain 
truths of all were the kind which I recognized clearly in connection with shapes, or 
numbers or other items relating to arithmetic and geometry, or in general to pure and 
abstract mathesis [ad Arithmeticam vel Geometriam vel in genere ad puram atque 
abstractam Mathesim pertinetibus]” (AT VII, 65; CSM I, 45). Later, as he completes that 
Meditation, wherein he proves the necessary existence of all things of which one has a 
clear and distinct idea, he concludes: “And now it is possible for me to achieve full and 
certain knowledge of countless matters, both concerning God himself and other things 
whose nature is intellectual, and also concerning the whole of that corporeal nature which 
is the object of pure mathesis [de omni illa natura corporea, quae est purae Matheseos 
objectum]”(AT VII, 71; CSM I, 49). Here, Descartes makes it clear how the mathesis 
universalis fits into his later metaphysics, i.e., it provides the rubric according to which 
corporeal nature can be conceived clearly and distinctly. The essence of material things, 
which can be conceived clearly and distinctly and thus makes possible the existence of 
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material things, is understood qua object of pure mathesis. A similar concept is again 
reiterated in the Principia II, §64 where abstract mathesis is correlated with geometry and 
the two fields are determined to be the only acceptable principles of Cartesian physics 
(AT VIII-A, 78; CSM I, 247).  
We will have a chance to explore the philosophical issues raised by these 
passages in the closing sections of this chapter. For the moment, it is sufficient to note 
that the mathesis universalis bears a largely continuous relevance for Descartes’ 
philosophical project from its earliest inception in 1619 up to its most mature formulation 
in the Principia (1644, 1647). We see this interest grow out of Descartes’ studies in 
mathematics. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, mathematics was also 
closely related to more general project of reforming Aristotle’s Organon, setting the 
sciences on a firm foundation, and reordering our knowledge in order to make it useful 
for instruction and scientific discovery. All of these historical elements ought to be 
brought to bear on an interpretation of Descartes’ Regulae.  
 
The mathesis universalis and Descartes’ successors, especially Leibniz 
If these brief references are not sufficient to demonstrate that what is intended by 
the mathesis universalis is Descartes’ algebraic method, through which he considered it 
possible to comprehend any physical phenomenon, then the testimony of his successors 
can help to support my interpretation. Three textbooks on Cartesian geometry appeared in 
the century following the publication of Descartes’ Géometrie, each of which refers to 
their study as a study of ‘mathesis universalis’. John Wallis’ Mathesis universalis (1649), 
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Franz van Schooten's Principia matheseos universalis (1661) and William Jacob’s 
Matheseos universalis elementa (1727) all understand the method of Cartesian geometry 
and its subject-matter to be defined as a ‘mathesis universalis’.240
I have already discussed his first major work, De arte combinatore (1666), which 
refers principally to Llull and the Llullian commentaries as the progenitor of the art of 
combination outlined there. In that work, Leibniz also refers to Descartes via Franz Van 
Schooten, but does not really incorporate the Cartesian algebraic geometry into his 
understanding of mathesis universalis. However, after Leibniz traveled to Paris in 1676, 
he obtained a copy of the Regulae, which we have seen is now known as the famous 
Hanover manuscript. During his travels to London, Leibniz may have also come into 
contact with John Wallis’ Mathesis Universalis (1649), another text on algebraic 
geometry, but which contains numerous references to the problem of writing in general 
and of occult writing in particular. Wallis seems to have been interested in algebraic 
characters as a specific kind of signs, ciphers, and textuality in general.
 These textbooks 
indicate a rather widespread interpretation of Cartesian geometry as the fulfillment of that 
sixteenth and early seventeenth century vision of a universal science of mathematics that 
would resolve all the classical problems in geometry. Yet Leibniz is the first to truly 
synthesize the mathesis universalis with a general ontology and a theory of language.  
241
                                                 
240 These books are discussed in Sasaki, Descartes’ Mathematical Thought, 394-98, though 
Sasaki insists on the purely mathematical nature of the works. I would also emphasize the 
linguistic interests of Wallis and the physical applications of mathematics in van Schooten as 
supporting a broader interpretation of the range of the mathesis universalis. 
 Whatever 
sources may have had a primary influence on Leibniz, he clearly understood the mathesis 
241 Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory, 152. 
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universalis as the application of Cartesian style geometry to a general method of 
cognition; he saw it as part of the project to create what he called “an alphabet of human 
thoughts.”242
This project seems to have exercised a continued influence on Leibniz’s thought, 
a hypothesis that is confirmed by references in his correspondence to his Dissertatio.
  
243 
Indeed, Leibniz’s interest in an art of combination dovetails with his introduction to, for 
instance, John Wilkin’s Characteristica Realis, which expands a theme of Francis 
Bacon’s. In the De augmentis scientiarum, Bacon had suggested devising a true 
philosophical language based on “real characters,” i.e., words whose meanings precisely 
mirror things.244
                                                 
242 G.H.R. Parkinson, “Introduction,” Leibniz’s Logical Papers. 
 The basic idea is that if one were able to devise a symbolic system of 
classification wherein the basic elements of every existing thing were identified by a ‘real 
character’, then understanding and properly naming the essence of any given thing would 
be a task of simple combination and calculation using real characters. It would be as if 
the periodic table of elements had semantic content. Wilkin’s expansion of Bacon’s 
proposed project of developing a truly philosophical language was heavily influenced by 
Comenius, the student of Alsted, who introduced ideas of universal language and 
encyclopedism to Britain in the 17th century. These elements are closely related to the 
mystical and Neoplatonic aspirations of people like Ramon Llull. Though Leibniz would 
ultimately distance himself from his youthful inspiration by Llull, he continues to express 
243 See, for instance, Leibniz to Th. Burnett, Gesamelte Werke, III, 216: “J’avois consideré cette 
matiere avant le livre de Mr. Wilkins, quand j’estois un jeune homme de 19 ans, dans mon 
petit livre de Arte Combinatoria, et mon opinion est que les Caracteres veritablement reels et 
philosophiques doivent repondre à l’Analyse des pensées.” 
244 Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory, 145-50; Leibniz to Th. Burnett, op cit. 
 195 
an interest in a true combinatorial art of essences. Whereas the earlier treatise conceived 
of the characters of the combinatorial art to mirror the real world of qualities or elements 
like Llull’s theory of the elements, Leibniz’s mature understanding mediates those 
abstract symbols and their physical counterparts through quantitative measurement. In 
other words, he designates physical entities with a common measurement in order to 
translate the real qualities into mathematical relations and then perform the appropriate 
calculus. In order to understand any real product of two physical things, it would suffice 
to translate the mathematical result obtained through Leibniz’s calculus back into 
descriptors of physical qualities. 
In Leibniz’s unfinished treatise on the mathesis universalis (begun around 1695), 
he identifies the mathesis universalis with “logistic,” i.e., a calculus applied to logical 
combinations of formal relations.245
                                                 
245 “Mathesis universalis,” in Gesamelte Werke, VII, 49-76. 
 Logistics appears to be specifically the process of 
attaching symbols to arithmetical problems: Leibniz says that logistics is what algebra 
has come to be called [Logisticam, quae Algebrae nomine venit]. Yet he also suggests 
that this symbolization has a direct bearing on physical qualities, redressing for instance 
common errors of calculation in dynamics, i.e., the physics of the forces and motion. 
While the treatise provides a technical outline of the principles of geometrical algebra, in 
essence providing Leibniz’s response to Descartes and Viète, the role of logistics and the 
importance of symbolic characters stretch its implications beyond merely mathematical 
problem solving. In the introduction to the treatise, Leibniz conceives of this general 
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calculus to have direct application to mechanics and “mixed mathesis,” though he never 
develops that proposed section.246
Instead, in the first part of the actual treatise (the only part completed), Leibniz 
affirms a standard definition of mathesis universalis: “Mathesis universalis is a science of 
quantity in general, or of designated ratios to which limits are determined and between 
which certain things fall [Mathesis universalis est scientia de quantitate in univesam, seu 
de ratione aestimandi, adeoque limites designandi, intra quos aliquid cadat].”
  
247 But he 
continues, “[J]ust as metaphysics is a general science of things, mathesis universalis is 
the general science of created things. And this has two parts: finite science (which is 
called algebra and which has already been explained) and infinite science, where it 
determines what comes between the finite and the infinite [ut Metaphysica est scientia 
rerum generalis, ita Mathesin universalem esse scientiam creaturarum generalem. 
Duasque habet partes: scientiam finiti (quae Algebrae nomine venit priorque 
exponentur), et scientiam infiniti, ubi interventu infiniti finitum determinatur].”248
                                                 
246 Ibid., 51-2 (marginal section heading): “De usu huius Scientiae, ut qui eius praecepta tenaeat, 
ipse per se facilius invenire possit, quae in Geometria et Mechanica et Matesi mista traduntur, 
paucis tantum privatis cuiusque scientiae ad hanc subalternae principiis cognitis. Quod nunc 
magis locum habet, ex quo novum Calculi Algebram Transcendentis hoc primum libro 
explicati genus ipsa infiniti scientia subiit, quae partem huis nostrae facit et ad majoris 
momenti problemata adhiberi debet.” 
 The 
“just as” (ut ... ita) analogy to metaphysics certainly lends the mathesis universalis a 
broader scope than a merely mathematical science and harkens back to Aristotle’s 
rejection of any analogy between “universal mathematics” and metaphysics. Given these 
broad overtures, however, one need not get carried away by the language of finite and 
247 Ibid., 53. 
248 Ibid. 
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infinite sciences (scientiam finiti, infiniti). It seems that this distinction is equivalent to 
the distinction between finite calculus and infinite calculus, i.e., Riemannian integration. 
Leibniz’s notation and its application to particular problems are outlined on the following 
pages of the treatise. In essence, Leibniz appears to be weighing in on the algebraic 
geometry of Viète and Descartes (and van Schooten who also plays a significant role). 
Just as these philosophers identified their algebraic calculus with the ancient art of 
“analysis,” so too does Leibniz.249
Aside from generalizing the analytic art of mathesis to infinitessimal calculus, 
reclassifying curves in terms of transcendental and geometrical, and reinterpreting the 
law of homogeneity (as a rule governing the reduction of equations in order to determine 
their roots), Leibniz’s greatest innovation in this treatise is to determine explicitly the 
mathesis universalis as encompassed under a broader “combinatorial art.” In so doing, 
Leibniz extends the art of logistic to both quantity and quality [scientia generalis de 
quantitate ad scientiam generalem de qualitate, ut adeo speciosa nostra Mathematica 
nihil aliud sit quam specimen illustre Ars Combinatoriae seu speciosae generalis] and he 
explicitly relates it back to his youthful vision of an ars combinatoria.
 
250
                                                 
249 Ibid., 54: “unde et Logistica nostra nomine Analyseos Mathematicae passim venit.” 
 In this way, the 
mathesis universalis is subsumed under what Leibniz sometimes calls the characteristica 
universalis or the combinatorial art applied to the characteristics or formal qualities of 
things perceived through sensory intuition. The characteristica universalis is 
subsequently subsumed under the pure formal logic of ideas. Thus, one crucial innovation 
that Leibniz appends to the mathesis universalis is to apply the idea of a universal method 
250 Ibid., 61. 
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of the mathematical sciences to qualities or forms of sensory intuition as well as to 
quantity or magnitude. Leibniz thought such an extension was possible on the basis of an 
analogy between the designations “similar” and “dissimilar” applied to quality with 
“equal” and “unequal” as they are applied to quantity. This seems to be, in some measure, 
directly related to the concrete applications of the abstract science of mathesis. Whereas 
the formal features of number or ratio are treated by finite or infinite calculus, the 
mathesis universalis makes it possible to conceive of their corresponding concrete 
applications, e.g., as lines, shapes, solid bodies, time, movement, force, sound, light and 
the like [Abstractae sunt numeri, vel etiam rationes, quas ipsas (quemadmodum supra 
dicum) ut numeros tractes concipio. Quantitates concretae possunt esse linea, figurae, 
solida, tempora, motus, vires, sonitus, lux, et omnia denique, in quibus eiusdem mensurae 
repetitio intelligi potest].251
 
  
Repitition of measure and the unit of measure: the key to a mathesis 
universalis 
The crucial feature that allows Leibniz to move back and forth between the 
abstract calculus of mathematics and concrete physical qualities is what he calls the 
repetition of measure (mensurae repetitio). This repetition of measure is a kind of unit of 
measure to which various kinds of measurements can be compared. To stress the 
importance of this concept, Leibniz compares the mathesis unviersalis to a kind of 
                                                 
251 Ibid.  
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science of the repetition of measure.252
In fact, Leibniz’s appeal to the mensurae repetitio echoes Descartes’ discussion of 
the role of the “unit” of measure in the Regulae, itself recalling the famosa mensura 
commonly attributed to Regiomantus (1436-1476).
 Thus, it appears that the repetition of measure 
functions as a focal point around which the mathematical calculus can be conceived 
either purely abstractly, as numbers and symbols, or concretely, as describing lines, 
shapes, solid bodies, time, movement, forces, sounds, or light. In this way, Leibniz 
outlines his understanding of mathesis universalis as an analytic and synthetic procedure. 
The analysis allows one to proceed from a proposed problem (which could be physical or 
mathematical) to the presuppositions necessary for solving it, but the synthesis, or the art 
of combination, allows one to move either from one problem to another or from the 
simple starting points to complex realities with reference to the repetition of measure. 
Here the mathesis universalis is clearly integrated into a method for solving real 
problems, whether abstractly mathematical in nature or dealing with concrete physical 
realities. 
253
                                                 
252 See Leibniz’s definition, ibid., 53: “Quia autem omnis quantitas determinari potest per 
Numerum partium congruentium inter se seu repetitionem mensurae, hinc fit ut mathesis 
unversalis simul sit scientia de Mensurae repetitione seu de Numero, unde generali calculi 
nomine venire solet.” 
 The basic idea behind this concept 
is that measurements of different kinds of things, e.g., weight, motion, or number, can be 
253 See for instance, Michel Varro’s De motu tractatus (1584), Lemma II, where he applies the 
famosa mensura to the concept of weight: “ponderibus scilicet quibusdam certa quantitate 
constantibus inditis nominibus, vt essent ponderum omnium communes mensuræ, vt sunt 
libræ, vncia, drachmæ, &c. quas famosas mensuras vocant.” See also Bos, Redefining 
Geometrical Exactness, 148-51 on Descartes’ use of the famosa mensura to circumvent the 
“law of homogeneity.” 
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compared if they refer to a common unit of measurement. Descartes introduces this 
concept in terms of his general method for problem solving in Rule XIV: 
... we should note that whenever we deduce something unknown from something 
already known, it does not follow that we are discovering some new kind of entity 
[genus entis] but merely that we are extending our entire knowledge of the topic 
in question such that we perceive that thing sought participates in this way or that 
way [participare hoc vel illo modo] in the nature of the things that are given. (AT 
X, 438; CSM I, 56) 
 
He goes on to describe how this extension of knowledge is made possible by the fact that 
different things possess “common natures,” though not in an equal degree. What is 
common to them allows us to deduce the nature of something unknown by means of what 
is already known by creating an equation or ratio of natures. There is a direct relationship 
between the concept of a “common nature” and the concept of “magnitudes in general,” 
since “nothing can be reduced to such a degree of equality except what admits of 
differences of degree” (AT X, 440; CSM I, 58). This reference to “magnitudes in 
general” is a clear reference to the mathesis universalis. Moreover, it is clear that when 
Descartes refers to “common natures” he is not restricting his discussion to mathematics 
alone, since he uses examples of the magnet, of a gold or silver crown, and embarks on a 
detailed discussion of the nature of the relationship between “extension” and “body.” 
Indeed, it seems that this notion of common nature is directly related to the simple 
natures of Rule XII, which are not at all confined to mathematical entities in the strict 
sense. 
Setting the issue of simple natures aside for the moment, Descartes clarifies what 
he means by the concept of the “unit” in Rule XIV: 
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Unity is the common nature which, we said above, all the things which we are 
comparing must participate in equally. If no determinate unit is specified in the 
problem, we may adopt as unit either one of the magnitudes already given or any 
other magnitude, and this will be the common measure of all the others. (AT X, 
449-50; CSM I, 63) 
 
Thus, the unit is not a fixed point of reference, but an arbitrary point of reference; and it 
is that common nature through which anything can be submitted to the ‘method of 
comparison’. This stipulation that one can arbitrarily select the unit of measure will 
feature in Descartes’ solution to the Pappus problem where any two of the given lines, 
heeding some pragmatic rules of thumb, are chosen as the principle lines or axes for 
solving the problem. Though Descartes does not depend on some fixed “common 
nature,” such as would have been required by Aristotelian demonstration according to 
genera, the arbitrarily chosen unit acts as the explanatory “middle term” of the 
demonstration. Descartes says, “But I cannot get to know what the proportion of 
magnitude between 2 and 3 is without considering some third term, viz., the unit, which is 
the common measure of both” (AT X, 451; CSM I, 65). If the unit or ‘third term’ is 
sufficiently general, then the nature of scientific explanation is greatly simplified. For 
instance, if one were to examine the case of motion from the perspective of change in 
position (which is then determined by some unit of measurement), it becomes much 
easier to describe and compare the motion of the planets, the motion of ships traveling at 
sea, or the motion of a projectile through the air. Though these are different “kinds” of 
things, they can be referred to the same unit of measurement and thus their motion is 
tractable through the same method of comparison. It seems that Leibniz’s concept of a 
mensurae repetitio recalls this basic concept of the unit expressed by Descartes. 
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The unit of measure, in effect, absolves the mathesis universalis of the defect 
noted by Aristotle. Insofar as any given thing can be referred to a common measure, or a 
unit of measure, then there is a unifying principle for understanding both geometrical and 
arithmetical magnitudes in the same way. While Descartes has no real conceptual 
solution to the problem of incommensurability (he is still unable to treat equations with 
either irrational—surd—coefficients or irrational roots), he does have a way to bypass 
this issue by determining the unit to be any length that results in a rational coeffecients.  
 
 Contemporary interpretations of the concept ‘mathesis universalis’ 
 
Thus, the notion that different kinds of things can be referred to a common 
measure allows Leibniz to conceive of a very broad application of the mathesis 
unversalis, which supplies the technique for solving problems and applying those 
solutions to both quantities and qualities. Indeed, this Leibnizian interpretation of the 
mathesis universalis becomes decisive for the subsequent history of interpretation. In the 
most general sense, Leibniz’s understanding of the mathesis unversalis and its role within 
a larger combinatorial art are often related to formalism and logicism in philosophy. This 
movement is most poignantly characterized by Frege and Russell at the turn of the 
twentieth century.254
                                                 
254 See Volker Pekhaus, Logik, Mathesis universalis und allgemeine Wissenschaft for an 
impressive history of Leibniz's legacy of formal logic up to Frege and Russel. 
 However, it should be noted that, while Leibniz and Descartes 
gesture toward an abstract notion of “common measure” or “unit of measurement,” it 
appears that this concept is still essentially tied to concrete magnitudes and thus does not 
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constitute an abstract, formal concept of number. Though Descartes and Leibniz, in their 
interpretation and incorporation of the mathesis universalis, seem to anticipate 
mathematical formalism of the twentieth century, this is only the earliest foreshadow of 
that later development. Nevertheless, both Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger make 
explicit reference to the mathesis universalis in Leibniz as it relates to formalism in early 
modern philosophy. Their discussions are broad and thematic, seemingly intended to 
contextualize their own philosophical ideas with a historical sensibility rather than to 
engage in a specifically historical treatment of the concept. Yet, these discussions are 
especially instructive for the way in which the concept of a mathesis universalis has been 
understood in contemporary philosophical debates.  
Husserl, for his part, inserts the concept of a mathesis universalis into a discussion 
of the traditional path to an idea of formal logic, understood as “formal apophantics,” i.e., 
a science of logical propositions based on the pure form of ordinary judgments.255
                                                 
255 Formale und Tranzendentale Logik, trans. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nihoff, 1969). 
 The 
domain of what Husserl calls formal apophantics is understood to outline the principles 
of logic: it is a kind of logic of logic. In this way, it pertains both to the formal procedures 
of combination and verification that are germane to logical syntax as well as to the 
semantics of predication. In a broad way, Husserl claims that the emergence of a formal 
calculus for the mathematical sciences posed the first historical possibility of a fully 
comprehensive science of predication, a universal logic. Some historical verification for 
this hypothesis can be seen in the projects of Ramus, Bruno, van Roomen, and Alsted, as 
seen above. Yet this project does not really become explicitly related to the ‘mathesis 
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universalis’ until Leibniz treats formal mathematical techniques and their relation to 
physical qualities through the repetition of measure. Indeed, insofar as the “repetition of 
measure” is an axis along with the formal logic of relations can be applied to both 
mathematical and physical relations, this does seem to hint toward later notions of formal 
logic. For Husserl, the idea of formal mathematics is of a piece with the idea of formal 
logic.256
However, especially as Husserl’s later writings focus on the historical dimensions 
of phenomenological concepts, the crucial philosophical question for him becomes one of 
rooting the formal statements of logic and mathematics to well-defined ontological 
domains of experience. While the early modern question is certainly tainted with 
uneasiness about how abstract ideas relate to concrete realities, Husserl makes this issue 
thematic. His hope in the Formal and Transcendental Logic is to generate an analysis of 
the semantic structure of predication that yields a general science of formal logical 
relations without losing the specificity inherent in ordinary language, i.e., when we talk 
about the world of our experience. This semantic analysis is achieved through the 
celebrated structures of “intentionality” that Husserl develops as early as the Logical 
Investigations. In order to describe the aim of his project in his later work, in a rare 
instance of rhetorical flare, Husserl calls the true mathesis universalis “a formal 
mathematics that does not float in the air but stands on its foundations and is inseparably 
 
                                                 
256 See his Philosophie der Arithmetik, trans. D. Willard, esp. 9-22 where Husserl builds a concept 
of number from the concepts of multiplicity and relation (or sets and relations). This strategy 
of building a formal logical concept on the basis of perceived states of affairs becomes 
essential to his Logical Investigations (1901). 
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one with them.”257
This trend can be seen in Heidegger, too, who presents the concept of mathesis 
universalis in the context of a historical retrieval and a historical critique.
 For Husserl, the foundations of any abstract science of logical 
relations can only be established with reference to the world of lived-experience, the 
Lebenswelt. Thus, Husserl’s real project is to specify the way that a science of formal 
relations, like the mathesis universalis, is tied to the world of everyday experience 
through the structure inherent in language, i.e., its “intentionality.” In order to do so, 
Husserl’s presentation of the mathesis universalis in the Formal and Transcendental 
Logic incorporates both analytic and synthetic elements from Leibniz’s account. That is, 
it moves back and forth between the abstract relations of logic and the concrete world of 
sense experience. However, Husserl’s reminiscence of Leibniz and the mathesis 
universalis also contains an implicit critique of the tradition. For Husserl, the movement 
toward greater generalization and formalization in the mathematical sciences has not 
been historically matched by an equal attention to grounding formal statements in the 
world of ordinary experience, to which they ultimately pertain, and from which they 
ultimately derive their meaning. 
258
                                                 
257 Ibid., 87; Dorian Cairns translation, 99. 
 The larger 
context of Heidegger’s discussion of the mathesis universalis is his attempt to pose the 
question, “what is a thing?” as a means of interpreting Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 
Heidegger sees the mathesis universalis as a concept that indicates an important shift in 
the history of philosophy, toward a greater formalization of thought, much in line with 
Husserl’s presentation. In fact, he conceives his question, “what is a thing?” as the most 
258 Die Frage nach dem Ding. 
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proper question for addressing Kant’s Critique, since the nature of Kant’s work is such 
that it undertakes a general analysis of the thingliness of things (der Dingheit des 
Dinges), i.e., metaphysics, by way of a critique of pure reason. Heidegger remarks that 
such a task would have been an absurdity for classical philosophy: why engage in a 
critique of pure reason in order to understand the things themselves? For the ancients 
(conceived broadly, as Heidegger does) the thingliness of things in no way depends upon 
reason, but on a general cosmology, determined by the various kinds of elements and 
causes. By contrast, for Kant, it is the purity of reason that gives knowledge its universal 
scope while the critique of reason limits that scope to what can be known with certainty. 
In short, a critique of pure reason provides an exposition of all that can be known for 
certain, the domain of necessary truths. In Heidegger’s account, he sees the underlying 
philosophical justification for this project as directly related to the nature of predication; 
in particular, he understands propositions to designate the way that things exist, insofar as 
they are identified by predicates, which themselves denote the various ontological 
categories of existence. The decisive difference between Kant’s modern project and its 
ancient counterparts, for Heidegger, is that Kantian predication is already determined by 
a kind of mathematical preference, by placing a universal unknown under every empirical 
observation, e.g., the thing-in-itself or the transcendental “X.” This bare unknown is then 
clothed in the garb of predication, so to speak, using the innate categories of the 
understanding.  
The historical reasons for this shift Heidegger attributes to the mathesis 
universalis. He understands this term primarily in its linguistic sense, namely, as a kind of 
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doctrine and naming (Lehre und nehmen) of things in terms of their quantitative 
measurement (Dinge als Zählen).259
                                                 
259 This can be inferred from the linguistic affinity, noted even by Descartes, between matheseôs 
(in Greek) and disciplina (in Latin). 
 Modern science, for Heidegger, thus operates under 
a doctrine of mathesis universalis, such that it is (1) a science of facts, (2) an 
experimental science, and (3) one that understands its standard of truth in terms of a 
correctness of measurement. Heidegger characterizes modern philosophy, and here he 
refers to Descartes’ Regulae and his Meditationes, by its conception of the world in terms 
of the conceivability or representability of objects to a subject, a “cogito,” an “I,” which 
becomes the ultimate subject in a metaphysical sense (hypokeimenon) for the categories 
of predication. Again, for Heidegger, the priority of mathematics in modernity emerges 
because it is the science that most easily avoids contradiction, the kind of error germane 
to the intellect, and because it meets the standard of clarity and distinctness, the criteria of 
truth determined by the human intellect. In this way, Heidegger understands the mathesis 
unversalis as fundamentally related to mathematics and a mathematical way of thinking 
characteristic of modernity, which reaches its pinnacle in Kant’s Critique. But he 
understands this relation to mathematics as underlying a basic privilege of 
epistemological considerations over cosmological ones for determining the nature of 
things in general. In essence, Heidegger’s critical view of modernity is that a 
mathematical way of thinking, which privileges a concept of truth as correctness, neglects 
the original sense of truth as that which emerges from out of concealment. Without 
diverging into a complicated discussion of Heidegger’s concept of truth, one can 
appreciate Heidegger’s criticism of modernity as an age which assumes that the intellect 
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and its ideas are utterly transparent to the knower and therefore the most proper objects of 
scientific investigation. To what extent one can attribute this trend to “modernity” in a 
broad sense is difficult to assess, but it is clear that Descartes at least advocated a concept 
of scientia in this vein. Moreover, the mathesis universalis appears to be sought as a 
description of Descartes’ method precisely because it provides a technique for arriving at 
scientia through a mathematical calculus that is appropriately fitted to our mental powers. 
Though Heidegger’s interpretations of the history of philosophy are often 
controversial, contemporary commentators affirm the proposed connection between a 
mathesis universalis, as a model of scientific method based on mathematics, and modern 
critical philosophy. These commentators seem to follow Kant’s interpretation of the 
Baconian scientific method in the B preface to his Critique of Pure Reason, namely, that 
only a true concept of method could secure a solid foundation for natural science. 
Consider the introductory remark by Neal W. Gilbert, to his classic study on method: 
“Throughout the modern enterprise of science, then, it is this critical aspect which 
predominates and which stamps its procedures as carried on by the scientific method” 
(my emphasis).260
                                                 
260 Renaissance Concepts of Method, xvii. 
 David Lachterman carries this analysis even further. He considers 
modern philosophy to be predicated on a prior divorce of reason from sensory perception. 
This divorce, he says, “is not because of any particular misdeeds on the latter's part ... [it] 
is rather the recognition that pretheorectical, premethodical perception keeps reason in 
thrall to a putative source of knowledge over which it cannot, in principle, exercise 
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systematic command.”261 Lachterman contends that the essential feature of modern 
philosophy, following Descartes, is to bracket the world of perceptions, render its 
persuasive power neutral, and then consider any truths of nature to be those that can be 
systematically and methodically constructed from primary intutions. In this sense, he 
understands the central idea governing the revolution of Descartes’ Géométrie to be the 
idea of construction, “or, more broadly, the ‘idea’ of the mind as essentially the power of 
making.”262
Preceding Lachterman chronologically, but echoing some of his central claims, 
Jean-Luc Marion has argued that the condition of possibility of mathematical certitude is 
a prior abstraction, i.e., a break from the material nature of everyday sensory experience. 
For Marion, the passage in Rule II, where Descartes eliminates probable syllogisms from 
science in favor of the certainty provided by arithmetic and geometry, is decisive. In that 
passage, the argument in favor of mathematics, as Marion points our repeatedly, is that 
“they alone are concerned with an object so pure and simple that they make no 
 Lachterman’s notion of construction here is explicitly indebted to Kant’s 
notion of the "productive imagination" as that which generates, or schematizes, objective 
representations. On this reading, a representation is true just in case the manner in which 
it is represented—its schematism—is well-founded on an a priori justification of the 
categories of predication that define the representation. In a certain measure, this bears a 
similarity to Descartes’ requirement in the Regulae that, for our ideas of things to be true, 
they must be composed out of ‘simple natures’ whose essence is known intuitively, or a 
priori in the Kantian sense.  
                                                 
261 The Ethics of Geometry, 54. 
262 Ibid. 4. 
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assumptions that experience might render uncertain” (AT X, 365; CSM I, 12). Marion’s 
commentary follows: “In effect, the precision (and thus certainty) of mathematics finds 
its counterparty in the very condition of its possibility: the abstraction from matter, the 
elimination of the ‘variable’ by setting aside the hyle.”263
The method is always certain because it produces certainty. . . . The method, by 
virtue of its primacy confirms and achieves the unity of science. . . . The method 
thus defines the function of certainty and the necessary precondition for the 
objects of entirely certain experientia.
 Thus, when Marion arrives at 
the interpretation of the mathesis universalis, the frequently parodied “mathématicité non 
mathématique des mathématiques,” he understands the mathesis universalis to respond 
precisely to the central proposition of Rule IV, namely, to determine a method such that 
“one will never take what is false to be true or fruitlessly expend one’s mental efforts, but 
will gradually and constantly increase one’s knowledge till one arrives at a true 
understanding of everything within one's capacity” (Rule IV-A: AT X, 371-72; CSM I, 
16). Marion’s interpretation of the essential interrelation between mathesis universalis 
and method is the following:  
264
 
 
As for the mathesis universalis: 
                                                 
263 Marion, Sur l'ontologie grise, 40. Doyle, The Logic of Descartes’ Method, Ch. 2.2, argues 
against Marion’s interpretation of this passage. The dispute is tangential to the argument here. 
Marion insists that one aspect of the hyletic abstraction that is the condition of possibility of 
the mathematical sciences is that it annuls the irregularities of material things and thus the 
mere probability of knowledge about material things. On this basis he links Descartes’ 
criticism of “probable syllogisms” with his insistence on mathematics as the paradigm of 
certainty. Doyle counters that the issue of “probable syllogisms” has to do with the fact that 
Descartes dismisses opinion from the realm of knowledge and that it has to do with his 
polemic against dialectic rather than against knowledge of material things as such. I agree that 
there are, in fact, two arguments at work in Rule II. However, Doyle’s criticism does not 
diminish the accuracy of Marion’s remarks on the nature of mathematical knowledge and the 
reasons why Descartes takes a mathematical method as his standard for the scientific method. 
264 Sur l’ontologie grise, 57. 
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. . . speaking of (mathesis) universalis, [Descartes] takes up again the idea of a 
science of the true principles of the mathematical sciences (which is the deciding 
blow [to Aristotelian metaphysics]) that is situated in the substitution, as 
important as it is often misunderstood, of mathesis for mathematics. It is not even 
a universal mathematics, that is, one that would provide the principles for the 
particular mathematical sciences, and thus limited to only quantity (no matter 
whether discrete or continuous), but it is a “universal science” that does not only 
govern quantity, about which it will be able to treat abstractly, but also all order 
and measure.265
 
 
On Marion’s reading, and I think it is a helpful one, the mathesis universalis is that in 
virtue of which a method can be proposed. The prior supposition that science will only 
investigate what can be known by order and measure submits any given subject matter to 
a restriction that ensures it is treated methodically. Descartes does not claim that the 
world is mathematical; instead he simply supposes that only the order and measure, 
proportions and relations (i.e., those conditions that enable any mathematical science to 
be mathematical), insofar as they are present in natural objects, will be considered. In a 
sense, this performs a proto-Kantian critical maneuver: I will consider the world as if 
ordered and measured. In so doing, I will discard all of the everyday perceptions of 
material things that do not admit of order and measure. This is the a priori condition of 
the possibility of a methodical natural science for Descartes. 
 
                                                 
265 Ibid. 63. Marion goes on to compare the mathesis universalis, not to the proposed common (or 
universal) mathematics in Aristotle, but to metaphysics as the study of being qua being. In 
short, Marion argues that the mathesis universalis considers any given being only insofar as it 
is conceived of as ordered and measured. Thus, it is the most universal and prior of all the 
sciences. I think this may be saying too much. While the mathesis universalis is clearly the 
rubric that governs the quest for a universal science in the Regulae, it is not a free-standing 
system. Moreover, in places Descartes indicates that he must go beyond “order and measure” 
in order to investigate the phenomena he wants to understand. Finally, the mathesis universalis 
gives no account of causality in the universe, either in terms of the existence of the ‘I’ or of 
material things. Thus, it seems difficult to conclude that the mathesis universalis is a science 
of being qua being. 
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In this section, we have discovered a number of historical sources surrounding 
and (likely) influencing Descartes’ concept of method, particularly as it is articulated 
using the concept of a ‘mathesis universalis’. First, we have found that a number of late 
medieval and Renaissance philosophers were intent on reforming the Aristotelian notion 
of scientific knowledge. This reformist strand of philosophy in the 13th through 17th 
centuries was largely motivated by a practical concern for pedagogy: simplifying the 
complex and varied syllogistic forms in favor of an ars brevis or compendium of the 
sciences that would outline a few simple rules to guide intellectual studies. During the 
same time, writers in philosophy and mathematics sought to recover a true method of 
discovery, an ars inveniendi, that had once been part of the purpose of Aristotle’s Topics 
and Sophistical Refutations and had been mentioned in Proclus and Plato as the art of 
‘analysis’, namely, a technique for discovering of first principles. However, by the 
Renaissance period, many elements of ancient dialectic had come to be associated with 
(mere) rhetoric or ornamentation. As a result, these authors saw little use in advancing the 
rhetorical practice of disputations for the purpose of discovery first principles. So 
Aristotle’s true method of discovery, dialectic, was discarded. Finally, we noticed the 
importance of the mneumotechnic tradition, Neoplatonism, and mystical thought as an 
influence on the reform of classical dialectic and the search for a true method of 
discovery. Though these traditions were associated with a hermetic legacy and seem, as 
such, to be opposed to scientific thought, they were instrumental in advancing the notion 
that the true method of science and the classification of the subjects of scientific study 
 213 
ought to be fitted to a certain psychology. In this way, authors conceived of linking their 
reformist project with a new understanding of the nature of cognition, emboldened by 
Augustinian and Neoplatonic theories of recollection that hinged on a concept of the 
universe as a mirror of the intellect.  
Each of these themes can be seen in Descartes’ Regulae as guiding the project of 
determining true scientific method. When Descartes works out an algebraic procedure for 
discovering the principles of geometrical construction, it seems a natural step to correlate 
this at once with the analytic art of the ancient geometers and the method of discovery 
sought by the humanists. Leibniz would go on to link such a universal mathesis with a 
philosophy of language in the hopes of determining a truly formal, symoblic language 
that would actually represent the ontological makeup of the world. Though Descartes 
never really linked his own project to a search for a universal language in the way 
Leibniz did, his references to mathesis can be illuminated by reference to that broader 
context. 
 
Mathesis universalis, mathematics, method, and mind in Descartes 
 
This section will advance beyond the above historical observations regarding 
Descartes’ scientific method in the Regulae as it is expressed by the mathesis universalis. 
In a historical sense, the concepts of method and mathesis are united in the writings of 
late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Renaissance philosophers. Particularly 
Alsted, van Roomen, Piccolomini, Pererius, and Barozzi discuss the idea of a mathesis 
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universalis in such a way that it is connected with an idea of a general scientific method, 
a universal science, and a reclassification of the nature of things. This is not to imply that 
there is a univocal conception the mathesis universalis at the turn of the 17th century, nor 
to suggest that the traditional concepts of scientific method and mathesis were universally 
identified. However, the identification of these two concepts in Descartes is the product 
of a history that, particularly by virtue of a historical misinterpretation of Aristotle, the 
influence of Neoplatonic mathematics, and the introduction of modern algebra, blurred 
the distinctions between method, epistemology, cognition, and science. These factors 
diminish the distinctions that had existed in classical philosophy between properly 
mathematical and properly philosophical methods of investigation. In short, this is why 
Descartes simultaneously denounces the “dialecticians” and their “probable syllogisms” 
while heralding a new mathematical method of discovery as the unifying method that 
would lend the sciences a secure, that is, certain, foundation. Moreover, the issue of 
finding a universal method (scientia penitus nova, clavis totium mysterium, or ars 
secretum) was of longstanding interest for Descartes, from his fascination with the 
memory arts and the encyclopedist tradition to his first unfinished treatise (a period 
spanning the decade, 1618-1628). Thus, it is no surprise that remnants of this tradition 
would continue to influence key passages in the Regulae. 
This section will advance upon those historical observations with a detailed 
examination of Descartes’ writings on mathematics and method. What I will show is that 
Descartes’ attempt to set the sciences on a certain and evident path to knowledge forces 
into the forefront epistemological concerns. In short, the method is designed according to 
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and emerges from Descartes’ understanding of the nature of cognition. That Descartes 
prioritizes certainty over any other criterion for scientific knowledge is the most basic 
confirmation of a connection between Descartes’ concept of method and his concept of 
mind. However, the mathesis universalis makes this connection much more profound. 
Not only is the criterion of truth adequate to the powers of the mind, but also Descartes 
will claim that all that can be known will be known if one follows this method. This 
means that, for Descartes, the realm of certain and evident cognition is not only necessary 
for scientific truth, but is also sufficient. This is quite a radical claim and I think it 
indicates Descartes’ deep-rooted idealism.  
As a consequence of this idealistic conception of scientific knowledge, Descartes 
will claim that the nature of physical reality—everything apart from the mind—has a 
certain structure, namely, that there is nothing other than extended matter and wherever 
there is something, it is extended matter. This radical thesis about the basic metaphysical 
nature of the universe—one that Descartes will maintain throughout his career, despite its 
limitations and its factual inaccuracy266
 
—is a direct consequence, I will argue, of the 
mathesis universalis. To put it in the most concise terms: corporeal nature considered 
generally (corpus in genere sumptum) is the objective correlate of the idea of pure 
mathesis (idea purae matheseos). Moreover, this idea is the principle that makes a 
science based on mathematical figures and numbers possible. 
                                                 
266 Here I have in mind two decisive advances in natural philosophy that undermine Descartes' 
basic assumptions about physical reality: (1) Pascal demonstrates experimentally the existence 
of a void through his work with the Toricelli tubes. (2) Leibniz demonstrates mathematically 
the necessity of including forces in the explanation of physical phenomena. 
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 Mind and method 
 
The connection between Descartes’ project for devising a general method to 
discover truth in the sciences and his understanding of the mind’s powers is twofold. 
First, Descartes conceives the principle operation of the mind to be intuition [intueor, 
intueri]. In its most general sense, to intuit simply means to gaze at, look at, or regard. 
But in its conceptual sense, it is closely related to ‘contemplation’ or ‘apprehension’ and 
in this sense serves, in philosophy, as a translation of the Greek, noeô, noein. Therefore, 
at least as it was understood in the Platonic tradition, it must be identified as the essential 
operation of the mind. For Descartes, mathematics is a privileged subject matter because 
it alone provides clear and distinct intuitions that are simple, evident, and free from 
doubt. Second, Descartes’ early methodological project is focused on the goal of devising 
a mathematically based method that would be applicable to “all of human knowledge.” 
This means that Descartes’ early conception of mathematics holds it to be both rooted in 
the essential activity of the mind and potentially applicable to the entire domain of human 
knowledge. These two components are quite clearly connected in Rule IV, which 
addresses the method for investigating the truth of things, in a passage that I have quoted 
above: “There are two points here which we should keep in mind: we should never 
assume to be true anything which is false; and our goal should be to attain knowledge of 
all things” (AT X, 372; CSM I, 16). In this sense, Descartes’ early vision for developing a 
universal mathematical method was thought to have a very broad application. Certainly, 
the later concept of mind which finally provides a real metaphysical foundation for the 
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sciences goes far beyond what Descartes could have accomplished through mathematics 
alone (for one thing, there is no explanation of the cause of the mind’s existence and 
nature in the Regulae), but the scope and aims of the early project illustrate the 
motivations behind this later conception.267
 
 
 Intuition as the distinct perception of a clear and attentive mind 
For Descartes, intuition is not “the fluctuating testimony of the senses or the 
deceptive judgment of the imagination as it botches things together [vel male 
componentis imaginationis judicium fallax].” He specifies its nature in this way because 
he acknowledges the close etymological relationship between intueor and percipere, 
which was generally conceived to be mediated by the imagination. Descartes is clear that 
his notion of intuition is nothing other than “the conception of a clear [pura] and attentive 
mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are 
understanding.” He elaborates, “intuition is the indubitable conception of a clear and 
attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of reason” (Rule III: AT X, 368; 
                                                 
267 Descartes’ introduction to the French edition of the Principes de Philosophie provides some 
idea of the continuity from the beginning to the end of his work (though the issue is stated 
here in terms of causes): “In order for this kind of knowledge [i.e., wisdom or philosophical 
knowledge] to be perfect it must be deduced from first causes; thus, in order to set about 
acquiring it—and it is this activity to which the term 'to philosophize' strictly refers—we must 
start with the search for first causes or principles. These principles must satisfy two 
conditions. First, they must be so clear and so evident that the human mind cannot doubt their 
truth when it attentively concentrates on them; and, secondly the knowledge of other things 
must depend on them, in the sense that the principles must be capable of being known without 
knowledge of these other matters, but not vice versa. Next, in deducing from these principles 
the knowledge of things which depend on them, we must try to ensure that everything in the 
entire chain of deductions which we draw is very manifest.... Next, I would have looked at the 
benefits of this philosophy and shown that it encompasses everything which the human mind 
is capable of knowing,” (AT IX-B, 2-3; CSM I, 179-80). 
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CSM I, 14). From this definition it is clear that Descartes conceives of intuition as a 
mental operation that is purely rational, indubitable, and emerges from innate mental 
capacities (the “light of reason”).268
Descartes’ explicit focus in the Regulae on simple things first is directly related to 
his idea that all knowledge is ultimately derived from the intuition of “clear and attentive 
mind” (Rule III, AT X, 368; CSM I, 14). This is why he prefers to investigate the few 
 Furthermore, from Rule II it is clear that these 
characteristics of intuition make it indispensable for scientific knowledge [scientia], 
which he defines as “certain and evident cognition [cognitio certa & evidens]” (AT X, 
362; CSM I, 10). That Rule, which I have referred to repeatedly, makes it clear that 
knowledge is in some sense absolute, i.e., not admitting of differences, and that certain 
and evident reasoning [ratio] will convince [convinco] the intellect of any scientific truth. 
In other words, knowledge does not rest on the authority of tradition, sensation, or the 
syllogistic form; instead, Descartes’ notion of science consistently reinforces the 
foundational role of clarity and distinctness, both in its principles and in what is deduced 
from them. Though Descartes does not actually have a theory of clear and distinct ideas 
in the Regulae (and he actually never refers to ideas as “clear and distinct”), he 
nonetheless employs certainty and evidence in a way that clearly foreshadows this later 
concept. In the Regulae, the priority of certainty and evidence is part of his crusade 
against “ordinary philosophy [vulgari Philosophia],” which was based on the authority of 
the syllogistic forms and the ontological genera of Aristotle.  
                                                 
268 Unlike Kant, Descartes does not address the necessity of establishing how pure cognition, or 
intellectual intuition is possible. Rather, he seems to assume that it is possible on the basis of 
its role in mathematical knowledge. 
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things that can be known with certainty rather than the many things that are based on 
merely probable conjectures. Arithmetic and geometry, Descartes concludes, 
... are therefore the easiest and clearest of all the sciences and have just the sort of 
object we are looking for. Where these sciences are concerned it scarcely seems 
humanly possible to err, except through inadvertence. Yet we should not be 
surprised if many prefer of their own accord to apply their minds to other arts, or 
to philosophy [si multorum ingenia se sponte potius ad alias artes vel 
Philosophiam applicent]. The reason for this is that everyone feels free to make 
more confident guesses about matters which are obscure than about matters which 
are clear. It is much easier to hazard some conjecture on this or that question than 
to arrive at the exact truth about one particular question, however straightforward 
it may be. (Rule II: AT X, 365-6; CSM I, 12) 
 
This sentiment is strictly parallel to what Descartes says regarding the mathesis 
universalis: 
So why is it that most people painstakingly pursue the other disciplines which 
depend on it [sc., the mathesis universalis], and no one bothers to learn this one? 
No doubt I would find that very surprising if I did not know that everyone thinks 
the subject too easy, and if I had not long since observed that the human intellect 
always bypasses subjects which it thinks it can easily master and directly hurries 
on to new and grander things. (Rule IV: AT X, 378; CSM I, 20) 
 
This trope recurs in Rule IX, which tells the reader “how to become accustomed to intuit 
the truth distinctly and perspicaciously [donec assuescamus veritatem dstincte & 
perspicue intueri]” (AT X, 400; CSM I, 33). This will be accomplished, he claims, if one 
becomes accustomed to attending carefully to a few simple things. He continues: 
It is, however, a common failing of mortals to regard what is more difficult as 
more attractive. Most people consider that they know nothing, even when they see 
a very clear and simple cause of something; yet at the same time they get carried 
away with certain sublime and far-fetched arguments of the philosophers, even 
though these are for the most part based on foundations which no one has ever 
thoroughly inspected. (AT X, 401; CSM I, 33) 
 
By contrast, the ease and simplicity of arithmetic, geometry, and the mathesis unviersalis 
in general provide a real foundation for the sciences. In the following chapter, we will see 
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that Descartes’ early hypotheses about the psycho-physiological nature of cognition 
reinforce the idea that the mind is best suited to attend to a few simple things, rather than 
many complex ones. 
It may at first be odd to hear Descartes proclaim the ease and simplicity of 
mathematics. After all, his notebooks give ample evidence that he struggled to resolve a 
number of very difficult mathematical problems. Moreover, the status of mathematics at 
the time, shifting between a modern algebraic and classical geometrical conception, was 
not at all clear and distinct. In response to this concern, I think that the terms facilis and 
simplex should be understood to apply to arithmetic and geometry only in principle. That 
is to say, the rational basis of geometry ought to be obvious and evident to anyone; and 
every arithmetical problem ought to be composed of many simple operations that anyone 
could perform. Thus, the foundations of these sciences are inherently transparent and 
self-evident, despite the fact that their application to particular problems can be difficult 
and complicated. 
To return to the operation of the mind, the axiomatic transparency of the 
mathematical sciences mirrors the way in which Descartes speaks of the two mental 
operations that are the cornerstones of his method: intuition and deduction. He explains, 
“The method cannot go so far as to teach us how to perform the actual operations of 
intuition and deduction, since these are primitive and the simplest of all [quae sunt 
omnium simplicissimae & primae]” (Rule IV: AT X, 372; CSM I, 16). This operation of 
the mind is basic, as illustrated by its simplicity. And mathematical knowledge, insofar as 
it is paire with the cognitive faculty of intuition is similarily fundamental. One can 
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appreciate how central the notion of simplicity is to Descartes since it functions as a 
theme that runs throughout the Regulae. Rules V and VI stress the importance of 
reducing complex problems to their simple components. Rules VI, VIII, and XII all stress 
the importance of “simple natures” as the first principles of scientific knowledge. Indeed, 
the simplicity of figures and their abstract representation is exactly what drives the 
mathematical techniques for problem solving in Rules XIV-XVI, XVIII and in short the 
entire project of Descartes’ early algebra. Reducing problems to simple units—entails a 
perception of the basic foundation of the problem, which in turn enables its solution. 
When explaining how to make use of the two mental faculties of intuition and deduction, 
Descartes recalls the etymological root of intuition, comparing it to “vision itself [ipsa 
oculorum].... If one tries to look at many objects at one glance, one sees none of them 
distinctly. Likewise, if one is inclined to attend to many things at the same time in a 
single act of thought, one does so with a confused mind [confuso ingenio]” (Rule IX: AT 
X, 400-1; CSM I, 33). This is why, he says, “Everyone ought therefore to acquire the 
habit of encompassing in his thought at one time facts which are very simple and very 
few in number—so much so that he never thinks he knows something unless he intuits it 
just as distinctly as any of the things he knows most distinctly of all” (AT X, 401-2; CSM 
I, 34). 
It is clear from these references that intuition of simples is the essential starting 
point for the Cartesian methodological project in the Regulae. The importance of 
arithmetic and geometry to this end also becomes evident: these are just the sciences that 
best prepare the mind for attending to simples, and these sciences themselves stand on 
 222 
self-evident and transparent foundations so that their validity can be clearly seen. In his 
youth, Descartes tells the reader of the Discours, “I delighted in mathematics, because of 
the certainty and self-evidence of its reasonings. But I did not yet notice its real use; and 
since I thought it was of service only in the mechanical arts, I was surprised that nothing 
more exalted had been built upon such firm and solid foundations” (AT VI, 7; CSM I, 
114). On my reading, it seems clear that Descartes would realize the “real use” of 
mathematics only through the project of developing a method according the general form 
of the mathesis universalis. 
 
 Intuition as the basis for method 
The importance of intuition for Descartes’ method cannot be overstated. While, 
for instance, Descartes often speaks of deduction as the other essential mental operation, 
his definition of deduction makes it clear that this mental operation is essentially founded 
on intuition. When he introduces the concept, Descartes says, “There may be some doubt 
here about our reason for suggesting another mode of knowing in addition to intuition, 
viz., deduction”; and he continues by defining deduction as “the inference of something 
as following necessarily from some other propositions which are known with certainty” 
(Rule III: AT X, 369; CSM I, 15). This distinction between two different modes of 
knowledge allows Descartes to account for a clear and distinct perception of complex 
things: 
But this distinction had to be made, since very many facts [res] which are not self-
evident are known with certainty, provided they are inferred from true and known 
principles through a continuous and uninterrupted movement of thought in which 
each proposition is clearly intuited. This is similar to the way in which we know 
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that the last link in a long chain is connected to the first: even if we cannot take in 
at one glance all the intermediate links on which the connection depends, we can 
understand this connection provided we survey the links one after the other, and 
keep in mind that each link from first to last is attached to its neighbor. (AT X, 
369-70; CSM I, 369) 
 
From this passage it is clear that Descartes defines the concept of deduction according to 
the understanding of intuition as it is discussed above. Deduction ought not to be 
understood in terms of conceptual analysis, such that the conclusion is necessarily 
contained in the premises. Rather, Descartes seems to use deduction in a loose sense, 
meaning something like: any inference from one term to another. Thus, deductions can be 
analytic, or they can be ampliative, i.e., they can introduce some new intuition. The only 
requirement for a deduction, on Descartes’ account, is that each step in the sequence of 
reasoning is composed of a clear, simple, and distinct intuition. Since it is impossible to 
inuit a chain of reasons clearly, simply, and distinctly (precisely because a chain of 
reasons is necessarily complex, i.e., composed of parts), Descartes calls the knowledge 
[scientia] that one has of a chain of reasons deduction, while he maintains that each link 
in that chain is known through intuition.269
                                                 
269 For more on the role of intuition as the foundation for deduction, see Marion, Sur l'ontologie 
grise, 53-54, where Marion makes an important and provocative observation. He notes that, 
while Rule II, and much the Aristotelian tradition, would support the belief that deduction 
surpasses intuition in terms of its certainty, i.e., that scientific knowledge is guaranteed 
through deductive demonstration, Rule III makes it clear that intuition is primary, since it 
grants or sustains [permet] the certainty of deduction. This observation occurs within the 
context of Marion’s effort to reinvigorate a Cartesian sense of indubitable experientia as that 
which confirms and sustains scientia: “dès lors, la rapport s'inverse; l'intuitus non seulement 
certain, mais qui permet la production de certitude jusqu'à investir et récapituler l'experientia 
entière, devient le paradigme d'une certitude, que la déduction ne produit, et ne possède plus 
qu'en second.” 
 In this sense, deduction is simply an extension 
of intuition over a series of steps. 
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The third mental operation constitutive of Descartes’ concept of method, i.e., 
enumeration, provides a bridge between the centrality of intuition and the extension of 
the method to all of human knowledge. It has been noted that there are two kinds of 
enumeration in Descartes: an enumeration that provides a comprehensive review of the 
long chains of reason and an enumeration that provides a methodical survey of the 
various classes of things to be investigated.270
                                                 
270 Following Beck, The Method of Descartes, 114-20 and 126-33. 
 (It is possible that Descartes himself did 
not conceive of a distinction between these two operative definitions of enumeration 
since he speaks of both in the same breath (see Rule VII), but it is nonetheless useful to 
make such a distinction for the purposes of interpretation.) Descartes first defines 
enumeration in terms of deduction: “For this deduction sometimes requires such a long 
chain of inferences that when we arrive at such a truth it is not easy to recall the entire 
route which led us to it. That is why we say that a continuous movement of thought is 
needed to make good any weakness of memory” (Rule VII: AT X, 387; CSM I, 25). Here 
he acknowledges that deduction, which “in a sense gets its certainty from memory” (Rule 
III: AT X, 370; CSM I, 15), must be shored up with another mental operation that 
strengthens what would be a potential liability. When Descartes elaborates how this 
“continuous movement of thought” works, he clearly means it to reinforce deduction by 
expanding the capacity of intuition: “So I shall run through them [sc., a chain of reasons] 
several times in a continuous movement of the imagination, simultaneously intuiting one 
relation and passing on to the next, until I have learnt to pass from the first to the last so 
swiftly that memory is left with practically no role to play, and I seem to intuit the whole 
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thing at once” (Rule VII: AT X, 388; CSM I, 25). The resonance of this passage with the 
Aristotelian and Ciceronian mnemonic tradition should be apparent. But with respect to 
the identification between enumeration as comprehensive review and intuition, Rule XI is 
even more to the point: “The present Rule explains the way in which these two operations 
[intuition and enumeration] aid and complement each other; they do this so thoroughly 
that they seem to coalesce into a single operation, through a movement of thought, as it 
were, which involves carefully intuiting one thing and passing on at once to the others” 
(AT X, 408; CSM I, 38). In this way, Descartes acknowledges that deduction derives its 
legitimacy from intuition, but that the long chains of reason can cause one to lose contact 
with that primary intuition. This is why enumeration is brought to the aid of deduction, 
by reinforcing the intuition that underlies that movement of thought. Indeed, this 
technique for reinforcing the less capable powers of the mind reminds one of Alsted’s 
theory of a methodical ordering in the sciences: that it could repair the “fallen” state of 
the faculties. More broadly, it suggests that the method is intended to be fitting and 
appropriate to the powers of the mind, such that it aids and suplements those natural 
powers. Again, in the following chapter, we will see that these powers of mind are 
founded on a conception of the physiological capacities of the brain. In short, memory 
and intellectual attention are fallible because they are restricted by the nature of the 
central processing center in the brain. 
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 Rule VIII: the scope of human knowledge 
In addition to this supporting and confirming function, enumeration also provides 
an inventory of all human knowledge: “We maintain furthermore that enumeration is 
required for the completion of our knowledge. The other Rules do indeed help us resolve 
most questions, but it is only with the aid of enumeration that we are able to make a true 
and certain judgment about whatever we apply our minds to” (AT X, 388; CSM I, 25). 
Descartes makes several distinctions relative to this notion of enumeration as a 
methodical survey of human knowledge, which he also calls in this sense “induction,” 
that are not relevant to the present discussion. For instance, he distinguishes “complete,” 
from “distinct” and “sufficient” enumerations. Setting these aside for the moment, it 
seems that all of these notions of enumeration depend on a preliminary understanding of 
the general categories or classes of things. That is, an enumeration, in the sense of a 
“methodical survey,” lists each of the pertinent categories under consideration. For 
instance, to prove that the rational soul is not corporeal, Descartes says, “it will be 
sufficient if I group all bodies together into several classes so as to demonstrate that the 
rational soul cannot be assigned to any of these.” Descartes is explicit that this concept of 
enumeration depends on a prior class-ordering of things: “... if every single thing relevant 
to the question in hand were to be separately scrutinized, one lifetime would generally be 
insufficient for the task.... But if we arrange all of the relevant items in the best order, so 
that for the most part they fall under definite classes, it will be sufficient if we look 
closely at one class, or at a member of each particular class, or at some classes rather than 
others” (Rule VII: AT X, 390-1; CSM I, 26-7). In other words, the kind of enumeration 
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that aids one in the completion of knowledge depends on a certain prior understanding of 
classes or categories under which the things investigated will fall.  
The idea that he could devise a method that would apply to all kinds of human 
knowledge, which in turn depends on a preliminary inventory or categorization of the 
objects of knowledge, is at least as central to Descartes’ mathematical and 
methodological project of the 1620s as is the notion of intuition. Aside from the 
frequently referred to letter to Beeckman of March 26, 1619, we can indicate the 
introduction to what appears to be an unfinished treatise, the Thesaurus Mathematicus 
(found in the Cogitationes Privatae). There, Descartes says, “This work lays down the 
true means of solving all the difficulties in the science of mathematics, and demonstrates 
that the human intellect can achieve nothing further on these questions” (AT X, 214; 
CSM I, 2). This claim is again echoed in Descartes’ discussions with Beeckman in 1628, 
where he introduces his algebra in similar terms. Beeckman records, “He told me that he 
wished for nothing more in arithmetic and geometry: that is, in these nine years he had 
made as much progress as the human mind could grasp on the subject [id est, se tantum in 
iis, his novem annis, profecisse, quantum humanum ingenium capere possit].” Beeckman 
also reports Descartes’ claim that “he had arrived at a perfect knowledge of Geometry, 
through which it is possible to arrive at all human understanding [quaque ad perfectam 
Geometriae scientiam pervenit, imo quo ad omnem cognitionem humanam (sic) pervenire 
potest]” (Beeckman’s journal, October 8, 1628: AT X, 331-32). 
Descartes restates this goal many times in the Regulae: in Rule IV, he calls the 
method a “more powerful instrument of knowledge than any other with which human 
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beings are endowed, as it is the source of all the rest,” extending the “discovery of truths 
in any field whatever” (AT X, 374; CSM I, 17); Rule VI suggests that on the basis of our 
knowledge “of the most simple and primary things we can make many discoveries, even 
in other disciplines” (AT X, 387; CSM I, 24); Rule IX echoes this claim by stating that 
all of “the sciences, however abstruse, are to be deduced only from matters which are 
easy and highly accessible” (AT X, 402; CSM I, 34); and Rule XII suggests that the 
method will allow us to “make the most of our human powers” and that “it is not possible 
for us ever to understand anything beyond those simple natures and a certain mixture or 
compounding of one with another” (AT X, 410 and 422; CSM I, 39 and 46). In all of the 
cases sighted, the method starts with simples, which can be known immediately through 
intuition, and it extends quite broadly, covering the many different sciences and even the 
entire domain of human knowledge. None of these many references to the broad scope 
and aim of the Regulae is clearer than Rule VIII, which itself is composed of what appear 
to be three separate attempts to articulate the same vision, i.e., that the aim of anyone who 
really cares about truth ought to be to extend knowledge to the limits of human 
understanding.271
In many ways, Rule VIII is a linchpin in the interpretation of the Regulae. The 
centrality of this Rule is belied by its stated purpose, which appears to be merely a further 
 
                                                 
271 See Roger Florka, “Problems with the Garber-Dear Theory of the Disappearance of 
Descartes’s Method,” for an appraisal of the importance of Rule VIII for understanding 
Descartes’ method, especially as it relates to a global vision of science, what Florka rather 
blandly calls the “scientia doctrine,” fully developed in the Meditationes and Discours. I 
especially appreciate Florka’s suggestion that we not import the anachronistic conception of 
“metaphysics” as reality and “epistemology” as the task to fit our thoughts with reality when 
talking about Descartes. Surely, for Descartes, these issues are deeply intertwined. But this 
cannot be because, as Florka suggests, Descartes had so little interest in questions of 
epistemology. 
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heuristic suggestion in methodical problem solving: “If in the series of things to be 
examined we come across something which our intellect is unable to intuit sufficiently 
well, we must stop at that point, and refrain from the superfluous task of examining the 
remaining items” (AT X, 392; CSM I, 28). However, as Descartes explains what he 
means by this bit of advice, it becomes clear that he is referring to the nature and scope of 
intuition as it relates to the nature and scope of scientia. He says, “This Rule is a 
necessary consequence of the reasons I gave in support of Rule II” (AT X, 393; CSM I, 
28), which is the Rule that claims the superiority of arithmetic and geometry over 
dialectical reasoning as a model for the method of scientific discovery. These disciplines 
represent the gold standard of scientific knowledge since they are utterly certain and 
evident. The present Rule expands upon that foundation by showing “those who have 
perfectly mastered the preceding seven Rules how they can achieve for themselves, in 
any science whatever [in qualibet scientia], results so satisfactory that there is nothing 
further they will desire to achieve [ut nihil ultra cupiant]” (ibid.). In this way, Descartes 
adds the claim that no more knowledge can be achieved than what is certain and evident 
to the prior claim that certainty and evidence are paradigmic for scientific knowledge. He 
reinforces this further claim with the statement that when one acknowledges that no 
knowledge can be gained beyond the intuition of simple things, this is “not because of 
any fault of his mind, but it is just what the nature of the problem itself or the human 
condition presents [non ingenii culpa, sed quia obstat ipsius difficultatis natura, vel 
humana conditio].” Descartes continues, “the recognition of this point is no less 
knowledge than that which the nature of the thing itself reveals; and one would seem to 
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be insane to try to stretch one’s curiosity further [Que cognitio non minor scientia est, 
quam illa quae rei ipsius naturam exhibet; et non ille videretur sanae mentis, qui ulterius 
curiositatem extenderet]” (ibid.). These striking statements seem to identify the limits of 
knowledge with the limits of certain and evident intuition. That is, Descartes now claims 
that no knowledge can be hoped for beyond what can be evidently cognized. This is why 
it is necessary to stop one’s investigation at the moment when one is no longer able to 
intuit certainly and evidently the nature of something; and it lends a much greater 
significance to the seemingly mundane title of Rule VIII. 
Given that this is the context of Rule VIII, it is perhaps not so surprising that 
Descartes would undertake to introduce the project of examining “all truths, for the 
understanding of which human reason is sufficient [veritates omnes, ad quarum 
cognitionem humana ratio suficiat]” (AT X, 395; CSM I, 29-30). He says that this is 
something which anyone who desires good sense ought to undertake “once in his life 
[semel in vita].” The clarion call and the nature of the project are restated three times in 
Rule VIII, with important variations. 
 In the first instance, Descartes calls the project of investigating the entirety of 
human knowledge “the finest example of all [omnium noblissimum exemplum]” (AT X, 
395; CSM I, 29). In order to outline how that investigation might proceed, Descartes first 
claims that “indeed one will discover by means of these proposed Rules that nothing can 
be understood prior to the intellect, since the understanding of everything else depends on 
the intellect, and not vice versa” (ibid.; CSM I, 30). This claim can be supported by what 
has already been shown to be the importance of intellectual intuition for knowledge. In 
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effect, Descartes claims that the investigation of the entirety of human knowledge 
proceeds first and foremost by the pure cognition of the intellect [intellectus puri 
cognitionem]. Once the knowledge attained through the pure cognition is exhausted, 
Descartes says, the investigator “will enumerate among whatever instruments of 
cognition we possess in addition to the intellect, which are only two, namely, imagination 
[phantasia] and sense-perception [sensus]” (AT X, 395-96; ibid.).272
Descartes goes on to say “there can be no truth or falsity in the strict sense 
[veritatem proprie vel falsitatem] except in the intellect alone, although truth and falsity 
often originate from the other two modes” (ibid.). This is a critical distinction that 
appears to be the precursor of the distinction between “material” and “formal” falsity 
made in the Meditationes (AT VI, 43-4, 206-8 and 231; CSM I, 30, 145-6 and 162). In 
the later work, that concept is essential to Descartes’ claim that his idea of God is a real 
 Though the 
translation is ambiguous, I believe that Descartes does not mean that pure cognition is 
one operation of the intellect, among others. Instead, I think he identifies cognition with 
intellection, reserving pure cognition for that activity of the intellect that operates without 
the use of corporeal faculties. The intellect in turn makes use of the other (corporeal) 
faculties as instruments [instrumenta cognoscendi]. (More on this distinction in the 
following chapter.) For the moment, we should recognize a distinction between pure 
intellection and instrumental intellection, a distinction that roughly corresponds to the 
mind-body distinction. 
                                                 
272 As Adam and Tannery point out (Appendix B to the Regulae: AT X, 485-6), it is notable that 
Descartes omits memory from this list of faculties. This is especially noteworthy since the 
third formulation of this topic in Rule VIII does include memory (AT X, 398.29).  
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idea. There, he will claim that truth and falsity in the strict sense derive from judgments, 
which result from an interaction between the pure intellect and the will. Yet even at this 
early stage, Descartes is already committed to an idea of truth that depends on the pure 
intellect. Though I believe that there is an important realist strand in Descartes’ work, 
where he claims knowledge of things and not only ideas, he does not think that truth will 
be discovered through an elaborate, systematic explanation of the universe. Rather, it is 
by carefully restricting knowledge to what can be known for certain that one can be sure 
of the truth of one’s ideas. His nascent concept of truth prejudices what might be called a 
critical style in Descartes’ method: for Descartes, it is much more important to guard 
against error than to attempt an explanation of many uncertain things. This is why the 
investigator “will pay careful heed to everything that might deceive him, in order to 
guard against it” (ibid.). Finally, the investigator of human knowledge will enumerate the 
various “paths to truth [vias ad veritatem]” (a reference to the via et ratio of Cicero), 
determining what is most reliable, so that he may follow it. He will also distinguish 
which items of knowledge are truly useful, and which are mere ornaments of the learned 
(cf. Ramus’ critique of rhetoric), understanding that “any lack of further knowledge on 
his part is not at all due to any lack of intelligence or method, and that whatever anyone 
else can know, he too is capable of knowing” (ibid.).273
                                                 
273 This sentence is actually incomplete in the manuscripts. I add what seems to be missing, 
namely the notion of “truly useful” items of knowledge, following Descartes’ distinction in 
the following paragraph. 
 Here the method of intuiting 
clearly and limiting the range of one’s investigation to what can be intuited clearly 
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emerges as the cornerstone of Descartes’ method, conceived as a reform of Aristotelian 
dialectic. 
This outline seems to fit the ordinary conception of Descartes’ method: that it 
places a priority on the pure intellect, it suggests that if one attends to the simple things 
first, the method will be accessible to anyone, and it implicitly frowns upon book learning 
in favor of, at least in principle, a more democratic view of knowledge. The present Rule 
surely does nothing to clarify these vague and provocative suggestions, but it does 
reinforce the claim that an understanding of the entirety of human knowledge begins with 
an examination of the nature of the intellect itself, or intuition, and its application to the 
various mental powers, which are the instruments of cognition. In this way, it supports 
the intimate connection between Descartes’ concept of mind, however sketchily 
conceived, and his method. 
The second draft of the project expands on these claims through an evocative 
metaphor. Descartes opens the section (AT X, 396.26-397.26) by repeating his refrain: “it 
is necessary once in our life that we inquire carefully into what in the world human 
reason is capable of understanding [oportet semel in vita diligenter quaesivisse, 
quarumnam cognitionum humana ratio sit capax]” (AT X, 396-7, CSM I, 30). All things 
being equally simple to understand, Descartes claims, we ought to begin by investigating 
those that are most useful. The primacy of utility is a remnant of the Stoic conception of 
method. Descartes adds to this that the utility of method can be understood on analogy 
with the mechanical arts, which have no need of any other method than their own, and 
apply the same method to the fabrication of their tools that is applied to the actual 
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production of products. This works like a primitive blacksmith who is first required to 
create tools to shape and mold the hot metal before he is able to forge his wares. One 
imagines that the figurative “tools” of Descartes’ science ought to be those mental 
operations, the instrumenta cognoscendi, that reinforce and extend the powers of the 
intellect such that it can treat any given matter. Indeed, one wonders if the method itself 
is an elaboration of the tools of the human mind which are meant to be applied to 
particular problems. If that is so, while the powers of the mind are surely inborn, the tools 
of methodical research develop and extend those limited powers. This is perhaps why a 
preliminary examination of the nature of the mental powers is so intimately related to the 
kind of method that will be devised.274
In the final segment, treating the project of defining the scope of knowledge (AT 
X, 398.26-400.11), Descartes again opens with the now familiar refrain: “Truly, no more 
useful inquiry is possible than this one: what is human understanding and what is its 
scope?... This is the one task which all those who have the slightest love of truth ought to 
 
                                                 
274 Incidentally, I was reminded of Descartes’ metaphor while visiting a museum in Paris. Below 
the square in front of the Centre George Pompidou, there is a permanent instillation devoted to 
the Romanian sculptor, Constantin Brancusi, who spent most of his productive career in Paris. 
When he died, he bequeathed his remaining finished and unfinished sculptures to the French 
state on the condition that they were presented exactly as they had been left in his studio 
apartment where he had lived up to the end of his life. The instillation affords a remarkable 
image of the artist in his studio, all of the works arranged as they would have stood during the 
process of production. Even more a propos of Descartes’ suggestion here, it is evident that 
many of the unfinished pieces are studies of finished pieces, so one can appreciate the stages 
of production. Also, it is evident that Brancusi had produced primitive tools, devices, and 
modifications to existing tools, in order facilitate his sculpting. Most remarkable is a large 
circular platform, roughly formed out of stone, which apparently served as a platform on 
which Brancusi worked. Above it is a rope and pulley, with a drill attached to one end and a 
counter-weight to the other. Brancusi’s works are stunning formal abstractions: long sweeping 
lines with delicate features, usually forged out of iron. It is apparent that he had devised this 
weighted pulley system in order to allow him to wield that drill in the most delicate fashion. 
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undertake, since the true instruments of knowledge and the entire method are involved in 
its investigation” (AT X, 398-9; CSM I, 31). This time, Descartes greatly embellishes the 
nature of the problem and the reason for his optimism about success. (From the first 
chapter, we can see that this is probably because this section was written after the other 
two and, more importantly after the insights that constitute Rule XII.) As he explains, the 
task is first to inquire what kinds of things can be known by the human intellect. This 
amounts to defining “the limits of the mental powers we are conscious of possessing,” 
which he reasons to be much easier than “making judgments about things which are 
outside us and quite foreign to us.” Again, he suggests that the reader not be 
overwhelmed by this “immeasurable task,” since “nothing can be so many-sided or 
diffuse that it cannot be encompassed within definite limits or arranged under a few 
headings by means of the method of enumeration we have been discussing” (AT X, 398; 
ibid.). Again, Descartes returns to the key heuristics of the method: reducing complex 
problems to simple, well-defined, and clearly intuited elements; deducing our knowledge 
of things only on the basis of these simples; and preliminarily enumerating the categories 
under the present field of inquiry. These elements are said to make this most useful 
inquiry tractable. 
Unlike the earlier two drafts of how to inquire into the nature and extent of human 
knowledge, this final treatment actually contains the enumeration. Descartes tells the 
reader that there are only two different categories relevant to this question: “either to we 
who are capable of cognition, or to the things themselves that it is possible to understand 
[vel ad nos qui cognitionis sumus capaces, vel ad res ipsas, quae cognosci possunt]” (AT 
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X, 398; CSM I, 32).275
However, at this early stage there remains some ambiguity in this distinction. 
Descartes seems to include the intellect twice in his enumeration: on the one hand, the 
intellect and its faculties (here including imagination, sense-perception, and memory) are 
counted on the side of “we who are capable of cognition,” yet these faculties are 
presumably counted again under the category of purely spiritual simple natures, which 
are a sub-category of the things themselves.
 These categories are certainly broad, but the fact that this is the 
primary division that Descartes makes relative to the nature and extent of human 
knowledge is crucial. Rule XII will repeat precisely this dichotomy (AT X, 411.3-4) and 
will be devoted to outlining carefully the nature of each of the two categories. This will 
be the subject of Chapters 3 and 4; and indeed it is an essential precursor for Descartes’ 
mature metaphysics. It seems quite clear that this distinction foreshadows Descartes’ 
metaphysical dualism, i.e., he conceives of a primitive dichotomy between the nature of 
cognition and the objects of cognition, between the intellect and the things themselves. 
276
                                                 
275 Systematizing the former category, “we who are capable of cognition,” insofar as this will 
include (in Descartes’ later metaphysics) an examination of the ideas that we possess, could 
properly be called “transcendental philosophy” after Kant: “I call all cognition transcendental 
that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in 
general. A system of such concepts would be called transcendental philosophy,” Critique of 
Pure Reason, A 11-12; B 25. 
 It is important to realize that at the stage 
of the Regulae substance dualism is not yet a workable concept for Descartes: in this 
276 Though Descartes will make the distinction between cognition and its objects more clearly in 
his later substance dualism, ambiguity remains even in that formulation. For instance, 
Descartes will unproblematically shift between a discussion of cognition vis-a-vis the mind-
body complex, which is subject to the passions and other physical-psychological effects, and 
pure cognition, understood as the pure modifications of intellectual substance. This is echoed 
in his response to the problem fo interaction posed by Princess Elisabeth (Letter 16 May, 
1643: AT III, 660-62). In response, Descartes refers to a third primitive notino of the mind-
body union to explain the interaction between mind and body (Letter 21 May, 1643: AT III, 
663-68). In a sense, this is an explanation that is no explanation at all. 
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work, his categories are less tidy and he does not yet have a concept of “substance” with 
which to propose a dualism of substances.277
Rule VIII goes on to outline the distinction between simple natures, dividing these 
among the spiritual, corporeal, and common simple natures, as opposed to complex 
natures, summarizing what will be the core of Rule XII: “As for composite natures, there 
are some which the intellect experiences as a composite before it decides to determine 
anything about them: but there are others which are put together by the intellect” (AT X, 
399; CSM I, 32). This comment demonstrates the productive character of the mind in 
science. Those composites that are, in effect, recomposed out of simples by the intellect 
according to deductive reasoning will comprise scientia. The method is to reduce 
complex things, which the intellect experiences ipso facto, to their simple elements, 
which are intuited clearly and distinctly by the intellect, and then recompose those 
complex entities from simples through a process of step-by-step inferences. Moreover, 
the method of recomposition is not haphazard, but is guided by the “method of 
comparison,” which is an extension of the algebraic method. Rule XIV refers to this 
“combination of familiar entities or natures [entiam sive naturam] which produce like 
 However, this preliminary division remains 
essential to understand the developmental stages of thought from which Descartes’ 
dualism emerges. In that sense, Rule VIII provides a prime specimen of the elements of 
Descartes’ method that will eventually play a central role in his metaphysics. 
                                                 
277 The excision of “substance” as a valid metaphysical concept in the Regulae, is a function of 
one of Descartes’ primary aims in that work, namely, to undercut the notion of the syllogism, 
and the Aristotelian categories on which it depends, as the sole means to scientific knowledge. 
See Marion, Sur l'ontologie grise, 30-4, 60-3 and 85-98. 
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effects” (AT X, 439; CSM I, 57), by which unknown natures are known on the basis of 
known natures.  
By applying this method to the categories of all possible knowledge, which he 
here enumerates, Descartes finally outlines his vision of a universal method for the 
sciences in a concrete way. This conclusion is not stated without acknowledging that the 
method outlined here is incomplete and not perfectly transferable to Descartes’ later 
metaphysical dualism. Nonetheless, the method as it is explained here is a mature, 
thorough, and plausible attempt to define the organization of human knowledge and place 
it on a firm foundation. This concrete program outlined in Rule VIII is the first real, 
concrete development of Descartes’ vision of a ‘mathesis universalis’ that he initially 
proposed to Beeckman in 1619 and which in some sense was the guiding theme of his 
studies in the 1620s. It shows signs of influence from the Renaissance conceptions of 
method, memory art, and encyclopedism.  
 
 Mind and mathematics 
  
While Descartes’ Géométrie is often regarded as the most complete application of 
his purely mathematical method of discovery, it is also noteworthy with respect to the 
question of the relationship between Descartes’ concept of method and his concept of 
mind. The reason for this is that Descartes explains some of the most critical concepts in 
the Géométrie with reference to the nature of the cognitive powers. We will look at his 
classification of geometrical, as distinguished from what he calls mechanical, curves. 
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This distinction is, in part, explained algebraically, but it is also explained with reference 
to the way they are cognized. Indeed, this difference appears to mirror the difference 
between intuition, i.e., pure intellection and instrumental intellection. 
Briefly, the Géométrie is a work in which Descartes showcased the efficacy of his 
method for solving a classical problem in geometry, the Pappus locus problem. This 
problem requires one to construct a number of lines (no one prior to Descartes had solved 
it for four lines or more) each of which would be a predetermined distance from a given 
point. The opening pages of the Géométrie outline the relationship between geometry and 
arithmetic, the sense in which these sciences can be reduced to a few transparent 
operations, the importance of the unit “prise à discrétion,” the method of forming a 
comparison or equation between two different forms of the same quantity, the reduction 
of many unknowns to one, and the corresponding geometrical construction of solutions to 
geometrical problems, using only conic sections. This seems fairly straightforward. 
However, the Géométrie is also a strange specimen of the method insofar as it mainly 
demonstrates the constructions without demonstrating how they were achieved. In the 
text itself, Descartes says, “But I will prevent myself from explaining this in more detail 
because I would like to leave you the pleasure of learning them on your own, and the 
utility of cultivating your mind in its exercise, which is, I believe, the highest principle 
own could take from this science” (AT VI, 374). In a letter to Mersenne, Descartes 
confirms that he had omitted certain elements (one might say the most crucial elements) 
from the treatise: “But the good thing is that, bearing on this question of Pappus, I 
included only the construction and the demonstration in its entirety, without including all 
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of the analysis” (AT II, 83). Thus, in order to understand what is perhaps Descartes’ 
greatest immediate contribution to the history of ideas—certainly the source of his 
greatest influence in the seventeenth century—a bit of reconstruction is required. The 
most convincing reconstructions of the treatise suggest that the solution to the Pappus 
locus problem is the organizing principle of the work, not only in terms of its crowning 
achievement, but also in terms of its underlying structure.278 Though Descartes seems to 
have settled on a form of the algebraic method for problem solving around 1623, the 
solution to the Pappus locus problem provided a means of translating algebraic equations 
into geometrical constructions and classifying the kinds of construction according to a 
criterion of acceptability, simplicity, or more generally exactness.279
In Rule XIII, Descartes suggests that in order to approach geometrical problems 
(quaestiones), one must perform a preliminary enumeration: “By quaestiones, moreover, 
we mean everything in which there lies truth or falsity. We must enumerate the different 
kinds of problems, so that we may determine what we have the power to achieve in each 
kind” (AT X, 432; CSMI, 53). This categorical enumeration sorts problems into classes 
so that the appropriate method can be applied. In the opening sections of the second book 
of the Géométrie, Descartes invokes just such a distinction in kind, i.e., in the kind of 
 
                                                 
278 Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry, 144-48; Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness, 283: 
the Pappus locus problem was “the crucial catalyst; it provided [Descartes] in 1632, with a 
new ordered vision of the realm of geometry and it shaped his convictions about the structure 
and the proper methods of geometry.” 
279 Manders, “Algebra in Roth, Faulhaber and Descartes,” has shown that Descartes’ work with 
Faulhaber in 1620-1621 was probably the crucial time for developing his understanding of 
algebraic equations and their utility in solving geometrical problems. In fact, it is most likely 
that Descartes’ acquired his sense of the fundamental theorem of algebra via Roth’s 
Arithmetica. Moreover, the critical conception of the multiplicative property of equations, i.e., 
conceiving of equations as the product of roots, appears to originate from this work as well. 
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curves admissible in geometry. While the first book treats only those problems that can 
be constructed with the use of a compass and a ruler (i.e., using circles and straight lines), 
which would confine it to those solutions that were classically admissible, the second 
book introduces new mechanisms for drawing curves that Descartes must justify.  
It is frequently noticed that Descartes has a “problematical” rather than 
“axiomatic” or “foundational” approach to geometry. This is certainly characteristic of 
his treatise on geometry, and it was typical for the time. However, there is an underlying 
issue that approaches what Descartes himself called the “metaphysics of geometry,” and 
that is the issue of the acceptability of types of curves in the solution to geometrical 
problems.280 This distinction describes the conditions necessary for any possible 
construction; and they were in fact required to justify Descartes’ solution to the Pappus 
problem of greater than four lines. As Henk Bos has demonstrated in his singular effort to 
determine precisely the nature of construction and the acceptability of geometrical 
constructions in the 17th century, the issue concerning the classification of curves has 
direct bearing on what counts as an acceptable geometrical demonstration.281
                                                 
280 Letter to Mersenne, 9 Janvier 1639, AT II, 490. Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry, 143, 
identifies this with the principles of determining what curves ought to be admitted into 
geometry. In the passage, Descartes criticizes M. des Argues for having employed a kind of 
“metaphysics of geometry” in reasoning about geometry. By contrast, Descartes says, “je ne 
m’y fie point tant, que d’assurer aucune chose de ce que j’ay trouvé par son moyen, avant que 
je l’aye aussy examiné par le calcul, ou que j’en aye fait une demonstration Geometrique. Car 
on s’y peut tromper fort aysement et mesler quelque difference specifique avec les generiques, 
au moyen de quoy le tout ne vaut rien” (ibid.). 
 For the 
ancients, this was evident: only the circle and straight line could be used to construct the 
solutions to geometrical problems. One important consequence of this, at least for the 
281 Bos, “The Concept of Construction and the Representation  of Curves in Seventeenth-Century 
Mathematics,” in Lectures on the History of Mathematics, 23-36. See also, Bos, Redefining 
Geometrical Exactness, Ch. 1 et passim. 
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modern reader, is that throughout classical geometry, it is not so much the deduction 
(from axioms) that is paramount for true geometrical knowledge, but the construction of a 
solution to the problem that counts.282 Thus the parameters of acceptable constructions 
were absolutely central to the concept of mathematical truth. Nonetheless, the classical 
restrictions on construction did not prevent ancient geometers from devising all kinds of 
devices to construct solutions to the most notoriously difficult problems, e.g., the 
trisection of the angle, squaring the circle or duplicating the cube (i.e., finding two mean 
proportionals).283
As Bos has pointed out, the purpose of Descartes’ Géométrie was twofold: (1) to 
develop an “analysis,” or universal method for finding the appropriate construction for 
any type of geometrical problem and (2) to determine what constructions were acceptable 
in geometry beyond those using the ruler and compass.
 Among these devices were the quadratrix, the cissoid, the conchoid, as 
well as Erotasthene’s compass for finding two mean proportionals (from which it is likely 
Descartes derived his own compass for finding mean proportionals via its discussion in 
either Pappus’ Collectiones or Simon Stevin’s Arithmetica). However, none of these 
“solutions” were real solutions to the problems proposed since they did not conform to 
the standards of geometrical exactness, i.e., constructions using only the ruler and 
compass. 
284
                                                 
282 See Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness, Ch. 2 and 4. 
 As we have seen, the answer to 
the former aim is provided through the algebraic method and the mathesis universalis 
more generally. The answer to the second question is provided in the classification of 
283 See Thomas Heath. A History of Greek Mathematics, I, Ch. 7. 
284 Bos, Lectures on the History of Mathematics, 43. Cf. 25-26 for a description of these principle 
aims as the central methodological issues in all of 17th century mathematics. 
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curves. I claim that, in fact, both of these elements (i.e., not only the algebraic method of 
discovery) are ingredient to Descartes’ response to the issue of the mathesis universalis. 
That is, it seems that Descartes’ notion of the mathesis universalis is linked to a 
preliminary classification of the kinds of things tractable by means of that method.  
Acccording to Bos, the acceptability of constructions can actually be divided into 
two different parameters: acceptability and simplicity, the former is treated in Bk. II of 
the Géométrie and the latter in Bk. III.285 Briefly, the acceptability of curves is 
determined by the nature of construction, while the criterion of simplicity states that it 
would be an error, or “une grande faute,” to use a more complex method of construction 
than is required by the nature of the problem.286
For the present purposes, only the issue of the acceptability of curves and their 
classification is pertinent. The second book of the Géométrie makes several definitive 
pronouncements on the nature of acceptable curves in geometry. First of all, Descartes 
dismisses the ancient distinction between geometrical and mechanical curves, suggesting 
that the straight line (which is generated with the use of a ruler) and the circle (which is 
generated with the use of a compass) are no less “mechanical” in nature than other 
curves, since one uses tools to create them. Descartes wishes to found the distinction 
between curves on a different basis, in short, he says, “we are looking only for the 
 The criterion of simplicity serves to 
reinforce the rigor and necessity of classification for the adequacy of method to treat 
higher order problems.  
                                                 
285 Ibid., 48-50. 
286 This appears on AT VI, 444. See Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness, 357-59 for a 
discussion of this passage among others. 
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correctness in reasoning” (AT VI, 389). One may object that even though ancient 
geometers surely used tools to construct their lines and circles, it was the concepts 
themselves--the ideal line and circle--that made these acceptable for construction. Lines 
and circles were fundamental to the general ontology of classical geometry. Thus, 
perhaps Descartes’ appeal to the “justice of the reasoning” is closer to the original intent 
of those ancient authors than he would like to admit. Nevertheless, he goes on to state 
that the distinction between geometrical and mechanical curves is generally conceived in 
the following way: “It is, I think, quite clear that one can take, as one does, Geometrical 
as that which is precise and extact and Mechanical as that which is not” (ibid.). 
Furthermore, he anticipates the distinctions that will follow by claiming that “in order to 
trace all of the curved lines that I intend to introduce, there is no need to suppose 
anything if not two or more lines that could be moved, one by the other, and whose 
intersections trace other lines, which seems to me to provide no further difficulty” (ibid.). 
These passages are ambiguous. Descartes wishes to distinguish certain curves from others 
on the basis of several conditions: precision, exactness, movements creating them, and 
their conformity to reason. The overriding aim is to justify the inclusion of certain new 
curves, of a degree of complexity greater than the circle and straight line, in his 
geometrical constructions. Each of these criteria serves this purpose while also 
reinforcing the centrality of the cognitive apprehension of curves as the standard of their 
inclusion or exclusion from geometry. However, it is not entirely clear which standard we 
should accept and why.  
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 Classification of geometrical curves 
In an effort to clarify the technical nature of these curves, on the one hand, 
Descartes defines the nature of the curves according to the nature of the movement that 
produces them: “given that one can imagine them described by a continuous movement, 
or by many subsequent movements that are completely regulated by the preceding ones: 
for, in this way, one may always maintain an exact knowledge of their measure” (AT VI, 
390). Yet on the other hand, he defines their nature according to their algebraic 
representation, “those that one calls "Geometrical," that is, which fall under a precise and 
exact measurement, necessarily have some relation to all of the points on a straight line, 
and which can be represented by some equation, entirely by the one, itself” (AT VI, 392). 
Thus, Descartes is clear that in some sense the curves that are accepted into geometry 
should be easy and clear to comprehend. But he defines this easy and clear 
comprehension in two different ways: according to the criterion of ‘continuous 
movement’ (with its extension to successive continuous movements, each regulated by 
the previous) and the criterion of ‘algebraic representability’.  
These two different ways of distinguishing geometrical from mechanical curves 
lead to a difficulty for interpreting exactly what is intended by this distinction. It is at 
least clear that whatever the real nature of the distinction, Descartes intends it to coincide 
with a distinction between what is clear, exact and, rational (geometrical) and what is not 
(mechanical). Henk Bos understands this to relate directly to the two intellectual faculties 
of knowledge described in the Regulae, intuition and deduction, where the ‘continuous 
motion’ is a motion that is intuitively transparent, while the ‘successively combined 
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motions’ resemble deduction. Incidentally, he sees the requirement that geometrical 
curves be represented by algebraic equations as a separate restriction.287 In an altogether 
analogous way, David Lachterman understands what he calls the ‘kinematic criterion’ to 
be an epistemic criterion that rest “on the motions the mind performs as it passes along a 
series of relations in quest of new knowledge, that continuous motion Descartes calls 
‘deduction’.”288 Others have tried to understand the ‘continuous movement’ criterion as 
reducible to the algebraic criterion, insofar as the purpose is to demarcate those curves 
whose points are all potentially identifiable and whose intersections with other curves can 
be determined.289 Still others have denied this reduction, preferring to distinguish 
‘constructability’ from what can be represented by algebraic equations, but have seen 
Descartes’ geometrical curves as essentially coextensive with the first two types of curves 
mentioned in Descartes’ letter to Beeckman of March 26, 1619.290
I shall be able to demonstrate that certain problems involving continuous 
quantities can be solved only by means of straight lines and circles, while others 
can be solved only by means of curves produced by a single motion, such as the 
curves that can be drawn with the new compasses (in my view these are just as 
exact and geometrical as those drawn with ordinary compasses), and others still 
can be solved only by means of curves generated by distinct and independent 
motions which are surely only imaginary, such as the notorious quadratrix. (AT 
X, 157; CSMK, 2-3) 
 The latter historical 
reference is fitting for the present investigation. In that letter Descartes states:  
 
Though this passage provides little in the way of clarification, since the phrasing is nearly 
identical, it does serve to connect Descartes’ classification of the curves c. 1637 to his 
                                                 
287 Ibid., 48-49. 
288 Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry, 182, cf. 169-74. 
289 Rashdi Rashed, “La Géometrie de Descartes et la distinction entre courbe géometriques et 
courbes mécaniques,” in Descartes et le Moyen Age, 19-22. 
290 M. Serfati, “Les compas cartésiens.” 
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proposed project of a scientia penitus nova in 1619. Indeed, it reinforces my claim that 
this classification ought to be understood within the broader context of issues pertaining 
to the mathesis unviersalis. This also may signal why Descartes includes two different 
criteria for geometrical curves, one with reference to “continuous movement,” which 
would be a remnant of the earlier project, and the other with reference to algebraic 
equations, which may have come later. 
One question that is raised in virtue of Descartes’ classification of curves is 
whether the continuous movement criterion is in fact coextensive with the algebraic 
representation criterion (as suggested above, some commentators think that it is, while 
others claim that it is not). One way to try to adjudicate this difficulty is to appeal to our 
contemporary understanding of mathematics. Descartes’ mechanical/geometrical 
distinction is surpassed, in the history of mathematics, by Leibniz’s 
transcendental/algebraic distinction, still appealed to in contemporary mathematics. 
Indeed, things like the quadratrix, cycloid, and spiral, all of which Descartes’ identified 
as “mechanical”(AT VI, 390), are commonly called transcendental, while all of the 
curves that Descartes’ identified as geometrical are recognized to be algebraic.291 At least 
in contemporary terms, a curve is algebraic just in case the set of points traced by that 
curve can be described by an equation of the form F (X, Y) = 0 where the coefficients of 
X and Y are rational numbers.292
                                                 
291 Of note, Descartes admits the conchoid and cissoid since it is possible to find a pointwise 
construction for these curves and thus an equation that describes them. 
 (Today both algebraic and transcendental curves are 
studied in geometry, so they are both in a sense ‘geometrical’.) Thus, in a contemporary 
292 Adapted from Weisstein, Eric W. “Algebraic curve,” from MathWorld-A Wolfram Web 
Resource (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/AlgebraicCurve.html/). 
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understanding, Descartes’ algebraic representation criterion seems to be a legitimate 
candidate for distinguishing the appropriate curves from all others.  
What about Descartes’ continuous movement criterion? Answering this question 
is difficult, primarily because it is difficult to understand what Descartes means by 
“continuous movement, or by several successive movements that are entirely determined 
by the preceding ones” (AT VI, 390). He tells us that this criterion omits those curves, 
like the quadratrix, spiral, and cycloid that are produced by “two separate movements 
with no ratio between them that can be measured exactly” (ibid.). But the several 
successive movements allows, for instance, the curve traced by Descartes’ mesolabe 
compass, or by the Cartesian parabola, or even higher (iterated) degrees of the Cartesian 
parabola (AT VI, 391, 393 and 476-84). (In fact, the second degree Cartesian parabola, 
described in the section concerning “A general method for constructing curves” is a 
centerpiece of the Géométrie.) One thing that is certain is that Descartes’ notion of 
“continuous movement” is not identical to the contemporary notion of “continuity” of 
functions, i.e., whether a function is differentiable over a finite range of values, since the 
latter is too broad for Descartes’ purposes. This is obvious given the case of the sine 
wave, which is continuous and differentiable at all values, but is not “geometrical” in 
Descartes’ sense (presumably, the quadratrix would be continuous and differentiable, 
though the cissoid and cycloid would not be). Secondly, there is little but historical 
fascination in these issues of geometrical construction today; mathematicians today use 
formal algebraic means to define the nature of curves. So there are few commentators 
with sufficient mathematical expertise who have addressed the issue. Henk Bos—one 
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commentator who certainly fits that bill—has offered an interpretation of what Descartes’ 
means by continuous movement that entails that all and only those curves constructed by 
means of a continuous movement can be defined algebraically. First of all, Bos 
understands continuous movement as rectilinear movement, reading Descartes’ rejection 
of the cycloid and spiral as a rejection of curvilinear motion in combination with 
rectilinear motion.293 Then Bos links the notion of continuous movement to algebraic 
representation through the concept of “generic pointwise construction.”294 In other words, 
he finds that by continuous movement, Descartes means to designate just those curves 
that could also be constructed by a procedure that would randomly pick out any given 
point along the curve by drawing the line that joins it to a point on a chosen axis. This 
method picks out the familiar abcissa and ordinate, or x- and y-coordinates, that describe 
the curve according to the way they are plotted on an ordinate plane. This procedure is 
possible only if the curve can be described by an algebraic equation. In fact, the algebraic 
equation in two variables is the ‘key’ to a generic pointwise construction: just insert a 
value for x and calculate the corresponding y value.295
                                                 
293 The key text to defend this view is found at (AT VI, 412): “la proportion qui est entre les 
droites et les courbes n'estant pas connuë et mesme, je croy, ne le pouvant estre par les 
hommes.” Cf. letter to Golius, January 1632 (AT I, 233-34). 
 While this interpretation seems 
eminently plausible, there is no guarantee that one could devise a method of construction, 
294 This is the crucial concept, inferred from Descartes’ statement that the points determined by an 
appropriate geometrical construction are “tellement propre qu'ils ne puissent estre trouvés que 
par elle” (AT VI, 411), not the “point générique” or “generic point” suggested by Christian 
Houzd, “Descartes et les courbes transcendentales,” in Descartes et le Moyen Age, 28. A 
generic point is a specific topological property that is trivial for all Hausdorf spaces, i.e., all 
topological spaces that are not in some strong sense separated or disjoint. In other words, 
Descartes would have no use for this term. A much more general concept is required here. Bos 
suggests “generic pointwise construction”; I would suggest “function.” 
295 Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness, 336-38. 
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according to Descartes’ continuous movement criterion, for any given algebraic equation. 
Indeed, this seems to have been part of the difficulty behind the Géométrie: that 
generating actual methods of construction was at least as difficult as solving the 
analytic/algebraic side of the problem. Though the Cartesian parabola is an achievement, 
a contemporary reader marvels at just how complicated the construction is: a parabola of 
the first degree (i.e., a normal conic section) is moved along its axis in conjunction with a 
turning ruler in order to generate another parabola by the intersection of these two lines. 
Iterating this procedure one step further is even more complicated, as is attested by its 
description (AT VI, 480-82).  
Descartes’ requirement that all geometrical curves be “expressed by an equation” 
or that there is “some relation from the curve to all the points of a straight line”(AT VI, 
392) seems to have more promise. Descartes may have a concept of “functionality” in 
mind (though Bos claims that the seventeenth century concept of a curve is not a 
functional one).296
                                                 
296 Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness, 127. The reason for this, he claims, is that the 
seventeenth century mathematicians do not have the concept of independent and dependent 
variables; they simply conceive of equations as describing a relation between knowns and 
unknowns. 
 If this were the case, Descartes should have in fact said that there is “a 
relation from each point on the curve to exactly one point on a straight line.” If we take 
the straight line in question to be the y-axis, then this would give us a function f(x) = y to 
describe the curve, where each point on the curve is described by f(x) and each point on 
the y-axis is described by y. This would be a good requirement for geometrical curves 
and would rule out the conchoid and the spiral from the list of acceptable curves. 
Additionally, the functional requirement would give an obvious explanation for why 
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Descartes would identify the requirement that the “relation from the curve to all the 
points of a straight line” would be an identical to the requirement that the curve “could be 
expressed by some equation.” When Descartes describes how to determine the equation 
of a curve according to its relation to a straight line, which he does by using the Cartesian 
parabola (AT VI, 393-94), he says that the “relation” of the curve to the line is 
determined by straight lines with definite ratios between them. This is consistent with 
Descartes’ requirement that all relations or proportions are (potentially) related in some 
definite way to a “unit” length. Such a relation would not be a rational one (Descartes 
even suggests that it would be impossible!) if one of the lines were curved.297
One of the consequences of a detailed study of Descartes’ classification of curves 
in the Géométrie is that one begins to realize that even though Descartes is on the 
threshold of a purely formal (algebraic) criterion for defining geometrical exactness, he 
remains, in important ways, bound to the geometrical, figurative, representations of 
 In any case, 
there does seem to be a close connection between what Descartes regarded to be the 
determinate ratio of lines that produce the desired curve and the algebraic representation 
of that curve in the form of an equation. While I do not know and have not seen a proof 
of the precise nature of that connection, it is at the very least an appropriately Cartesian 
idea. Recall that it is the ‘ratio and proportion’ or ‘order and measure’ that defines the 
mathesis universalis; and the representation of mathematical operations by line segments 
is ingredient to at least Descartes’ concept of mathematical truth in the Regulae.  
                                                 
297 “The proportion that exists between straight lines and curves is not known and even, I believe, 
is not capable of being known by men, and as a consequence one would not be able to 
conclude from this anything that would be sure and exact” (AT VI, 412). 
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curves for his concept of geometrical exactness.298 Though there is nothing more 
common than to suggest that Descartes made geometry algebraic, one should keep in 
mind that the algebraic equation is not the final word; the concept of geometrical 
construction still remains central.299
                                                 
298 There is nothing shameful about this; such a bond to geometrical construction as the standard 
of exactness would prevail for some time after Descartes. Bos is fond of relating a story about 
the correspondence between Leibniz and Christiaan Huygens, where both Leibniz and 
Huygens seem to prefer a much more complicated algebraic expression to a simpler one; the 
reason for this lies in the simplicity of construction rather than the simplicity of the equation. 
He even finds in Newton a similar prejudice: “it is not its equation but its description [read: 
construction] which produces a geometrical curve.” See Bos, “The Concept of Construction 
and the Representation of Curves” in Lectures on the History of Mathematics, 23-30, quoted 
text on 30. 
 That is not to undermine the central importance of 
the equation in Descartes’ Géométrie. Indeed, the algebraic equation, that accurately 
represents the problem, is, so to speak, the first principle of its demonstration. However, 
the construction is necessary in order for the demonstration to be complete. Lachterman 
has gone as far as to suggest that geometrical construction in Descartes is a paradigmatic 
case of Vico’s principle: verum et factum convertuntur. According to this interpretation, 
Descartes recognizes the truth of a geometrical solution only insofar as he is able to 
reproduce that truth, i.e., to construct the solution. Moreover, insofar as the geometer-
philosopher demonstrates her mastery over the subject in question, her mind, in the 
process of geometrical construction, is an active producer of truth. It is in this sense that 
Lachterman would like to link the concept of geometrical construction to the concept of 
the Kantian productive imagination: for Kant, “mathematical construction [comes] from 
the construction of a concept. But to construct a concept means to exhibit (darstellen) to 
299 Vincent Julien, Descartes et la Géometrie, repeatedly notes the ambiguity between algebraic 
expressions and geometrical representations. 
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oneself its corresponding intuition.”300 There is a great deal of truth to this proposed 
connection. Though Descartes consistently identifies thought with passive perception 
(cogitare = percipere: Meditation VI: AT VII, 79; CSM I, 55; Principles I.32: AT IX-b, 
17; CSM I, 204) in marked contrast to the spontaneous activity of perception in Kant, the 
hallmark of truth or falsity for Descartes, i.e., judgment, depends on volition and thus the 
mind’s active mode. For the purposes of geometrical demonstration, this activity is made 
manifest in the construction; only in this sense is geometrical knowledge proved.301
 
 
Furthermore, this identification between geometrical construction and the manifestation 
of an intuition suggests a reasonable philosophical background for the claim that there is 
a correspondence between the continuous movement of the geometrical construction and 
the continuous movement of thought that preserves the veracity of the intuition, i.e., 
deduction. Perhaps this is why Descartes intimates a connection between the two, though 
he clearly lacks an explanation for the connection. 
 Geometry and the intellect in the Regulae 
Several texts from the Regulae could be cited in support of the conclusion from 
the Géométrie that truth is preserved through exact, imaginative constructions. The most 
                                                 
300 See Lachterman, Ethics of Geometry, 7-16 for the main lines of this argument. The Kant 
quotation comes from the “Doctrine on the Method” A 713; B 741. 
301 Doyle, The Logic of Descartes’ Method, makes a further precision of this statement with which 
I agree: namely, that Descartes only needs the construction (whether geometrical or physical) 
to demonstrate the practical efficacy of the theory, which is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for speculative truth. The additional requirement would apparently be the causal 
principles of natural philosophy from which these practical truths follow. Thus, we could say 
that Descartes only obtains the necessary and sufficient conditions for the speculative truth of 
mathematical ideas when he demonstrates the existence of God and the ego as the conditions 
of mathematical knowledge. This is, of course, accomplished in the Discours and 
Meditationes, or perhaps in the doctrine of eternal truths c. 1630. 
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decisive passages emerge in Rule XIV, which is a rule dedicated to the representation of 
problems in the imagination such that they can be more clearly conceived by the intellect: 
“These problems should then be transformed into real corporeal extension and depicted 
as bare figures by the imagination. Thus they will be much more distinctly perceived by 
the intellect” (AT X, 438; CSM I, 56). This rule follows the method of problem solving 
outlined in Rule XIII whereby the real difficulty is isolated—the unknown—and all other 
extraneous concerns are dissolved by virtue of an abstraction (AT X, 430 and 37; CSM I, 
52 and 56). This prepares for the specific (perfect) problems—those that are “determined 
in every respect” (AT X, 431; CSM I, 52)—addressed in Rules XV-XVIII. Descartes’ 
inclusion of corporeal or geometrical representations of problems in Rule XIV seems to 
allow him to extend the efficacy of the method beyond purely mathematical problems to 
physical problems as well.302
                                                 
302 This is one reason why I do not think there is a precise analogy between perfect problems, 
imperfect problems and mathematical, physical problems like, e.g., Doyle, The Logic of 
Descartes’ Method, advocates. 
 He refers, for instance, to the nature of sound, the nature of 
extended things, weight, speed, and so on in contexts that clearly refer to perfect 
problems. In a certain measure, this rule can be conceived on analogy with Descartes’ 
application of the geometrical properties of the ellipse and hyperbola to the grinding of 
lenses as described in the Géométrie and put to use in the Dioptrique. In these cases, the 
problem can be considered to be perfect by virtue of the method of comparison used. In 
other words, if one can determine in every way the comparison or analogy that 
appropriately describes the quaesitum, then it is a perfect problem. By contrast, if some 
feature of the problem cannot be so represented, then the problem is imperfect. Descartes 
 255 
seems to have no concern that the conclusions reached by virtue of applying the method 
to perfect problems will be falsifiable. They seem, at least according to the text of the 
Regulae, to be based on the same kind of experientia that renders geometry and 
arithmetic indubitable. Since Descartes’ conclusions about some of these matters, 
especially his notions of weight and the nature of light, are not in fact accurate, one could 
conclude that this is an overextension of a mathesis-type method. Moreover, the 
unfinished nature of the Regulae and Descartes’ use of a much more experimental 
method in his actual physical investigations reported, for example, in Le Monde and 
Météors, suggest that the difficulty of applying a strictly mathematical method to 
physical problems may have been one of the reasons for the discontinuation of the project 
c. 1628. 
Nonetheless, Descartes’ explanation of the method in these rules is instructive for 
understanding how he conceived of the mathesis universalis and its potential for 
application to natural philosophy in the 1620s. More than that, I maintain that these 
prescriptions reveal deep-seated commitments in Descartes’ philosophy that will remain 
central throughout his career. First of all, Descartes outlines what I have referred to as the 
‘method of comparison’ in these Rules: a method that is essentially an algebraic method 
of discovery in a broader natural scientific perspective. The method of comparison is 
outlined as a means of extending knowledge from what is already familiar to what is 
unknown by means of the similarity between the unknown and the known. The reason 
why Descartes applies this method to natural philosophy is that he acknowledges no 
faculty of the intellect that is able to divine the true nature of things by itself. Thus, the 
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best that can be hoped for is to describe the nature of unknown things according to their 
relation to things that are already known. To illustrate, Descartes introduces the case of 
the blind person who has no concept of ‘color’. He suggests that one may be able to relate 
the nature of color to the blind person if one explains the structure of colors that we 
ordinarily see as a mixture of primary and secondary colors. In this way, one can perhaps 
explain to the blind person the nature and structure of perceived colors even though he 
may have no sensory intuition of them. With reference to one of his favorite examples of 
a difficult problem to understand, Descartes’ invokes the same procedure, parts of which 
I have cited above, in a way that addresses ordinary human cognition: 
In the same way, if the magnet contains some kind of entity the like of which our 
intellect has never before perceived, it is pointless to hope that we shall ever get to 
know it simply by reasoning; in order to do that, we should need to be endowed 
with some new sense, or with a divine mind. But if we perceive very distinctly 
that combination of familiar entities or natures which produces the same effects 
which appear in the magnet, then we shall credit ourselves with having achieved 
whatever is possible for the human mind to attain in this matter. (AT X, 439; 
CSM I, 57) 
 
The nature of the magnet, Descartes claims, is unknown to the ordinary human intellect 
in the same way that colors are unknown to the blind man: the magnet exhibits a kind of 
effect whose cause we cannot perceive. However, like the case of the colors, if the nature 
of the magnet were explained on the basis of simple natures, which we can perceive and 
which operate in an analogous way to the perceived effects of the magnet, then we can 
completely understand the nature of the magnet on analogy with these other simple 
natures. The method of comparison, on the basis of which, “we perceive that the thing we 
are looking for participates in this way or that in the nature of the things given the 
statement of the problem” (AT X, 438; CSM I, 56), allows us to extend our knowledge 
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from the familiar to the unfamiliar without a wild intuitive leap or specious, “dialectical” 
reasoning.303
The method of extending our knowledge is a method of comparison, or analogy, 
which is basically algebraic in character. That is, one takes x to be unknown and a, b, and 
c to be known. If one can then establish a proportion between the known and the 
unknown, for example, a is to b as c is to x, then the solution becomes apparent by virtue 
of this stated analogy: x is related in such a way that it is proportional to b, but inversely 
proportional to a and c. Further, if these terms are cashed out in terms of quantitative 
magnitudes, then the solution of the problem is a matter of simple multiplication and 
division. In order to set up a problem like this, Descartes suggests translating the ratio of 
knowns and unknowns into an equivalent ratio between line segments. Lines segments 
are chosen to indicate any given magnitude because of the ease with which they are 
represented to the imagination. The operations of addition and subtraction (Rule XVIII) 
as well as multiplication and division (Rule XV) are pictured by means of line segments. 
Despite this reliance on geometrical figures to describe the operations of arithmetic, 
however, Descartes does not fall into the same difficulty as Viète with respect to the “law 
of homogeneity.” Instead, he takes his cue from Stevin’s Arthmetica and reduces figures 
of two dimensions to one dimension by reference to the arbitrariness of the unit segment: 
“we shall always understand the unit to be in every sense an extended subject and one 
susceptible of countless dimensions” (AT X, 453; CSM I, 66). That is, he takes a 
rectangle whose sides are equal to two and three units respectively and sets this equal to a 
  
                                                 
303 I say this with reference to Descartes' effort to distance himself from traditional dialectic even 
though I think Descartes' reasoning on this point is 'dialectical' in some broader sense. 
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rectangle of sides one and six. The second rectangle can then be considered as a line 
equal to the length of its base. Descartes even suggests representing these figures by a 
series of points, which can easily be set one after the other in a line in order to reduce the 
dimension.304
The reduction of problems to symbolic relations between line segments allows 
one to understand the relations that exist between the known and unknown quantities. 
Again, symbols are useful because they help to improve the capacity of the imagination 
to perceive the essence of a problem in its entirety. In effect, symbolic representation of 
problems makes use of the method of abstraction, described in Rule XIII. Descartes 
describes the method as follows: 
 “So we must note above all that the root, the square, the cube, etc. are 
nothing but magnitudes in continued proportion which, it is always supposed, are 
preceded by the arbitrary unit mentioned above” (AT X, 357; CSM I, 68). In one 
sentence, Descartes dispatches with the confusing language of multiplication, which in 
the Cossist algebra referred to squares, cubes, squares squared, and so on. The metaphor 
of dimensionality was a great stumbling block to understanding multiplicative roots to 
algebraic equations. Additionally, in the same sentence, Descartes expresses the 
relationship between mean proportionals (the ‘geometrical mean’ as we would say today) 
and roots: if x is the mean proportional between y and 1, then x2 = y. Thus, proportional 
relations, the unit, and the symbolic representation of knowns and unknowns are the 
“simple components” (Rule V) to which any geometrical problem can be reduced and it 
is on the basis of these that we ought to make a step by step assent to their solution. 
                                                 
304 Doyle, The Logic of Descartes’ Method, has pointed out that this technique dates back to 
Euclid's Elements. 
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We ought to write down a list of terms of the problem as they were stated in the 
first place; then we should note down the way in which they may be abstracted, 
and the symbols we might use to represent them. The purpose of this is that once 
we have found the solution in terms of these symbols, we shall be able to apply it 
easily to the particular subject we are dealing with, without having recourse to 
memory. For we always abstract something more general from what is less 
general. (CSM I, 69; AT X, 458) 
 
Though the abstraction is meant to highlight the most general, or essential, features of the 
problem at hand, even this level of generality is taken to correspond to a depiction in the 
imagination, or even the sense perception, since these figures are supposed to be notated. 
Thus, Descartes clearly designs his algebraic method of comparison with attention to the 
strengths and weaknesses of the various faculties of the mind. Moreover, algebraic 
expressions notated by symbols are strict corollaries of the method of comparison of 
Rules XIII and XIV and the notion of an explanatory series from Rule VI. (We will have 
a chance to return to these issues in the next chapter.) 
The method of comparison and the representation of proportional relations, using 
either symbols or line segments, describe the mechanics of the method. But the 
conditions of the method are determined by the parameters within which problems must 
be framed. Descartes’ notion of ‘quantifiability’, not to be confused with quantification, 
carries with it an implicit bipolarity condition for all problems: “by problems 
[quastiones], moreover, we mean everything in which there lies truth or falsity” (AT X, 
432). Thus, every problem must be determinable as either true or false. As is apparent in 
today’s natural sciences, this criterion is a vital criterion for any scientific investigation. 
When dealing with imperfect problems, therefore, it is necessary to isolate the particular, 
quantifiable feature of the thing in question and to compare this to other quantifiable 
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features only. In that way imperfect problems can be “reduced” to perfect ones. Part of 
the implicit assumption behind this reduction is that any feature of a physical thing is 
simply a “mode” of an extended object. These perceivable features are not ‘real qualities’ 
or ‘substantial forms’ that have some independent ontological status. For example, when 
Descartes compares the tension or weight of different strings that produce some sound, he 
does not understand heaviness to be a real quality of the strings, but to be a quantifiable 
mode of the extended substance. This mode can then be treated as any number, symbol, 
or extended magnitude and is thus amenable to the method described above. Accordingly, 
Descartes’ conviction that matter is essentially extended and that all space contains some 
extended matter rests on the a priori conditions that make his method possible. 
In the Regulae just as in the Géométrie, we see a very close relationship between 
Descartes’ algebraic method and the mental operations of pure cognition, imagination, 
and sense perception. These mental powers help to determine the way in which problems 
ought to be represented and solutions ought to be sought. Though Descartes is on the 
cusp of an independent, formal system that justifies his natural philosophy, he is still 
wedded to the idea that knowledge is determined by and fitted to the mind. His method is 
continually justified with relation to the way it is carried out by the mind. The various 
steps of the method correlate with the faculties of the mind. And, we will see further, 
objects are conceived in contradistinction to the intellect. In this sense, Descartes 
commits the psychologistic fallacy. He justifies purely formal truths by the psychological 
processes necessary to grasp them. 
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 The idea of pure mathesis in Descartes’ mature philosophy 
 
In the Meditationes Descartes adds a further precision to the relationship between 
corporeal extension, i.e., physical nature, and purely mathematical knowledge. He opens 
Meditation VI by reminding himself that at least he knows that those material things [res 
materiales], which are the object of pure mathesis, are capable of existing “insofar as I 
perceive them clearly and distinctly” [jam ad minimum scio illas [res materiales], 
quatenus sunt purae Matheseos objectum, posse existere, quandoquidem ipsas clare et 
distincte percepio] (AT VII, 71; CSM I, 50—cf. AT VII, 80, ln. 10; CSM I, 55). This 
statement effectively dissociates knowledge of pure mathesis from knowledge acquired 
through the senses and imagination. As a further measure of distinguishing what is 
known via mathesis, versus what is known by way of the senses or imagination, 
Descartes distinguishes corporeal nature, understood as the object of pure mathesis from 
“much else that I habitually imagine, such as colors, sounds, tastes, pain and so on” (AT 
VII, 74; CSM I, 51). This distinction clearly reinforces the idea that whatever is tractable 
through the mathesis unversalis is different from the perceived qualities of things. In this 
way, Descartes reinstates the mathesis universalis in the Meditationes as a matrix through 
which corporeal nature is understood clearly and distinctly, i.e., insofar as it is modeled 
on mathematics. Thus, for Descartes, nature as an object of pure mathesis is distinct from 
the many colors and sensations (in short the secondary qualities) that one usually has of 
the world. That is, only a corporeal world, understood as that which is extended in length, 
breadth, and depth, admits of modifications in movement and size, is indefinitely 
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extended, and contains no vacua, is the object of pure mathesis. Here mathematical 
thought, which is ideal, has a direct and determined relation to physical reality. Descartes 
demonstrates the truth of his clear and distinct ideas about mathematics and the mathesis 
universalis in Meditation V, which entails the possible existence of the object of those 
ideas, i.e., body in its general sense. Meditation VI goes on to demonstrate the actual 
existence of body, or extended matter by way of the compelling perception of its effects 
combined with God’s benevolence.  
As is well known, in Descartes’ Meditationes, there is a real distinction between 
ideas, which are the property of thought, and physical objects, which are some complex 
of modifications in extended matter. However, for Descartes, all ideas are nonetheless 
directed at some object, whether that object is another idea, an incorporeal entity, or 
corporeal matter. Thus, Meditation V demonstrates the truth of the ideas of corporeal 
things, while Meditation VI proves the existence of those corporeal things. The clearest 
outline of the ‘theory of ideas’ underlying this distinction, I think, is provided by Vere 
Chappell.305
                                                 
305 “The Theory of Ideas” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, 177-98. 
 On his interpretation, which I adopt wholesale, ideas are real entities for 
Descartes, but they have two different aspects: they are either mental acts (material ideas) 
or objects represented by mental acts (objective ideas). Thus, there is only a ‘distinction 
of reason’ (distinctio rationalis) between these two kinds of ideas; they are different 
aspects of one and the same thing. It is, nonetheless, a useful distinction because through 
it we can distinguish objective ideas as the content of material ideas, while we understand 
material ideas to be coextensive with perceptions (both of thought and sensation). When 
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Descartes talks about enumerating our ideas, the relevant concept is the concept of 
objective ideas because material ideas are distinguished by reference to their content. 
Accordingly, ‘objective being’, which Descartes suddenly introduces in Meditation III, is 
the mode of being that objective ideas possess. To put it in modern terminology: the 
objective being of an idea referes to the ontological status of the representational content 
of that idea. Formal being is thus the ontological status of the cause of that idea, which 
includes either real things or material ideas.  
In the case of ordinary perception, the objective being of a perceptual idea is the 
psychological counterpart to the physical thing it represents. The psychological state, in 
this instance perception, is causally connected to the perceived object. So, if I look at a 
blue ball in front of me, the proposition ‘the blue ball’ refers to a physical entity that is 
causally connected to a psychological state ‘the perception of the blue ball’. The 
objective being of that idea refers to the ontological status of the proposition ‘the blue 
ball’, which is a proposition whose material nature is captured by ‘the perception of the 
blue ball’. And the truth of the representational content of the idea, Descartes believes, 
rests on the clarity and distinctness of the psychological state. In the Meditationes, I take 
Descartes to be pointing out that our ordinary sensory perceptions are not at all clear and 
distinct. Only carefully deduced, mathematically modeled propositions will reliably 
describe the physical universe. On this reading, I take material falsity to indicate when 
two objective ideas are ambiguous in their representational content, i.e., they have the 
same external thing as their cause. The paradigmatic example from Meditation III is hot 
and cold: these two ideas refer to the same thing, but in different respects. Place one hand 
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in a container of hot water and another in a container of cold water. Then both hands and 
place them in the same container of water at room temperature. To the one hand it will 
feel cool, to the other it will feel luke-warm. Thus, hot and cold are not “real ideas,” i.e., 
they do not represent anything in particular.  
This discussion of Descartes’ theory of ideas is important because he invokes it to 
explain the nature of mathematical ideas in an exchange with Pierre Gassendi. In the fifth 
set of objections, Gassendi suggests that he would agree with Descartes’ statement that 
corporeal things are the object of pure mathesis, or rather he says of some “applied 
mathesis,” only if it is conceded that there is no real distinction between the 
understanding and the imagination, insofar as these are acts of the same faculty or power 
of the intellect (AT VII, 328-9; CSM I, 228). He illustrates this by discussing the 
knowledge that pertains to intelligible geometrical figures like a triangle or chiliagon (a 
thousand-sided figure): “...when, not without some effort on your part, you make the 
[triangle] become, as it were, present before you, contemplate and examine it, and discern 
the three angles distinctly and in detail then you say you ‘imagine’ it” (AT VII, 329; 
CSM I, 229). On this point, both Descartes and Gassendi agree. However, in the case fo 
the chiliagon, Descartes claims that there is adequate understanding of what a chiliagon is 
(equal to the understanding of a triangle) even while it is impossible to imagine such a 
figure. Gassendi, by contrast, finds that the confused state of geometrical representation 
in the case of the chiliagon leads Descartes to make a false distinction between the 
understanding and imagination: “You are in a confused state [when you try to imagine a 
chiliagon], just as you are when you are dealing with a myriagon or any other figure of 
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this sort; hence you think that in the case of the chiliagon or myriagon you have 
understanding, not imagination” (ibid.). This is a very important objection and is related 
to Gassendi’s belief that the faculty of understanding is not something essentially 
separate from the physical operation of the brain. We will have a chance to address some 
of these issues in the next chapter. For now, let us examine Descartes’ response. 
Descartes claims that there is in fact a clear and distinct understanding of the chiliagon, 
quite apart from its being figured, or imagined, “for many properties can be very clearly 
and very distinctly demonstrated of it, which could certainly not happen if we perceived 
it only in a confused manner” (AT VII, 384-5; CSM I, 264). He continues: 
And it is clear from this that the powers of understanding and imagining do not 
differ merely in degree but are two quite different kinds of mental operation. For 
in understanding the mind employs only itself, while in imagination it 
contemplates a corporeal form. And although geometrical figures are wholly 
corporeal, this does not entail that the ideas by means of which we understand 
them should be thought of as corporeal (unless they fall under the imagination). 
(ibid., my emphasis) 
 
Thus, for Descartes of the Meditationes, the object of pure mathesis—the objective 
content of the idea of pure mathesis—which is characterized by its being utterly clear and 
distinct to the understanding, governs the ideas by means of which geometrical figures 
are represented; and these ideas are not identical with those figures of the imagination.  
In effect, Gassendi charges Descartes with invoking a concept where none exists: 
geometrical ‘ideas’. For Gassendi, there are only geometrical representations and these 
are the ideas of geometry. However, Descartes claims that, in fact, there are independent, 
objective ideas of geometry: these are the properties that define geometrical objects and 
can be enumerated without reference to any pictoral representation. The figures that 
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represent geometrical objects, by contrast, are the real objective correlates of those ideas. 
For Descartes, extended magnitudes, which are the substance of geometrical 
representations, are real things (whether they are constructed or naturally occurring in the 
world); and those real things are the referents of the ideas of pure mathesis. This means 
that from the fact that a chiliagon cannot really be represented to the imagination, i.e., the 
brain is incapable of forming an adequate image of the chiliagon, we should not infer that 
no such idea exists. Nor should we require that the mind generate a clearer image of such 
an idea in order to say that we understand it (as Gassendi seems to want). Indeed, we are 
quite able to enumerate many properties of the chiliagon that must be the properties of 
some ideal entity without, for all that, being able to imagine it. For Descartes, the 
incapacity of the imagination to represent what the understanding knows to be a real 
thing demonstrates the distinction between these two faculties. 
This is a more fine-grained distinction than what we have found in the Regulae, 
which blurs the distinction between figura and idea, but it seems to derive from 
Descartes’ understanding of what makes geometrical figures geometrical.306
                                                 
306 In addition to Chappell’s article, see “Descartes’ Idea and its Sources” in R. Ariew, Descartes 
and the Last Scholastics. The relevant passages from the early Descartes that identify figura 
and idea are the following: Rule XII: AT X, 414 and Rule XIV: AT X, 441; L'Homme: AT XI, 
174, 175, 176-77, 181, 183, 185 and 201. Descartes repudiates this identification in his later 
writings in the following places: Second Reply: AT VII, 160-61; Third Reply: AT VII, 181; 
Fifth Reply: AT VII, 363-64; and the Letter to Mersenne, July 1641: AT III, 392-93. 
(Citations taken from Chappell, “The Theory of Ideas,” 194-95n2-4.) 
 (The 
following chapter will explore the relationship between ideas, figures, and mental 
representation more thoroughly.) In the Meditationes, the mathesis universalis (the 
concept, not the term—which is not in fact used in that work) refers to those things that 
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can be conceived without reference to extended magnitudes or geometrical 
representations: its ideal content is really distinct from these figures. Furthermore, 
mathematics in general is distinguished from natural philosophy by the fact that the 
objects of mathematical thought are ideal while the objects of natural philosophy are the 
physical objects in the universe. The figures of geometry that are represented to the mind 
stand as a medium, a tertium quid, between the ideas of mathematics and the real objects 
of physics.  
However, in the Regulae, where these two sciences are treated under one rubric, 
the ideas of pure mathematics are not distinguished from the figures of geometrical 
representation and these together are supposed to provide a means for acquiring 
knowledge of the physical world. The following passage from Rule XIV is particularly 
illustrative of this ambiguity: 
Thus, if we were to say, “extension is not a body,” the term ‘extension’ here is 
taken in a much different way than above [where it was shown that the concept 
‘extension’ contains nothing distinct from the concept ‘body’]. In this [second] 
meaning, there is no idea that is peculiar to these concepts that corresponds to 
anything in the imagination [phantasia]. On the contrary, what is claimed here is 
entirely brought about by the pure intellect, which alone has the capacity to 
separate abstract entities of this sort. This is the source of errors for many who, 
not realizing that extension taken in this sense cannot be grasped by the 
imagination [non posse ab imagintatione comprehendi], [nonetheless] represent it 
to themselves as if it were a true idea. (AT X, 444; CSM I, 60) 
 
This passage contains reference to true ideas and particular ideas, the imagination (both 
as phantasia and imaginatione) and the pure intellect, but it takes these terms in a much 
different sense than what we have seen in the Meditationes. Here, Descartes is dismissive 
of those who use the pure intellect to represent merely abstract entities in a way that is 
then erroneously applied to actual things. By contrast, he advocates considering these 
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ideas in the imagination as a means of properly grasping the idea. The Meditationes, 
however, are clear that the imagination only grasps figures and that these are derivative 
of the ideas of the pure intellect. 
I believe that the reason for this difference between the two works is that the 
enitre aim of the Regulae is to determine a single (mathematical) method that would 
simultaneously be applied to problems in pure mathematics, arithmetic and geometry, as 
well as to problems in mixed mathematics, or the natural sciences (mechanics, optics, 
harmonics, geodesics, astronomy, etc.). This implies a reduction of the objects of mixed 
mathematics to the objects of pure mathematics. Such a reduction is only possible on the 
basis of blurring the distinction between pure ideas and imagined figures and conceiving 
of the latter to be really identical to extended objects. Thus, when the imagination 
considers the concept ‘extension’, it cannot help but actually form an extended figure (a 
thing) and thus cannot understand this concept apart from some really extended object. 
This is why, I believe, the imagination plays such a prominent role in the Regulae, 
whereas the Meditationes is much more careful to distinguish the corporeal nature of the 
imagination from the incorporeal intellect. The ideas of pure mathesis, in the Regulae, are 
identical to the figures and images depicted in the imagination, and for this reason 
Descartes supposes them to be directly and unproblematically applied to knowledge of 
real, physical objects. Descartes’ Meditationes reflects the underlying doctrine that there 
is a “real distinction” between the incorporeal faculties of mind, intellect and will, and the 
corporeal faculties, imagination, memory, and sense perception. There is no doubt that 
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Descartes’ continued reflection on the ontology of mathematics prompts him to make 
such a distinction. This reflection is a heritage of the Regulae, but it is not present there.  
Thus, the distinction between ideas of pure mathesis and the figures of geometry 
appears to be a later development. This distinction would certainly limit the range of the 
mathesis universalis since that science would not, strictly speaking, be directly 
informative of questions in natural philosophy. While this consideration restricts the 
scope of the mathesis universalis in Descartes’ later work, it does not diminish its 
importance. As we have seen, the ideas of pure mathesis are the basis for geometrical 
representations and the application of these to natural philosophy. Thus, the mathesis 
universalis determines the principles for any inquiry into geometrical or physical 
phenomena. Moreover, the way that Descartes conceives of the principles of natural 
philosophy suggests that the concept of a mathesis universalis motivates his conviction 
about the nature of the physical world. As we have seen in the Meditationes, the physical 
world, considered in its most general sense, is just the objective correlate of the idea of 
pure mathesis. In other words, the principles of any natural philosophy must conform to 
the requirements of the mathesis universalis: that any problem be quantifiable, that the 
problem express a well defined relation between known and unknown terms, that these 
terms be represented using symbols and line segments, and that the solution to the 
problem be either true or false. As a consequence of this deep-seated conviction, 
Descartes presumes that the physical world has a certain character, specifically, that it is 
composed completely and only of extended matter with shape, size, and motion as its 
modes. 
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However, this reading of the relationship between the mathesis unversalis and 
Descartes’ natural philosophy does not imply that Descartes’ Regulae contains his theory 
of matter. The Meditationes shows that Descartes’ mature theory of matter, the structure 
of the physical world, conforms to the principles of a science of pure mathesis. That is, 
the later doctrine is consistent with, but not entailed by the earlier theory. In order to 
arrive at his mature theory of matter, Descartes would require additional premises. These 
he will introduce for the first time when he describes the nature of light and the anatomy 
and function of natural bodies in Le Monde. That work will make a distinction between 
ideas and actual things. In the opening pages of Le Monde, Descartes is very careful not 
to identify light with a real physical action; it is a sentiment or mere perception, “that is, 
an idea which forms in our imagination by what the mediation of our eyes with the object 
that produces in us the sentiment, namely, that which in the flame or the sun we call by 
the name ‘light’” (AT XI, 4; CSM I, 81). By the time of Le Monde, Descartes has made it 
clear that our sensations of things are only nominally and causally connected to things in 
the physical world. These sensations are products of our imagination, which is in causal 
contact with the physical world. God’s providence will underwrite the causal connection 
between our ideas of things and the things themselves. Yet even when Descartes presents 
a proof, in the Discours, for the existence of a God that could underwrite the causal link 
between our sensations of things and the things themselve, he is still cautious. There, 
Descartes’ admits that his complete causal account of the physical world depends on a 
number of suppositions and analogies, which is at least in part why he proposes to talk, 
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not about the real world, but about “a new world” that God created in some “imaginary 
spaces” (AT VI, 42; CSM I, 132).  
It is important to be clear that at the time of the Regulae, Descartes had not yet 
clearly distinguished between discoveries in mathematics from discoveries in natural 
philosophy, but this would not have been unusual for a philosopher of mathematics in the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. During that time, it was generally believed that 
the ontology of mixed mathematics could essentially be reduced to pure mathematics; 
these were both somehow part of a larger mathesis. If Descartes thought, as I believe the 
Regulae shows, that the true objects of pure mathematics, i.e., those that could be 
represented geometrically, were somehow identical to, or accurately represented, the 
structure of the physical world, then he would have a philosophical justification for why 
problems in mixed mathematics could be reduced to, or entirely explained by, problems 
in pure mathematics. For Descartes, as we have seen, solutions to geometrical problems 
are represented through an accurate construction. His commitment to construction as the 
standard of geometrical truth is evident in the Géométrie, which presents only the 
constructions and not the analysis. Thus, it may have been quite natural for Descartes to 
believe that, somehow, the structure of the physical world could be entirely explained 
through geometrical constructions. In this sense, the Regulae implicit holds the promise 
of “geometricizing” or “making mathematical” all of nature; this is surely one sense in 
which it relies on a rather grey ontology. 
If we want a complete account of the connection between God’s existence, the 
existence of corporeal substance, and the principles of pure mathesis, we must turn to the 
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Principia. The first book of the Principia begins with a basic skepticism about the 
accuracy of our perceptions, which isolates the most fundamental principles of Descartes’ 
metaphysics from all of the qualities, forms, and substances that are ordinarily treated in 
metaphysics. However, the failure of ordinary perception cannot undermine the truths of 
mathematics. Indeed, in order to doubt the veracity of mathematical knowledge, 
Descartes invokes the hypothesis of the evil genius, which he admits is a weak and 
“metaphysical” argument. In turn, this form of hyperbolic doubt enables Descartes to 
make a further distinction between the pure intellect and other modes of thought. This is 
why the pure intellect is the essence of that thinking thing that the ‘I’ am. The 
independence of the ego cogito from everything else, the nature of its ideas, and the way 
that these ideas prove the existence of God, is the core revelation of the first book of the 
Principia. The second book goes on to treat the existence of the physical world, external 
to the mind. This physical world, however, exists only as the effect of corporeal 
substance, i.e., extension in itself. What I want to claim is that, while the actual nature of 
the physical world remains to be determined, either by hypothesis or by experiment, the 
notion of the physical world as essentially extend can only be understood on the basis of 
the ideas of pure mathesis. I believe that this is what the final section of that book means 
when it describes, in the heading, “the only principles that I accept, or require, in physics 
are those of geometry and pure mathesis; these principles explain all natural phenomena, 
and enable us to provide quite certain demonstrations regarding them” (AT VIIIa, 78; 
CSM I, 247). While the existence of the res cogitans and God who creates and sustains it 
are the two ultimate principles of Descartes’ metaphysics, the ideas of pure mathesis are 
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utterly foundational for the rest of Cartesian science or natural philosophy. These 
principles govern all of the truths of mathematics and they outline the basic structure of 
the physical universe such that it is tractable through Descartes’ scientific method. That 
the external world can be so clearly and definitively distinguished from the mind in 
Descartes’ metaphysics, is a consequence of the fact that Descartes recognizes the 
principles that provide an explanation of the natural world to be products of the mind, 
they are ideas of pure mathesis. 
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Descar tes’ Epistemology of the Regulae: Ourselves the Knowing Subjects 
 
In the preceding chapters, I have been developing an interpretation of the Regulae 
that establishes, to summarize, three principle claims: (1) the Regulae is a coherent work 
devoted to the question of what method to apply in natural philosophy; (2) the essence of 
the method is described by a workable technique applied to certain kinds of problems (the 
technique is algebraic--called the mathesis universalis--and the kind of problems it treats 
are those that admit of order and measure—which Descartes thought to encompass all 
problems in natural philosophy); and (3) the method, thus construed, is intimately and 
essentially correlated with a certain concept of mind and a certain epistemology. We have 
already had some hints as to what this epistemological outlook is. The primary result of 
the mathesis universalis is to put forth a research program on the working hypothesis that 
problems in natural philosophy will be most productively addressed if they are conceived 
in a way that can be treated mathematically. That is, Descartes explicitly restricts his 
investigations to what can be known for certain, and thus he abstracts all objects of 
knowledge from their place in the order of nature so that they conform to the order and 
measure of human intellection. Implicit in this program of research is an assumption 
about the nature of human knowledge, especially its limitations with respect to 
conceiving complex things. However, this hypothesis also had a powerful ancillary effect 
on Descartes, inclining him to characterize all matter in a certain way, i.e., to see the 
subject matter of natural philosophy or the basic constitution of the physical world as 
essentially corpuscular.  
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In this chapter, I will be more specific about the epistemological background 
behind the method of the Regulae, by focusing on Descartes’ account of perceptual 
cognition in the first half of Rule XII. That rule treats two principle issues: “ourselves the 
knowing subjects” and “the things which are the objects of knowledge” (AT X, 411; 
CSM I, 39). The final chapter will address the objects of knowledge, or the proto-
metaphysics of the Regulae. In this chapter, I will focus on ‘ourselves the knowing 
subjects’. I will do so by focusing on what I am calling Descartes’ theory of perceptual 
cognition. What I mean by that phrase is that Descartes’ account in Rule XII is essentially 
an account of the process of cognition in its most basic form, i.e., when a subject 
cognizes or perceives an external physical object. This theory will exercise an important 
influence on Descartes’ method and the justification for that method. In this way, 
Descartes’ theory of perception is an epistemologically motivated theory. The importance 
and novelty of this epistemological theory will best be understood by comparing it to the 
historical background directly preceding the composition of the Regulae. Indeed, late 
scholastic theories of cognition have become a source of much attention in contemporary 
scholarship. Though there is no need to claim that Descartes was aware of all of the 
intricacies of the scholastic theories that I am discussing, I think it is fair to say that he 
had a much better grasp of those theories than today’s philosopher. I indulge in this topic 
because I think it will help inform our reading of the Regulae. 
Nonetheless, it seems clear to me that Descartes’ discussion in at least the first 
part of Rule XII is indexed against Aristotle’s discussion of the nature of the soul and 
perception in Books II and III of the De Anima, since the sets of issues in each of the 
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texts largely correlate. In those texts, Aristotle distinguishes the various powers or 
faculties of the soul, especially distinguishing those that are purely concerned with the 
conservation of life and those that are concerned with sensation and appetite from the 
pure intellect. When Descartes addresses these same problems, he emphasizes this latter 
distinction, ignoring the former. For Descartes, both sensation and the basic processes of 
life can be explained by appealing to physical-mechanical models. In his account of the 
physiology of perception, Descartes relies on his knowledge of optics and the anatomical 
structure of the human eye. However, when he turns to the essence of thought, the pure 
intellect, or power of cognition (vis cognoscens), he resolutely denies that it can be 
explained by mechanics. This bifurcation between intellectual cognition and sensory 
perception mirrors the deep and enduring dualism of mind and body for which Descartes 
is famous. In some ways, this chapter will be most directly relevant to the issues 
commonly considered when one examines Descartes’ concept of mind.  
Moreover, there are important connections between the accounts of cognition and 
the basic metaphysics of both the Aristotelian tradition and Descartes. These connections 
can be understood in light of the familiar epistemological questions: What are the causes 
of our knowledge? How can we justify that our knowledge of things is as we believe it to 
be? And what is the nature of cognition? These questions involve basic presuppositions 
concerning causality, the nature of explanation, and the true referents of our perceptual 
and cognitive beliefs. I will elaborate on what I take to be the central issues in this regard: 
the nature of cognition (divided into sensory perception and pure intellection), the nature 
of the distinction between sensation and intellection, the causes or sources of cognition, 
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and a justification for the veracity of ordinary cognition. It is not surprising that the later 
scholastics were heavily invested in debates on just these topics; in fact, scholastic 
positions on these topics are varied and contentious. I hope to show that Descartes is well 
within the bounds of scholastic debate on these issues. He does not ignore the central 
concerns of previous philosophers; nor is his break from the tradition without precedent. 
Yet, his engagement with these issues is characteristicly Cartesian. 
Finally, this discussion will be integral to providing a complete interpretation of 
the Regulae. Indeed, it is utterly essential to understanding Descartes’ discussion of 
method in the Regulae that one understand it as a method suited to and appropriate for an 
immaterial mind interacting with material sense-organs in a material universe. The 
scientific account of sense perception in Rule XII explains the nature of the various 
corporeal faculties of the intellect—including also imagination and memory. These 
faculties play an indispensable role in the exercise of the method itself. Unfortunately, 
Descartes’ description of these faculties, as with the entire discussion of cognition, is 
very brief in Rule XII. However, there are a number of passages throughout the Regulae 
that can further illuminate Descartes’ thought concerning each of these faculties. In 
particular, I will claim (1) that Descartes’ method relies on his understanding of the 
physiological properties of the cognitive faculties and (2) that his basic physical 
hypotheses (his supposed principles of explanation) are chosen precisely because he 
believes they can be easily comprehended by these faculties. In both ways, Descartes’ 
physical description of cognition is correlated with his presuppositions about the way a 
unified immaterial mind intimately interacts with corporeal faculties of sensation and 
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imagination. Descartes refers to the pure intellect as a pure cognitive power (vis 
cognoscens). When this cognitive power produces new ideas, or interacts with the 
corporeal organs of the body in some way, Descartes says that its proper name is the 
ingenium (AT X, 416; CSM I, 42). Thus, he clearly indicates that it is the direction of this 
power, i.e., the application of the pure intellect to the corporeal faculties, with which the 
Regulae is concerned. I take this to refer back to the first Rule of the treatise such that 
training the ingenium cultivates human wisdom, while the spiritual cognitive power 
provides the “natural light” by which all the sciences are known. In short, this purely 
spiritual power and its consequent interaction with the corporeal faculties of cognition, 
though only briefly mentioned, surely underwrites the entire project of the Regulae. 
 
An Aristotelian/Thomistic theory of perceptual cognition 
 
This section will address the predominant theory of perceptual cognition in the 
late scholastic period. It is a general Aristotelian account, largely following the 
interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of cognition by St. Thomas Aquinas. While I do not 
pretend to address the wide variety of viewpoints on these issues, I think that restricting 
our account to a general Thomistic-Aristotelian account is nonetheless justified. Indeed, I 
think that this most closely corresponds to the kind of account Descartes is responding to 
in the first half of Rule XII in the Regulae, and one with which he would have been 
familiar from his schooling at La Flèche. The central issue in the theory of perceptual 
cognition is the nature of the rational soul’s involvement in the normal sensory activity of 
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the body. A theory of perceptual cognition is, uniquely, an analysis of human cognition, 
since perceptual cognition is the kind of cognition that is peculiar to human beings. For 
the scholastics, no other being has both an intellect and sensory faculties, or a rational 
and sensitive soul as these functions were called. Thus, the way that these faculties 
interact in perceptual cognition is peculiar to human existence and the nature of the 
human soul. Perceptual cognition highlights the role of the intellect in perception, which 
is our principle interest when approaching the epistemological account in Descartes’ 
Regulae. In this section, I will focus on the sensory aspect of perceptual cognition. 
However, there is a certain sense in which these processes cannot be entirely separated 
from the work of the pure intellect in its more abstract cognition of things. Strictly 
speaking, perceptual cognition cuts across both domains, but for the purposes of 
exposition I treat sensation first, then intellection. 
In recent years, interest in Aristotelian psychology has been revived, partly due to 
the success of functionalism as a research program in philosophy of mind and partly in an 
effort to reintegrate the mind and body in a meaningful way.307 The tradition of faculty 
psychology, on which the intuitions of the functionalist program are based, was largely 
derived from Aristotelian psychology. Faculties, or powers, can be conceived of in terms 
of their functional outputs or their operations within a mental system.308
                                                 
307 See M. C. Nussbaum, De Motu Animalium: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978) and M. Nussbaum and H. Putnam, “Changing Arsitotle’s 
Mind” in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, 27-56. 
 However, the 
extent to which this philosophy of mind can be called Aristotelian has been challenged—
308 See Jerry Fodor, The Modularity of Mind.  
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and I think rightly so—by Myles Burnyeat.309 This criticism has been influential even 
though proponents of the view have tried to counter it. What is instructive about this 
debate for the present analysis is that it hinges on a distinction between the metaphysical 
bases of Aristotelian psychology and our contemporary metaphysical assumptions. In 
particular, Burnyeat highlights the sense in which Aristotle’s theory of matter, 
particularly the disposition of matter to receive a form, does not sit well with the 
contemporary theory of matter governing research in the cognitive neurosciences or in 
philosophy of mind. Burnyeat puts it this way: “... the failure of the functionalist 
interpretation of Aristotle is bound up with the fact that Aristotle has what is for us a 
deeply alien conception of the physical.”310 In particular, Aristotle conceives of 
perceptual cognition as a kind of alteration, whereby an organ of sense receives the form 
of the object of cognition. I will discuss at length this idea of “receiving the form,” but 
for now suffice it to say that this amounts to the actualization of a capacity or disposition 
in the sense organ in the same way as, for instance, a person fluent in a language uses the 
grammar of that language.311
                                                 
309 “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind still credible? (A draft)” in Essays on Aristotle’s De 
Anima. 
 According to this explanation, physical facts only determine 
the necessary conditions for perception or cognition. While scholastic philosophers often 
concede that the sensory organs must be undamaged or otherwise unimpeded in their 
perception of the objects, these physical facts about the status of the sense organs and 
their relation to the objects of sense do not provide sufficient conditions for cognition. 
310 Ibid 26. 
311 This is how I interpret a classical Aristotelian example cited by Burnyeat, ibid. 19. He 
differentiates this kind of alteration from the other kind of alteration whereby the subject 
receives a wholly new quality, e.g., the ungrammatical human being acquires grammar. 
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Instead, the intrinsic capacities of perception in the soul, actualized by the presence of a 
perceived object, determine the nature of perception. As we will see, clarifying those 
capacities and their conditions of actualization requires a much more complex and 
ordered metaphysical picture than the contemporary philosopher is usually willing to 
countenance. 
By contrast, Descartes’ theory of matter, and consequently his account of 
perception, which we have seen is fundamentally determined by its adaptability to the 
mathesis universalis, is much more congenial to a contemporary understanding. 
According to this account, physical facts provide the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for every physical or material change in the process of perception. In other words, 
according to a Cartesian natural philosophy, one could provide a complete story about my 
seeing red through a physical account of reflection of light off the object and the 
reception of the rays of light in the retina, the transmission of that information along the 
optic nerve, etc. However, to be more precise, while my seeing red can be explained 
completely through physical mechanisms, the fact that it is ‘red’ that I see (what we 
would call a red color quale) cannot be explained physically. For Descartes, the 
specifically phenomenal character of perception is purely intellectual. While the physical 
or material story of perception is completely reductive (i.e., explained by appeal to 
underlying mechanical forces), the fact of perception, or what it feels like to be a 
perceiver, is set apart. 
The explanation of perceptual qualia in terms of any kind of completely physical, 
or materialist, universe remains a contested issue today. This is the “hard problem of 
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consciousness.”312 Contemporary attempts to resolve to the problem of qualia perception 
appeal to the categorical bases of modern physics—including a description of light as 
spectral reflectance patterns of electromagnetic radiation, involving things like fields, 
forces, the transmissions of electron packets, and the corresponding acceptance of voided 
space—that are nothing like the bases of a Cartesian explanation of the same 
phenomenon.313
Conversely, while the epistemological implications of a theory of cognition are 
apparent in Descartes, this is less clear for the late scholastics. Indeed, it is difficult to 
distinguish a discrete field in scholastic philosophy that would correspond to our 
contemporary questions of epistemology.
 Nonetheless, there is a much greater philosophical similarity between 
Cartesian science and contemporary science, particularly the commitment of each to 
viewing the physical world as composed of entities that can be modeled by mathematics. 
I think that it is principally for this reason that Descartes’ psychology appears to be so 
much more at odds with the views of contemporary philosophers. Indeed, the fact that 
Descartes has a seemingly complete physical and scientific account of the natural world 
leaves many utterly puzzled as to why he insists on the immateriality of the pure intellect 
and intellectual acts, such as perception.  
314
                                                 
312 David Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3), 
1995, pp. 200-219. 
 Our epistemological questions are typically 
motivated by responding to the challenge of skepticism with an adequate justification or 
explanation of why our beliefs are true. Thus, justified true belief answers the question: 
313 See R. Pasnau, “The Event of Color,” or G. Hatfield, “The Reality of Qualia,” for two 
different, clear-sighted approaches to a contemporary theory of color perception. 
314 Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, 6, makes this point. 
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what is knowledge? For the Latin medievals, however, knowledge is scientia, which was 
normally divided into various domains (metaphysics, physics, mathematics, ethics, 
rhetoric, etc.) and, for each domain, propositions that could be counted as known are 
those that could be demonstrated. Thus, scientia actually meant “demonstrative 
understanding,” where the syllogism was the vehicle of demonstration. One of the 
features of this emphasis was the development of an elaborate syllogistic logic and rules 
of inference designed to verify that given conclusions actually follow from given 
premises. As we have seen in the last chapter, one of the components that seemed to get 
lost in this pursuit of demonstrative understanding was the art of “finding the middle 
term” or analysis as it was sometimes called. Descartes saw an answer to the search for 
an analytic method, or a method of discovery, in the new science of algebra. 
Consequently, he harnessed this mathematical technique for the purposes of physical 
explanation and happily discarded the scholastic syllogism.  
Beyond this, there is another important facet of this medieval notion of scientia 
that has been intimated above but ought to be explained. For Aristotelians, every 
demonstration, in order to demonstrate, must do so according to some underlying genus. 
For example, Aristotle rejects the idea that premises from arithmetic could be used to 
demonstrate conclusions in geometry.315
                                                 
315 This is the problem of metabasis eis allos genos, Pos An ii: 7 
 Likewise, one would suppose, premises from 
physics should not be able to provide demonstrations for conclusions in ethics. More 
specifically still, Aristotelians would reject the idea that premises from mechanics or 
from the science of human art, could demonstrate anything about the nature of the soul, 
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or workings of living organisms. Here, I think, is a very clear example that illuminates 
why the Aristotelian framework is wholly unsuitable for a functionalist theory of mind 
and, similarly, why the Aristotelian concept of explanation differs radically from the 
Cartesian one. For the functionalist, mechanical and particularly computer models are 
essential to the process of defining and explaining psychological functions. Likewise, 
Descartes’ account of perception is informed by mechanical models of the sense organs. 
These mechanical models play an indispensable role in the account of cognition and they 
provide a fundamental reason why Descartes’ theory of cognition diverged so radically 
from prior theories. 
 Despite these rather significant differences, the historical excursion into scholastic 
theories of cognition will not be merely an exercise in erudition. Rather, it will frame the 
set of issues that I hope my account of Rule XII will address. In order for me to claim that 
Descartes provides a radically new and complete theory of cognition, I will need to show 
that his theory still responds to the chief issues that the older theories addressed. So, it is 
with this aim that I outline those theories.  
 
 Perception  
 
I will attempt to develop this historical account in two stages: first to explain the 
nature of perception, and then to explain the nature of cognition proper. As I have 
suggested above, these two aspects of perceptual cognition can only be separated 
conceptually. In real terms, the whole process takes place in a unified, single act. I see a 
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green leaf and I immediately attribute ‘green’ to the ‘leaf’, a predicative action that 
requires cognition above and beyond mere color perception. Nonetheless, there are 
important distinctions that can be made between the process of perception, strictly 
speaking, and the process of cognition. In particular, the cognitive component requires a 
peculiar sort of cognitive activity, called abstraction. First, I will explain how the process 
of perception occurs on the level of the sense organs and the internal senses. Then I will 
turn to the more properly cognitive operation of abstraction and intellection. The 
distinction between perception and cognition had important consequences for how the 
late scholastics conceived of the separability of the mind. In the final section, I will 
introduce some implications for mind-body dualism by turning to these accounts. 
 
 Perception as alteration 
On the standard Aristotelian view, the process of perceptual cognition is 
conceived to be a kind of affection or alteration. In order for a thing to be altered, 
according to the Aristotelian method of explanation, it must receive a form from some 
agent, which is the efficient cause of alteration. The efficient cause is distinguished from 
the underlying material that constitutes the thing, which remains the same through the 
process of alteration. For example, if I take a pot of cold tap water and heat it, I have 
introduced the form of heat to the material element water through the agency of the gas 
flame on my stovetop. As the water heats up, it loses the form of coldness that it 
originally possessed and acquires the form of heat. Moreover, in order for the alteration 
to occur, water must have the capacity or potential to receive the form of heat. We might 
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say that water is a fairly good conductor of heat (it has a high potential to receive the 
form of heat), unlike, for instance, clay, which is slow to receive heat and doesn’t change 
its form dramatically under normal heating conditions.  
Likewise, it is important to distinguish in what way the intellect and the sensory 
faculties have the potential to be altered by external objects and in what way they are 
actually altered. Aristotle outlines the intellect’s capacity to receive the forms of things in 
the following way:  
Within the soul the faculties of knowledge and sensation are potentially these 
objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible. They must be either 
the things themselves or their forms. The former alternative is of course 
impossible: it is not the stone which is present in the soul but its form. It follows 
that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools, so thought 
is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things.316
 
  
Here, Aristotle recognizes that intellection and perception are unique kinds of alteration 
since the form of the intellect or the sensory faculties are not destroyed by the alteration. 
This is not to say that under certain circumstances, say, long exposure to very loud noises 
or very bright lights might not result in some substantial change in the sense organ. 
Indeed, Aristotle cites this fact to argue for a distinction between the pure intellect and 
the physical organs of sense.317
                                                 
316 De Anima 3: 8, 431b 24-432a 3; cf. 429a 13-17. 
 The point is simply that in the course of ordinary 
perception, the sense organs receive the forms of things without thereby altering their 
capacity to receive other sensible forms. Even though the senses or the intellect grasp the 
nature of material things—they actually receive or become the form of the thing—the 
form of the thing does not alter their form. This is the sense of the analogy to the hand as 
317 Ibid.: 4, 429a 29-429b 5. 
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a tool of tools. The hand grasps the form of a thing without becoming that form. It is 
altered without losing its own form as a result of the alteration. Indeed, we will see that 
cognitive powers capable of grasping a greater diversity of content are higher or nobler 
than those that are restricted in some way. The hand’s status as a tool of tools gives it a 
certain prominence and mastery over all other tools. Indeed, one of the main reasons for 
the dignity of the rational soul is its unrestricted capacity to understand anything 
whatsoever. 318
One may still wonder how this alteration without substantial change (without a 
destruction of the previously existing form) is possible. It seems that the senses and the 
intellect must both receive and yet not receive the things cognized. This view of 
alteration is underwritten by the presence of forms in the soul in a purely immaterial way, 
i.e., as a “form without matter.” That is to say that the alteration involves the acquisition 
of an immaterial form, one that has a different kind of existence than forms usually have 
when they inhere in material things. In common scholastic terminology, we would say 
that the form grasped by the intellect has “intentional existence” as a “species.”
 This is tied, in important ways, to the rational soul’s immateriality and 
hence immortality. We will have a chance to address this connection in the following 
sections of the chapter. 
319
                                                 
318 Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle, 45, makes this point by contrasting the sensitive and 
intellective souls with the vegetative soul. The latter “has received from nature the principles 
of its activity in a fully actualized form,” while the former are blank slates, but they have the 
capacity to possess all sensory and intellectual forms. In this sense, the sensitive and 
intellective souls are clearly better off, and higher, for their greater potential than the 
vegetative soul. 
 But 
what is a species, how is it like or unlike its object, and how is it received in the intellect? 
319 See Alison Simmons, “Explaining Sense Perception: A Scholastic Challenge.” 
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From the idea that species are the intelligible forms of things, we should not think of 
them as purely abstract or purely mental. For Aristotle, the impressions in the sensory 
organs are “without matter,” yet the sensory faculties perceive the actually existing 
external object, which is a combination of matter and form, a concrete, individual entity. 
So, the sensible species are without matter in the sense of having a universal, or abstract, 
mental content. But neither are species merely mental objects. Rather, they are the forms 
of objects, as cognizable. The following text from Aristotle indicates what he has in mind 
when he says that the sensible form is “without matter”: 
Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of 
receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in 
which a piece of wax takes on the impression of a signet-ring without the iron or 
gold; what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not qua 
bronze or gold: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or 
flavoured or sounding not insofar as each is what it is, but insofar as it is of such 
and such a sort and according to its form.320
 
  
What is clear from this text is that sense perception involves the reception of some 
information about the object sensed without actually acquiring the object or undergoing 
any physical change (unlike the case of cold water that is heated). Here, Aristotle 
distinguishes the object qua sensible form from the object qua this matter. It is useful to 
highlight the phrase, “not insofar as each is what it is,” because this phrase picks out the 
peculiar individual nature of the object of perception. For Aristotle, it is the material 
element that individuates the thing. But the sensible species does not contain any matter. 
So the sensible species does not contain the thing insofar as it is what it is, but only 
insofar as it possesses a certain form, i.e., insofar as it is of “such and such a sort.”  
                                                 
320 De Anima 2: 12, 424a 18-23. I do not pretend that this passage is obvious or straightforward, 
but it is Aristotle’s clearest explanation of what he means by forms without matter. 
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To provide a more technical definition, we can think of the form or species 
(following the Latin terminology) as a configuration that encodes information that is 
isomorphic to an aspect of the object without that information being encoded in the same 
way as it is in the object. With this definition, I am imagining something like the 
blueprint that encodes the form of a building, or the electronic bits of data on my hard 
drive that encode the form of this chapter.321
 
 These systems encode information that is 
identical in form to the thing they represent (either the building or the document). Indeed, 
it is by virtue of each that we can reproduce the object in question—and, if the encoded 
data is specific enough, we can reproduce it exactly as it is. However, each encodes that 
information in an utterly different way: the blueprint is not made out of brick and mortar 
and the hard drive does not contain any words. We ought to think of the sensible (or 
intelligible) species or form in the same way. We will explore whether or not this 
interpretation allows for the intellect to be in contact with singular entities, or the essence 
of a specific thing, in the last chapter. For the moment, I acknowledge that Aristotle’s 
claim that the senses perceive a thing “insofar as it is of such and such a sort” may 
provoke one to question whether the senses actually perceive singular things, or if instead 
they perceive things as sortal kinds. In any case, we have at least ruled out the possibility 
that the intellect undergoes any substantial change as a result of perception. It receives 
the form of the thing, but in a different way than that form exists in the thing itself. 
 
                                                 
321 Much of this language is borrowed from E. Stump, “The Mechanisms of Cognition: Ockham 
on Mediating Species,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, 170-75. 
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 External senses and the sensible species 
Given this explanation, we may still wonder by what mechanism the senses or the 
intellect receive the forms of objects? The standard account that developed through the 
Arabic commentators, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas held that the vehicles of 
sensory and mental content are species, but in three different senses, each of which serves 
a unique purpose in the entire process of perceptual cognition. The species that are 
received in the senses are called the sensible species. However, the sense organs are often 
not immediately affected by objects. Many of our senses (sight, hearing, and smell in all 
cases) act through some medium (air and water are the usual suspects). Thus, in order to 
account for the reception of a sensible species—in order for the sense organ to be moved 
or altered by the object—philosophers needed to posit the existence of species in medio, 
which could transmit the form of the object to the sensory faculty. Aristotle goes even 
further to suggest that an intermediary species is necessary for perception by claiming 
that if the object of sight were immediately in contact with the eye, it would not be 
visible; he even claims that this is true for each of the senses, but does not elaborate 
how.322
                                                 
322 See ibid. 2: 7, 419a 12-21. 
 I will set these issues aside for the moment and simply claim, along with 
Aristotle, that all sense perception occurs through some species in medio. Finally, the 
species received in the intellect is called the intelligible species, and these are truly 
abstract. The formation of intelligible species requires an additional, causal process called 
“abstraction,” which strips the sensible species of its particular content. I will briefly 
mention the role of the species in medio, and I will spend the rest of this section talking 
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about the different forms the sensible species take in the process of cognition. The next 
section will treat the production of the intelligible species in the intellect. 
The idea that there are species in medio tends to elicit a number of objections. For 
example, it is often wondered whether the air is colored by the intervening species, or 
why the species in medio do not violate the principle of non-contradiction (that two 
contraries cannot be attributed of the same subject at the same time), as when I see your 
white shirt and you see my black shirt through the same intervening air.323 Another 
problem is suggested by the fact that the intellect knows by possessing the species, but air 
also possesses species, so does air know as well?324 However, by far the greatest problem 
for the entire species theory—and the species in medio tend to highlight this problem—is 
the natural conclusion that the senses or intellect only know objects by virtue of some 
intermediary. It is clear that Aristotle and Aquinas thought that perceptual cognition was 
cognition of the object, not of some internal or intermediary likeness of the object. Yet, 
the species is the intermediary cause of perceptual cognition. So, it would seem that, 
indeed, the species is known first and the object only by means of being represented by 
the species. In particular, the notion that perception requires the transmission of species 
in medio, through the air to the sense organs, seems to highlight the absurdities of the 
theory.325
However, this need not be the conclusion we reach. Indeed, we ought not think of 
the species as “little images flitting through the air”—even though Descartes himself 
 
                                                 
323 The example comes from A. Simmons, “Explaining Sense Perception.” 
324 See Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 49-52. 
325 See Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 11-17 and Ch. 6, where he defends Aquinas against a 
representationalist theory of perceptual cognition. 
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accused the Aristotelians of just such an idea (AT VI, 121). We ought to think of the 
process of perception, instead, as a process that happens through or by means of the 
species. What the species express is simply the unique character that sensible objects 
have when they are perceived, the external objects qua phenomenal objects of experience 
we might say. This is the sense of their representational character and the reason, 
following Scotus, they were understood to present the object sub ratione cogniscibilis seu 
repraesentati, and were said to have an esse cognitum.326 Thus, the intentional species 
ought not to be understood as the objects of cognition, as if they were entities distinct 
from the objects themselves. Rather, the intentional species simply are the (qualities of) 
objects as cognizable. Alison Simmons puts this nicely when she says that the intentional 
species are corporeal, yet they are strictly speaking imperceptible. The reason why is that 
what one sees, when one sees intentional species, are simply the things themselves. We 
can understand this to be the case by virtue of the fact that the species have no 
independent, material existence; they depend on the object for their existence, and they 
do not change the quality of the medium in which they appear.327 I think this is also the 
sense of Robert Pasnau’s claim that we perceive “through the species and to the world.” 
The idea seems to be that the species are not the object of our judgments and beliefs 
about the world, but the transparent means by which we are capable of forming 
judgments and beliefs about the world.328
                                                 
326 On Scotus, see Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 289-90; Antonio Rubio characterizes them 
similarly, see Simmons, “Explaining Sense Perception,” 265-66. 
  
327 Simmons, “Explaining Sense Perception,” 264-65. 
328 Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 213-19. 
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In this way, the intentional species in medio first inform our sensory faculties, 
which interact directly with the world by being in direct physical contact with the 
intervening medium between the perceiver and objects. The sensory and intellective 
powers are distinguished by their various capacities to receive different kinds of species. 
In particular, each of the sense modalities is distinguished by the limited capacities of the 
physical organs of sense. In short, this is what makes the intellect different from the 
sensory faculties: it is unhindered by its physical or material disposition, and is thus 
capable of grasping any object whatsoever. By contrast, each sensory faculty is 
individuated according to the sensible objects that it is capable of perceiving: auditory, 
visual, olfactory, tactile, and gustatory. These five sense modalities, called the ‘external 
senses’, each has its proper object of sense: sound, color, smell, texture, and taste, 
respectively. It is impossible for the sense of sight to hear sounds, except per accidens. 
That is, sight can see an object that is making sounds, say, a drum, but not qua auditory 
species. These proper objects of sense or proper sensibles are distinguished from the 
‘common sensibles’, which can be sensed by more than one sense modality. The 
characteristic examples of common sensibles are movement, rest, number, figure or 
shape, and magnitude or size.  There is an analogy between this distinction and the more 
common modern distinction between ‘secondary qualities’ and ‘primary qualities’ that I 
will pass over (more on this in the final chapter). For now, I simply want to take note of 
the fact that sensible qualities are distinguished by the sensory modality with which they 
are sensed. The reason for this is because each sensory faculty has the capacity to receive 
only those forms that are suited to it. This is why the external senses are the lowest form 
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of cognition in the process of perception; they have limited powers of perception and can 
receive only certain kinds of species. Nonetheless, they play an indispensable role since 
they provide our initial contact with external objects. 
 
 Internal senses and the phantasms 
Because of these deficiencies in the external senses, there are reasons to posit 
higher faculties that unify sensible experience and give perceptual content a greater 
generality. I have already mentioned the common sensibles, which are perceived through 
multiple sensory modalities and suggest a sensory faculty capable of representing objects 
across sense modalities. In addition to this evidence, there are two principle motivations 
for positing the existence of some unifying internal sensory faculties. First, Aristotle 
notes that, aside from the senses themselves, there is an inner awareness of sensation, a 
sense of sensing. Though there is some truth to this idea, he thinks it will not get us 
anywhere. If we posit a faculty of sense for the awareness of each sensation, then there is 
a threat of infinite regress. Additionally, since Aristotle understands sensation as an 
affection of the sensory faculty (and thus that actual sensation is identical to its object), 
he must hold that there is no further activity of awareness beyond this. In other words, 
what is sensed, in the way that it is sensed, lies in the subject sensing. This leads to the 
second motivation. Consider the case of the sweet thing that is also white, say, sugar. It is 
obvious that we have an awareness of the sugar as being both white and sweet, yet we 
recognize that the sugar’s being white is not the same as the sugar’s being sweet. We 
might then wonder what sense is capable of discriminating the sweet from the white? 
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Neither taste nor sight can do the work necessary, since sight cannot perceive what is 
sweet (except per accidens) and likewise for taste in regard to what is white.329
For these reasons, it is supposed that there are ‘internal senses’ that do the work of 
discriminating objects that are diversely characterized by the sensory faculties. When 
Aquinas introduces this notion, however, the primary argument for the nature and 
existence of the internal senses is neither of the two above, but a third argument, based on 
our capacity to perceive and represent objects of sense in their absence. It occurs to me 
that this argument is different from the two others an important way. To illustrate: a 
naive, non-representational realist (in the contemporary sense) could argue against the 
supposition of the internal senses in the way they are defended above. The realist would 
object that we recognize the sugar to be both white and sweet because that’s just what 
sugar is. Thus, the work of unifying and discriminating from among the proper objects of 
sense falls to the nature of things themselves which we readily and immediately perceive 
in ordinary perception. However, this objection seems to have less force in light of our 
capacity to represent objects of sense in their absence. Indeed, the idea that we normally 
represent things that are not present before us is closely related to the problem of 
perceptual illusion, i.e., our capacity to be deceived about the existence or nature of 
objects present to our senses under ordinary circumstances. In both cases, we represent to 
ourselves an object that is not there (either taking it not to be there, or mistakenly taking 
 These 
two examples point to a secondary faculty (or genus of faculties) of sense that enables 
one to discriminate among the five senses and their objects. 
                                                 
329 De Anima iii: 2. Cf. Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle, 58-65. 
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it to be there). This is commonly cited as a motivation behind the position of 
representationalism, i.e., the doctrine that some or all of our perceptions are mediated by 
some representational content.330 In fact, the Latin term repraesentare comes from the 
Latin translations of Avicenna, who used the term to refer to the mental content of the 
internal senses. Latin commentators came to conceive of the concept in terms of internal 
representation.331
In the Summa Theologica Ia: 70, Thomas Aquinas addresses the nature of internal 
senses by acknowledging a familiar kind of Aristotelian principle of parsimony: “since 
nature does not lack whatever is necessary” [cum natura non deficiat in necessariis]. 
More generally, the principle is often articulated as: ‘nature does not make anything 
without a purpose’. Indeed, it is by virtue of the purpose or function that things are 
known. If there are internal senses, these will be made apparent by referring to their 
function in the process of cognition; if we must invoke diverse functions to explain the 
process, then there must be diverse faculties or powers to perform those functions. So, 
from the apparent necessity for animals, especially higher animals, to perform actions on 
 
                                                 
330 I do not want to make the claim that Aquinas is a representationalist; all I want to claim is that 
someone who holds a representationalist theory of perception may be attracted to the doctrine 
of the internal senses. See Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 195-219, for an argument against a 
representationalist reading of Aquinas’ theory of perceptual cognition. My arguments here are 
heavily indebted to Pasnau. However, it is important to note that the target of Pasnau’s critique 
is a proponent of the view that the sensible species are the mediating content between the 
perceiver and the external object of sense. Here, I am not claiming that the sensible species are 
the carriers of representational content. Rather, I claim that the images produced by the 
imagination (or the internal senses more generally) are the vehicles of representational 
content. Thus, in cases of direct perception, these can be utterly transparent and one can come 
very close to a kind of direct realism. However, in the case of absent objects of representation, 
the account seems weighted in favor of representationalism. 
331 Lagerlund, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Mental Representation in Medieval 
Philosophy” (2004). He notes the close connection between repraesentare or repraesentio to 
phantasia and cites Quintilian as one ancient source of the concept. 
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the basis of objects that are not present to them, Aquinas infers the presence of some 
faculty to retain and preserve the images of those things.332 In this explanation, it is 
particularly worth noting that Aquinas appeals to the nature of higher animals, which is 
“that they are moved by a succession of motions” [quae moventur motu processivo]. The 
idea here is that higher animals clearly display the capacity to carry out a sequence of 
activities intended to bring about a particular result. Moreover, there is a kind of 
complexity that is apparent in the action of animals, for instance, when the sheep flees 
from a wolf. In this case, the sheep needs not only to perceive the sensory qualities of the 
wolf, and to perceive the pleasure or displeasure that these qualities give to the senses, 
but also to perceive the wolf as threatening. The wolf’s threat is not easily reduced to or 
explained by particular sensory qualities of the wolf. “It is necessary,” Aquinas 
concludes, “that the animal perceives in this way by virtue of ‘intentions’, which are not 
perceivable by the external senses.”333
With this idea in mind, we can now flesh out the nature of each of the internal 
senses. Though Averroes held that there were five internal senses, Aquinas does not 
distinguish imaginatio from phantasia. In either case, the internal senses together are 
 Here Aquinas invokes the technical term, 
‘intentions’, in order to describe the kind of abstract cognition that is available to the 
internal senses (and thus particularly apparent in higher animals for whom these senses 
are well developed), as distinct from what is present to the external senses. 
                                                 
332 “... cuius contrarium apparet maxime in animalibus perfectis, quae moventur motu processivo; 
moventur enim ad aliquid absens apprehensum. Oportet ergo quod animal per animam 
sensitivam non solum recipiat species sensibilium, cum praesentialiter immutatur ab eis; sed 
etiam eas retineat et conservet.” ST I. 78 4 co. 
333 Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus 
exterior. Ibid. 
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conceived as a genus of sensory faculty that is more complex (and thus nobler) than the 
external senses. This genus can be divided into the four internal senses along the lines of 
the following square of opposition: 
   [sensible species]  [complex intentions] 
[perceives]  common sense   estimative power 
[retains]  imagination or phantasy memory 
Along the vertical side, I differentiate between the perceiving and retaining faculties. In 
this respect, Aquinas calls both the imagination and memory a “thesaurus,” i.e., a 
storehouse or treasure-trove. In contrast, presumably, the other two faculties receive 
information from the external senses, but do not preserve this information. Thus, along 
the horizontal side, I distinguish between the types of information that the internal senses 
receive: either sensible species or complex intentions. Now, there is a sense in which all 
sensible or intelligible species are “intentional,” i.e., they do not have any material 
existence, but only have the kind of existence available to cognition. This is to conceive 
of intentionality in just the way that Brentano speaks of the “intentional inexistence” of 
mental content, i.e., something is intentional just in case it is intelligible.334
                                                 
334 Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Trans. by A.C. Rancurello et al. 
London: 1973, p. 88. 
 And it also 
serves to differentiate the level of complexity of the sensible species from the level of 
raw sense data. Thus, any sensible quality, whether the object of one of the external 
senses or the internal senses, is intelligibly constituted, and thus intentional, in this 
minimal sense. What differentiates the intentiones of the estimative power and the 
memory is that these intentions refer to aspects, properties, or things themselves that are 
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only inferentially apparent. That a wolf appears frightening to a sheep is by virtue of 
some inference on the part of the sheep, some calculation based on a number of perceived 
qualities or perhaps prior experience and training. Toletus is quite good on this, calling 
the ‘intentions’ of the estimative power intentiones non sensatas, and he refers this 
faculty to a kind of cognition as opposed to a kind of sensation.335 In the De Anima 
commentary, Aquinas also refers to the capacity of the bird to apprehend its young either 
by its voice or by its appearance, which implies a complex intentional association 
between different sensory modes of presentation of the object.336
All of these processes are cognitive, in Aquinas’ sense, because at every level—
raw sensation, external senses, and internal senses—the powers of the creature receive 
the forms of things. The capacity to receive forms is the sole criterion of cognition, for 
Aquinas.
 Thus, the Thomists 
would conclude that certain higher animals have the capacity to display inferential 
calculations that exceed the information given from the powers of sensation. 
337
A semimaterialist is anyone who believes that cognition is possible in material 
things. The term marks what strikes me as an important distinction in theories of 
mind and cognition. On the one hand, one can reject materialism in the case of 
humans and further claim that no material thing can be cognizant. Or one can 
 This is important because Aquinas offers a view of each of the powers of 
cognition such that there is continuity among the different kinds of cognition. This is the 
reason why Pasnau calls Aquinas’ view of cognition “semimaterialism”: 
                                                 
335 Commentarii in de Anima III, c. 3, txt. 162, q. 6, 3: 126a. 
336 In de Anima II: l. 13, n. 15. 
337 “ ... cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil 
habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius, 
nam species cogniti est in cognoscente.” ST Ia, 14. co; quoted in Pasnau, Theories of 
Cognition, 32. 
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reject materialism in the case of humans yet think that some material things could 
be (or are) cognizant.338
 
 
Indeed, St. Thomas’ semimaterialism turns on conceiving the process of cognition as a 
continuous process, from the disparate sensory information received in the sense organs, 
to the sensible species of the external senses, to the composite information processed and 
stored at the level of the internal senses, and finally to the abstract cognition that is 
capable on the level of the intellect itself. Pasnau is again useful in treating this whole 
continuum as a heirarchy of complexity and abstraction. What it entails is that the 
rational intellect is highest because it can process the most complex kinds of information 
and is capable of receiving the most abstract forms. For Aquinas, it is not the case that the 
intellect perceives some radically different sort of thing than the external or internal 
senses. Rather, the intellect perceives this particular thing sub specie aeterna, or, 
according to its conformity with a universal. To quote from the commentary on De 
Anima:  
Thus I differentiate between that which has cognition and that which has the 
estimative power. Cognition apprehends the individual as it exists under a 
common nature, which it contains in it inasmuch as it is unified by the intellect 
with its own subject. Accordingly, it cognizes this human being as human being, 
and this line as line.339
 
 
 The intellect cognizes things according to a common nature, and asserts that this 
common nature inheres in this particular subject. The sheep does not see the wolf as wolf, 
but as dangerous; the bird does not recognize its chick as infant bird, but as something to 
                                                 
338 Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 36. 
339 “Differenter tamen circa hoc se habet cogitativa, et aestimativa. Nam cogitativa apprehendit 
individuum, ut existens sub natura communi; quod contingit ei, inquantum unitur intellectivae 
in eodem subiecto; unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo, et hoc lignum prout est 
hoc lignum.” In de Anima II, l. 13, n. 16. 
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be cared for. While the higher animals possess a kind of intentional orientation to the 
world, such that they make inferences about appearances that guide behavior, these 
animals do not yet see the world as conceptual, or in terms of general descriptions. This 
final capacity is identified with the power of the intellect. 
 Elsewhere, Aquinas outlines the various sensory powers of the soul according to a 
hierarchy or a gradus de anima. This gradation offers an important addendum to the 
square of opposition outlined above. According to a five-step hierarchy of cognition, 
where the external senses are the lowest grade and the intellect is the highest, Aquinas 
situates the common sense at the second level, then the imagination, and finally the 
estimative power. The reason for this is that the common sense functions simply as the 
place where the various senses come together. The imagination is a faculty for conserving 
those collected sensations, and thus depends on the common sense. The estimative 
power, then, is considered to be more like a kind of cognition than a kind of sensation, 
though Aquinas concedes that this is perhaps only the case in animals without thought, 
while the purely cognitive functions are presumably assumed by the intellect in rational 
animals.340
                                                 
340 Quaestiones in de Anima 13co 
 This is important because it indicates that the estimative power is a more 
genuinely cognitive power than a sensory power, as it will in fact be interpreted by 
Toletus. It should be obvious that this is the case since by definition the estimative power 
does not consider sensory objects, at least not as perceived by the senses. Moreover, this 
power indicates, in some measure, a bridge between sensation and intellection, i.e., a 
power that gets us on the way to abstract cognition, since it is able to calculate about 
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properties that are not strictly speaking sensory qualities (e.g., the wolf’s danger), and is 
directed toward things that are absent. 
With respect to our study of Descartes, the important concept to take away from 
the notion of the ‘internal senses’ is their organizing and representing functions. For 
Aquinas, these internal senses mark an intermediate level of cognition between the 
sensible species of the external senses and the intelligible species of the possible intellect. 
I think that the number and names of the internal senses is less important. We have 
already seen Aquinas reduce Averroes’ five internal senses to four; by the time we get to 
Toletus, he has reduced Aquinas’ four to three. Toletus identifies imagination with the 
estimative power, maintaining Aquinas’ identification between phantasy and imagination. 
At first this makes little sense, in view of the square of opposition sketched above. 
According to that schema, the imagination performs an entirely different function 
(retaining sensible species) than the estimative power (perceiving complex intentions). 
Toletus justifies his taxonomy in the following way: 
I do not separate imagination or phantasy from estimation, but (as I claim) the 
same power is in them that elicits non-sensory species with these faculties which 
it perceives in the absence of the object itself and connects to the species.341
 
 
Here Toletus makes it clear that what both imagination and the estimative power have in 
common is their capacity to be intentionally directed toward objects in the absence of 
sensible species, yet in such a way that connects this intention to those species. Whereas 
Aquinas would parse the distinction in a slightly more fine-grained way, conceiving of 
                                                 
341 “Unde imaginationem, vel phantasiam non separo ab Aestimatione, sed eadem (ut puto) virtus 
est, que elicit species non sensatas cum ea, quae in absentia objectorum ipsa percipit, 
speciesque conectit.” Commentarii in de Anima III, txt. 161, q. 6, 126c. 
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imagination’s capacity in terms of retention and estimation’s capacity in terms of the 
complexity of the intention, there is no real difference between the two accounts. This is 
important for our purposes because it again highlights the key function of the internal 
senses: to perform some intentional acts that are a result of either inference or retention, 
and to relate these acts to an image in the absence of the object it represents. 
In another instructive example, the medical tradition identified the three organs of 
internal sensation with the three ventricles of the brain, the front, middle, and back. For 
them, the front ventricle contained the common sense and the phantasy; the former was 
said to receive the sensory impressions and the latter retain them. The middle ventricle 
contained the imaginative faculty, which was thought to be responsible for combining the 
images stored in the phantasy. This faculty was also apparently called the cogitative 
power when the intellect used it actively. Finally, memory was identified with the back 
ventricle of the brain. The medical tradition is interesting to take note of because it 
identifies of the operation of these faculties of the soul with the mechanics of particular 
organs in the body. It is noteworthy that the intellect acts through the imaginative faculty 
in a process called cogitation, and the estimative power is absent from the description. 
Henrik Lagerlund suggests that this is the case because the estimative power was not 
considered to be in any part of the brain.342
                                                 
342 Lagerlund, “Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy.” See also Harvey, R. The Inward 
Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. (London: The Warburg 
Institute, 1975). 
 Again, it appears that the number and names 
of the internal senses are not as important as their function. 
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We now have a fairly good picture of the mechanics of perceptual cognition in 
late scholastic Aristotelianism. We know that when the intellect is directed toward 
objects, when it cognizes, it apprehends the species of those objects. 
 
 Cognition 
 
One way to think about the difference between cognition and sense perception in 
late scholastic epistemology is to consider the objects of intellection, the intelligible 
species, in contrast to the objects of sensation, the sensible species and phantasms. 
Receiving the intelligible species requires an additional step from the collection and 
representation of phantasms out of sensible species. This step is what the scholastics 
called “abstraction.” In a certain sense, the intelligible species is still the material thing 
cognized, e.g., this human being. But the intelligible species ‘human being’ is entirely 
abstracted from any material determination; it is truly a universal concept. In contrast, the 
particular human being that I am perceiving is a unique, material thing. Moreover, the 
sensible species that I receive when I perceive this human being are, in some sense, 
specified by my direct contact with the human being, via the species in medio. Thus, in 
order to get from this particular human being, or a group of human beings, intellection 
requires another, intellectual, agent to actualize the immaterial and intelligible form in the 
intellect. Perceiving many human beings does not alone give rise to the general concept 
‘human being'. For instance, it may not be immediately clear what common features in a 
group of human beings are the essential ones, and which are accidental. Intellectual 
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abstraction lifts the essential features from the non-essential ones. This is why Toletus 
appeals to, following Aquinas and Averroës, an agent intellect: 
... to cognize is an affection: thus, it is necessary that these two principles are at 
work, one which is like the material [cause] of intellection, the other its efficient 
[cause]. And this [efficient cause] is the agent intellect.343
 
 
In the above quotation, the material cause is not the material object cognized. Rather, it is 
the intellect itself in its material or potential aspect, what is called the possible intellect. 
The efficient cause is the agent intellect. To fill out the schema of Aristotelian causality: 
the formal cause is the intelligible species and the final cause is knowledge itself. It is 
important to see that, in a certain sense, the intellect is independent in its cognition of 
intelligible species. However, this is not entirely the case, since the intellect is intimately 
connected to the imagination and uses the imagination in the production of intelligible 
species. As one illustration of this fact, the Coimbrians refer to the phantasm as the 
material cause of intellection rather than the possible intellect.344
 
 We will see to what 
extent this is the case and how. 
 
 
                                                 
343 “Intellegere es quid effectu: ergo oportet duo haec principia facere, unum quod sit ut materia 
intellectionis, alterum ut efficiens: et hoc est intellectus agens.” Commentarii in de Anima, 
Lib. III, cap. V, txt. 17, 140c-d. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima iii: 5: “Since in every class of things, 
as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, a matter which is potentially all the 
particulars included in the class, a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all 
(the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its material), these distinct elements must 
likewise be found within the soul” (530a 10-13). Cf. also Coimbrans Commentarii in de 
Anima, “... id quod est in potentia, eget aliquo, a quo ad actum deducatur. Cum igitur 
intellectus possibilis sit in pura potentia, necessario erit danda aliquo facultatas, a quo ad 
intelligendi actum deduci possit: haec autem est intellectus agens” (Cap. 5, q. 1, art. 2, 419). 
344 Commentarii in de Anima, 458. 
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 Abstraction and turning toward the phantasm 
In this exposition, we are particularly concerned with an account of the activity of 
the intellect in the process of perceptual cognition. So, even if the intellect appears to act 
on its own, it must in some sense be related to and determined by the processes of 
perception that I outlined above. What is the point of contact between the independent 
operation of the intellect and the products of sense perception? The answer to that 
question is the ‘phantasms’. The activity can be explained in two ways: abstracting from 
the phantasm in order to produce intelligible species and turning toward the phantasm in 
order to specify the nature of the intelligible species. For Aristotle, the phantasms are 
related to the ‘phantasy’ as for us images are related to the imagination. We might today 
say that images are the vehicles of representational content, i.e., it is by way of images in 
the imagination that one pictures the world in a certain way. This representational 
capacity of imagination makes it essential to thought, which is how the late scholastics 
interpret Aristotle’s famous claim that there is no thought without phantasms (De Anima 
iii: 5, 430a 26).  
This relationship is explained neatly in Franz Brentano’s study of these passages 
in The Psychology of Aristotle: 
But how must we envisage this dependency of the intellect upon images? 
Aristotle answers that the intellect is related to images as sense to external 
sensible things. Sense receives its pictures by turning toward external objects; 
intellect receives its ideas by gazing, as it were, upon images.... Sensation is a 
kind of affection through the sensible; similarly, thinking is a kind of affection 
through the intelligible, and this intelligible, through which the intellect is 
affected is, as Aristotle says, is the sensory representations. Thus the sensitive part 
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which contains the images acts upon the intellect and through this the latter begins 
to think.345
 
 
Brentano exploits the analogy between intellection and sensation in the sense of a process 
of alteration. In both cases, the facutly of cognition is directed toward some kind of 
object and is determined with respect to that object, becoming the form of the object. 
Sensation has already made available a certain level of representational content, which is 
itself intelligible or immaterial, namely, the sensible species. However, this content is not 
yet unified and represented in a way that is readily accessible to thought, and this is the 
work of the imagination. Here is how Aristotle describes the relationship: 
Hence no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and when 
the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an 
image; for images are like sensuous objects, except that they contain no matter.346
 
 
In the discussion of the previous section, we recognized several grades of sense 
perception: the external senses, the common sense, imagination or phanatsy, and the 
estimative power. The idea behind the claim that images are like the sensuous objects of 
the intellect simply means that in order for intellectual activity to get underway, the 
sensible species, received in the sense organs, have to be combined and organized by the 
internal senses before they are available for cognition. This is the work of the imagination 
or phantasy in creating the phantasms. 
These images, in turn, provoke the production of intelligible species in the 
possible intellect. The close relationship between the imagination and the possible 
                                                 
345 The Psychology of Aristole, 96. 
346 De Anima 3: 8, 432a 6-9. 
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intellect can be observed, for example, in Toletus’ comments on this very passage. In a 
particular passage discussing the nature of memory in the immortal soul, he writes: 
Thus, that which has died does not remember, that is, we do not know by that 
which, embodied, we would know. And the reason for this is that embodied we 
would know by virtue of the passive intellect, that is, the imagination, just as all 
those suppose who follow Themistius. Since therefore the bodily power does not 
remain [after death], the soul does not know in the way as before; to [the part of 
the soul] that is immortal, it knows in some other way.347
 
 
The phrase “per intellectum passivum, id est, imaginationem” clearly indicates a close 
relationship between the passive or possible intellect and the imagination. In a sense, the 
passive intellect needs the imagination in order to cognize. It seems that, at least in this 
life, when the soul is embodied, the possible intellect is very intimately related with the 
corporeal faculty of imagination. Elsewhere, Toletus clarifies that “the possible intellect 
is not the power of imagination, rather it is another faculty that inheres immediately in the 
body.”348 Indeed, he argues that since the possible intellect possesses, potentially, the 
immaterial forms of things, it cannot be a material thing, like the imagination.349
                                                 
347 “Unde sit, quod post mortem non reminiscimur, id est, non intelligimus ea quae in corpore 
intelligebamus; et ratio est, quia in corpore intelligebamus per Intellectum passivum, id est, 
imaginationem, ut omnes ex ponunt cum Themist. Cum igitur ista non maneat, quia vis est in 
corpore, non intelliget anima illo modo, quo ante, a[?] quiam immortalis est, alio modo 
intelliget.” Commentarii in de Anima III, 5, txt. XX. 
 In his 
considered opinion, he rejects the doctrine of Themistius, who had held that the possible 
intellect is identical to the imagination, though he concedes that there is something right 
about this claim. Indeed, Toletus thinks that the intelligible species seem to have a dual 
348 “Intellectus possibilis, non est vis imaginativa, nec aliqua facultas in corpore immediate 
inhaerens.” Ibid. III, 4, txt. VII, q. 10, 135a. 
349 Commentarii in de Anima, 135a. See section three for some problems with this kind of 
argument. 
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character, one is immaterial and inheres in the possible intellect, the other is corporeal in 
nature and is called the phantasm.350
Thus, images or phantasms are very closely related to the intelligible forms in the 
possible intellect. That any given form is actualized in the possible intellect depends on 
the presentation of some phantasm together with the activity of abstraction. In the Summa 
Theologica Ia 86.1, Aquinas addresses the nature of intellectual cognition and concludes 
that “a person understands by abstracting the intelligible species from its material aspects 
[intelligit abstrahendo intelligem speciem ab huiusmodi materia].” The Coimbrians, in 
turn, recognize the necessity of abstraction when they say that the phantasm is of a 
different order [alterius ordinis] than the intellect. Thus, it is necessary to abstract from 
the phantasm in order to make it suitable for possession by the intellect.
 
351
Indirectly, and by a kind of reflection, it is possible to cognize singulars, which, as 
was said above, have been thus abstracted [to form] intelligible species. It is not 
possible, however, following that act, to know [singulars] unless by turning to the 
phantasm, in which one understands the intelligible species.
 It is for this 
reason that the intellect only knows the universal, Aquinas tells us, which is “what is 
abstracted from the material of the individual [Quod autem a materia individuali 
abstrahitur].” Again, we will return to this issue in greater detail in the next chapter. For 
the moment, however, it is important to realize that intellectual abstraction does not 
preclude knowledge of singulars entirely, it only means that such knowledge is indirect.  
352
                                                 
350 Aquinas, Questiones in de Anima, 2co: “Sic igitur species intelligibilis habet duplex 
subiectum: unum in quo est secundum esse intelligibile, et hoc est intellectus possibilis; aliud 
in quod est secundum esse reale, et hoc subiectum sunt ipsa phantasmata.” 
  
351 Commentarii in de Anima, cap. 5, q. 1, art. 2, 419. 
352 ST Ia 86.1 co, “Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere 
singulare, quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non 
potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species 
intelligibiles intelligit.” 
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On this view, all thinking of particular things requires the intellect “to turn toward the 
phantasms” in order for the thought to be determined by some specific content. Duns 
Scotus characterizes the relationship quite succinctly: 
The intellect understands nothing except by turning toward the phantasms: not 
that this turn belongs to the intellect alone, [looking] over phantasms; rather it 
belongs to the soul as a whole, so that the intellect understands nothing except 
while phantasia forms phantasms [phantasantur].353
 
 
The Coimbrians call this phantasm-producing fantasy the ‘express form’ of the thing. It is 
by such expression of the form or species in the fantasy that the intellect is determined 
toward cognizing the specific sensible content of a particular entity.354
These passages reinforce what was claimed above: that the specifying content of 
intellection is the phantasm, out of which the intelligible species are formed and by which 
they can be determined. It is in this sense that I understand the phantasms or images to 
form the inner representations of thought. Again, Aquinas’ statement that this process is 
indirect, and “a kind of reflection” serves to reinforce the idea that these images form the 
inner representational content of thought. However, we ought not sever the ties between 
this inner content and the external object too hastily. After all, there is an important sense 
in which the entire process, from the reception of species in the sense organs to 
intellectual abstraction, is a continuous process. Toletus is helpful in reminding us that, 
while the species, imprinting itself on the intellect by way of the sensible phantasm, is the 
 
                                                 
353 Lectura II, d. 3, pars 2, q. 1, n. 255. The text is quoted in Pasnau, “Cognition,” 289-90, and the 
translation is his. 
354 Commentarii in de Anima, cap. 5, q. 6, art. 2, 456: “... intellectus agens in prducandis 
speciebus intelligibus est causa universalis, quae ut hanc potius, quam illam speciem 
produceat, eget causa particulari, a qua determinatur; haec autem causa est phantasma 
expressum rei sensibilus.” 
 311 
motive cause [motivum] of intellection, the terminating cause [terminativum] is 
intellectual understanding, which possesses the species.355
One of the governing metaphors for this process is the metaphor of illumination. 
It is often said that the agent intellect is like light to colored things: it makes them visible. 
The Coimbrians understand the agent intellect to have three closely related duties 
[munia]: to illuminate the phantasm, to bring the object of intellection into act, and to 
produce the intelligible species in the possible intellect. For them, the agent intellect is 
always exercising its illuminating power, but it does not produce any intelligible species 
 In other words, the process of 
perceptual cognition may be understood according to the stages that I have been 
outlining, in which case one can make a distinction between the reception of sensible, 
concrete species in the sensory faculties from the abstraction of a more general nature in 
the intellect from those species. But it must also be understood that the process is only 
complete once the intellect possesses the intelligible species, and thus it can be broken 
into stages only by a conceptual abstraction. In reality, when human beings perceive an 
external object, they perceive the sensory qualities of that object as inhering in a subject 
whose nature is known by virtue of some intelligible species. This is why we recognized 
above that human beings always understand according to the universal, by predicating 
certain universal properties of particular subjects. 
                                                 
355 Commentarii in de Anima 3: 4, txt. 8 q. 9: “Intellectus est denudatus ab omni natura cuius 
primo speciem recipit, et ab omni eo, a quo primo moventur . . . duplex esse objectum 
intellectus. Unum motivum tantum, alterum terminativum, et aliquo modo simul motivum. Id 
dicitur motivum, quod speciem imprimit ipsi intellectui, quamvis nonsei ipsum, quod 
cognoscitur ab intellectu. Terminativum est, et aliquo modo etiam motivum, quod cognoscitur 
ab intellectu, et ipsius etiam species in intellectu est.” 
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unless it is presented with a phantasm.356 This language is closely related with the 
Neoplatonic idea that the agent intellect is really the divine intellect (which was 
conceived to be in continual activity). The Coimbrians would have rejected such a 
characterization, but it is difficult to see under what conditions the agent intellect would 
be provoked into act. It was almost universally agreed that the agent intellect was a self-
mover, but whether it is set into motion only in the presence of the phantasm or if it is 
continually moving must have been subject to debate. We will see that a full response to 
this question requires thinking of the process of intellection as the completion of two 
partial processes. Closely related to the idea of intellectual illumination is the term 
influxus, which describes the way that intelligible species are generated from the agent 
intellect. The term refers to the transfer of agency from that which is in act to that which 
has the potential to be in act.357
                                                 
356 Commentarii in de Anima q. 2: Quae sint intellectus agentis munia?, esp. 424 on the perpetual 
action of the agent intellect. 
 In this sense, it simply describes the nature of the 
relationship between the possible intellect qua material intelligence and the agent 
intellect qua formal intelligence. However, the metaphorical content of influxus, together 
with the idea of “illumination,” seems reminiscent of a concept of divine illumination or 
the inflowing of divine intelligence in human cognition. Indeed, it is simply unavoidable 
to see such connections in the Thomistic doctrine of the agent and possible intellects. In 
part, this seems to have provided the force behind Pietro Pomponazzi’s (1462-1525) 
criticisms of Aquinas in his De Immortalitate animi. We will consider this a subsequent 
section.  
357 See Thomas-Lexicon, “influxus”: “id quod est in actu, agit in id, quod est in potentia, 
huiusmodi actio dicitur influxus” (Quodl. 3. 3. 7c). 
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 Coordination between intellect and imagination 
For now, let us focus more closely on the causal agents of intellection, their roles, 
the reasons why they were thought to be necessary, and the way they are related to one 
another. We have referred to the agent and possible intellects on analogy with the 
concepts of form and matter. This language is meant to clarify the causal power of the 
agent intellect and its necessity in the process of intellection. However, this language 
does not remove all concerns; even ancient Greek commentators like Theophrastus were 
perplexed by the terminology. Indeed, he comments on the question of the impassibility 
of the intellect more than on any other passage in his De Anima commentary. The reason 
for this seems to be that the issue raises a number of apparent puzzles. First, the intellect 
seems to be both moved and not moved by its object. If the intellect is immaterial, then it 
cannot be moved by a material object; yet, the intellect is wholly determined by its 
object, so it must be moved or altered by that object. Second, if the intellect is truly the 
cause of its own intellection, then does it ever cease thinking? Or, why is the intellect 
unable to think of anything whatsoever? No real resolution is to be found in 
Theophrastus, but he does seem to suggest that the impassibility of the intellect should be 
understood in a relative sense, and that its movement should be conceived of as an 
imperfect movement. In other words, it seems, Theophrastus envisages some 
interpretation by which the intellect is partially moved by its object and partially moved 
by itself, the two movements together composing intellection.358
                                                 
358 See E. Barbotin, La Théorie aristotélicienne de l’intellect d’apres Theophraste, 105 ff. 
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Pasnau is helpful in outlining the Thomistic account of the ‘imperfect’ movement 
of the soul with respect to the objects of knowledge. Aquinas, he tells us, distinguishes 
between two different kinds of agents: (A1) agent as sufficient to bring about an effect in 
the patient and (A2) agent as incompletely sufficient cause, i.e., one that needs another 
cause in order to complete it. Likewise, Aquinas distinguishes two different kinds of 
patients: (P1) patient as in no way cooperative with its agent and (P2) patient as in some 
way cooperating with the agent.359
                                                 
359 These distinctions can be found in Aquinas, Quodlibet 8. 2. 1, but my discussion here is taken 
from Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 126-30. See also, Pasnau, “Cognition,” 292. 
 Perhaps the A2-P2 variety of interaction seems 
obscure. To make this more palatable, consider the case of insemination. On the 
Aristotelian account, the man’s semen is the agent of generating an embryo, but it is an 
incomplete agent that requires the cooperation of the female’s womb in order to be 
effective. Now, with respect to perception, sensation is an A1-P1 type causal interaction. 
That is, in the presence of some color or sound, the faculties of seeing and hearing (if 
they are not impeded in any way) cannot help but be affected by the sensory objects. The 
internal senses function somewhat differently; they have an A1-P2 kind of interaction. 
Unlike the external senses, the imagination or phantasy and the estimative power play a 
cooperative role in the production of internal images: they are even able to form new 
images of things never seen, or things that are absent from perception. Once we arrive at 
the level of the intellect, we find an activity of the A2-P2 type. External objects, and 
indeed even the phantasms, are insufficient agents to bring about intelligible species. This 
is clear because they are material, while the intellect is immaterial. Thus, the intellect 
needs a completing agent, the agent intellect, to produce an immaterial species. Likewise, 
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the patient intellect must be a cooperating patient in the sense of providing the immaterial 
potential for producing immaterial species. Now, Aquinas conceives of the agent intellect 
as the real, or principal, cause in this process because it is the higher cause. However, I 
think it is also clear that without the aid of the phanatasms, the agent intellect would need 
some other completing cause in order to produce the intelligible species.  
Aquinas refers to this relationship as an “instrumental” one. The agent intellect 
simply makes use of the phantasy as a necessary instrument for the cognition of material 
particulars. This kind of instrumentalist view of the bodily powers of perception found 
some revival with the republication and translation of Simplicius’ Commentaria in tres 
libros de Anima (Venetis, 1564). The translation renders the agent intellect the intellectus 
manens and the possible intellect the intellectus progressus. Thus, it was conceived that 
the agent intellect operated as a kind of downward projection of thought through the 
body, that “uses the body as an instrument . . . The progressing soul goes out to cognitive 
objects external to itself, but only to discover upon return that it already contained these 
objects in its inner self as colours without light.”360
                                                 
360 Quoted in Spruit, Species Intelligibilis, II: 161. 
 It may have been in response to such 
views that the Coimbrians reject the “instrumentalist” understanding of the phantasms. 
Instead they conceive of the two causal elements to be, from one perspective, the agent 
intellect and the phantasm, and from another perspective, the possible intellect and the 
intelligible species. These two different causal interrelations produce the same effect, 
namely, understanding. They are to be understood as two lights illuminating the same 
space. Either one of them has a minus perfectum, but together they complete the process 
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of intellection.361 The Coimbrians seem to have a slightly more nuanced view of the 
process than Aquinas. They conceive of the intelligible species as the principle of 
intellection, whereas Aquinas clearly reserves the agent intellect as the ultimate principle 
of intellection.362
 
 In either case, it is clear that the intellect in some sense cooperates with 
the phantasy or imagination in the process of intellection. 
 Critics: Peter John Olivi and William of Ockham 
Not surprisingly, there were serious detractors of this view of intellectual activity 
among the late scholastics. I will very briefly discuss the views of two, Peter John Olivi 
and William of Ockham. Neither of these philosophers accepted the real existence of 
species, and so they had already rejected one of the cornerstones of the theory. Olivi 
considered the putative role of the species in perception to be absurd. On the one hand, it 
did not seem possible that a spiritual process like intellection could depend on corporeal 
entities like the species. On the other hand, it seems that the ethereal existence of species 
in medio did not seem to be the kind of thing that could have a real effect on the 
corporeal sense organs or be produced by corporeal objects themselves. It seems that 
Olivi is trading on the distinctive nature that species are said to have, namely, intentional 
                                                 
361 Commentarii in de Anima, 458: “Quod si quis opponat, cum duae causae ita concurrunt, 
quamlibet earum posse per se solam edere effectu eiusdem speciei, licet minus perfectum, ut 
cum duo luminosa lumen producunt. Occurendum, nonesse id perpetuo verum, quia fecus 
accidit in causis, quae sunt heterogeneae comparatione effectuum, quomodo se habent 
intellectus agens et phantasma ad species intelligibiles: itemque intellectus patiens et species 
intelligibiles ad intellectum.” 
362 Ibid. 419: “id est, intellectimum principia, quae sunt species intelligibiles.” 
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existence. If this is conceived as physical, then it cannot be the cause of intellection; if it 
is conceived as immaterial, then it cannot be the cause of sensation.363
Ockham, likewise, would reject the existence of intentional species, conceiving 
instead of all those intentional aspects of things as conceptual, or in some sense mind-
dependent. Trading on his celebrated principle of parsimony, Ockham argues that if 
species have any role in the cognitive process it is simply to designate the nature of 
objects as they are conceived in the mind. Thus, he liberates himself to reconstruct a 
theory of perceptual cognition by which the objects existing in the intellect are simply 
that, mind-dependent concepts. He calls these ficta: which are said to have a non-real 
existence whenever the mind considers some object intentionally. In his later works, 
however, even these mind-dependent objects are dismissed in favor of a direct view of 
cognition that trades on the distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition.
  
364
By Ockham’s time, the notion of intentional existence had become firmly linked 
with nonreal, mind-dependent existence. Intentionality was no longer of any help 
in explaining the mind; rather, the concept was itself badly in need of explanation 
and could do no more than muddy any waters into which it might be cast. 
 We 
will have a chance to review this distinction in the final chapter. For now, I simply call 
attention to the fact that it is controversies like these that lead Pasnau to claim:  
 
This is not entirely true, since there were a great many commentators who continued to 
use the concept of intentional existence and the species theory of perception in the 16th 
and 17th centuries. However, the concept was certainly open for debate and easily 
                                                 
363 Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 68. Pasnau is not persuaded that these arguments are effective 
against Aquinas, and I am inclined to agree, though I highlight them in order to suggest that 
Descartes’ complete rejection of the entire causal apparatus was not without precedent. 
364 Ibid. 76-85. For a good summary, and critique, of Ockham’s mature theory, see Stump, “The 
Mechanisms of Cognition,” 168-203. 
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ridiculed by the early moderns. In an entirely analogous way, though Leen Spruit has no 
special love of the early modern philosophers, interpreting their readings of scholastic 
theories as distortions and even plain omissions of key concepts, he does acknowledge 
that by the early modern period the concept of intelligible species had almost entirely 
been supplanted by idea, notion, and image.365
For the moment, I would like to continue the analysis of Ockham and Olivi 
because both of these philosophers also reject the notion of agent and possible intellects 
that we have been considering. Indeed, this seems to follow naturally from their rejection 
of the species theory of perception. After all, the purpose of the agent/possible distinction 
was to describe the process whereby sensible species can become intelligible. Ockham’s 
mature philosophy of mind holds that the rational soul consists of two kinds of acts 
(intellect and will) and two kinds of attributes (qualities and habits). Qualities are the 
short-duration affections of the soul when it is in the process of any intellectual act; 
habits are the long-duration dispositions of the intellect to act in a certain way, given a 
certain kind of stimulus.
 We will see in just what way this can be 
said of Descartes’ Regulae. 
366
                                                 
365 Spruit, Species Intelligibiles, II: 267-73 and 352ff. It appears that one of the earliest sources of 
this transition is Augustino Nifo, who replaces species intelligibilis with notio, see ibid. 117. 
 Whenever the intellect is said to judge or apprehend 
something, what it apprehends is a sentence or proposition that has the property of 
signifying some thing or state of affairs in the world. Thus, Ockham can treat all sensible, 
imaginary, and abstract objects of cognition with the same schema, i.e., through an 
account of the philosophy of language. Moreover, simple apprehension involves only 
366 E. Karger, “Ockham’s Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Ockham, 204-5. 
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asserting that this is so, whereas judgments involve some composition of sentences.367 
Ockham places the entire causal efficacy for cognition on the object, which he maintains 
has the capacity to act at a distance on the sensory faculties and even the intellectual soul. 
He claims: “The external sensible object immediately moves sense and intellect to an 
intuitive act, so that the first thing caused in intellect by an object is an intuitive act.”368
Olivi, by contrast, presents the opposite view of intellection, whereby the intellect 
is active throughout the process of cognition, reaching out to external objects, by a 
process of ‘virtual attention’. The idea that the mind’s activity in perception is a kind of 
attention clearly reminds one of Augustine’s theory of cognition, that the mind perceives 
by actively attending to aspects or properties of objects.
 
Thus, Ockham has an entirely passive conception of perceptual cognition, one that has 
immediate and direct contact with the perceived object by a kind of action at a distance.  
369
                                                 
367 Ibid. and Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 277-89. 
 On this view, the intellect is 
causally connected to the object through a kind of virtual presence, i.e., simply because it 
is in the intellect’s capacity to perceive the object. This entails that the external object 
need only be in the vicinity of the perceiver in order to be virtually encapsulated by the 
intellect. Here, the object is the final or terminative cause of intellection and the agency 
lies entirely with the intellect’s capacity for attention. This need not imply some theory of 
extromission, or positing some corporeal-visual ray, that is directed toward the object. 
Instead, it need only imply that the intellect has the capacity to perceive objects in its 
vicinity (thus these objects are “virtually” possessed by the intellect). In order for 
368 From Questiones in libros sententiarum (Reportatio) III. 2; Oth VI, 64-65. Quoted in Pasnau, 
Theories of Cognition, 165 (translation is his). 
369 See ibid. 131-32. 
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cognition of the object, the intellect activates that virtus in the direction of the object 
(through attention).370
With Olivi and Ockham, we have a sample of two polar extremes in the theory of 
perceptual cognition that reject the species account. The motivation for these accounts 
seems clear: the species theory and the agent/patient intellect distinction is mysterious 
and complex. Surely there is a simpler and more direct way of accounting for the causes 
and the phenomenology of perception. Need we multiply external and internal senses, 
different kinds of species, and even different aspects of the intellect? To be sure, the full 
Thomistic account has an answer to most of these worries, but the presence of such 
criticism undermined the force of the theory such that it is not hard to see why it seemed 
in need of complete demolition by the early 17th century. 
 
 
 Impact on mind-body distinction and mind-body union 
 
In this final section, we will consider some implications for the species account of 
perception on the issue of the rational soul’s immateriality and immortality. These issues 
have a direct bearing on Descartes’ discussion in the Regulae: indeed, one of the basic 
themes of his account is that sense perception is a process that is distinct from the 
operations of the pure intellect. In effect, this distinction will parallel Descartes’ later 
mind-body distinction and the ensuing “mind-body problem”; essentially, it typifies the 
hard problem of consciousness. As we have seen, Thomists agree that the rational soul is 
                                                 
370 Ibid. 168-174. For a condensed account, see Pasnau’s entry “Peter John Olivi” in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
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composed of possible intellect and agent intellect. This conception of the soul operates on 
analogy with the hylomorphism of substances, explaining the causal powers of the 
primary components of a simple substance.371
The unavoidable conclusion, it seems, is that if the intellect is immaterial and 
separable from the body, then its union with the body must, in some sense, be contingent. 
This conclusion is mitigated by a complex conception of the relationship between the 
separable, rational soul and the material body. It is maintained that the soul informs the 
body and is its activating power, providing not only the powers of cognition, but also 
those that pertain to bodily life. At the same time, however, the soul’s participation in a 
higher domain, the “spiritual,” lends it its peculiar powers of abstraction and its essential 
immateriality, and consequently immortality. The rational soul is, then, a medium quid, a 
kind of intermediate being suspended between two realms. I will explore this notion in 
what follows. But I will also attend to serious detractions, both scholastic and 
contemporary. 
 However, conceiving of the intellect as a 
separate substance from the body the relationship between rational understanding and 
bodily perception more mysterious. Moreover, given that the rational soul is a complex of 
active and possible powers in its own right, in what way does it serve as the primary 
activating power of the human being as a whole?  
 
 
                                                 
371 Toletus, Commentarii in de Anima 3, c. 3, txt. 8, q. 10, illustrates this nicely: “Si igitur [the 
intellective soul] est compositio per se, necessario oportet fateri, quod una pars sit actu, et 
altera potentia: et tunc erit compositio ex materia, et forma, cum sint partes distinctae.” (134c) 
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 Separability and impassibility of the soul 
The account of the separability and immateriality of the rational soul is closely 
connected to its role in cognition. Recall that in thinking of any given thing, the intellect 
actually becomes that thing, i.e., it comes to possess the form of the thing cognized 
through a process of alteration. This is the sense of the often-repeated definition that 
“actual knowledge is identical with its object.”372 Yet, there seems to be no limit to the 
things the intellect can know, whether this includes other objects or the contents of the 
intellect itself. At the very least, this is what we would want an account of the intellect to 
provide, i.e., an account such that the intellect is capable of knowing anything 
whatsoever. Thus, the intellect must in some sense possess or be capable of receiving all 
potential objects of intellection. Apart from the real objects of sense, which we have been 
examining in the previous two sections, it is easy to see how abstract cognition and self-
reflective thought can be conceived of in exactly the same way. Aristotle writes: 
“Thought is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its objects are. For in the case of 
objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what is thought are identical; for 
speculative knowledge and its object are identical.”373 From this, Aristotle concludes that 
thought is capable of receiving the form of anything. This is why he can affirm the 
seemingly bizarre claim attributed to Anaxagoras that the intellect is all things.374
One may then ask what kind of nature thought has such that it is capable of 
receiving the form of everything. Answering this question provides proof that the 
 
                                                 
372 E.g., De Anima 3: 7, 431a 1. 
373 Ibid. 3: 5 430a 3-6 
374 Ibid. 430a 14-15 
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intellect is impassible and unmixed with any body. “The co-presence of what is alien to 
[thought’s] nature is a hinderance and a block; it follows that it can have no nature of its 
own other than that of having a certain capacity.”375 Perhaps the minor premise is not 
evident by itself, but it surely follows from Aristotelian physics. For Aristotle, all bodies 
are determined, in a prior way, by their material constitution (and that constitution is a 
kind of organization of matter to receive a certain kind of form). Thus, any material 
determination is a hinderance or block to the reception of certain kinds of form. If 
thought is said to receive all forms, then it cannot have any material determination. 
Consider the case of the external senses, each of which is determined by the nature of the 
sensory organs. These external senses are only capable of receiving a narrow slice of 
reality, the aspects or qualities of things as differentiated by the various sensory qualities 
or proper sensibles. Thus, any blending with a determinant matter (body) specifies the 
nature of a thing and limits its capacity to receive certain kinds of forms. This is why 
Aristotle concludes that the part of the soul that is called thought is, before it thinks, “not 
actually any real thing,” by which he means it is not “blended with the body.”376
                                                 
375 Ibid. 3: 4, 429a 20-22 
 The later 
scholastics would say the intellect is denudatus; and both the Coimbrans and Toletus 
reject the idea that the possible intellect could be a vis organica, or a power of the body. 
It seems that this characterization is motivated both by the desire for the intellect to be 
capable of receiving all things and because of the empiricist tendencies of the 
Aristotelians, i.e., to think of the mind as a blank slate. 
376 Ibid. 429a 22-25 
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But if the rational soul is impassible, unmixed with any body, and separable from 
the body, then what is the nature of its union with the body? Aquinas frequently repeats 
the definition, paraphrasing Aristotle, that the soul is “the first act of a physical, organic 
body possessing the capacity for life [anima est actus primus physici corporis organici 
potentia vitam habentis].”377 Thus, the soul is in some sense distinguished from a 
physical body by being the form or act of that body in the sense of actualizing the nature 
of that material substance or making it what it is. This is also why Aristotle calls the soul 
the “account” (logos) of a natural body: it the necessary and sufficient condition of its 
existence.378 Moreover, the body is here taken to be an organic natural body, which is not 
only meant to reinforce the idea that it possesses the capacity for life, but also to indicate 
that the body is organized in a certain way, with proper parts whose various functions 
serve to maintain the life of the whole. Nevertheless, it was common to distinguish three 
kinds of souls, or three kinds of actus: the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective. 
This list proceeds from the lowest (or least noble) to highest.379
                                                 
377 For Aristotle: De Anima ii: 1 (412a 27-28); for Aquinsa: Summa Contra Gentiles II, 61; 
Summa Theologica I, 76: 4 ad 1. 
 The first was considered 
to be the principle of generation and growth, the second the principle of sensation, 
appetite, and local motion, while the third was the seat of rationality. Following this 
schema, it is clear that any entity possessing a sensitive soul, must also possess a 
vegetative soul, for sensation, appetite, and local motion, seem to be (at least for 
biological organisms) dependent upon generation and growth. Likewise, for a rational, 
biological being like a human being, it seems necessary that it not only possess a rational 
378 De Anima ii: 1 (412 b 11) 
379 See Aquinas De Veritate 10, 1 c. 
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soul, but also a sensitive and vegetative soul. But are these souls or activities distinct, or 
are they unified in the human being? 
Toletus opens his discussion of this question saying, “[Of those] who posit 
multiple souls, many also posit them in one substantial form; but not all, [for there are 
those] who posit many forms, and consequently posit many souls.”380 The sticking point 
here seems to be the distinction and unification of the rational soul, or intellective power, 
with the sensitive and appetitive souls in the human person. Toletus cites Philoponus and 
the Manicheans who both claim that appetite and rationality cannot be unified by the 
same form, since they are often at odds. Moreover, he adds, the rational soul seems to be 
of a wholly different kind than the sensitive and vegetative souls insofar as the latter are 
corruptible, while the former is not.381 In what follows, I will focus on the separability 
and independence of the rational soul (the intellect), as well as its potential union with the 
sensitive and vegetative souls. The difficulty seems to be that most late scholastic 
philosophers thought that the rational soul was in some sense immaterial, while they 
maintained that it was essentially united with the human body. The chief source of this 
difficulty stems from Aristotle’s characterization of thought as “separable, impassible, 
and unmixed.”382
                                                 
380 “Qui ponunt plures animas, plures etiam ponunt in uno substantiales formas: sed non omnes, 
qui ponunt plures formas, consequenter ponunt plures animas.” Commentaria una cum 
Quaestionibus in tres libros Aristotleis de Anima, in Opera Omnia III, 61b, L. 3, C. 3, Q. 7. 
He cites Duns Scotus as an advocate of a unified soul. 
 In the passage in question, it appears that Aristotle is referring 
specifically to the agent intellect, or to the pure intellect in its active nature. However, we 
381 Ibid. Here Toletus cites Aristotle’s Meaphysics 10: 10, 1058b 26, where he states the principle 
that corruptible things are of a different kind than the incorruptible. 
382 De Anima 3: 5, 430a 17, see above. 
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have seen that the same characterization seems to apply to the possible intellect as 
well.383
The Arabic commentators on Aristotle, who were instrumental in reviving interest 
in Aristotle’s texts in the 11th and 12th centuries, held views on the rational soul that were 
the source of dispute. Avicenna held the position that the agent intellect (or simply 
intellect) is common to all and is the source of the intelligible species. Averroes held the 
position that both the agent and possible intellects are separable and common to all, 
where the possible intellect is the storehouse of intelligible species and the agent intellect 
is what makes them known. Both of these conceptions threatened a strong Thomistic 
reading of the rational soul as the substantial form of the body. If the intellect is in some 
sense common to all, then it cannot be the individuating element of particular human 
beings. Moreover, it threatened the Christian doctrine that each human being was a 
divinely created individual. Aquinas argues against the Averroist idea that the possible 
intellect is one in all human beings with an illuminating thought experiment. He supposes 
that two human beings are cognizing the same object in the same way. Thus, they each 
possess the form of that object in the possible intellect. But if each person does not have 
her own possible intellect, then her thought (the intelligible species as actualized in the 
possible intellect) would be identical (numerically the same) as the other person’s, which 
is absurd.
 
384
                                                 
383 In Toletus’ Commentarii in de Anima 3, c. 3, txt. 8, q. 10, he confronts the question of whether 
the possible intellect is separable, and if this implies that it cannot be an informing form of the 
body. 
 Instead, Aquinas supposes that the possible intellect is the individuating 
384 Quaestiones in de Anima 3co: sed duorum hominum simul idem intelligentium, necesse est 
quod sit unum et idem numero ipsum intelligere, quod manifeste est impossibile. Impossibile 
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element of the rational soul that makes the rational soul distinct for each individual. This 
follows from the conception of the possible intellect as the material principle of the 
intellect. One can see such an argument in Toletus, where he claims that the material 
element, in this case the possible intellect, makes a thing, in this case the rational soul, a 
quodquid, or this particular thing.385
 
 Something like this argument is what lies behind 
Aquinas’ thought experiment: the two rational souls contemplating the same object are 
distinct quid; indeed, the intelligible species possessed by each intellect is a distinct quid, 
and thus not idem, i.e., there is at least a numerical distinction between them. This 
argument is silent on Thomas' position on the agent intellect. 
 Resolution of the problem and its detractors 
On the standard Thomistic account of the rational soul as the substantial form of 
the human being, the intellect is the first act of the body and thereby accounts for all 
bodily activity, whether it is proper to the processes of the vegetative soul (e.g., digestion 
and growth) or the sensitive soul (e.g., perception and local motion). The agent intellect, 
being the act of intellection is thus the act of the entire body since the greatest quality (or 
highest form) of the body is said to individuate and identify the body.386
                                                                                                                                                 
est igitur quod intellectus possibilis, quo intelligimus formaliter, sit unus in omnibus. 
 Moreover, like 
any substantial form, it is not corruptible per se. As pure form or act of the body, it 
cannot be a source of corruption, but only the source of activity, generation, and 
385 Commentarii in de Anima, 134d. 
386 Aquinas, Quaestiones in de Anima, 1co: “Dicendum quod hoc aliquid proprie dicitur 
individuum in genere substantiae. Dicit enim philosophus in praedicamentis, quod primae 
substantiae indubitanter hoc aliquid significant; secundae vero substantiae, etsi videantur hoc 
aliquid significare, magis tamen significant quale quid.” 
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unification. However, for all other substantial forms, when the material basis of a 
substantial form succumbs to material corruption, the form leaves the body. This is the 
case of corruption and death, where the entity ceases to be what it is by virtue of losing 
its substantial form. Consider the case of a horse, say, Bucephalus. When the body of the 
Bucephalus fails, the substantial form is destroyed secundum esse, or accidentally, and 
the Bucephalus’ body assumes the form of a corpse. On this account, the corpse of 
Bucephalus’ body is an entirely different entity, and the substantial form, Bucephalus, no 
longer exists since it has no body to inform. Clearly, this cannot be the account of the 
human soul.  
Indeed, in response to this very question, Aquinas has a characteristically nuanced 
and clever response. His response is that the rational soul is essentially separate from the 
body because its operations depend in no way on the body. Thus, the intellect is 
essentially (secundum se) immortal. Yet, it is relatively (secundum quid) mortal, since in 
respect of the life of the body, the intellect inheres in and informs the body.387 On this 
account, the rational soul is a substantial form that has its own per se existence separate 
from the body. In a sense, the rational soul is contingently embodied and essentially 
disembodied. Or, as Aquinas would say, the intellect is naturally, but not essentially, 
embodied.388
Pietro Pomponazzi charges Aquinas with infidelity to Aristotle on this count and 
observes what he calls the undue influence of Neoplatonism on Aquinas’ account of the 
  
                                                 
387 Questiones Disputatae de Veritate, 13.4; ST 1a 75.6; see Eberl, Jason T. “Pomponazzi and 
Aquinas on the Intellective Soul,” Modern Schoolman 83:1 (2005), 65-66. 
388 ST 1a 89.1 
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nature of the rational soul. For Pomponazzi, the intellectual soul is closer to a substantial 
form of a material body than a substantial form that has its subsistence in itself. He 
argues that the capacities of the intellectual soul tend more towards the mortal than the 
immortal, it is more sensuous than intellectual and more concerned with the operations of 
the living organism than the contemplation of universals. He also adds the important 
criticism that if the intellectual soul exists after the death of the body without its sensitive 
and vegetative capacities, then it would be deprived of some of its essential capacities for 
eternity, which is absurd.389 Aquinas could counter that this, in fact, proves the necessity 
of the soul’s reincarnation in the resurrected body. He thus accepts the premise that the 
intellectual soul is essentially united with its sensitive and vegetative powers, and the 
conclusion that it is separated from those powers per accidens and for a time, but denies 
that this state is eternal or that it is in vain.390 Moreover, Aquinas allows that, 
disembodied, the rational soul could be informed directly by the power of God.391
This seems to be the source of the greatest controversy surrounding the nature of 
the intellect and its relation to the human body. To illustrate, it is useful to turn to the 
writings of John Buridan (ca. 1295-1361), whose commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima 
addresses these issues in detail. One of the useful features of Buridan’s discussion for the 
purposes of our exposition is that he makes a clear distinction between his investigations, 
which proceed according to natural principles, and a theological investigation of the 
nature of the soul, which would use as its principles the articles of faith. He makes such a 
 
                                                 
389 Eberl, “Pomponazzi and Aquinas,” 67-68. Pomponazzi’s work, Tractatus de Immortalitate 
Anima was burned in Venice and he only narrowly avoided charges of heresy. 
390 SCG 4. 79; Eberl, “Pomponazzi and Aquinas,” 69 
391 ST Ia. 89.1co 
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distinction because, as a teacher of letters, he refrained from strictly theological 
controversies.392
On the nature of the soul, according to “the conclusions someone might reach if 
he were to use natural arguments alone, without the Catholic faith,” Buridan 
demonstrates how two different characterizations of the intellect each entailing that other 
properties also pertain to it.
 Descartes, too, would avoid the strictly theological discussions 
concerning metaphysics and the nature of the soul. However, in neither case does this 
relieve the philosopher from maintaining a position that is consistent with faith. 
393 In particular, Buridan has in mind the positions of 
Alexander of Aphrodias and Averroes. The former holds the position that “the intellect is 
generable and corruptible, extended, derived, inherent, and multiplied”394
                                                 
392 My exposition here follows closely Jack Zupko’s “John Buridan on the Immateriality of the 
Intellect” in Forming the Mind, ed. H. Lagerlund, 129-47. 
; the latter holds 
that the intellect is immaterial. What is important about these two claims is that each 
entails a series of consequent properties of the intellect: if you hold that the intellect is 
material, then it follows that it is not everlasting, is generated and corruptible, inheres in 
matter, is extended, and is multiplied (in the sense that it is possible that many distinct 
souls exist); if you hold that the intellect is immaterial, then it follows that it is 
everlasting, is not generated or corruptible, does not inhere in matter, is not extended, and 
is not multiplied (or, that there is only one immaterial soul). The entailment relation 
seems to follow from the nature of material forms. That is, if a form inheres in some 
matter as its material form (i.e., in a way that is naturally inseperable from it), then the 
393 Questiones in libros Aristotelis De Anima III, q. 6, 48-49; quoted in Zupko “Buridan on the 
Immateriality of the Intellect,” 135 (translations are Zupko’s). 
394 Questiones in De Anima, III, q. 6, 51; “Buridan on the Immateriality of the Intellect,” 138. 
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natural corruption of that matter (since all matter is corruptible) entails the corruption of 
that form. (The same can be said for the natural extension. Since the principle of 
individuation of any given thing is its matter, whether or not there are multiple souls 
seems to follow from the material nature of the intellect.) By naturally inseparable, I 
mean the sense in which the jagged and sharp form of granite cannot be separated from 
the granite except by the power of God. This would be different from the form of a 
granite sculpture, whose origin lies in the mind of the artist, and is thus separable from 
the granite. The question, then, seems to turn on whether or not the form of the human 
being, the rational soul or intellect, is a material form or an immaterial form, whether it is 
naturally separable or naturally inseparable. However, neither of these two positions is 
entirely acceptable, for on the one hand we are left with a corruptible and individuated 
intellect, while on the other hand we are left with an eternal, monadic soul, common to all 
human beings. 
The more moderate position, which is the position affirmed by faith, holds that 
the human intellect “is not everlasting heretofore, although it is everlasting hereafter,” “is 
not strictly speaking generated by natural generation, although it is created; nor is it 
strictly speaking corruptible by natural corruption, although it is annihilable,” “is neither 
derived from a material potentiality, nor extended,” “is multiplied in keeping with the 
number of human beings,” and “is inherent in the human body or matter as long as the 
man is alive, and is separable from the body and will return to it again.”395
                                                 
395 Ibid. III, q. 6, 51; 138-39. In 1513, the Lateran Council would weigh in on the issue and 
demand that ten propositions concerning the nature of the soul be upheld by all philosophers. 
Toletus quotes this verdict in the opening of his commentary on the De Anima. I cite all ten 
 In an attempt 
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to expand on these articles of faith, Buridan offers some useful clarifications, but he 
ultimately concludes that “even though the arguments adduced for it are readily 
believable (probabiles), nevertheless, it is not apparent to me that they are 
demonstrative.”396
To return to the sixteenth century Jesuit scholars, the Coimbrians append a 
treatise on the separate soul (Tractatus de Anima Separata) to their Commentarii in tres 
libros de Anima Aristotelis in order to address just these issues. In the Proemium of this 
treatise, they announce that the rational soul is without a doubt separable from the body 
(“nimirum anima rationalis, secundum separabilitatem a corpore spectata”
 In short, Buridan seems to think that true knowledge about the nature 
of the rational soul is outside the realm of scientia and in the realm of fides. This is a 
somewhat disappointing conclusion for the philosopher. But in the process of arriving at 
this cul-de-sac, Buridan has highlighted for us a critical aspect of Aristotelian 
metaphysics on which the antinomy of Alexander and Averroes hinges: the nature of the 
human soul depends on the way that the form of the human being (the rational soul) 
inheres in the body of the human being.  
397
                                                                                                                                                 
propositions here because they clarify the position of faith and because they would have been 
well known to Descartes: (1) The soul is one. Its “parts”—the vegetative, sensitive, and 
rational souls—are distinct only by reason. (2) The soul is not one in all humans, but equal in 
number to the number of individual human beings. (3) The soul is spiritual; it is neither a 
body, nor composed of bodies. (4) The soul is not divine substance or of divine substance. (5) 
It is created immediately by God. (6) The soul is the substantial form of the body, and makes 
with it an ens per se. (7) The soul is created at the same time as the body comes to exist. (8) 
The soul is not corrupted when the body is corrupted, but exists eternally. (9) Souls after death 
do not enter other bodies. (10) All reasons offered by philosophers against the immortality of 
the soul and the other truths of faith are sophistical, vain, and refutable. Toletus Commentarii 
in De Anima 7b-8d; I follow Des Chene’s presentation, Life’s Form, Ch. 2. 
). The 
396 Ibid. III, q. 3, 25; 141 
397 Commentarii De Anima, 562. The entire treatise is contained in pp. 562-670, making it a fairly 
substantial appendix. 
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treatise then proceeds by way of six disputations that aim to show that the rational soul is 
indeed separable from the body because it is immaterial and incorruptible. The first 
disputation, concerning the nature of the rational soul and its immortality, concludes that 
the power of cognition is wholly spiritual and thus cannot be corrupted. In fact, the 
authors argue at length that the spirituality and incorruptibility of the rational soul is 
analytically true, i.e., that it simply follows from what we mean by ‘rational soul’.398
                                                 
398 Ibid. Disp. I, Art. III, 568-76. 
 The 
second disputation goes on to discuss the way of being that the separate soul has with 
respect to the body. They conclude that the rational soul is naturally separable from the 
body, of which it is the form. This implies that the Coimbrians hold the position that the 
rational soul is the immaterial form of the body, i.e., that it is somehow contingently 
related to the matter in which it inheres. In the final four disputations, they consider the 
mode of cognition and the objects of cognition proper to the rational or separable soul. 
Here, the Coimbrians argue for an internalist conception of knowledge, i.e., that the 
separate intellect first understands itself immanently, and then is transcendentally 
directed toward objects. They claim that the cognition of the separable soul is the first 
cause of any human operation. Moreover, the principle of motion relative to the rational 
soul is the concept of the good. On its own, however, (i.e., without the aid of phanatasms) 
the proper objects of the rational soul are spiritual ideas, e.g., those pertaining to angels 
or the Holy Trinity. On this view, one can see the close connection between the 
immortality of the soul and its cognitive capacities, or the kinds of mental content that it 
potentially possesses. 
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 Indeed, one of the charges that Aquinas repeatedly contended with, concerning 
the essential separability of the intellect, was how the intellect continues to function, once 
it is removed from the corporeal organs capable of producing phantasms. On the other 
side of this coin is a standard scholastic argument for the immateriality and immortality 
of the intellect, namely, that the intellect knows immaterial things and thus it is 
immaterial. We have seen that the intellect’s power or capacity to receive certain kinds of 
species, specifically those that are intelligible rather than sensible, sets it apart from the 
organic powers of the soul, the internal and external senses. The basis for this claim is the 
central idea that the soul’s powers are discriminated by its acts, and it acts are 
discriminated by its objects.  
For one level follows those things that are in the soul without their proper 
material, but still according to their singularity and their individual conditions. 
These are consequently material; and this is the level of sense, which is receptive 
of the individual species without matter, but still in an organ of the body. 
However, the higher and most perfect level of immateriality is the intellect, which 
receives species entirely abstracted from matter and material conditions, and thus 
from any organ of the body.399
 
 
There is, however, a rather significant problem with this argument that seems entirely to 
elude Aquinas and his followers. The problem can be referred to as “the content fallacy.” 
To quote from Robert Pasnau, who coins the term: “The ‘content fallacy’ is my name for 
the mistake in reasoning that comes from conflating two kinds of facts: facts about the 
content of our thoughts, and facts about what shape or form our thoughts take in our 
                                                 
399 Aquinas, Quaestiones in de Anima, 13co: Unus enim gradus est secundum quod in anima sunt 
res sine propriis materiis, sed tamen secundum singularitatem et conditiones individuales, 
quae consequuntur materiam. Et iste est gradus sensus, qui est susceptivus specierum 
individualium sine materia, sed tamen in organo corporali. Altior autem et perfectissimus 
immaterialitatis gradus est intellectus, qui recipit species omnino a materia et conditionibus 
materiae abstractas, et absque organo corporali... 
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mind.”400 In short, Aquinas frequently makes an argument from the representational 
content of species, i.e., what they are about, to the nature of the faculty that apprehends 
them. In the above passage, we see Aquinas arguing from the fact that the senses perceive 
sensible things according to their particular features to the fact that these senses must be 
powers of corporeal organs. Similarly, the fact that the intellect perceives purely 
intelligible species, abstracted from material specificity, the intellect is immaterial. This 
inference is apparently false, but it is an entirely standard argument used frequently to 
argue for the intellect’s immateriality.401
I think that such questions are useful because they highlight the very different 
metaphysical bases that underlie Aquinas’ arguments for the nature of the rational soul. 
 To put a finer point on it, why couldn’t we 
assume that an immaterial mind is aware of the particular sensible features of objects? 
Why must my experience of seeing red be the experience of a corporeal power, while my 
experience of a triangle’s having three interior angles equal to 180˚ is not? If I were 
placed in a functional magnetic resonancing machine (fMRI) so that one could see the 
brain activity taking place in me while I was having each of these thoughts, wouldn’t 
there be some characteristic and corresponding activity in my brain in each case? In other 
words, the content of thought does not seem to be related necessarily to the nature of 
thought. 
                                                 
400 Pasnau, “Aquinas and the Content Fallacy,” 293. This article contains a thorough discussion of 
the content fallacy in Aquinas’ work: his argument that the intellect only knows universals, 
that the intellect is immaterial, and that the agent intellect is necessary. Thus, it amounts to a 
rather serious charge. See J. Novak, “Aquinas and the Incorruptibility of the Soul,” for a 
discussion of this fallacy with respect to the argument for the immateriality and 
incorruptibility of the soul. 
401 For example, Toletus uses the same argument to argue against Alexander’s notion that the 
possible intellect should be identified with the imagination, Commentarii in de Anima, 135a. 
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Throughout my discussion, I have been referring implicitly to the grades or levels of 
intellection, from the external senses, to the internal senses, to the intellect. Implicit all 
the while has been an assumption that it is necessary to posit a corresponding hierarchy in 
cognition to the hierarchy of objects cognized. This link between the metaphysical thesis 
that reality admits of degrees of perfection and the epistemological thesis that our 
cognition corresponds to these degrees is inseparable from the theory of cognition 
sketched here.  
In order to illustrate, I will present a (rather elegant) argument found in Toletus to 
support the claim that the intellect is a non-organic informing power of the soul.402
                                                 
402 Commentarii in de Anima, 3, c. 3, txt. 8, q. 10, the entire argument is contained in conclusion 
3. 
 
Toletus argues that the rational soul is the most perfect natural form (forma naturaliu 
perfectissima). Thus, it contains the lower powers eminently and participates in higher 
powers. On this basis, he claims that the intellect stands in between bodies and spiritual 
things. Though it is unum et simplex, in its role as an informing form, it must play this 
role of a medium quid between the spiritual and the corporeal. Here he distinguishes 
between two perspectives, the order of reason (gradum rationalem), according to which 
the rational soul is an informing form of an organic body, and the order of the highest 
intellect (ultimum intellectum), according to which the rational soul is like the Angels, 
and is a separable form. Under one perspective, the rational soul enables the body to 
function. This is the domain of all sense perception and the source of all of our 
knowledge about objects in the world. However, from the perspective in which the 
rational soul participates in the highest intellect, it is separable.  
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Toletus backs away from committing himself to either perspective by saying that 
“It is better for us to say that [the intellect] is alone a single and most simple intermediate 
between Angels and the sensible forms, which eminently contains what is inferior, and 
under what is more eminent attains the lowest level of what is superior, i.e., of the 
Angels.”403
 
 In this way, the intellect is capable of informing and governing the powers of 
sensation even though it, strictly speaking, participates in an entirely different, spiritual 
order. The idea that somehow the intellect participates, simultaneously, in two different 
ontological domains (the spiritual and the material) depends on a rather rich ontology. 
We find Toletus claiming that the soul is a single, simple form, yet denying that it is 
either an immaterial form or a material form. The intellect somehow participates in both 
materiality and immateriality, conceived variously from the order of reason (the order of 
scientific explanation) and the order of pure intellect (the theological). Thus, by making 
fine distinctions between different ways of knowing, as this relates to the complex and 
interconnected hierarchy of being, Toletus is able to walk the knife-edge of this 
contentious issue. 
We have seen that the scholastic account of perceptual cognition is intimately 
linked to a metaphysical hierarchy of forms, species, and the acts of the soul. In fact, this 
understanding of the nature of the soul in terms of its place in a grander system tokens a 
                                                 
403 Ibid. 135c: ... melius dicimus: esse unum solum simplicissimum gradu medium inter Angelos, 
et formas sensitivas, qui eminenter continent inferiores, et sub eminenter attingit infimum 
superioris, scilicet Angelorum.” 
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more general scholastic method of explanation.404 We see that the human soul plays a 
number of roles that might be today called epistemological, psychological, etiological, or 
theological. For this reason, our modern “philosophy of mind” fails to capture the much 
more broad class of investigations that Dennis Des Chene has recently called “the science 
of soul.” 405
 
 In our brief exposition of the issue here, we can see that questions of 
cognition are closely related to the physiological questions of operation and theological 
questions of immortality. I have tried to sample the diversity of opinions later 
scholasticism on this issue in order (1) to dispel the myth of a unified “scholastic” theory 
of mind and (2) to demonstrate some of the fissures in the predominant 
Aristotelian/Thomistic theory of mind and cognition that would later be exploited by 
Descartes.  
Descartes’ Theory of Cognition in the Regulae 
 
We have seen in the preceding section that the process of perceptual cognition 
was an important and much discussed issue in late scholasticism. Though it is impossible 
to say for certain that Descartes was acquainted with any of the theories that I have been 
outlining, there is very good evidence that he was well aware of the general thrust of a 
Thomistic species theory of perception and that he saw his account of perception as a 
substitute for that theory. This fact is most evident in the Dioptrique, where Descartes 
                                                 
404 I will have occasion to discuss this type of explanation in the final chapter. See also, Gilson, 
Etudes, 158-59, where natura is identified with forma and the task of the natural philosopher 
is seen to be the classification of forma according to their place in the order of being. 
405 Des Chene, Life’s Form. 
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makes his critique of the species theory most explicit. That treatise begins with an outline 
of his theory of the refraction of light as a movement of corpuscles along rectilinear 
paths. It is followed by a short discussion of the anatomy of the eye, and the discussion of 
sensation where the species theory is explicitly attacked. There are a number of important 
historical sources of Descartes’ account in that work, principally: the discovery of the 
sine-law of refraction, related in the Regulae, anatomical observations using cows’ eyes 
and sheep brains c. 1630, and the translation of these discoveries into a coherent story 
about the role of light in perception and human action in La Traité de l’homme (c. 
1632).406
Consider the following passage from Descartes’s general theory of sensation, 
followed by a specific account of vision: 
  
Beyond this [a discussion of the operation of the nerves], it is necessary to beware 
not to suppose that in order to sense the soul needs to contemplate certain images 
that were sent by the objects up to the brain, as is commonly held by our 
Philosophers; or, at least, it is necessary to conceive the nature of these images 
entirely differently than they are [ordinarily conceived]. Because, as long as they 
consider them to have some resemblance with the objects they represent, it is 
impossible for them to show us how they can be formed by objects, and received 
by the organs of external sense, and transmitted by the nerves up to the brain 
(cerveau). (AT VI, 112; CSM I, 165)407
 
 
                                                 
406 La Dioptrique would likely have been composed at or before the time of L’Homme (though it 
certainly could have been revised before publication). Descartes’ refers to the treatise on 
optics frequently in his treatise on man. 
407 Il faut, outre cela, prendre garde a ne pas supposer que, por sentir, l’ame ait besoin de 
contempler quelques images qui soyent envoyées par les objects jusques au cerveau, ansi que 
sont communement nos Philosophes; ou, du moins, il faut concevoir la nature de ces images 
tout autrement qu’ils ne sont. Car, d’autant qu’ils ne considerent en elles autre chose, sinon 
qu’elles doivent avoir de la resemblance avec les objects qu’elles doivent presentent, il leur est 
impossible de nous monstrer comment elles peuvent estre formées par ces objects, & receves 
par les organes des sens exterieurs, & transmises par les nergs jusques au cerveau. 
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It is clear from the quoted passage that Descartes thinks this psycho-physiological 
account of perception is sufficient to displace the species account, which would hold that 
“certain images” (sensible species) are conveyed from the object, through the air, to the 
sensory organs, and then contemplated by the soul. We have seen that the account is not 
so mysterious as Descartes makes it sound, but there remains an important objection to 
this account that is indispensable.  
In the passage, Descartes claims that, at the very least, what we mean by 
“species” needs to be understood in an “entirely different way.” In particular, we cannot 
maintain the claim that there is any “resemblance” between what is transmitted to the 
sense organs, along the nerves, and up to the brain, and the external objects of sense. The 
issue of “formal resemblance,” which is integral to the species theory, must be discarded 
in light of Descartes’ anatomical observations together with his account of the nature of 
light, and more generally, his underlying theory of matter. For Descartes, an account of 
perceptual cognition cannot rely on there being any resemblance between our sensory 
perceptions and the external objects they represent. Instead, there will be only a causal 
connection. The account will explain sense perception as the product of a series of 
mechanical interactions. The putative veracity of perception will have to be recovered 
through an arbitrary representational schema that will ultimately be certified by the power 
of God, who created human beings with the capacity to decipher its code. 
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From the Regulae to the Dioptrique 
 
The account of the Dioptrique is clearly the terminus ad quem of Descartes’ 
theory of perceptual cognition, and it is in virtue of this end that it responds to the 
scholastic theory. Thus, understanding this text will help contextualize the account in the 
Regulae. However, there are important historical distinctions that need to be drawn 
between the account in the Regulae and the account of L’Homme and the Dioptrique in 
order to avoid anachronism. First, it is clear that many of the details contained in the later 
accounts derive from careful anatomic observations and a theory of physiology, including 
the circulation of blood and animal spirits, that is largely informed by Descartes’ reading 
of Harvey.408
Second, the accounts of L’Homme and the Dioptrique are underwritten by a 
particular metaphysical thesis about the relationship between mental content and 
physiological events. The phrase, present everywhere, that such a relation is “instituted 
 The Regulae contains almost no trace of reference to these concerns, since 
it is concerned with mathematics, general physical theory, and method. Even when 
Descartes addresses the need for experiments and observation in the Regulae, he refers to 
problems in magnetism, optics, harmonics, astronomy, and gravitation; he does not refer 
to anatomical observations. It is reasonable to conclude that Descartes turns to these 
issues after the Regulae, when he arrives in Holland, and that they play an important role 
in his shift of focus. For this reason I will speak cautiously about the details of Descartes’ 
theory of perception, focusing my account of the principles underlying this theory.  
                                                 
408 The best source on these connections is still E. Gilson, Etudes, 51-100. 
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by nature,” suggests an account (or at least a sketch of an account) for why the non-
resembling sensations we have could be caused by the motions of matter in the nerves 
and brain. On Descartes’ mature account, it is God’s omnipotence and perfect creation 
that has instituted this relation, which is a constitutive element of the mind-body 
composite (and the source of “occasionalist” interpretations of Descartes, though this is 
only one possible interpretation of that theory). Such a hypothesis is nowhere to be found 
in the Regulae.  
Finally, the account in the Regulae serves a different purpose than that of 
L’Homme or the Dioptrique. In La Traité de l’homme, for instance, Descartes is 
presenting an account of the physiology of the human being that is consistent with a 
general cosmology, intended to have been published as Le Monde. Thus, the details of 
perception are intended to fit seamlessly within a larger framework that he had hoped 
would explain all natural phenomena. The Dioptrique, by contrast, has a more limited 
scope. It is intended to show the merits of the method by demonstrating the effectiveness 
of Descartes’ theory of light and his law of refraction for producing lenses to enhance 
vision. Here, the story of visual perception has a clearly instrumental end, i.e., to fit with 
the subsequent account of the shape of magnifying lenses. In the Regulae, by contrast, the 
theory of perceptual cognition has a more basic purpose, namely, to provide an 
epistemological justification for the range of applicability of the mathesis universalis. In 
other words, the account of the Regulae answers the question: how do our perceptual 
faculties guarantee that what we discover by virtue of our mathematical method conforms 
to the way the world actually is? In virtue of this desideratum, the account of the Regulae 
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furnishes a more explicit representational theory that conforms to the mathematical, or 
geometrical, representation of problems and their solutions. If the account of cognition is 
correct, then Descartes has shown that we are capable of exercising the method in the 
way that it has been presented and that we are capable of verifying its results. For this 
reason I will focus my account on whether and to what extent Descartes’ theory of 
perceptual cognition meets these demands, largely ignoring the metaphysical, 
physiological, and cosmological questions raised by the account. 
In the first section, I will present the basic structure of the account. I will rely on 
L’Homme and the Dioptrique in order to flesh out the brief passages from the Regulae. 
All the while, I will try to keep our distinctions between these works at the forefront so 
that my analysis does not exceed the bounds of what can be inferred on the basis of the 
text. What we find in the first section is that Descartes presents a coherent causal story of 
the nature of perception that does not rely on any formal resemblance between sensations 
and the objects of sensation. Moreover, the suppositions or hypotheses on which this 
causal story is based are informed by a commitment to a certain concept of mind. The 
second section will then focus on the imagination, or the internal senses more generally, 
and describe the nature of representation at that level. It seems that the imagination is 
really the bridge between the intellect and the sensory faculties. Thus, it plays an utterly 
critical role in the account. In this section, we can be more specific about Descartes’ 
theory of sensation without resemblance. Finally, I will turn to the operation of the 
incorporeal power of the intellect, which is said to be wholly distinct from the corporeal 
powers of sensation. It seems that the chief role of this power, in the Regulae, is to 
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interact with the corporeal powers in a methodical way in order to reliably discover the 
nature of things. We will examine how Descartes conceives of this interaction between 
the pure intellect and the body, and we will try to get a fix on the parameters of the pure 
intellect: What is its nature? How far do its powers extend? 
 
Principles of the pyscho-physiological account of perception 
 
In this section, I focus on the ‘principles’ of a psycho-physiological account of 
perception, since this is what is important for the Regulae. In contrast, later accounts will 
fill out the details, but the later accounts stand to the Regulae as the results of scientific 
investigation stand to a program of scientific research. I will refer to these results in order 
to confirm or clarify the research program, but I am primarily interested in the program, 
and thus the principles that underlie it. In a certain respect, Descartes is quite explicit 
about what his aims are in the beginning of his exposition: 
... it would be best if I could explain here what the human mind is, what the body 
is, and how it is informed by the mind, what faculties within the composite whole 
promote knowledge of things, and how each acts on its own. But, it seems to me, I 
lack the space to include all the things I wish, which [I believe] must be set out 
before the truth about these matters can be made clear to everyone. For I always 
desire to write in such a way that, before I assert anything that might provide 
material for controversy, I offer first my reasons, by which I have come to my 
view, and by which I believe others may be persuaded. But since I cannot do that 
here, it will be sufficient if I explain as briefly as possible what, for my purposes, 
is the most useful way of conceiving everything within us that contributes to our 
knowledge of things. You may not believe, if you do not wish, that things are this 
way. But what will prevent you any less from following these hypotheses 
[suppositiones], if nothing appears to diminish their truth, and moreover that they 
make things so much clearer? This is only to follow what one does in Geometry 
when one supposes certain things about quantity, which in no way weaken the 
 345 
character of the demonstration, even though in physics one often takes another 
view of the nature of such quantity. (AT X, 411-12; CSM I, 39-40) 
 
This long passage lays out the state of Descartes’ thought and his intentions for the 
discussion very clearly. First, it is clear that Descartes has in mind, however vaguely, 
some concept of mind that is distinct from the body and is the informing form of the 
body. Though this claim is repeated on several occasions in Descartes’ work, it is rarely 
expanded. Some have questioned whether or not Descartes can hold the position that the 
mind is an informing form of the body, given his mechanistic account of the body.409
These [hypothetical] human beings will be composed, just as we are, of a soul and 
a body. And it is necessary that I describe to you, first, the body on its own, and a 
bit later, also the soul on its own; and finally, that I show you how these two 
natures ought to be joined and united in order to compose human beings that 
resemble us. (AT IX, 120; CSM I, 99) 
 Yet, 
this passage makes clear that such an account is a desideratum of Descartes’ earliest 
concept of mind. Indeed, if we glance at the opening sentences of La Traité de l’homme, 
we find a nearly identical sentiment:  
 
Here Descartes takes the rhetorical guise of fabulation that is characteristic of the entire 
treatise, Le Monde. This rhetorical guise has important parallels to the suppositiones of 
the passage from the Regulae, which I will discuss below. What I want to emphasize for 
the moment is that Descartes seems to grant, as a matter of principle that the human being 
is necessarily composed of a body and a soul, that these each have their own independent 
character that can be treated separately, and that together they, by a kind of joining or 
union, make up the entire human being.410
                                                 
409 See, for example, Pasnau, “Form, Substance, and Mechanism.” 
 I do not think that this principle should be 
410 This is, in fact, what Rodis-Lewis means by the “anthropologie cartésienne,” L’Anthropologie 
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taken lightly, despite the fact that it difficult to see where Descartes provides a 
satisfactory account of it.  
Second, it is clear from the Regulae passage that Descartes’ interest is focused on 
the “faculties in the composite whole that lead to knowledge of things.” This may 
surprise those who still conceive of Descartes as holding that all knowledge is deduced 
from innate principles known to the immaterial mind alone. It is quite clear here that he is 
much more interested in the way the mind interacts with the body to acquire knowledge 
than in its operation apart from the body (the internal reflection of so-called “Cartesian 
souls”). Indeed, it is with respect to explaining how the mind receives information from 
the body and directs the body’s actions that Descartes’ brief explanation will be “most 
useful” for his purposes. Though we will leave some of these issues for the third section, 
a picture of how the mind can accurately receive information about the external world is 
important for justifying the kind of beliefs that the mind has about the world. 
  
 Hypotheses and the account of perception 
However, on both of these counts, Descartes is quite cautious. Instead of entering 
into the murky water of mind-body interaction and separability, he suggests that the 
reader accept certain suppositiones in order to follow the matter to its conclusion. He 
links this procedure to the suppositiones of Geometers who, in searching for some 
unknown quantity, assume what is sought as given. This, of course, ought to be familiar 
                                                                                                                                                 
cartésienne, 41.  
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to us as the ‘method of analysis’. 411
Therefore, it is necessary to conceive, first, that insofar as all of the external 
senses are parts of the body, sensation is strictly speaking passive, even though 
we apply those senses to objects by action, i.e., local motion. (AT X, 412; CSM I, 
40) 
 In the Regulae, as if to explain the suppositions 
involved in the explanation, Descartes goes on to say: 
 
It is not immediately clear how this explains Descartes’ suppositions. However, I think 
that certain suppositions must be inferred in order for the account to be plausible. First, it 
is clear that Descartes conceives of sensation to be a physical process like any other, 
namely, to be explicable through mechanical models of contact between physical bodies. 
This is why sensation must be strictly speaking passive, i.e., it is a movement effected by 
the motion of external bodies. Thus, the principle hypotheses about the nature of 
sensation that will govern Descartes’ explanation of sensory perception are the familiar 
principles of his corpuscular mechanics. This sort of supposition is much clearer in 
L’Homme where Descartes famously claims that his imagined human beings have a body 
that “is nothing other than a statue or a machine,” comparing these machines to “clocks, 
artificial fountains, windmills,” etc. (AT XI, 120; CSM I, 99). Again, the reason for this 
is quite explicit: there is no satisfactory explanation of bodily motion other than a certain 
“disposition” (or arrangement) of the constituent proper parts of the mechanism. This is 
clearly a much more powerful claim than Descartes is entitled to in the Regulae, but it is 
entirely consistent with that account and even seems to be a natural consequence of it.  
                                                 
411 Doyle, Logic of Descartes’ Method, 378-85 is particularly effective at linking the 
suppositiones to the method of analysis with respect to Descartes’ Optics. More on this below. 
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More implicitly, in the Regulae passage, Descartes seems committed to the 
existence of an incorporeal power that directs our action, or local motion, toward external 
bodies. He suggests that there is some active power of the intellect that is necessary for 
perception, though this active power seems to act only by moving the parts of the body 
toward external objects. One could say that such a claim is evident from experience of 
one’s free control over one’s own actions, but there are familiar objections to that 
conception.412
                                                 
412 These usually come under the heading of “problems of mental causation,” where it is fairly 
easy to perform a kind of reductio argument against the idea that immaterial minds have 
causal efficacy in a material world. In contemporary philosophy, it is generally assumed that 
the burden of proof is on the side of those who would propose that mental causation exists, not 
the other way around. 
 Though almost none of Descartes’ predecessors would have been inclined 
toward a materialist conception of the mental, clearly such ideas were in the air as both 
Hobbes and Gassendi present a more thoroughgoing materialist conception of cognition. 
Second, Descartes assumes that this incorporeal power is unified, or that its powers are 
nothing but the power of one single cause. One can understand this either in the way that 
it is presented in Rule I, namely, that there is a unified “intellectual light” that makes all 
knowledge possible, or it can be understood in terms of the ‘ego’ of the Discours or 
Meditationes. Clearly the former conception is a weaker claim that is closer to the 
purposes of our present investigation, but it is closely related to the later metaphysical 
picture of independently existing substantial entities whose principal attribute is to be the 
bearer of thoughts. And finally, Descartes seems to assume (as we will see) that in order 
for the single, incorporeal power to interact with the body, it needs a central locus of 
action, or a unified corporeal body that in some way receives and directs the actions of 
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the incorporeal power to the rest of the body and communicates bodily sensations to that 
power.  
This final assumption is also consistently maintained throughout Descartes works; 
it is the source of his hypothesis that the “pineal gland” is the seat of the soul (cf. 
Principia IV, §189). However, it is a curious claim that leads to the charge of the soul’s 
status as a “pilot in a ship” or an inner homunculus despite Descartes’ explicit (and 
repeated) protestations to the contrary. One wonders: if Descartes really conceives of the 
mind as an incorporeal entity that informs the body, is intimately connected to every part 
or it, and is the cause of the body’s actions, then why doesn’t he allow for some broader 
notion of causal interaction between mind and body? In other words, why not just think 
of the mind as having causal effects in several places at once? There should be no threat 
to the unity and identity of the mind on this account. St. Thomas and those who followed 
him, for instance, insisted that the rational soul was the true cause, or the principle, of all 
bodily actions, governing the vegetative and sensitive souls through its eminent power. 
There doesn’t seem to be anything preventing Descartes from making such a claim, 
though we will see that he had a very incomplete picture of how the brain worked, and 
that the imperfections of his physical account of the body may have lead him to suggest 
that the soul interacted with the body at a single point. Fortunately for us, these problems 
are largely background issues that we can be aware of but need not focus on in order to 
understand the account in the Regulae. 
However, there is a much more directly relevant issue raised by the passage we 
have been considering and to which we must respond. Given that I have already 
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suggested that the account of cognition in the Regulae is intended to provide an 
epistemological justification for the larger scientific project, one might wonder if the 
implicit and explicit suppositions we have been outlining undermine such an attempt at 
justification. In other words, how can Descartes rely on his account of perception as a 
justification for his method if the account itself depends on certain substantial 
assumptions that he cannot defend? Interestingly, the two sections of Rule XII that 
occupy these last two chapters of the thesis both begin with a series of suppositions or 
hypotheses. The second half of Rule XII compares these hypotheses to those that 
astronomers make when constructing “those imagined circles” (or epicycles) to explain 
celestial phenomena: “here, much in the same way as above, certain things are assumed 
which surely not all are inclined to agree with” (AT X, 417; CSM I, 43). The allusion to 
astronomical hypotheses is useful because it refers us to Descartes’ discussion in the 
Principia III, §15. In that paragraph, Descartes compares the position of the astronomer 
to the position of a sailor at high seas who cannot tell, just by looking, whether the 
movement of other ships around him is the result of their own proper motion, or of his 
motion relative to them.  
In the same way, the paths of the planets, when seen from the earth, are of a kind 
which makes it impossible for us to know, simply on the basis of the observed 
motions, what proper motions should be attributed to any given body. And since 
their paths are very uneven and are very complicated, it is not easy to explain 
them except by selecting one pattern, among all those which can make their 
movements intelligible, and supposing the movements to occur in accordance 
with this. (AT VIIIa, 85; CSM I, 250) 
 
Descartes goes on to discuss the hypotheses of Ptolemy, Copernicus, and Tycho Brahe, 
who begin with different assumptions (geocentricism or heliocentrism) and then attempt 
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to explain the observed motions of the planets on that basis. Indeed, this example is 
strictly analogous to Descartes’ recommendations in geometry. When describing his 
method for solving the Pappus problem, Descartes suggests that we simply choose two 
lines, arbitrarily, and treat these as the coordinate lines for reference. 
First, I assume that the problem is already solved and, in order to untangle the 
confusion created by all these lines, I consider one of those given and one of those 
sought, for example, AB & CB, as the principle lines according to which I 
undertake to refer all the others. (AT VI, 382-83) 
 
This, of course, is the ingenious Cartesian coordinate system. What is so remarkable 
about it is that the arbitrariness of the initial choice of axes (principle lines) has no effect 
on the solution, provided that all relations are kept constant. The same is true for the 
astronomical observations. 
In the particular case of perceptual cognition, there is no strict analogy (no one is 
assuming that the objects cognized are actually the cognizers, for instance). The case of 
perception is more closely related to the general case of empirical observations, which 
Descartes also addresses in part III of the Principia.  
The principles which we have so far discovered are so vast and so fertile, that 
their consequences are far more numerous than the entire observed contents of the 
visible world; indeed, they are so numerous that we could never <in a lifetime> 
make a complete survey of them even in our thought.... Our purpose is not to use 
these phenomena as the basis for proving anything, for we aim to deduce an 
account of effects from their causes, not to deduce an account of causes from their 
effects. (AT VIIIa, 81-2; CSM I, 249) 
 
Does Descartes mean to say that empirical study is strictly deductive or a priori as 
opposed to inductive or a posteriori? How would this justify assuming controversial 
premises for the purposes of deduction? These sorts of questions are a red herring 
prompted by the somewhat loose sense of “deduce” in the passage. What Descartes 
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means to say is simply that the account he is about to provide is based on certain 
principles that not everyone will agree with. What he hopes is that the account explains 
the phenomena, the effects, on the basis of these principles, i.e., as deduced from them, in 
such a way that it renders those principles plausible.  
Some may be inclined to doubt the sincerity of this talk about hypotheses since 
Descartes goes on to admit that his suppositions are almost certainly false, and in contrast 
affirms the belief that the earth, in fact, does not move (since motion is relative to 
surrounding bodies, III, §28) and that God, in fact, created the earth in perfect order (even 
though he will try to provide an account of the universe as a process of generation out of 
equally distributed matter in motion, III, §§45-47). Surely, Descartes cannot be serious 
about these thinly veiled attempts to comply with orthodoxy. And I doubt that he was as 
committed to the falsity of his suppositions as he would like us to believe.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of very important lessons to draw from these 
discussions that Descartes is utterly serious about. First, Descartes’ definition of motion 
as “the transfer of one body from the vicinity of the other bodies which are in immediate 
contact with it” (AT VIIIa, 90; CSM I, 252) is central to Descartes’ physical explanation. 
Second, the principle that “if we want to understand the nature of plants or men, it is 
much better to consider how they can gradually grow from seeds than to consider how 
they were created by God at the very beginning of the world” (AT VIIIa 100; CSM I, 
256) is again a fundamental belief driving Descartes’ scientific project.413
                                                 
413 For more on the importance of these concepts, see D. Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical 
Physics. 
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Closer to our purposes, Descartes also goes on to claim that we cannot hope to 
understand the nature of the world through deductive reasoning alone, since there are any 
number of possible ways that God could have created the world in accordance with the 
way we perceive it. In order to distinguish which way God actually created the world, 
Descartes says, “experience alone must teach us which configurations he actually 
selected in preference to the rest” (AT VIIIa, 101; CSM I, 256).414
Moreover, we should not be concerned with charges of circularity here. It is not 
the case that Descartes is assuming causes in order to deduce effects that are, in turn, 
meant to prove the veracity of those causes. Fr. Morin levies just this charge against 
Descartes in response to his claims at the end of the Discours. At the end of that work, 
Descartes had attempted to preempt any concerns his readers may have about the 
principles underlying his Dioptrique and Météors. He assures them that they will be 
satisfied by his account if they read through it in its entirety. 
 He continues, “We are 
thus free to make any assumption on these matters with the sole proviso that all the 
consequences of our assumptions must agree with our experience” (ibid.; CSM I, 256-
57). In this case, as in so many others, Descartes takes matters of faith seriously because 
doing so is instructive. Indeed, by addressing each of these issues, Descartes is able to 
demonstrate the underlying elements of his philosophical physics that are the truly 
radical. That motion is considered as relative local motion, that generation is explanatory 
of physical natures, and that our assumptions must accord with experimental evidence, 
these underlying principles are utterly foundational for the Cartesian project.  
                                                 
414 In this respect, Descartes was much more of an empiricist than Leibniz. 
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For it seems to me that the reasons follow one another in such a way that, as the 
last are demonstrated from the first as causes, the first are reciprocally proven 
from the last as effects. And one need not imagine that I commit the error that 
logicians call a circle; for experience renders most of the effects very certain, such 
that the causes not so much serve to prove them as to explain them; on the 
contrary, it is they [the causes] that are proven by them [the effects]. (AT VI, 76) 
 
To this, Morin had objected, “if it is true that to prove some effects by a supposed cause, 
and then to prove this same cause by these same effects, were not to reason in a circle, 
then Aristotle misunderstood it, and [in fact] one might say that no one could ever 
commit such a fallacy” (AT I, 538). In response, Descartes insists that “there is a great 
difference between ‘to prove’ and ‘to explain’” in the passage of the Discours. He claims 
that “one may use the word ‘to demonstrate’ to mean the one or the other” (AT II, 198). 
Thus, Descartes is proposing that only the effects can prove the truth of his assumed 
causes, while these causes are meant to explain those effects. As a matter of fact, the 
effects need no proof at all since they are the evident data of experience! The causes, on 
the other hand, are potentially disputed (such as was the case in the heliocentric model of 
the universe); their truth can only be assessed on the basis of their capacity to explain the 
apparent effects. This seems like just the sort of thing we expect from scientific theories. 
The explanatory power of the account itself is meant to justify the assumptions. If the 
account satisfies the objectives it sets out, then the assumptions ought to be accepted until 
they can be supplanted by other assumptions and another account. 
Given the principle assumptions mentioned above—that the only causal powers 
are either bodily, which are mechanical, or mental, which direct local motion, and that 
perception is a result of the interaction between these two powers (through a central 
processing organ)—what is Descartes’ account of sensation? 
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... [S]trictly speaking to sense is simply to undergo change [per passionem], 
which has the same character as when wax receives the figure [figura] of a seal. 
We ought to state this not by analogy, but conceiving of it in exactly the same 
way, the external form [figura] of the sentient body is really changed by the 
object, just as that, which is on the surface of the wax, is changed by the seal. This 
is the case, it must be acknowledged, not only when we touch some body as 
having a shape [figura], or hardness, or roughness, etc., but also when our touch 
perceives heat, or cold, and similar qualities. It is the same with the other senses: 
thus, when the first opaque membrane [primum opacum] of the eye assumes the 
shape [figura] impressed upon it by the illumination of various colors; and in the 
ears, the nose, and the tongue, by virtue an object up against its impervious 
membrane [objecto imperviam], it is changed to some new shape [figura] from 
the sound, odor, or flavor. All of this is a most helpful way of conceiving of 
theses matters, since nothing more easily falls under the senses than shape 
[figura]. (AT X, 412-13; CSM I, 40) 
 
First of all, we are told to conceive of sensation as an actual alteration of the external 
form or shape of the sensory faculties: sight, hearing, smelling, touch, and taste. This 
alteration is to be conceived not on analogy with the way that wax receives the form of a 
seal but in exactly the same way. Let us set aside the clearly essential role that this new 
concept of figura is playing in the passage above. It is clear that this notion is meant to 
revise and supplant the notion of species that had governed the scholastic account. For 
the moment, however, I want to focus on the change by way of contact that characterizes 
the interaction between the sense organs and the objects of sensation. 
It is obvious that this notion of some kind of direct contact between the organs of 
sense and the external world, by which sensation occurs, follows the general mechanical 
principles of Descartes’ method of explanation. However, it is not clear exactly what 
Descartes has in mind to explain this contact. He is careful to extend the description from 
the case of touch, where such contact seems obvious, to our distal sense perceptions, such 
as sight and hearing. With respect to vision, he claims, “the opaque membrane of the eye 
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assumes the shape impressed upon it by the illumination of various colors.” This account 
is also extended to include the other faculties: “and in the ears, the nose, and the tongue, 
by virtue an object up against its impervious membrane, it is changed to some new shape 
from the sound, odor, or flavor.” In order for such an account to make any sense, 
Descartes must believe that he is in possession or close to possession of a corpuscular 
account of sensation. 
 
 The mechanics of vision and hearing 
If we focus on vision, we discover an account of the corpuscular mechanism 
underlying visual perception in La Traité de la lumière. There, Descartes proposes to 
understand the nature of light by first turning to the nature of fire, since the flame is one 
of the primary sources of illumination. He makes an important methodological provision 
and then he poses an enlightening thought experiment: 
... as for myself, since I fear deceiving myself if I suppose anything more than 
what necessarily must be the case, I am content to conceive in this [the action that 
burns the fire] a movement of its parts. For, place yourself in front of a fire, place 
it where [you feel] some warmth, and then allow it to burn, as much as you like. If 
you do not suppose in that case that there are some small parts that move against 
you, or that these parts detach from their neighbors, then I do not know how to 
imagine that you receive any alteration or change. (AT IX, 7; CSM I, 83) 
 
Beginning with the principle that no change can be accounted for without contact, 
Descartes is left with no other way to explain the heat of a fire than to suggest that there 
are certain very small particles released from the fire that come in contact with the skin. 
He supposes that, not these, but similar small particles can account for the nature of light 
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that comes from the fire as well as its heat.415 In the Dioptrique, this mechanism is 
explained through the examples of the blind man’s canes, the wine vat, and the tennis 
balls. Again, Descartes does not pretend that these analogies describe things exactly as 
they are, but they are like suppositions or hypotheses about the nature of things that make 
the account easier to comprehend.416
And to take from this a comparison, I would like you to think of light as nothing 
other than some thing in those bodies that we call luminescent, which has a 
certain movement, or a very prompt and lively action, which passes toward our 
eyes, by the intervening air and other transparent bodies, in the same way that the 
movement or resistance of bodies, which the blind man encounters, pass toward 
his hand, by the intervening cane. (AT VI, 84; CSM I, 153) 
 With respect to the case of the blind man who 
senses objects with his canes, Descartes describes the nature of light in perfectly 
mechanistic terms. 
 
So the light passes to the surface of our eyes, from the light source, or from illuminated 
objects, in the same way as the movement of one end of the blind man’s cane passes to 
his hand. In short, all sensation is a kind of touch, a direct contact with physical bodies by 
which the sensory faculties are moved by those bodies. 
Descartes is not very clear in the Regulae passage we have been considering how 
the mind is capable of receiving the impressions of the tiny corpuscles of light, nor how 
the light received in on the “opaque membrane” of the eye is transmitted to the brain and 
interpreted as color sensations. By the time of L’Homme, he is in possession of a more 
                                                 
415 I am being cautious here, because when Descartes introduces the account of vision in 
L’Homme, he describes the contact with the membrane of the eye by virtue of those particles 
of the ‘second element’, which are the imperceptible round particles of air, as opposed to the 
infinitesimally small and active ‘first element’ that is identified with fire. Cf. AT IX, 24ff. 
416 It is noteworthy that Descartes again refers to the “astronomers” in defense of his use of 
analogies in the Dioptrique (AT VI, 83). 
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complete account of the nature of sensation by virtue of a theory about the nerves, the 
circulation of animal spirits, and the anatomy of the eye and brain. Descartes’ debt to 
anatomical observations of others is evident throughout L’Homme: he frequently refers to 
les Anatomistes and follows the given names of the anatomical parts of the body that he 
discusses. He did not leave it to the authority of anatomists, however, engaging in 
dissections and anatomical experiments of his own (see Anatomica: AT XI, 549 ff.). 
These empirical observations allow Descartes to fill in the gaps in his initial theory, but 
the entire account is regulated by the same principles: sensation is a kind of alteration, 
and all alteration is explained by the direct contact of solid bodies. What Descartes adds 
to the account is a description of the nerves, or more precisely, the petits filets that are 
contained within the nerves, along with an enveloping tissue and the animal spirits. These 
little nets or filaments (they were called ‘fibrils’ in England) are distributed throughout 
the body and connected, ultimately, to a central processing center in the brain: the pineal 
gland and the surrounding cavity. The brain itself is to be conceived simply as a very 
peculiar sort of soft tissue, containing pores through which the animal spirits (those very 
small and lively particles circulating throughout the body) can pass freely (AT IX, 
170ff.). When tugged by external objects acting on the surface of the body, the filaments 
of the nerves open pores in the gland that releases animal spirits into the inner cavity of 
the brain. Descartes contends that these movements are fine-grained enough to 
communicate all different sorts of sensations. In the section treating the nature of touch, 
he notes, one movement of the nerves causes “a certain bodily fullness that is called 
titillation [chatoüillement], and which, as you can see, being so close to pain in its cause, 
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is completely contrary in its effect” (AT XI, 144; CSM I, 103). Thus, a slight difference 
in movement, or texture, of the corpuscles affecting the external sensory membranes 
could cause radically different sensations, by virtue of a difference in the characteristics 
of the animal spirits released.  
Descartes’ description is particularly effective when he discusses the case of 
music. Here, he draws on his work in harmonics to show that certain sounds are more 
pleasing than others by virtue of the movement of air, or the concussive impulses, that 
occur in the cavity of the ear. He shows that a certain combinations of pitches, 
particularly a major third, fifth, or octave are most pleasing to the ear by virtue of the 
ratio between those pulses of sound. And he observes that the same pitches, when 
combined differently, can give rise to very different sensations. Thus, “it is not the things 
that are in an absolute sense the most sweet, which are the most agreeable to the senses, 
but those which titillate the senses in a more temperate way” (AT IX, 151). The same 
account is repeated in the case of colors, where agreeable or disagreeable natures are 
differentiated by the proportional relations between the colors that create either a 
temperate effect (agreeable) or a dissonant effect (disagreeable) (AT IX, 158). Moreover, 
internal dispositions of the body can react with the external object to create different 
sensations at different times. Descartes describes how a piece of meat can give one a 
sense of pleasure at one time, but taste bland or even unpleasant on another occasion, by 
virtue of a change in the saliva, which he thought to come from the stomach. “And this is 
so generally true,” he says, “that often, just as the temperament of the stomach changes, 
so the effect of taste changes also” (AT IX, 147). Of course, such an analogy could be 
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extended to the disposition of the animal spirits or the brain, such that a particular 
sensation occasions a different emotional or intellectual response at different times. On 
this understanding of sensation, it is easy to see why all sensory qualities ought to be 
conceived of as relative to the perceiver. This does not necessitate that all sensory 
qualities are “solely mental” as opposed to “real”; it could entail a sort of response-
dependent, indexical, or dispositional interpretation of sensory qualities. There is nothing 
in these texts to decide between those interpretations. However, it is clear that, for 
Descartes, sensory qualities are not “real” in the sense that they play any causal role in 
the process of cognition. In this sense, he opposes a basic plank of the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic theory of cognition outlined above. 
If we return to the case of vision, which Descartes admittedly spends more time 
on and discusses in more detail than the other senses, we get a clear explanation of the 
causal interaction from motions in external objects to the nerves and brain. Here, he can 
make use of the retinal image to clarify the shape (figura) of internal sensation. He claims 
that this image has a neurological correlate in the pineal gland, through the transmission 
of animal spirits. The figure, traced on the back of the eye, is immediately transferred, 
through the optical nerve to the interior of the brain. Descartes imagines that the optical 
nerve opens specific pores in the central cavity of the brain (just as in the case of touch), 
such that these pores release animal spirits which, in turn, move the pineal gland in a 
specific way corresponding to the figure seen (AT XI, 174-75; CSM I, 105).417
                                                 
417 This relation can be quite wide-ranging, though Descartes probably conceived of it in 
mathematical terms. See Betsy Newell Decyk “Cartesian Imagination and Perspectival 
Painting,” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, eds. S. Gaukroger et al, 447-86. 
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Descartes understands this action of the animal spirits using two different models 
or analogies: a church organ and the wind against the sails of a ship. The analogy of the 
church organ helps to explain the way that the pores of the nerve endings, directing 
animal spirits through different paths, could produce diverse sensations. Descartes 
compares the external objects to the fingers of the organist, the animal spirits to the air 
from the organ’s bellows, and the pores to the pipes of the organ, which, simply by virtue 
of the quantity of air in certain pipes produces either harmony or discord (AT XI, 165-66; 
CSM I, 103-04).418
                                                 
418 See G. Hatfield, “Descartes’ Physiology and Its Relation to His Psychology,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Descartes, 335-70, esp. 346. 
 In similar fashion, he claims, only four factors are necessary to 
account for “all the diverse humors or natural inclinations that are in us”: the quantity of 
animal spirits, their size, their movement, and the relation to those of some other time 
(AT XI, 166; CSM I, 104). The analogy to the wind in the ship’s sails allows Descartes to 
explain more precisely the material nature of the brain and the way that it is moved by the 
animal spirits. The organ analogy highlights the diversity of effects that can be produced 
through changes in only a few different characteristics. However, the human brain, as 
Descartes was well aware, was not composed of rigid pipes or mechanical keys, like the 
organ. Instead, Descartes knew the brain tissue to be quite malleable, such that slight 
changes in the animal spirits could move the tissue of the brain and alter the nerves 
attached to it, just as the sails of a ship tug on the ropes attached to them. “...[B]ut,” he 
says, “the source that produces these spirits is ordinarily so abundant, that to the extent 
that they enter in the cavity, they have the force to push all around the material that 
surrounds them, and to inflate it, and by such means to tug on those little nerve fibers that 
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come from them: just as the wind, being moderately strong, can inflate the sails of a ship, 
and tug all the cords to which it is attached” (AT XI, 173). We thus have an image of a 
very flexible and malleable substance that can be modified by tiny, invisible particles in 
order to produce a wide variety of effects. The whole process is directed by way of the 
pineal gland, from which the animal spirits issue and by which they can be directed into 
the various tissues of the brain (AT XI, 170-71).419
 
 
 Figures or images impressed in the brain 
In order not to get bogged down in the details of Descartes’ physiological account 
of the brain and nervous system in the L ’Homme, we ought to return to the Regulae to 
see what is really at issue in all of this. When Descartes describes the relationship 
between corporeal-physical motions in the brain with motions in the senses excited by 
external objects, he invokes terminology borrowed from Aristotelian faculty psychology. 
I will postpone a discussion of these internal faculties of sense to the following section. 
Here, I am more interested in the appeal to mechanical analogies: 
Secondly, when an external sense organ is stimulated by an object, the figure 
which it receives is conveyed at one and the same moment to another part of the 
body known as the ‘common’ sense, without any entity really passing from the 
one to the other. In exactly the same way I understand that while I am writing, at 
                                                 
419 It is possible to be somewhat more critical of Descartes’ account than I am being here. Celia 
Wolfe-Devine claims that Descartes resorts to the animal spirits in order to hedge against the 
obvious inadequacies of his theory of the pineal gland. In particular, she claims that Descartes 
wants his account to provide a means of transmitting an image from the retina to the brain. It 
is unclear how the animal spirits could convey this kind of information. She suggests, “The 
most likely explanation for these theories being propounded by Descartes is that they are a 
carryover from the Aristotelian tradition, in which the cardiovascular system carries out many 
of the sensitive functions later assigned to the nervous system. Descartes does very little to 
integrate these earlier views with his own and seems to include them by force of habit without 
thinking out the mechanisms of the process very thoroughly,” Descartes on Seeing, 61. 
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the very moment when individual letters are traced on the paper, not only does the 
point of the pen move, but the slightest motion of this part cannot but be 
transmitted simultaneously to the whole pen. All these various motions are traced 
out in the air by the tip of the quill, even though I do not conceive of anything real 
passing from one end to the other.... Thirdly, the ‘common’ sense functions like a 
seal, fashioning in the phantasy or imagination, as if in wax, the same figures or 
ideas which come, pure and without body, from the external senses. The phantasy 
is a genuine part of the body, and is large enough to allow different parts of it to 
take on many different figures and, generally, to retain them for some time; in 
which case it is to be identified with what we call ‘memory’. (AT X, 413-14; 
CSM I, 41-42) 
 
The analogy with the wax and seal is simply a reference to the prototypical analogy 
passed down from antiquity. Descartes uses it in several places and never seems to 
distinguish the “pictorial” character of the analogy, which implicitly endorses a kind of 
representation through resemblance, from his non-resembling representations.  
I will pass over this analogy for the moment and focus on the pen. That analogy 
recalls his account of the movement of light (I am here thinking of the analogy of light 
with the blind man’s cane). According to that model, Descartes imagines light to transmit 
information instantaneously, by virtue of the contact that light corpuscles have with each 
other. In the passage above, the nerves (or the body more generally) are compared to the 
way a pen traces letters on paper at the same time as its upper portion traces figures in the 
air. These figures in the air are not the same as those letters on the paper; that upper 
movement is “quite different and opposite” to the movement of the letters. Nevertheless, 
the information is transmitted instantaneously from one end to the other in the same way 
that the external transmit information to the internal senses. The whole process is 
explained in material terms, by means of the contact between bodies. He describes an 
isomorphism between the external senses and the internal senses in terms of figurae: 
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presumably the shape, motion, and quantity of particles. He provides no details about 
how the “figures” in the brain are correlated with figures in external bodies, but he 
presumes that this can be explained using simple analogies, such as the pen. We can 
return to our images of the church organ and the boat’s sails to help make the picture 
more vivid, but the essential point to take from the description is that Descartes believes 
he is in possession of a mechanistic explanation of perception that accounts for how our 
brain may receive precise information about the external world through the mechanical 
contact of bodies. 
The movement in the brain, whether in the common sense, imagination or 
phantasy, is both the locus of all of our mental information about the world and the 
source of local motion. In the Regulae, Descartes calls this point of interaction the 
phantasy, which, he says, “is a genuine part of the body” and the source of mental 
images, either produced on its own, occasioned by perception, or remembered. He is 
clear that whatever information the phantasy receives from the external world, it does not 
receive this information by virtue of the passage of some particular body. These figures 
arrive in the brain, Descartes claims,  “pure and without body, from the external sense.” I 
believe this means that the information is encoded in the shape and movement of 
particles, and does not require the transmission of the external body. This should not 
imply in any way that this information is immaterial, or spiritual. Rather, it indicates the 
kind of material information that is passed along the nerves, namely, one that identifies 
the modes of material bodies, their shape, size, quantity, and movement.420
                                                 
420 Jean-Marie Beyssade is quite helpful in this regard. Beyssade tells us, through an analysis of 
 Along the 
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lines of the analogy with the church organ or the ship’s sails, it is easy to imagine how 
the alterations of shape, size, quantity, and movement of the small particles and malleable 
passages in the brain could convey a wide variety of information about the shape, size, 
and movement of external bodies. Descartes stresses that there is no need for the internal 
“figures” of the brain to resemble the apparent figures of external things. Just as there is 
no resemblance between the organ’s keyboard and the air passing through its pipes (or 
the notes for that matter), there need be no resemblance between the activity of my brain 
when I see red and the redness of that red patch I am seeing.  
Thus, the brief description in the Regulae makes it clear that Descartes believed 
he could offer an adequate mechanistic interpretation of perception that had no need for 
the species theory prevalent in the Aristotelian tradition. Moreover, the fact that 
Descartes could provide a mechanistic explanation of perception that could plausibly 
account for the accuracy of our ordinary perceptual faculties lent an epistemological 
justification for his broader mechanistic project. In other words, he would be able to 
provide a complete story about the nature of the material world—our sensory faculties 
included—that tells us why we can rely on those sensory faculties even though our 
ordinary sense perceptions in no way resemble the world described. He gives us a 
mechanistic explanation for how our sensory faculties accurately convey information 
                                                                                                                                                 
the analogy with the pen, that “La figure vient du sens externe au sens commun pure de tout 
corps. Elle arrive comme elle était partie: purement corporelle, mais sans aucun corps ou 
partie de corps qui fasse avec elle le voyage” (84). This interpretation is ultimately based on 
the Cartesian distinction between a thing, or substance, and its modes rather than a distinction 
of substances (86). Thus, the common sense represents what a generic change in the mode of 
extended substance and thus, through some coded connection with thought, the image. The 
image present in the common sense is not itself a thing, but is characterized by modes that can 
be correlated with the modes of the actual, extended thing. 
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about the external world even though nothing in his explanation relies on the way we 
ordinarily perceive the world. In contemporary language, we could say that the 
physiological account of perception does not rely in any way on the phenomenology of 
perception (in marked contrast to late scholastic accounts). Yet, even though our 
sensations do not resemble the way the world is, our sensory faculties are reliable 
because, Descartes’ theorizes, they are in direct causal contact with the physical world. In 
effect, Descartes pushes the problem back: we no longer need to find a naturalistic 
explanation of species; we now need an account of how to explain the connection 
between our mental life and the complex mechanistic system that gives rise to sensations. 
This is the origin of the mind-body problem.421
 
 
The internal senses, ideas or images, and representation 
 
We now have a fairly clear picture of Descartes’ naturalistic explanation of 
perception, by way of a contact between bodies in motion. In order to fill out this picture, 
Descartes relies on several models or analogies to illustrate the operation of the sensory 
faculties. In his mature account, which was formed by the early 1630s with the 
                                                 
421 In stating this conclusion, I simply confirm what Gilson had indicated three quarters of a 
century ago, Etudes, 141-190. Consider also P. King, “Why Isn’t the Mind-Body Problem 
Medieval?” in Forming the Mind. King identifies the mind-body problem with the “hard 
problem of consciousness,” i.e., to explain the relation between the nature of our sensations 
and the bodily processes that cause them. He carefully and precisely demonstrates that this 
problem could not be medieval because, from the time sensatio entered the Latin 
philosophical lexicon, it identified, precisely, those physical processes that produced 
sensations. This implied the impossibility of disembodied souls having anything like sense-
perceptions. In short, Latin medievals would not have accepted the possible existence of 
“zombies” and so the current language used to discuss the mind-body problem would have 
found no traction.  
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composition of Le Monde and La Dioptrique, Descartes relies heavily on the postulation 
of small and lively particles (light corpuscles and the animal spirits) to convey 
information about the external world to a central processing center in the brain, 
spcecifically, the cavity surrounding the pineal gland. The lack of a real physiological 
basis for postulating such a role for the pineal gland was beginning to be apparent to 
Descartes and the Cartesians of the 17th century. Louis de la Forge, in his Rémarques on 
the Traité de l’homme, is forced to justify the clear misrepresentation of the size and 
function of the pineal gland in his sketches.422
Three years ago, wanting to see an autopsy of a woman at Leiden, I looked for 
[the pineal gland] with great curiosity, and knowing quite well where it ought to 
be, having been accustomed to find it in freshly killed animals without difficulty, 
it was entirely impossible for me to recognize it. An elderly Professor of anatomy, 
named Valcher, confessed to me that he too had never been able to see it in any 
human body... (AT III, 49) 
 Mersenne, too, seems to have questioned 
Descartes’ hypothesis about the function of the pineal gland, prompting a very telling 
response. In a letter dated April 1, 1640, Descartes insists on the necessity to posit some 
central locus of interaction between the soul and the brain in order to account for the 
capacity to easily imagine a variety of things that one has not even seen: “... isn’t it this 
gland alone to which the soul must be thus joined; for there is no other, in the entire head, 
that is not duplicated” (AT III, 47-48). However, in the same letter, Descartes is forced to 
admit that he had never actually been able to find the pineal gland in a human brain, and 
that it must have been so small that it was very hard to see.  
 
                                                 
422 See AT XI, 170 note b for reference to La Forge: “... comme l’Auteur dira quantité de choses 
de la glande, laquelle j’ai representée notablement plus grosse que le naturel, et que n’ont 
accoutumé de faire les Anatomistes dans leurs figures....” 
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To explain this, Descartes postulates that the gland would diminish in size if the person 
were ill or if the body had been deceased for a period of time. Descartes postulates that 
since the brain was not the first organ typically investigated, the pineal gland must have 
already shrunk before it was even investigated. However, it seems clear that this is a vain 
attempt to explain away what was an obvious difficulty for Descartes’ account of 
cognition. 
Given the obvious lack of any physiological reason for postulating the pineal 
gland as the “seat of the soul,” we must suppose that Descartes was motivated to such a 
conclusion for philosophical reasons. Indeed, as I have cited above, the principle reason 
for maintaining such a theory of brain functions was that Descartes believed there must 
be a single point of interaction between the mind and body. This bodily organ had to 
account for all variety of mental acts through a mechanical interaction with the rest of the 
body. For this reason, the organ could not be duplicated in another part of the brain, and it 
had to have the potential for a great range of motion. It seems that not only did Descartes 
blithely ignore empirical difficulties with his theory, but he also seemed to be looking for 
the wrong thing. The fact that he was looking for one, single part of the brain or organ in 
the body could be responsible for every mental operation dooms his investigation from 
the start. The relationship between mind and brain is no doubt a great deal more 
complicated than Descartes realized. But he cannot be faulted for having failed to find a 
seat of the soul in the brain! Such a locus of unification and interaction for consciousness 
seems far from our reach even today. At least in terms of a theory of mind-body 
interaction, Descartes’ problems are our own. Nonetheless, I find it unfortunate that 
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Descartes insisted on a single organ to account for interaction. The scholastic notion of 
form seems much more flexible than this hypothesis. 
 
 The internal senses 
For this reason, it will be quite informative to examine the way that Descartes 
accounts for the various faculties of higher thought, the so called ‘internal senses’, and 
their function in mental representation. Recall that it was Averroës who first codified the 
various internal senses and described their function in cognition. He believed that there 
were five internal senses: the common sense, imagination, phantasy, memory, and 
estimative power. However, by the end of the sixteenth century, few thought there was a 
distinction between imagination and phantasy, and many sought to collapse these with 
the common sense. By that time, the estimative power had also lost its grip as a unique 
faculty of the mind, as can be seen in Toletus as well as in the medical tradition. Thus, 
when Descartes refers to these faculties of internal sense, he does so in a justifiably loose 
way. We will note differences in his terminology, but the purpose of our investigation 
into these internal faculties of sense will be ultimately to understand their role in 
Descartes’ explanation of mental representation. For almost all late scholastic authors, as 
for Descartes, the internal senses are the means by which human beings and higher 
animals are capable of representing the world in a certain way.  
In the previous section, we saw Descartes refer to the transmission of information 
from the external senses to a “common sense”: “when an external sense organ is 
stimulated by an object, the figure which it receives is conveyed at one and the same 
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moment to another part of the body known as the ‘common’ sense, without any entity 
really passing from the one to the other.” I had commented that this transmission of 
information involves conveying the modes of the corporeal bodies of the external world 
with which the human body is in contact (whether immediately or by virtue of some 
intervening medium). It is clear from L’homme that Descartes understands the animal 
spirits to play the role of transmitting this information immediately to the brain. 
However, it is unclear where or what the common sense ought to be. From the fact that 
Descartes devotes a separate paragraph to the description of the common sense in the 
Regulae, it appears that, at that time, he conceived of it to be a distinct faculty from 
imagination or phantasy. In the beginning of the paragraph treating imagination, he 
claims “the ‘common’ sense functions like a seal, fashioning in the phantasy or 
imagination, as if in wax, the same figures or ideas which come, pure and without body, 
from the external senses.” A natural reading of this sentence would seem to entail that the 
common sense is distinct from the imagination, but that the imagination is possibly 
identified with the phantasy; it is what fashions figures or ideas in the imagination or 
phantasy.  
According to the Regulae, the fantasie “is a genuine part of the body” that is 
called imagination when it produces or receives images, but can also be called “memory” 
when those images are retained. The imagination, or “corporeal imagination,” is also 
identified with a part of the brain which is the origin of the body’s “motive power” or 
force of movement. Here, the corporeal imagination must be identical to, at least 
physically it would seem, the phantasy. Consequently, we can reasonably suppose that, at 
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the time of the Regulae, Descartes conceives of the pineal gland as the locus of phantasy, 
imagination, and memory, while the common sense appears to be some collection of 
information from the external senses prior to the reception of images or figures in the 
gland. 
While it is consistent with the prevailing Thomistic psychology to differentiate 
between the bare collection of sensory information in the common sense from the 
formation and reception of images in the imagination, this is not the same way Descartes 
conceives of these internal faculties in his more mature physiological studies. In 
L’Homme, when Descartes refers to the common sense, he does so invariably in 
conjunction with imagination. The section where he treats the nature of these faculties 
most carefully (AT XI, 174-79) confirms that there is no substantive distinction between 
the imagination and common sense, only a distinction in function.  
The entire section is concerned primarily with specifying the nature of our ideas 
of objects, which, Descartes says, is the “most remarkable” function of the brain (AT XI, 
174). Ideas, in this sense, are simply all those “impressions that the [animal] spirits may 
receive when emitted from the [pineal] gland.” Some of these are attributed to the 
common sense “as long as they depend on the presence of some object,” while others 
may come from “many other causes . . . and thus they ought to be attributed to the 
imagination” (AT XI, 177). In this more mature rendering of the internal faculties of 
sense, Descartes is careful to differentiate those faculties according to their function, 
much the same way as the theories in late scholastic psychology that we have seen. The 
common sense has to do with the formation of ideas (or sensible species) in the presence 
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of some external object, while the production of images in the absence of an object 
(whether in the form of some desire or fantasy, etc.) is attributed to the imagination. 
Again, it is noteworthy that the estimative power is entirely absent from this description, 
but that would not have been uncommon for a thinker at the beginning of the 17th 
century. (To my mind, this is a great shame, since the estimative power is quite a 
powerful functional concept that can be easily differentiated from imagination or 
common sense. Descartes may endorse something like this internal calculative power in 
his concept of “natural geometry.”423
The utility of such a conception can be readily observed in Descartes’ discussion 
of memory. In L’Homme, Descartes describes the formation of ideas in terms of the 
passage of animal spirits along the “tubes [tuyaux]” in the brain. Imagine again the 
church organ, where air passes along the pipes of the organ to produce various sounds; or 
think of the sails of the ship that are much more malleable, but through a similar effect, 
) Moreover, Descartes’ functional differentiation of 
the internal faculties does not rely on any specific bodily organ to be identified with the 
faculty. Rather, the presence of certain kinds of corporeal ideas (by which I mean certain 
configurations of animal spirits in the brain) is “attributed” either to the imagination or to 
the common sense. This is a much more useful way of conceiving of the faculties, one 
that does not rely on a reduction of faculties to parts of the body, but conceives of 
faculties as reducible to bodily operations, and thus second order properties of body 
parts.  
                                                 
423 See N. Maull, “Cartesian Optics and the Geometrization of Nature,” in Descartes: Philosophy, 
Mathematics, and Physics, 23-40, for a full account of the role of Descartes’ concept of 
“natural geometry” in his theory of perception. 
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i.e., the passage of wind, allow various impressions that tug on the ropes connecting the 
sail to the mast. Initially, Descartes says, these spirits do not pass into the tubes of the 
brain “so easily or so perfectly.” But if the action of those spirits is “stronger,” “remains 
for a longer time,” or “is reiterated many times,” then the brain becomes more susceptible 
to the passage of those particular spirits, and thus to the reproduction of that particular 
image. “And this,” says Descartes, “is what Memory consists in” (AT XI, 177-78). He 
compares this passage of animal spirits to the perforation of a tissue with a pad of 
needles. In this way, “[the spirits] have the force of forming certain passages which 
remain open, even after the action of the [external] object ceases; or, at least, if they close 
again, there remains a certain disposition in the nerve fibers of which this part of the 
brain is composed, by which they can much more easily be opened afterward” (AT XI, 
178). Clearly this description does not appear to accomodate neuroplasticity (a 
demonstrable feature of the brain in contemporary neuroscience), but it is more flexible 
than the common caricature would lead one to believe. 
This functional description of memory allows for a broader interpretation, even 
though L’Homme continues to identify memory with a particular part of the pineal gland 
(at least in the images that accompany the text). By the time of his letter to Mersenne of 
April 1 1640, Descartes seems to move toward an even more functional position, 
claiming that the pineal gland does not serve as the seat of memory, but “all the rest of 
the brain . . . principally its internal parts, and even all the nerves and muscles can serve 
as a kind of memory; in this way, for example, a lute player has a kind of memory in his 
hands, for the facility with which he plucks the strings and places his fingers in diverse 
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ways, which he acquires through habit, helps him to remember certain passages for the 
execution of which he must thus place his hands” (AT III, 48). In this passage, it is clear 
that the body as a whole possesses the contents of memory insofar as these consist in the 
reproduction of certain actions (either mental or physical) that result in certain effects for 
which one has trained or habituated oneself. On this reading, the pineal gland is but a 
conduit of animal spirits, which subsequently alter the brain, nerves, and muscles in such 
a way as to produce actions, images, or ideas. Thus, by 1640, Descartes accounts for 
psychological functions by the entire interaction between the pineal gland and the rest of 
the body, not any one organ. 
 
 Ideas, images, and figures 
Though the explanation of the physiological details involved in the function of 
internal faculties of sense changes after the Regulae, there is one aspect of Descartes’ 
account that remains constant. In the Regulae, Descartes describes the “figures or ideas” 
fashioned in the internal senses exactly in the same way that wax receives the form of a 
seal. We can see from the foregoing description that this is exactly how Descartes 
imagines the production or reproduction of figures or images in the brain, even in his 
more mature physiological work. It recalls for us the sense in which this level of 
cognition, i.e., the level of internal sensation, remains entirely materialistic. There is 
nothing “spiritual” or “immaterial” about the reception of the form of a seal in wax, just 
as there is nothing spiritual or immaterial about the formation of images, figures, and 
corporeal ideas in the brain, Descartes clearly believes.  
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That claim may sound a bit odd, especially if one is used to considering, as 
Descartes does in his mature metaphysics, that ideas are the modifications or attributes of 
an immaterial mind. What, then, are these “figures or ideas” of the earlier work, and how 
do they relate to the modes of the immaterial mind in the mature metaphysics?  
I have already mentioned that the word ‘figura’ appears to play a central role in 
the account of perception offered in the Regulae. There is a linguistic and conceptual 
similarity between figura and species, since both Latin terms refer to the visible shape or 
form of a thing, at least in the most concrete senses of the words. Moreover, the way that 
Descartes uses this concept, i.e., to describe the causal exchange from the external object, 
to the external senses, and on to the internal senses, reinforces that analogy. This is why I 
have referred to the figure as transmitting “information” that maintains an “isomorphism” 
between idea and object. This is very similar to the way that I defined species in my 
outline of scholastic psychology. But these words are vague; they hold the place of a 
more precise definition. In order to be more precise, we should recall that, for Descartes, 
figure is different than species in that a figure need not resemble what it represents. So, 
whatever form the figure of an external object takes in sensation, it will not be a replica 
of that external object. The idea of formal resemblance is essential to the scholastic 
account; it is the basis for attributing sensible qualities to external objects, the so-called 
real qualities or accidental and substantial forms. Even though Descartes employs the 
traditional analogy of a seal impressing its form into wax, and does not comment on the 
obvious resemblance between the seal and the impression in wax, he is clearly opposed to 
such a reading on philosophical grounds.  
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Moreover, Descartes uses the term figura in a number of contexts in the Regulae 
that may suggest a broader connotation of the term than the seal and wax example. For 
instance, in Rule IV, there is a clear connection between Geometry and figures: 
Geometry is the science of figures, Descartes says, just as Arithmetic is the science of 
numbers (AT X, 373.15-18; CSM I, 17). Again, in Rules XIV-XVII, figures play a 
central role in the method of determining proportional relations and discovering the 
solution to problems in Arithmetic, Geometry, and the applied mathematical sciences. In 
these rules, figures are closely connected with the imagination and external senses, since 
these faculties use figures to depict the nature of problems considered. For instance, the 
title of Rule XV—“It is generally helpful if we draw these figures and display them 
before our external senses. In this way it will be easier for us to keep our mind alert” (AT 
X, 453; CSM I, 65)—illustrates the way that figures can help the mind represent a 
problem clearly and concisely. In Rule XIV, figuration is connected to the imagination 
and is the means for verifying the truth of geometrical abstractions. In that rule, Descartes 
seems wary of purely intellectual abstraction, using the imagination to confirm the 
calculations of the intellect. This is necessary if Geometry is to be applied to real 
extension, since the imagination makes use of a kind of subject (which is analogous to 
real bodies), namely, figures, which like bodies have shape, extension, and surface.424
                                                 
424 Dennis Sepper’s Descartes’s Imagination, Part II, 83-208, is probably the most complete 
source on this issue. 
 I 
will return to the application of these mathematical figures to the method in the final 
section of this chapter. For the moment, I want to emphasize the connection between 
figures and extended bodies. Whereas figures can be either represented abstractly in the 
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imagination or perceived by the external senses, both bodies and figures have some real 
extension (even if the extension in figures is ideal and, perhaps, two-dimensional). Thus, 
by using the notion of figures, Descartes can refer to a relatively abstract concept (one 
that can be treated through pure geometrical analysis), which at the same time has a direct 
analogue to bodies in the physical world. 
On this reading, figures can represent many different kinds of relations that need 
not involve a pictorial likeness to the thing represented. For instance, in Rule XV, 
Descartes uses simple figures to represent numbers (such as triangular numbers, i.e., 
those that can be represented by a triangular arrangement of points, like 3, 6, 10, 15, etc.) 
or familial relations. In Rule XVI, he uses a variety of different figures to represent 
multiplicative relations, suggesting that the concept of multiplication can be rendered in 
different ways, and thus that the figure itself is not a copy of the operation. When we look 
at the role figure plays in the definition of our ideas, we see a concept that is paradigmatic 
for the many different ways that corporeal extension can exist. In Rule XII, Descartes 
says that those simple natures “that cannot be understood without being in some 
corporeal body: such as figure, extension, motion, etc.” are the material simples (AT X, 
419; CSM I, 44-45). Here, figure is listed first, along with extension and motion, as if it is 
the primary characteristic of material bodies. We can see why this might be the case: all 
figures contain some shape, extension in at least length and breadth, and some external 
form. While abstract figures can be two dimensional, figures of real bodies must have 
some depth. Even motion, as Descartes’ work in hydrostatics and freefall of bodies 
demonstrates, can be represented by a figure by virtue of the tendency to motion or the 
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motion vector. Thus, figures are able to represent, in an abstract and two- or three-
dimensional way, all of the attributes of physical bodies. Indeed, as we saw in the 
physiological account of perception, this abstract representation is precisely what 
accounts for the transmission of information from external bodies to the senses. That is, 
the attributes or modes of the external body—their shape, motion, size, form, etc.—are 
transmitted to the senses by virtue of the external medium (in the case of the external 
senses) and the nervous system (in the case of the internal senses).  
 
 Representation 
If we return to the text of Rule XII that has provided the background for our 
discussion, we see that this representational role is just what Descartes’ proposes to 
describe the transmission of information about the material world. The example he uses is 
one of color, which is the essential object of visual perception, the characteristic effect of 
light on bodies, and thus a central quality for Descartes to account for. At first he begins 
with the kind of methodological caveat that we have seen before and then he goes on to 
describe how colors can be represented by figures. 
So what troublesome consequences could there be if—while avoiding the useless 
assumption and pointless invention of some new entity, and without denying what 
others have preferred to think on the subject—we simply make an abstraction, 
setting aside every feature of color apart from its possessing the character of 
shape [figura], and conceive of the difference between white, blue, red, etc. as 
being like the difference between the following figures or similar ones? 
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The same can be said about everything perceivable by the senses, since it is 
certain that the infinite multiplicity of figures [figurae] is sufficient for the 
expression of all the differences in perceptible things. (AT X, 413; CSM I, 41) 
 
In this passage, Descartes proposes a kind of hypothesis about the nature of color. He 
suggests that instead of focusing on the many different aspects of the sensible quality, 
color, we only focus on the fact that it possesses some shape or figure. Consequently, we 
can abstract from real colors that inhere in objects and simply conceive of color as an 
arrangement or pattern of shapes in some figure. Thus, he proposes these various sized 
squares and the patterns on them as representing the colors white, blue, and red. 
Though the passage in the Regulae is meant to provide a simple illustration of the 
way that a pattern or configuration of figures can represent the sensible qualities of color, 
it is also clear from our discussion of Descartes’ physiological work that such 
information could be conveyed by the shape, size, movement, and quantity of animal 
spirits transmitted to the brain. These animal spirits could conceivably be so arranged that 
they could represent a great variety of shapes, textures, and patterns perceived in the 
external world. In this way, our ideas of material things (the qualities that we perceive to 
be in some external subject) can be conceived as simply an arrangement or disposition of 
material bodies that are in causal contact with our brain. This effectively eliminates the 
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need to posit substantial forms or real qualities in things because such sensible qualities 
play no explanatory role in the account of perception. Instead, the entire process can be 
explained mechanically, or so Descartes would like to claim. 
However, as I intimated at the end of the last section, this solution only displaces 
the problem. Whereas Descartes no longer maintains any explanatory role for sensible 
qualities like color, he is now faced with the difficulty of explaining why a certain pattern 
of animal spirits in the brain gives rise to the kind of sensations that are 
phenomenologically evident. We have seen Descartes maintain that the immaterial soul 
or mind of the human being is attached to the central gland and is immediately aware of 
the activity of that gland. How, then, are we to understand the conversion or translation of 
these purely corporeal figures into mental ideas? The Regulae gives us very little idea of 
how to resolve this problem. Descartes seems not to distinguish ideas from figures in that 
work. He is clear that the pure intellect or spiritual power of the person “receives figures 
from the common sense” (AT X, 415; CSM I, 42) or is “stimulated by the imagination” 
(AT X, 416; CSM I, 43). Additionally, he claims that the intellect can act on the 
imagination, producing images through that faculty. From these examples, Descartes 
seems inclined to think of an interaction between the spiritual or incorporeal intellect and 
the material brain. However, he also seems happy to blur the lines between these two 
domains rather than to explain their interaction clearly. 
The standard interpretation of Descartes holds that the animal spirits or the 
impressions in the brain are the immediate objects of intellection. These figures then 
mediate, or represent, external bodies by virtue of the causal connection that can be made 
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(either presently, or through some retention) between the traces in the brain and the 
objects in the world.425
                                                 
425 John Sutton summarizes the standard view quite succinctly in his preface to the symposium on 
Descartes on perceptual cognition in Gaukroger, Schuster, and Sutton (eds.), Descartes’ 
Natural Philosophy, 524-27. The symposium itself is a response to John Yolton’s work on 
Descartes, principally his book, Perceptual Acquaintance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984. 
 In short, the standard interpretation holds Descartes’ theory of 
perception to rely on a thoroughgoing representationalim: all perceptions are mediated by 
some representation. These representations are the coded figures, or dispositions, of 
animal spirits in the brain. The fact that Descartes presents a naturalistic theory of 
perception up to and including a description of brain states that representing states of 
affairs in the external world effectively reduces these cognitive states to physical states. I 
have suggested that—at least in its mature formulation—this is not what we would call a 
type identity reduction, but a token identity reduction. That is, perceptual states are 
explained by token physical states—some characteristic interaction between the pineal 
gland, surrounding cavity, animal spirits, and brain tissue—rather than particular physical 
organs or standing physical properties. Hence, Descartes is closer to a functionalist 
account of sense perception, imagination, and memory than a classically physicalist one. 
Nonetheless, the prevailing view is that Descartes’ explanation of perception is reductive. 
However, it is also clear that Descartes conceives of some mental acts as essentially non-
reductive: the pure power of cognition (vis cognoscens) whose action is wholly spiritual 
and only analogically similar to the impression of a seal in wax. Thus, whatever this 
spiritual power of the intellect is, Descartes maintains that there is some essential 
explanatory gap between its operations and those of the brain. It is but a small step from 
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such an explanatory gap to a “veil of ideas” theory of perception, similar to one standard 
reading of the Meditationes, where the ego is set apart from its own body and the external 
world, mediated by its imperfect ideas about the world. Such a position is then forced to 
confront the dual challenges of skepticism and idealism.  
One way to bridge this apparent gap in Descartes’ explanation of cognition is to 
suppose that if Descartes had possessed a more thorough understanding of the mechanics 
of the brain, he may have been less inclined to suppose that certain mental acts were in 
principle spiritual, i.e., that they could not be explained by physical processes. John 
Cottingham advocates such a reading, principally on the basis of Descartes’ reliance on 
an argument from conceivability for the distinction between body and mind in the 
Meditationes.426
Descartes cannot avoid admitting that, for all the meditator in the Second 
Meditation knows, the ‘thinking thing’ he is aware of might well be a corporeal 
being of some kind; his ability to doubt the existence of corporeal objects is quite 
compatible with the possibility that what is doing the doubting is after all, 
something essentially embodied.
 I do not want to linger on the adequacy or inadequacy of the modal 
arguments from the Meditationes. I simply want to cite Cottingham’s claim in order to 
understand its consequences for an interpretation of Descartes’ psycho-physiology of 
cognition in the Regulae and L’Homme. Focusing on the argument in the Meditationes 
and Descartes’ responses to Gassendi, Cottingham says:  
427
 
 
To transpose this argument into the language of the Regulae, we could say that Descartes 
has no basis for supposing that the actions of the soul, when it moves the body 
                                                 
426 “Cartesian Dualism: Theology, Metaphysics, and Science” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Descartes, 236-57. 
427 Ibid. 243. 
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spontaneously, or imagines things that are not present to its senses, or contemplates ideas 
that have no corporeal representation, are essentially spiritual. Why couldn’t these actions 
be the actions of a more complex mechanism than the one that Descartes had imagined? 
Isn’t Descartes’ argument from conceivability based on a limited conception of the 
physical world? Cottingham’s case is strictly parallel to that of contemporary 
eliminativists like Daniel Dennett and Paul and Patricia Churchland.428 These 
philosophers hold that the explanatory gap between mind and body is not, in principle, 
unbridgeable. Given a sufficiently developed future science of the brain, we ought to be 
able to explain the nature of all cognitive operations reductively. What Descartes calls the 
purely spiritual power of cognition is just a place-holder for some set of physical actions 
to be explained by some future scientific theory. As Cottingham puts it: “Once Descartes 
had taken the vital step of assigning so many of the traditional functions of the ‘soul’ to 
the minute physical mechanisms of the nervous system, it was only a matter of time 
before Western science would go all the way, and make even the residual âme raisonable 
redundant.”429
Even without turning to the Meditationes, the Regulae already gives us sufficient 
reason to doubt that such an interpretation is consistent with Descartes’ philosophy. Let 
us be clear about what is at issue: Cottingham claims that if Descartes simply had more 
empirical knowledge about the brain, then he would have been willing to give up the 
 
                                                 
428 See, Consciousness Explained and Neurophilosophy, respectively. 
429 “Cartesian Dualism,” 252. This objection was anticipated by the 17th century Cartesian, 
Rouhault, who writes in the Entretiens sur la philosophie (1671), II, 191: “Si vous tenez 
présentement pour certain que les bêtes ne sont que de simples automates, n’avez-vous point 
peur de croire un jour que les hommes ne sont aussi que de simple machines?” Quoted in 
Rodis-Lewis, Anthropologie cartésienne, 39. 
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notion that certain cognitive acts or mental states are irreducible to physical states. But 
what could more empirical knowledge possibly give Descartes, or any philosopher? It 
could supply him with more evidence, more empirical facts. These facts would still have 
to be considered the effects of some supposed causes that would explain them. This is the 
understanding of empirical facts that became apparent when we examined Descartes’ 
reference to suppositions or hypotheses. In other words, greater empirical knowledge 
about the mechanisms of the brain would supply Descartes with more evidence that 
would, in turn, require a revision of his initial hypotheses about matter. On this reading, if 
Descartes had possessed CAT-scans, electro-encephelograms (EEG), functional 
magnectic resonancing machines (fMRI) and the like, he would have modified his initial 
hypotheses to fit with the idea that all mental acts are really physical.  
There are two reasons, apparent in the Regulae, to suppose that Descartes would 
not accept any hypotheses in physics that could completely explain the nature of the 
intellect. For now, I can only state these claims with the promise of defending them later. 
First, he characterizes the intellect by its capacity to act on its own, to move the body in 
various ways, to imagine things that it has never encountered, and to contemplate things 
that have no material representation. I will discuss these features of the intellect and their 
importance for the Regulae in the final section of this chapter. But even a preliminary 
consideration of these acts leads one to believe that they are, in principle, of a different 
nature than mental acts that are in causal contact with putatively physical things. This 
difference, in fact, is central to Descartes’ discussion of method and the application of the 
mind to problems in natural philosophy. In short, the kinds of mental representations 
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listed above exceed the scope of what Descartes’ mechanistic natural philosophy can 
explain. Descartes seems committed to an idea of mind as a causally undetermined force 
that is also capable of contemplating ideas that have no material representation. This is 
not something that could be explained by Cartesian science. Secondly, Descartes 
supposes that the explanatory principles of material things are of a different kind than the 
explanatory principles of intellectual things. The prospect of some future science bridging 
the gap between the mental and the physical is impossible in principle, because such a 
science would be founded on a category mistake. In the next chapter, we will see that the 
simple natures signal such a distinction in kind, and thus rule out the possibility of an 
entirely naturalistic epistemology in Descartes. My argument is not that Cottingham’s 
solution is incorrect, but simply that it is not Cartesian, even from the earliest of 
Descartes’ writings. 
Cottingham’s proposed solution is not the only one. Others have attempted to 
overcome the explanatory gap between purely mental acts and mental acts that admit of 
some psycho-physiological explanation. There is some connection between the following 
proposals, but I will not attempt to draw that out here. Instead, I present these as possible 
avenues for further research. Ferdinand Alquié first put forth the hypothesis that one 
could reverse the representational relation between ideas and the mechanisms of the 
brain. In other words, we ought not conceive of ideas as brain states that in turn represent 
external objects. This is the way Descartes’ representationalism is usually construed: 
mental states qua physical mechanisms in the brain represent a certain physical state of 
affairs and the incorporeal cogito somehow inspects these internal brain states in order to 
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learn about the external world. Instead, we should think of brain states as signifying not 
things but ideas: that we feel such and such sensation is the result of a signifying 
operation or representation on the part of small physical bodies in our brain. John Yolton 
has called this the “reverse-sign relation.” He explains how this reversal of the usual way 
of conceiving this relation helps resolve the problem of an explanatory gap between the 
mental and the physical. 
If the processes or events in the brain were just physical, the problem of how 
those events could cause or relate to cognition would be a puzzle; it certainly was 
a puzzle for many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers. If those same 
brain events are also signs, if they play a sign (or significatory) role in relation to 
the mind, then we have a partial solution to the question of the relation between 
mind and physical objects: the same events that bring about physical (neural) 
events in the brain, also bring about cognitive events in the mind. They do the 
latter because, as well as being physical events, they are also signs. They carry 
information about the objects in the world, the very objects that have affected our 
sense organs and brain. So we have two interactive relations, a physical causal 
interaction and a significatory or semantic interaction.430
 
 
On this interpretation, brain states should be thought to play two simultaneous roles with 
very different natures: the first is a purely physical role (to interact with physical stuff in 
the external world by way of the sense organs and the nervous system); the second is a 
semantic role (to be a sign, symbol, or code for some concurrent mental event). Thus, the 
complex mechanical story that Descartes tells about perception is one way of 
representing the causal interaction that occurs in the event of perception. However, there 
is another story to be told, namely, the significatory or semantic story that explains what 
we might call the phenomenology of the perceptual event, i.e., how it appears to a 
conscious mind. The very same brain states that are causally connected to the external 
                                                 
430 “Response to My Fellow Symposiasts,” Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, 577. 
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world are the signs of mental life, they signify thought. Since these are different ways of 
explaining the same event, they surely have a causal connection, but we should not for 
that reason expect to reduce one to the other.  
This is an attractive solution to the problem of the relationship between mental 
ideas and physical brain states. It suggests that perhaps most of what we think is non-
reductively mental may be, in some sense, semantic. In other words, perhaps the 
phenomenology of mental events is, in some sense, peculiarly linguistic. Descartes makes 
a number of provocative statements about the philosophy of language in his corpus; it 
would be interesting to see what connection, if any, there is between his concept of 
language and his concept of mind. However, the primary passages used in defense of 
such a position (e.g., Le Monde: AT XI, 4) refer to the perception of states of affairs that 
are ordinarily conceived of as “signs.” For instance, Descartes calls the concussive pulses 
of air occasioned by speech, signs of words; he calls the expressions displayed by a 
person’s face as signs of emotions. These physical events are naturally conceived as 
“significatory,” and this may be all that Descartes’ intends to refer to when he claims that 
physical events “signify” mental concepts. There are serious questions about whether and 
to what extent these passages really support a more general theory about the significatory 
role of brain states in perception. In other words, it is a great idea that may not be 
anywhere near what Descartes was thinking. 
Jean-Luc Marion offers a second hypothesis: he claims that the “idea or figure” of 
the Regulae is a “code” that mediates between the intellect and the physical world. This 
code institutes a certain schematism that permeates Descartes’ view of physical reality. 
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Moreover, it is a code that is generated by the intellect for an explicit purpose, namely, to 
make knowledge of the physical world clear and distinct. On Marion’s interpretation, this 
codified understanding of the physical world operates in direct contrast to the traditional 
Aristotelian understanding, according to which the nature of things is essentially 
determined by the way they appear, their form or essence (eidos). 
Ideas no longer represent things directly as they are perceived by our senses, nor 
as they present themselves to us. Rather, ideas hold the place of things by virtue 
of an intermediary codification that uses figures: things consist only in figures of 
extension in motion, which only appear to the senses by virtue of concealing their 
original character as figures (primary qualities) by an appearance that conforms to 
the senses (secondary qualities). As opposed to the sensible qualities which are 
ignored, figures play a fundamental role in the function of the idea. Science 
should thus be reconstituted: for each sensation received in the mind, at bottom, 
some intelligible and insensible figures cause that sensation as a sensible and 
intelligible effect.... Therefore, even though figure is mathematical and abstract, 
and thus has no resemblance with sensation, it effectively constitutes the thing 
itself. Figure schematizes the thing according to its true nature, considered as 
disfigured sensation; it thus holds the place of the thing itself that it represents in 
its original invisibility.431
 
 
This is a dense passage that I try to treat in stages. First, allow me to indicate some 
broader themes that are indicated in the passage above. Here, Marion is presenting the 
concept of idea from the Regulae in order to pose a possible connection between 
Descartes’ early notion of idea and his later notion of idea, in the Meditationes. At the 
same time, Marion wants to claim that there is, in fact, good reason to suggest that 
Descartes’ is the founder of modern “idealism,” a claim that is both banal and 
problematic. This is the reason for the clearly Kantian language in the passage: the 
reference to a hidden “thing in itself,” known only by virtue of some active 
schematization of the thing that is at once a product of the intellect and abstracted from 
                                                 
431 Questions Cartésiens, 77. 
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the thing as such. However, there is another reason for such language that refers back to 
Marion’s earlier study on Descartes’ Regulae. In Sur l’ontologie grise, Marion states that 
“figure permits not only an abstraction, but a transcription, where each particular, 
sensible quality . . . can be coded; figure comes to encode the message of sensation.”432
Descartes’ account of sensation, by virtue of a mechanical figuration of ideas in 
the brain, could not be more opposed to the Aristotelian picture. We are in a position to 
affirm this thesis by appealing to the distinction between species, which both transmit and 
resemble the real forms of things, and figurae, which are only causally, but not 
apparently, linked to external objects. Marion seems to conclude from this that the 
intellect sets up an arbitrary and hypothetical schematic representation of objects as 
figures, in direct causal connection with the sensible faculties. Thus, according to 
Descartes’ method of representing physical events, invisible figures (primary qualities) 
would be the true cause of apparent sensible qualities (secondary qualities). In this way, 
figures (understood as the underlying, causally efficacious qualities of material things) 
mediate between our sensations and their objective correlates. Marion’s interpretation of 
 
This abstract encoding of sensible qualities is completely arbitrary, but figure is chosen 
for a reason. Indeed, the mathematical model of the mathesis universalis, Marion tells us, 
determines the way that figures “encode” sensible phenomena. In Sur l’ontologie grise, 
this interpretation lends further support to Marion’s central thesis that the Regulae 
announces a new ontology, based on the mathematical ideal, that ignores and abstracts 
from the nature of things as such, their essence or substance (ousia). 
                                                 
432 Sur l’ontologie grise, 118. 
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figures as a “code” recalls the “semiotic” or symbolic role that figures play in Yolton’s 
account. However, Marion seems to maintain that consciousness, or perhaps the 
institution of nature (God), deciphers the code in order to give rise to our ordinary 
phenomenal experience. The “decoding” of our brain states, then, is just what God 
endows embodied minds with when he creates them. In contrast to Yolton’s hypothesis, 
where figures actually play a dual role (one causal, the other symbolic), Marion’s account 
seems susceptible to the “inner homunculus” criticism of Descartes’ theory of perception. 
If the figures, or brain states, are codes to be deciphered, then there must be some agent 
that does the work of deciphering the code. On this model, the intellect would be that 
internal agent that decodes the information from the senses, and the immediate objects of 
intellection would not be objects, but coded figures.  
To be fair, I think that Marion’s point is that Descartes proposes to understand all 
physical phenomena according to the “code” of mathematical figures. Thus, the central 
point is that the physiological process of perception admits of such a coded 
representation. This leaves the question of the intellect’s activity (as decoding agent) 
open. But the suggestion that the intellect is the grand “decoder” of some divinely 
instituted natural code badly contradicts the phenomenology of perception. To be blunt, 
one perceives objects, not coded figures. Marion says that, for Descartes, the apparent 
sensible qualities that constitute these objects conceal their original character. On this 
reading, objects are just figures in motion (a complex of primary qualities) even though 
we perceive color, sound, temperature, and all the features of sensible experience (a 
complex of secondary qualities). However, this sort of interpretation may commit 
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Descartes to a “veil of ideas” theory of perception too hastily. It seems to suggest that our 
sensory ideas are merely a veil, hiding the real, underlying, mechanical structure of the 
world. If not this, then Marion’s interpretation seems to entail that our ideas are in some 
sense systematically false; it leads to a kind of error theory of perception. Again, this 
seems to give up too much ground on the phenomenology of perception. I don’t think 
Descartes is committed to this kind of theory and I would hope that he is not. 
There is, I think, a more straightforward reading of these passages. It makes the 
most sense simply to conceive of brain states as signifying mental states, rather than 
thinking of them as signifying physical objects. If brain states signify to the immaterial 
mind some state of affairs in the external world, then we face the threat of an inner-
homunculus model of perception: we have external events that cause brain states, and 
then we have some internal mind that has to interpret those brain states. One might ask 
what faculties this inner spirit has in order to interpret those brain states, and we would be 
on the way to an infinite regress.433
                                                 
433 This is what is commonly called the “Cartesian theater” of inner sensation. It may be a 
plausible picture of the ego given a certain reading of the Meditationes, but I think the Regulae 
need not commit itself to such metaphysical absurdities. 
 Instead, we ought to suppose that the brain states 
simply signify mental activity which itself is directed at the external world. Then we can 
suppose, just as is plainly obvious in ordinary experience, that we are directly aware of 
the external world through perception. We can observe this scientifically by looking at 
the causal relation that obtains between brain states and external objects. This causal 
relation shows, or signifies, that the mind is actually attending to external objects. This 
interpretation makes the pineal gland no more mysterious an intermediary between mind 
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and body than the retina of the eye is an intermediary between vision and light: we see 
light because of, or through, the refraction of light onto the retina. But it is obvious that 
we do not see the retinal image; we see the light. In the same way, figures are the 
physiological code of thought, but not as a code to be deciphered by the intellect; rather, 
figures offer a model to describe the physiology of perception that in turn explains why 
one perceives the external objects directly. 
 
The incorporeal intellect and its role in the method 
 
I have tried to play down the representational relation between figures and the 
intellect in order to preserve a more straightforward interpretation of Descartes’ theory of 
perception. I have argued that the mechanical model of perception simply describes the 
physiological operations that are going on when perception occurs. These operations 
account for a causal connection between mind and objects, while entirely undermining 
the idea (on which the Aristotelian account of perception is based) that our sensible 
qualities are real, causally efficacious, properties of things. This does not threaten a 
representationalist interpretation of Descartes any more than the species theory threatens 
representationalist interpretation of Aquinas, since these intermediary causal operations 
simply explain the nature of direct perceptual awareness. We do not perceive animal 
spirits, or brain states, on Descartes’ account any more than we perceive species on 
Aquinas’. In this section, it will become clear that Descartes’ perceptual model is not an 
inert, theoretical model of perception; rather, it has direct consequences on the operation 
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of the intellect, particularly in its investigation of the world and its use of the faculties 
that represent the world. The interpretation that I am advancing suggests that the intellect 
uses the mechanical model of perception, the physiological faculties of the brain, as 
instruments to investigate the world. But these instruments need not be conceived as 
something detached from the intellect itself. Rather, when the intellect acts voluntarily, it 
does so by means of the faculties of the brain. We will see that there is a practical 
element to this activity: it is goal-directed and normative. It should not be a surprise, then, 
that the role of the intellect in the method is analogous to its role in moral action. 
 
 Intellect, ingenium, and method 
In the last chapter, we discussed in some detail the importance of Rule VIII—If in 
the series of things to be examined we come across something which our intellect is 
unable to intuit sufficiently well, we must stop at that point, and refrain from the 
superfluous task of examining the remaining items—for defining the method in terms of 
the capacities and, especially, limitations of the mind. In this section, we will be able to 
flesh out the details of such an interrelation, now armed with an account of the mechanics 
of cognition. Before we get into the details, some preliminary observations are necessary. 
First, when Descartes introduces the concept of a purely spiritual power of cognition that 
“is no less distinct from the whole body than blood is distinct from bone,” he identifies it 
as “one single power” (AT X, 415; CSM I, 42). He reiterates its singularity, by stating 
that throughout its diverse operations, which receive different names in virtue of their 
functions (common sense, imagination, memory, etc.), it is “one and the same power” 
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(ibid.). The unity of the spiritual power of cognition is, I believe, the reason why 
Descartes earlier identified, in Rule I, “human wisdom” as the goal of all scientific 
investigation. There, Descartes attempts to differentiate the unity of human wisdom from 
the disunity of the sciences, as advocated by the Aristotelian tradition. “For the sciences 
as a whole,” he responds, “are nothing other than human wisdom, which always remains 
one and the same, however different the subjects to which it is applied, it being no more 
altered by them than sunlight by the variety of the things it shines upon” (AT X, 360; 
CSM I, 9). The analogy between a kind of intellectual power and sunlight was 
commonplace in late scholasticism. It was the guiding metaphor for the agent intellect, 
which illuminates the intelligible species in the possible intellect, when in the presence of 
a phantasm. There is an analogy to be made between Descartes’ notion of the intellectual 
light and the late scholastic idea of the agent intellect that I will explore later. For now, 
the important connection to be drawn between Descartes’ conception of the unified 
intellectual power and the intellectual light of human wisdom, is that cultivating and 
refining this power is the purpose of the method:  
If, therefore, someone seriously wishes to investigate the truth of things, he ought 
not to select one science in particular, for they are all interconnected and 
interdependent. He should, rather, consider simply how to increase the natural 
light of his reason, not with a view to solving this or that scholastic problem, but 
in order that his intellect should show his will what decision it ought to make in 
each of life’s contingencies. (AT X, 361; CSM I, 10) 
 
This highlights the practical nature of the method. It involves cultivating a kind of 
practical skill that allows one to judge correctly any given contingency. We should take 
note of the sense in which this goal of Descartes’ scientific method radically diverges 
from the Aristotelian one. Descartes is not at all interested in the classification of powers 
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and objects according to a metaphysical hierarchy. Instead, he is interested in cultivating 
a skill or practice that will ensure the right results. 
The second preliminary observation will be brief, and it will simply confirm the 
conclusions of the first. It is noteworthy that Descartes identifies the application of the 
purely spiritual cognitive power to the cognitive faculties with the ‘ingenium’. He uses 
the term frequently throughout his work, but typically in an informal way that is intended 
to refer to the intellect itself, particularly when it concerns some intellectual training or 
application of method. The word emerges from Hellenistic philosophy and gained 
common usage in the Renaissance. It is closely related to the search for a method of 
discovery or invention, where the ingenium is conceived to be the power of 
understanding that is flexible and adaptable enough to invent new modes of explanation. 
It is a specifically human capacity that is not common to all human beings—in contrast to 
ratio—and one can increase its power through training.434 In its most general Latin 
usage, it indicates a kind of innate temperament or disposition, a bent or leaning. This 
temperament can have an intellectual connotation, meaning a capacity or ability; it is the 
etymological ancestor of our terms genius and ingenuity.435
                                                 
434 See Sepper, Descartes’s Imagination, 87-91. 
 In philosophical usage, 
ingenium can be applied to the common intellectual faculties associated with learning, 
especially memory and judgment. According to Goclenius, the most proper philosophical 
meaning of the term is “a rational faculty by which the soul is constituted to know, 
discover, or learn something. Likewise, the ingenium is a natural aptitude or faculty, by 
435 ‘Ingenio’, Lewis and Short. 
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which we learn, according to which we know or discover something.”436
 
 This is the 
general sense in which Descartes uses the term throughout his corpus. In the passage we 
are considering, however, he appears to give the term a technical definition. He says, 
“when [the cognitive power] forms new ideas in the corporeal imagination, or 
concentrates on those already formed, the proper term for it is ingenium” (AT X, 416; 
CSM I, 42). Thus, when this spiritual cognitive power is applied to the mechanism of the 
brain, in order to form new ideas or concentrate on those already formed, it is called the 
ingenium. As a consequence, the treatise on method—as its title indicates—is meant to 
direct the application of the spiritual power to the brain in forming ideas (or figures), and 
concentrating on those already formed. This is as clear an indication as any that the 
method consists in exercising the purely spiritual power of cognition in such a way that it 
cooperates with and utilizes the psycho-physiological powers of cognition we have been 
discussing. It is the practical application of the spiritual power to the cognitive faculties 
of the brain with which we are concerned. Sometimes Descartes invokes the ingenium to 
describe this application, sometimes he reverts to the language of faculty psychology, 
both for the same reasons and with the same results. 
 Brain physiology and the importance of the imagination 
With this in mind, we ought to be clear about the key characteristics of the brain 
that will influence its operation. First, we must note that there is a central processing 
                                                 
436 Lexicon Philosophicum, 241-42: “Ingenium maxime proprie dictum, est facultatis rationalis 
animi constitutio, ad intelligendum aliquid, sive inveniendo, sive discendo. Seu ingenium est 
naturalis aptitudo seu facultas, qua nos discimus, per nos ipsos cogitamus, seu invenimus 
aliquid.” 
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location, a single point in the brain, where Descartes thinks the soul interacts with the 
body. This is the pineal gland and its surrounding cavity. Any activity of the purely 
spiritual power on the brain must be considered with reference to the mechanics of the 
pineal gland. Second, we know that the pineal gland has the capacity to direct the animal 
spirits, either toward the body through the nerves, or toward the brain tissue and nerves. 
The former helps to move the body; the latter helps to recall certain figures or images that 
are stored in the brain by virtue of a certain disposition to receive some animal spirits 
rather than others. Third, the pineal gland is the locus of the common sense and 
imagination; it is the place where all of the information from the external senses is 
gathered and can be formed into complex images. Finally, the pineal gland is a very small 
gland in the center of the brain. Though it has the capacity to receive all of the 
information concerning the external world, produce images, and direct the body to action, 
it is not large enough to store a great deal of information. These points will be important 
as we consider the limitations and capacities of the ingenium, the power of mind as it 
interacts with the pineal gland. 
In this section, I will only be concerned with the application of the intellect to 
acquire knowledge of corporeal things. This is the principle focus of the Regulae since it 
has a direct application to scientific research. However, Descartes recognizes a 
distinction between “ideas that can be referred to the body” and “matters in which there is 
nothing corporeal or similar to the corporeal” (AT X, 416; CSM I, 43). The former 
include all ideas of the external world, our bodies, any physical or potentially physical 
thing, and even mathematical representations. It is not so clear what the latter might 
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include, though I would suppose that the idea of our own power of cognition, the idea of 
God, angels, and the Holy Trinity, would be included among them. It is also quite 
probable that, had Descartes possessed the doctrine of eternal truths at the time writing 
this text, he would have included these among the number of ideas in which there is 
nothing corporeal. Once Descartes discovers this doctrine, however, he will have no need 
to refer back to that earlier distinction. The doctrine of eternal truths will put the ego on a 
firm footing, making it entirely independent from any material thing. As long as God 
endows the incorporeal mind with certain innate ideas on the basis of which it can 
extrapolate logical truths, the knowledge of its own existence, and knowledge of God’s 
existence, then there is no danger that these ideas may be thought to come from 
experience or from some unknown material source. Moreover, eternal truths are the basis 
for determining the causal structure that underlies all material phenomena; they are the 
source of all purely intellectual ideas. Interestingly, the ideas that are referred to the body 
will be identified with the imagination. Indeed, this is the reason for distinguishing the 
imagination from “the essence of my mind” in Meditation Six (AT VII, 73; CSM II, 51). 
At any rate, it is not our task to speculate on these later metaphysical doctrines; we are 
concerned with the method, and the application of the power of cognition to 
understanding material things. 
When applying the incorporeal power of the mind to the faculties of the brain in 
order to discover the solution to particular problems, Descartes pays close attention to the 
nature of the mind-body complex. As I have indicated before, the Regulae is much more 
concerned with how the mind ought to interact with the body in order to discover the 
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nature of physical things rather than defining the distinction between mind and body. 
This feature of the treatise allows us to appreciate the basic empirical tendencies of 
Descartes’ scientific method: he is trying to make our understanding of the world 
concrete and verifiable. The mechanics of the brain help define its role in creating and 
transmitting images or figures that represent the world. Indeed, in Rule XII, Descartes 
explains that producing figures in the imagination or presenting images before the 
external senses is necessary in order to accurately represent actual things in the world: 
If, however, the intellect proposes to examine something which can be referred to 
the body, the idea of that thing must be formed as distinctly as possible in the 
imagination. In order to do this properly, the thing itself which this idea is to 
represent should be displayed to the external senses. A plurality of things cannot 
be of assistance to the intellect in distinctly intuiting individual things. Rather, in 
order to deduce a single thing from a collection of things—a frequent task—we 
must discard from the ideas of the things whatever does not demand our present 
attention, so that the remaining features can be retained more readily in the 
memory. In the same way, it is not the things themselves which should be 
displayed to the external senses, but rather abbreviated representations of them; 
and the more compact these are, the handier they are, provided they act as 
adequate safeguards against lapses in memory. (AT X, 416-17; CSM I, 43) 
 
The passage appears to be ambivalent. At first, Descartes seems to endorse a kind of 
imaginative figuration: “the idea of that thing must be formed as distinctly as possible in 
the imagination.” This would not imply that any real figure be drawn or mechanically 
represented, only that it be imagined “as distinctly as possible.” However, he goes on to 
claim that “in order to do this properly, the thing itself which this idea is to represent 
should be displayed to the external senses.” This seems to indicate that whenever one 
imagines something distinctly, one must actually be in the presence of the object being 
imagined. It would thus seem to deny pictorial or symbolic representations of things 
displayed to the external senses. Such an interpretation appears to be ruled out later in the 
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passage when Descartes claims that “it is not the things themselves which should be 
displayed to the external sense, but rather abbreviated representations of them” etc. Thus, 
on the one hand, Descartes endorses a very distinct formation of ideas in the imagination 
as a means of verifying the nature of corporeal bodies. On the other hand, he claims that 
what is imagined most distinctly must actually be displayed to the external senses, and 
that this display ought to be of the things themselves [res ipsas]. However, he goes on to 
qualify that suggestion, claiming that in order for external things to be simple and 
singular, they ought to be represented by abbreviated symbols or representations. 
There is thus some ambivalence (or trivalence) between the thing itself, its 
symbolic representation displayed externally, and the internal representation in the 
imagination. How can Descartes so blithely ignore the distinctions between these three 
levels of representation? The short answer is that he does not. But the reason why he 
seems to confuse these three different ways of representing actual things (res ipsas) will 
be instructive. First of all, we must recognize that the primary target of Descartes’ new 
scientific method is Aristotelian science. For scholastic Aristotelians, the things 
themselves are substances, whose essence is to be the bearer of many attributes. These 
attributes are, in turn, governed by a substantial form that organizes some underlying 
matter. Thus, whenever one asks about the nature of any actually existing thing, the 
answer will involve an explanation of its matter (what elements constitute it) and its form 
(the organizing principle that explains its functions, appearance, actions, etc.). Clearly, 
for scholastic Aristotelians, any thing itself is necessarily a complex of matter and form, 
usually a complex of several material elements and range of accidental forms governed 
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by a substantial form. Descartes signals that he is interested in the thing itself (not some 
mere abstraction), but the fundamental idea that all things are essentially complex just 
will not ensure a clear representation of them. Descartes realizes that the brain is only 
capable of attending to a few things at a time and that it is much more effective when it 
represents things as simply as possible. Consequently, the idea that all things are 
necessarily complex cannot be a guiding principle of Descartes’ method. 
However, Descartes does not simply reject the Aristotelian method of explanation 
without offering another method that will conform to his understanding of the way the 
cognitive faculties work. On Descartes’ view, the mind is best suited to represent things 
in the imagination as clearly as possible and as they actually are. Rule XIV advances this 
aim: “The problem should be re-expressed in terms of the real extension of bodies and 
should be pictured in our imagination entirely by means of bare figures. Thus it will be 
perceived much more distinctly by our intellect” (AT X 438; CSM I, 56). Descartes 
recognizes only one attribute that is in fact common to all material things: real extension. 
Extension, he says, is “whatever has length, breadth, and depth” (AT X, 442; CSM I, 59), 
or whatever “admits of difference of degree ... [i.e.] magnitudes in general” (AT X, 440; 
CSM I, 58). Thus, whenever we represent an object in the external world, we should do 
so solely in terms of its nature as an extended body, modified by length, breadth, and 
depth. We should not be surprised to see this maneuver. In short, Descartes claims that 
the only universal criterion for any really existing object is that it conforms to the 
mathesis universalis: that it can be quantified in some sense. Thus, the only restriction 
that Descartes places on our conception of external things is that they conform to some 
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representation that has extension, magnitude, or shape. This is exactly what the 
imagination provides the intellect: “If we are truly going to imagine something, not only 
making use of our pure intellect, but aiding [our intellect] with the images [speciebus] 
depicted in the imagination [phantasia], then nothing can be ascribed to magnitudes in 
general which cannot also be referred in some way to a specific image [specie]” (AT X, 
440-41; CSM I, 58).437
Later in the same rule, Descartes clarifies this notion by highlighting the type of 
mistake that can be made when one only treats pure intellectual abstractions. This is a 
passage that we examined in the last chapter with reference to the connection between the 
mathesis universalis and Descartes’ theory of matter. Here, we see the same set of issues 
pertaining more directly to the powers of the mind. 
 In other words, we can only be sure that we are talking about real 
things if we can represent what we are talking about with some specific image. This is 
because all images share the property of magnitude, shape, or extension, with all 
corporeal bodies.  
Finally if it is said: ‘extension is not [identical to] a body’, then the word 
extension is taken in a quite different way than it is above. Moreover, in this sense 
there corresponds no idea in the imagination peculiar to it. Instead, this expression 
is entirely the work of the pure intellect, which alone is capable of separating 
abstract entities in this way. This is a source of error for many who, not realizing 
that extension taken in this sense cannot be grasped by the imagination, 
nonetheless represent it to themselves as if it were a real idea. Now, since such an 
idea necessarily involves the concept of body, if they say that such extension is 
not a body, they are unwittingly ensnared into saying ‘the same thing is at once a 
body and not a body’. (AT X, 444; CSM I, 60) 
 
                                                 
437 I think that Cottingham botches this translation, rendering the final species as “species of 
magnitude.” I am unhappy with the redundant “specific image,” but I think it conveys the right 
sense. 
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This example makes it clear that it is possible to conceive of certain statements about real 
things, e.g., to claim that there is extension where there is no body (or that there is such a 
thing as a void), while exceeding the limits of what can be accurately depicted in the 
imagination. In the Regulae at least, Descartes attempts to reign in the excesses of 
intellectual abstraction by carefully depicting his claims about material things in the 
imagination. (In the Meditationes, interestingly enough, the situation is quite reversed. 
There, the possible excesses of the imagination must be reigned in by the will in order to 
restrict it to what can be known by the pure intellect (cf. AT VII, 29-30).) 
Implicit in all of this discussion about the relationship between the things 
themselves and their appropriate imaginative representation is the beginnings of 
Descartes’ theory of matter, which he have seen already at work in the Regulae. The 
reason why ideas about external bodies must be depicted in the imagination is because 
both images and bodies necessarily share the property of being extended. Whereas we 
can intellectually abstract the concept of body from its being extended in length and 
breadth, Descartes claims that there is no such thing in the world and, moreover, that if 
we had attempted to verify such an abstraction by representing it to ourselves in our 
imagination, we would have readily seen our error. Thus, by representing ideas in our 
imagination we are able to check the excessive abstractions of the intellect. Armed with 
our understanding of Descartes’ physiological account of cognition, it is quite apparent 
why he thinks this is the case. Every image depicted in the imagination corresponds to 
some real alteration of the body, some disposition of animal spirits, nerves, and brain 
tissue. These bodily alterations are linked causally to bodies in the external world, either 
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through experience or through a symbol. For instance, when I close my eyes and imagine 
a bright orange sunset, I am reproducing (according to Descartes) a physiological event in 
my brain that mimics the way my brain has been affected by past experiences of bright 
orange sunsets. The imagination thus grounds the intellect in the material world of causal 
relations between real bodies. A similar thing can be accomplished if I imagine a white 
skull and crossbones on a black background, which immediately recalls to me danger, or 
poison. In this case, the image represents a state of affairs by virtue of a culturally (or 
arbitrarily) determined symbol. In both cases, I am able to abstractly represent to myself a 
state of affairs without breaking its causal link to the real world. This explanation makes 
it clear that Descartes was not simply passing over the distinction between external 
object, symbolic external representation, and internal image. Rather, he was indicating a 
link between the object and its various representations (either symbolic or imaginative) 
that had been established by his account of cognition.  
 
 Mental exercises 
Indeed, Descartes will exploit each element of this link between objects and their 
representations when he expands the heuristics of method. To illustrate, I will focus on 
the concepts abstraction, attention, and enumeration. Descartes borrows these terms from 
scholastic Latin, but alters their meaning. We have seen examples, particularly in John 
Olivi and Augustine, of the connection between the active power of the intellect and the 
operations of abstraction and attention. Enumeration, by contrast, comes largely from 
Renaissance theories of method, where enumeratio sive inductio was considered to be a 
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means of outlining the various categories of things to be investigated. If the enumeration 
is complete, we can be reasonable sure that our discoveries will be true. We have seen in 
the last chapter that Descartes also has in mind a different kind of enumeration, a kind of 
intellectual review that serves to strengthen the powers of intuition. These three concepts 
show Descartes’ concern for focusing the mental powers on simple things, while 
discarding the rest. When viewed through the lens of Descartes’ account of cognition, we 
see that his preference for simplicity over complexity can be established on independent 
grounds, namely, by virtue of the physiological limitations of the brain and cognitive 
faculties. Moreover, they show that the intellect plays an active role in arriving at the 
intuitions that form the basis of scientific certainty.  
We have seen in the last chapter that mathematics plays such a formative role in 
the conception of Descartes’ method for two principle reasons: he thought that training in 
arithmetic and geometry would better prepare students for scientific study than any other 
subject and he conceived of the basic power of the intellect, intuition, to be uniquely 
fitted to perceive the truths of mathematics. In Rule III, he describes intuition as “the 
conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be 
no room for doubt about what we are understanding” (AT X, 368; CSM I, 14). We have 
seen that the truths of mathematics are, in principle, easily verified by a clear and 
attentive mind. This is why they are paradigmatic of scientific knowledge. Attention, 
then, is simply the act of turning the mind to perceive a certain state of affairs. Those 
states affairs that can be easily perceived by the mind attending to them are the basis of 
scientific knowledge. In this way, mathematics is characterized by its simplicity. Simple 
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things are naturally and easily perceived by the mind. But Descartes thinks they have 
been unjustly neglected by prior philosophers. With our summary of Descartes’ account 
of brain functions, we can see why Descartes would have thought the mind to be best 
capable of attending to simple things. The mind is connected to the pineal gland, which 
he realized was so small that it was hardly visible in autopsies. Since this point of contact 
is so physically small, one must suppose that its capacity to clearly perceive complex 
things would be limited.  
Nowhere is the limitation of the brain more apparent than in Descartes’ discussion 
of enumeration. In Rule VII, he describes “why we say that a continuous movement of 
thought is needed to make good any weakness of memory.” He appeals to his familiar 
problem of proportional relations which quickly becomes difficult to conceive clearly. In 
order to remedy this lack of clarity he describes a kind of mnemonic exercise: “I shall run 
through [these relations] several times in a continuous movement of the imagination, 
simultaneously intuiting one relation and passing on to the next, until I have learnt to pass 
from the first to the last so swiftly that memory is left with practically no role to play, and 
I seem to intuit the whole thing at once” (AT X 387-88; CSM I, 25). Viewed from the 
perspective of Descartes’ psycho-physiology, it seems as if he is advocating an exercise 
that will predispose the brain to make a certain connection, to intuit a certain relation. 
Thus, the imagination repeatedly runs through the series of relations, reinforcing the 
neural paths associated with that series, until the brain moves (almost) immediately from 
the first to the last. Thus, the series is preserved, as it were, in the very tissue of the brain 
by this imaginative exercise. Rule XI takes up this topic again, and concludes that “one 
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cannot fail to see that in this way the sluggishness of the mind is redressed and its 
capacity enlarged” (AT X, 409; CSM I, 38). In this sense, the mental exercise of 
enumeration, that reinforces the neural pathways of the brain so that the mind can 
recognize complex connections immediately, strengthens and enhances the powers of 
intuition. 
Bearing in mind that the brain is most capable of perceiving simple things, 
Descartes also advocates a peculiar kind of abstraction that is precisely fitted to his 
method of comparison. We have already seen the use of abstraction in the explanation of 
color sensations. There, Descartes abstracts from the specific characteristics of colors in 
objects to consider them as if they were merely patterns or shapes. This form of 
abstraction enables him to treat colors (secondary qualities) as if they were simply modes 
of extension, patterns, or shapes (primary qualities). We have also seen that problems in 
arithmetic and geometry are, strictly speaking, abstract. That is, they do not contain any 
obscurities from the variability of matter. Descartes likens these pure mathematical 
problems to the “perfect problems,” that are determinate in every respect (AT X, 429-30; 
CSM I, 51). For more complex problems, what is required is to make an abstraction so 
that they can be treated in the same way that problems in pure mathematics can be 
treated:  
Once we have sufficiently understood the problem, we should try to see exactly 
where the difficulty lies, so that by abstracting from everything else, the problem 
may be the more easily resolved. In order to find out where the difficulty lies, it is 
not always sufficient simply to understand the problem; we must also give 
thought to the particular factors which are essential to it. If any considerations 
should occur to us which are easy to discover, we shall put these aside; and once 
these have been eliminated, what we are left with will be just the point we are 
looking for. (AT X, 437; CSM I, 56) 
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The particular example Descartes is considering in this passage concerns the construction 
of a certain fountain with a sculpture of Tantalus. Descartes is apparently thinking of a 
fountain where a figure of Tantalus is placed in the middle of the collecting pool. When 
the water reaches Tantalus’ lips, the bowl is suddenly drained. In discovering the 
underlying principles that make the fountain work, the irrelevant factors are the sculpture 
of Tantalus and the shape of the bowl. The key difficulty is how to construct a container 
such that it lets out the water as soon as, but not before, it reaches a certain height. In 
many other cases, it seems that the main difficulty is obscured by a number of extraneous 
factors. For instance, the movement of the planets and stars is obscured by conjectures 
about their material constitution, e.g., are they composed of earthly material, are they 
gods, are they composed of some other, celestial elements? What is needed, is to abstract 
from these various concerns and consider the planets as points, tracing lines in the sky, in 
the way that Tycho Brahe did when he made his careful observations. This is the real 
utility of mathematical representation through lines, symbols, or figures. These 
representations bear no resemblance to the things themselves, and thus are unencumbered 
by questions about elements, essences, real qualities, substances, and the like. Instead, 
mathematical representations clearly express the quantitative relations that exist between 
things. They are based on a prior abstraction from these other concerns; this is why they 
are easily depicted before the mind; consequently, this process enables one to clearly 
represent the main difficulty involved in the problem. 
Descartes’ use of the terms abstraction and attention bear little resemblance to the 
traditional scholastic uses of these terms, save one important link. For Descartes, as for 
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the scholastics attention and abstraction are activities of an immaterial mind. Descartes 
uses these terms to describe the way that the mind interacts with the physiological powers 
of cognition, the brain, in order to arrive at solutions to mathematical and natural 
philosophical problems. Thus, the mind actively engages and directs the brain and the 
sensory faculties in order to solve problems. Indeed, the mind directs these faculties best, 
Descartes thinks, when it follows the heuristics of method that he outlines in the Regulae: 
reduce complex problems to their simple elements, follow an order among terms, and 
recompose simples in such a way that they necessarily explain the problem. Moreover, he 
seems to imagine, if the mind practices and continually engages in this kind of exercise, it 
will actually alter the nature of the brain, the neural pathways that contribute to 
reasoning. In this way, the method can engender an improved capacity to judge well and 
to apply the mind to various kinds of problems.  
I believe this is the sense in which we must understand the example of the 
blacksmith who constructs his tools using the very same methods as he will use those 
tools to construct products in Rule VIII. On this reading, the soft tissue of the brain is the 
primary tool of the philosopher or scientist in understanding the nature of the world. This 
analogy highlights the unique role of the incorporeal power of the intellect in conducting 
rational investigations, and it seems to suggest a dualistic concept of mind in this early 
work. Unlike all physical events, which Descartes thinks are entirely determined by the 
disposition of corporeal bodies and their movement, the mind has the capacity to reform 
and reshape its most intimate instrument, the brain. Given this capacity, it seems, the 
mind is of an entirely different character that ordinary physical objects; it has the ability 
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to alter its own capacities, to enhance its own powers through training and practice. 
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The Explanatory Bases of Descar tes’ Natural Philosophy: The Objects of 
Knowledge 
 
While the Regulae is ostensibly and for the most part a treatise on scientific 
method, we have seen that Descartes’ methodological statements have broader 
implications. In this chapter, we will explore the more specifically metaphysical 
implications of Descartes’ method. In the seventeenth century, metaphysics generally 
addressed questions concerning the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. 
Descartes treats neither of these questions in the Regulae. So when I refer to Descartes’ 
“metaphysics” here, I mean it in the much more basic sense in which we think of 
metaphysics as being about what kinds of things there are in the universe, and what kinds 
of principles of explanation are acceptable for the most rigorous knowledge of things. It 
is noteworthy that the constituents of Descartes’ universe are not the ontological genera 
or the categories of Aristotle, rather they are the kinds of things that can be simply 
apprehended by the intellect. This is characteristic of Descartes’ primary concern for 
epistemology as the manner of access to ontology.  
In the Regulae, Descartes imagines a world composed of “simple natures”; they 
are what I would call the categorical bases his science. He claims that anything that can 
be known about objects must be known through some composition of simple natures. But 
we will see that he does not mean ‘physically composed’, but ‘rationally composed’, i.e., 
by means of their explanatory power. Given that the simple natures are the principles of 
scientific explanation, it is no surprise that their nature and use are directly informed by 
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Descartes’ methodological concerns. In this chapter, it will become apparent that 
Descartes’ categorical division of simple natures, principally into intellectual, material, 
and common natures, implies a division in kind between scientific explanations of matter 
and those of mind. Thus, Descartes’ conception of simples will be central to the aim of 
this thesis. However, before any of this can be addressed, it will be necessary to look at 
the historical antecedents to Descartes’ use of the term ‘simple natures’.  
The concept of simple natures has a discernable and important history in the 
Aristotelian tradition, one that clearly informs usage of the term in both Descartes’ 
Regulae and Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum. We will see that the notions of 
‘simplicity’ and ‘nature’, which together are integral to the historical use of the term 
‘simple natures’ in the 16th century have an important precedent in scholastic 
metaphysics. In particular, these notions are closely associated with the concepts essence, 
universal, substance, and form. I will try to show how the idea of ‘simple natures’ 
emerged in scholastic philosophy, and why it was an important, though controversial, 
notion. However, with the earliest modern philosophers, principally Bacon and Descartes 
in the Regulae, the metaphysical context in which simple natures are understood changes 
dramatically.  
Like Descartes of the Regulae, Bacon employs the term ‘simple natures’ in a way 
that makes them central to his metaphysics. It is possible either that Descartes and Bacon 
independently employed vocabulary that would have been well known, or that Descartes 
employs this vocabulary following his exposure to Baconian philosophy, to which he was 
most likely introduced by Mersenne, c. 1625. In either case, there are some philosophical 
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comparisons and contrasts between the two usages that are instructive. In short, 
Descartes’ material simple natures, like Bacon’s simples, are qualitative properties of 
material things that serve as the basis for a mechanistic explanation of natural 
phenomena. In order to explain the essential role of material qualities in natural bodies, 
both Bacon and Descartes advocate the use of controlled experiments and the importance 
of the productive capacity of human understanding. Thus, the explanation of Bacon’s use 
of simple natures will be instructive for understanding Descartes’ use of the term.  
However, I will also show that there are fundamental differences between these 
two thinkers. First, Descartes’ simple natures are determined by the intellect: they are 
conceptually simple. By contrast, Bacon’s simples are not conceptually simple at all, but 
are selected for their putative connection to the natural laws that govern the things 
themselves. Bacon never enumerates these laws of material interaction, but his 
metaphysics is based on the belief that material things obey their own internal laws. 
Second, Descartes proposes that there are not only simple material natures, but simple 
intellectual natures as well. This suggests that the intellect may be a domain of scientific 
investigation in its own right, quite distinct from the investigation into the nature of 
material things. Although Descartes never develops an investigation of the intellectual 
simples in the Regulae, this will surely be the basis of the philosophical argument one 
finds in the Meditations I-V and Principles I-II, for instance. Bacon, by contrast, 
understands the mind to be essentially a mirror of the world, one that is more or less 
clouded, but whose purpose is essentially to reveal the natural world as it was created.438
                                                 
438 For instance, Bacon refers to the mind as an “enchanted glass” in the Advancement of 
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There would, thus, be little cause for a Baconian investigation of intellectual simples like 
the one that Descartes undertakes. In fact, it seems that, for Bacon, the division in 
faculties of the mind is most important for maintaining proper division in the sciences 
(see Bacon’s De Augmentis, Bk. V). 
In sum, the investigation into the simple natures will confirm that the Regulae 
defines foundational elements of Descartes’ philosophical project, especially insofar as 
they announce a distinction in kind between the explanatory principles of the physical 
world and those of the mental, a distinction that divides the universe into basic categories 
of thought and matter. The ‘simple natures’ is an important philosophical concept and 
one that is embedded in the principles of scientific truth, the explanation of natural things, 
and thus the core of Descartes’ project in the Regulae. At the same time, however, we 
will glimpse the shortcomings of the Regulae, specifically with respect to advancing a 
philosophical investigation of sensory qualities and their importance for a complete 
understanding of the mind and its ideas. 
 
Simple natures in late scholastic philosophy 
 
According to Gilson’s index, the term ‘naturae simplices’ appears in both 
Toletus’ De Anima and in the Coimbrian commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics. In the case 
                                                                                                                                                 
Learning (Sp. III, 394-95), which is in need of “helps” in order to make any progress (New 
Organon Sp. I, 151-52; Sp. IV, 13-14). In large measure, this is the objective of debunking the 
“idols of nature” in the first part of the New Organon. As a consequence of this belief, Bacon 
always dismisses a skeptical stance, suggesting that the only way to grasp the essence of 
nature is to shore up the mind’s deficient faculties with attention to method, while employing 
the mind’s natural faculties of investigation. 
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of both texts, Descartes’ letter to Mersenne of October 28, 1640 testifies to his knowledge 
of these sources from his days at La Flèche, though he claims not to remember much of 
the specifics, and not to have looked at these philosophers for “some twenty years” (AT 
III, 185). Some commentators see little influence in Descartes writings from these works 
before the Meditationes, the Replies to Objectors, and the Principia, suggesting that 
Descartes had already developed his philosophical position and later modified his 
terminology to appeal to his audience, particularly the faculty of theology at the 
Sorbonne.439
                                                 
439 Roger Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics, 28-33. 
 It is very difficult to be precise about Descartes’ relation to late scholastic 
sources, since he intentionally avoids any real engagement with their arguments. I do not 
intend to dispute the claim that when Descartes’ begins the Meditationes, he does so with 
careful attention to scholastic controversies and the explicit purpose of engaging in those 
controversies. Nevertheless, I do not think that this claim should imply that these 
exercises were merely window dressing for Descartes’ real concerns, e.g., his natural 
philosophical project. Rather, I think that the Regulae demonstrates a deep and enduring 
engagement with traditional metaphysical questions in an effort to break free from 
tradition and establish scientific knowledge on independent grounds. From this 
perspective, it will be most useful to understand the following historical discussion as 
forming an intellectual backdrop against which Descartes’ own philosophy can stand in 
relief.  In this context, the commentaries of Toletus and the Coimbrians are most helpful, 
since these constituted the textbook treatments of philosophical issues in the 16th and 17th 
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centuries (likely a centerpiece of education at La Flèche), being reprinted many times 
each and widely available. 
 
Simplicity and nature in Aristotle 
 
The broader context for understanding the notion of simple natures emerges from 
Aristotle’s De Anima and the possible connections between simple cognition and the 
essence of real things. In this sense, it is useful to consider the concepts of ‘simplicity’ 
and ‘nature’ as they influence the possible existence of ‘simple natures’. Simplicity can 
be taken in two senses: as it refers to cognition, or epistemic simplicity, and as it refers to 
entities, distinguishing simple substances from composites. In De Anima, III, 6, Aristotle 
refers to the “thinking of indivisibles,” a cognition of which is entirely simple, and for 
that reason free from error: “The thinking of indivisibles is found in those cases where 
falsehood is impossible: where the alternative of true of false applies, there we always 
find a sort of combining of objects of thought in a quasi-unity.”440
                                                 
440 De Anima 430a 27-29 
 Here the epistemic 
character of simplicity is clear. The basic reason why Aristotle makes such a claim is that 
what is indivisible, or what has no composition, cannot be a matter of judgment, since 
judgment is necessarily synthetic. In De Interpretatione 1, Aristotle states, “Just as some 
thoughts in the soul are neither true nor false while some are necessarily one or the other, 
so also with spoken sounds. For falsity and truth have to do with combination or 
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separation.”441
In the De Anima passage, Aristotle extends the indivisibility of thoughts from 
cognition of those things that are incapable of being divided to cognition of all things that 
are not actually divided in the moment that they are perceived. For instance, he claims 
that thinking of a line segment or a period of time can both be considered indivisible, 
since they are taken in their actually undivided state (whereas these things naturally admit 
of infinite divisibility). The key to understanding this kind of indivisibility is to 
understand it again as an epistemic notion. All lines are necessarily divisible when 
considered in themselves. However, if I am conceiving of a particular line segment, then 
I can conceive of it as a whole without actually dividing it. The line segment is not 
absolutely indivisible, but only relative to a certain conception of it at a certain time. 
 In this passage, Aristotle extends the conditions for epistemic or cognitive 
simplicity to logical or propositional simplicity. In both cases, what is apprehended 
simply requires no judgment because judgment involves the affirmation or denial of some 
combination of terms, such as predicate and subject. Thus, whatever is apprehended 
simply, or without any division, cannot be the source of error.  
This is how Toletus introduces the notion of simple natures: he says, for example, 
“Some things are themselves simply apprehended and understood, such that there is in 
them no question of truth nor falsity. On the other hand, some things are apprehended in 
composition and I judge, that is, affirm or deny, and thus am said to either compose or 
divide them: in such things there is a question of truth or falsity [Altera est simplex 
apprehensio et simplex cognitio ipsius, in qua nihil veri vel falsi inest. Altera est 
                                                 
441 De Interpretatione 1, 16a 10-13. 
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composita apprehensio et judicium, et assensus vel dissensus, qui etiam compositio et 
divisio dicitur: in quibus jam verum vel falsum inest].”442 Toletus is clearly following the 
passages of De Anima III, 6 and De Interpretatione 1 that we have considered. This 
connection becomes more clear when Toletus provides examples, saying that whatever 
we apprehend with our mind can be divided into three categories: “Since some things are 
simple natures or things: such as man, animal, or white. And since other things are 
composite, such as rational animal or just man; so also some things are composed by way 
of words in the form of a proposition: such as man is an animal or God is just [Quaedam 
sunt simplices naturae vel res: ut homo, animal, album. Quaedam sunt compositae, ut 
animal rationale, homo justs; quaedam sic composita ut habeant verbum sintque 
proposito, ut homo est animal, Deus est justus…].”443
In a sense, the case of purely epistemic simplicity becomes complicated when we 
consider the cognition of putatively simple natures. The word ‘natura’ tends to refer to 
 Thus, a simple nature, for Toletus, 
is whatever can be apprehended simply without being predicated of anything else. He 
seems to include both substances (like man and animal) and qualities (like white) in his 
enumeration of possible simples. In each case, simplicity seems to follow from the act of 
cognition that apprehends the object: when we simply consider the concept ‘man’ or 
‘white’ without predicating it of anything, we can consider it to be simple. I will note, for 
the moment, that Toletus calls ‘man’ a simple nature while the defintion of ‘man’ as 
‘rational animal’ is composite. This introduces a difficulty that we must address. 
                                                 
442 Gilson, Index, 200: Toletus, Comentarii de Anima, Bk. III, Ch. 7, Txt. 27, Q. 20, p.162, col. c-
d. 
443 Gilson, Index, p. 200: Toletus, Comentarii de Anima, Bk. III, Ch. 7, Txt. 27, Q. 20, p.162, col. 
c-d. 
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the essence of a natural body, some intrinsic property or set of intrinsic properties that 
give a natural body its internal principle of change or motion. Thus, for an epistemically 
indivisible concept to be a simple nature, it must not only be apprehended simply, but it 
also must pick out the essence or nature of some particular thing.444 We can see the 
difficulty when we note that while Toletus accepts ‘man’ as a simple nature, he rejects 
‘rational animal’. At first, it seems unclear how he means to differentiate these two 
concepts; man just is a rational animal. Perhaps Toletus thinks the latter concept can be 
analyzed linguistically, something along the lines of a form and formula distinction.445
                                                 
444 On the connection between ‘natura’, ‘essentia’, ‘forma’, and quiditty or definition (which we 
will come to later), see Aquinas, On Being and Essence, Ch 1: “Because the definition telling 
what a thing is signifies that by which a thing is located in its genus or species, philosophers 
have substituted the term 'quiddity' for the term 'essence'. The Philosopher frequently calls this 
'what something was to be'; that is to say, that which makes a thing to be what it is. It is also 
called 'form', because form signifies the determination of each thing, as Avicenna says. 
Another term used for this is 'nature', using 'nature' in the first of the four senses enumerated 
by Boethius. In this sense anything is called a nature which the intellect can grasp in any way; 
for a thing is intelligible only through its definition and essence. That is why the Philosopher, 
too, says that every substance is a nature. The term 'nature' in this sense seems to mean the 
essence of a thing as directed to its specific operation, for no reality lacks its specific 
operation. The term 'quiddity' is derived from what is signified by the definition, while 
'essence' is used because through it, and in it, that which is has being.” 
 
Forms indicate the essence of an individual, but the formula, i.e., a proposition that 
defines the individual, expresses the nature of the individual as a member of a species. 
Thus ‘man’indicates the individual man, while ‘rational animal’ indicates the species 
form of ‘man’: it indicates that ‘man’ refers to just those members of ‘animal’ that are 
‘rational’. Clearly, this species formula is analyzable. We will see how this distinction 
between form and formula or species will influence the Coimbrians to the degree that 
445 I am thinking of Aristotle’s distinction in 7: 4-6 between eidos and logos. Although Aristotle is 
ambiguous about what this distinction amounts to, especially since the logos is not merely 
linguistic but is the very rational structure of the thing, the later scholastics were probably 
much more sensitive to the distinction. 
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they conceive of ‘substance’ as analyzable into the parts of its formula, ‘being’ and ‘self-
subsisting’. In fact, the only terms that are not expressed by such a species formula are 
the categories and the differentia: the categories because they are the highest genera and 
the differentia because they are not themselves species. 
This question is further vexed by the claim that Aristotle makes regarding what 
kinds of object are indivisibles. He says the treatment of indivisibles follows for “objects 
which are without matter (anue hyle).”446
The fact that in the last line of the chapter Aristotle designates all these things, of 
which there is intellection, as things ‘without matter’ (aneu hyle), does not mean 
that they are immaterial substances, since all essences, whether of substances or 
of accidents, are immaterial, but being universals, they can never be separated 
substances, that is they cannot exist independently of material realities.
 Enrico Berti takes Aristotle to mean by 
indivisibles in this sense ‘universals’, which are ‘without matter’ in the sense of being 
abstract. 
447
 
 
Berti goes on to claim that this is precisely the same concept as is expressed in 
Metaphysics Theta, 10, albeit from a the opposite point of view: “there seems to be no 
doubt that the ‘incomposite’ realities of Metaph. Theta, 10 coincide perfectly with the 
‘indivisibles’ of De An. III, 6. Whereas the term used in the De Anima points out their 
unity, i.e., their universality, the term used in the Metaphysics tends, rather, to indicate 
their separateness, that is the condition of isolation in which they are considered by the 
cognitive act of the intellect.”448
                                                 
446  ibid. 430b 33. 
 In both cases, simples are considered as universals when 
apprehended by the intellect, i.e., the essences of physical or mathematical things. This 
447  Berti, “Intellection of Indivisibles,” 147. 
448  Ibid., 148. 
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intellectual apprehension of simples requires that they be abstracted from any particular 
matter. When they are apprehended as such, the knowledge of them cannot be in error. 
Here, simples or indivisibles are conceived as equivalent to ‘universals’ or ‘essences’, 
which seems to make the possible existence of ‘simple natures’ much more likely. 
However, species terms and formulae are also universals, so being a universal essence 
does not guarantee simplicity. Moreover, there remains some question about which are 
the real natures: the universal terms or the individual entities. 
The idea of simples as essences or universals does seem to capture Aristotle’s 
understanding of their epistemic grasp. Aristotle says, “About the things, then, which are 
essences and exist in actuality, it is not possible to be in error, but only to think them or 
not to think them. Inquiry about their ‘what’ takes the form of asking whether they are of 
such and such a nature or not.”449 In other words, one can inquire about ‘what it is’ to be 
an essence by clarifying whether it is of such and such a nature or not. However, if one 
apprehends the essence, that is, understands it, then one cannot be in error except in 
attributing that essence to a particular thing or in combining that essence with another. 
Presumably, this is what Aristotle means when he says that with respect to incomposites, 
“contact (aisthêsis) and assertion are truth ... and ignorance is non-contact.”450
                                                 
449   Metaphysics IX, 10 1051b 31-33. 
 Now, just 
as a universal, or essence, is what it is by virtue of having been the essence of many 
individuals, the unified, simple apprehension of that universal can be, and perhaps even 
must be, referred to the many distinct apprehensions of those individuals. In this way, the 
universal is indivisible only in the sense in which a line segment is indivisible, that is to 
450  Ibid. 1051b 23-24. 
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say, actually undivided. Here again, one can inquire into the nature of an indivisible 
universal essence with reference to many particulars or with respect to the formula that 
defines it.451
However, this way of understanding epistemic simplicity does not get us out of 
the woods. In fact, it places us in the thicket of the “problem of universals.” We will try 
to tread carefully along this path, because addressing the problem of universals, an 
enormously controversial topic in medieval philosophy, exceeds the scope of our present 
investigation. Nonetheless, it is helpful to consider some aspects of this problem in order 
to clarify the present issue, namely, the possible existence of simples and their 
apprehension by the mind. Consider the universal ‘homo’, or human being, from Toletus’ 
commentary above. This is a universal concept that describes all particular human beings. 
However, it is plain that, in fact, there are no human beings as such existing anywhere in 
the world. Instead, we have many individual human beings. The concept of ‘human 
being’ is not gendered, yet it is impossible for any given human being to exist without 
being gendered.
  
452
                                                 
451  See Berti, “The Intellection of ‘Indivisibles’ According to Aristotle,” pp. 141-164. 
 Thus, the universal concept ‘human being’ can only be conceived in 
abstraction from the actual existence of any given human being. I believe this is the sense 
of Aristotle’s distinction between indivisibles that are simply apprehended by the intellect 
and composites, which require judgment. When I think of the concept ‘human being’, the 
only way that I can conceive this concept is by not thinking that any such human being 
exists. That is, I make no judgment about the existence or non-existence of ‘human 
452 I borrow this example from Gyula Klima’s article, “The Medieval Problem of Universals,” in 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, when she introduces Boethius’ response to the 
problem. 
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beings’. Once I claim that a human being exists, I am no longer talking about ‘human 
beings’, but this human being, which correspondingly must be either a male or female 
and thus not a human being as such. So all universals are understood as abstract; they 
cannot be conceived as having any matter. As we saw in the last chapter, abstraction is 
the activity of the agent intellect, and it results in the formation of intelligible species. 
Thus, universals, or epistemic simples, like intelligible species, are products of the mind 
and mental abstraction. This reading does not imply that qualities or essences exist on 
their own, apart from actual instances. Rather, qualities or essences exist by virtue of 
their being abstracted from the actual bodies in which they normally exist. I understand 
this as a kind of shift in focus or attention of the mind. 
In reading Aristotle’s discussion in this way, I do not want to take sides in the 
debate concerning whether or not universals, essences, or categories are purely mental, 
linguistic, or real. To my mind, Aristotle leaves this question open, probably because he 
frequently identifies linguistic or mental distinctions with real ones. The important thing 
to realize is that various medieval commentators on Aristotle took all three positions. 
William of Ockham is most well known for advocating the idea that all universals are 
linguistic, existing in name only, while the Neoplatonic tradition would have given some 
traction to the notion that universals are mental (though the thought that universals truly 
exist ante rem in the mind of God does not make them merely mental), and Aquinas 
(whose view is nuanced on this issue) would hold something like the realist position 
about universals. To remain somewhat neutral in this debate, I will try to speak of the 
different ways that universals or essences can be conceived and in a broadly Thomistic 
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way. Given these caveats, I will attempt to restate our problem and then explore two 
different aspects of the problem.  
 
Simplicity in sensation and thought 
 
The task of science is to explain the nature of individuals, which, following the 
Aristotelian tradition, we can conceive as substantial entities that exist on their own. In a 
rough and general way, we can understand individuals according to their participation in 
a species and their possession of properties (those that are essential are necessarily shared 
by all members of the species, those that are accidental are not necessarily shared). These 
properties are united in the individual under a substantial form. Thus, the individual is the 
composite of a substantial form and some designated matter (i.e., determined in three 
dimensions). In order for us to grasp the essence of the individual, then, we must 
determine which properties of the individual are essential (i.e., belong to all members of 
the species), what are the implications of an entity that possesses those properties, and 
which properties are accidental. For this reason, it is clear that whenever we apprehend 
the essence of some individual, we apprehend it in abstraction from any determinate 
matter (as when we think the concept ‘human being’ without thinking of a specific 
gender). Now, a species just is a genus with a specific differentiation. Thus, the essence 
of the genus can be understood by abstracting from any specific differentiation. In this 
way, species are members of a genus in the same way as individuals are members of the 
species (i.e., by abstracting those differentiating elements). This process of abstraction 
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continues all the way up to the highest genera (summa genera), which are the categories 
(usually ten: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and 
affection). These categories cannot be further analyzed because they are the most general 
predicates of being, which is not a genus itself. Thus, the categories simply are the 
highest level of abstraction; they are not members of a higher genus. 
Given this very general presentation of late scholastic metaphysics, there arise 
two related problems in the area of science, or how to explain the nature of individuals 
according to their participation in species, genus, and the categories. First, there is an 
epistemological issue: how do we come to understand the essence of any given 
individual? Second, there is the problem of explanation: how to we account for the nature 
of any given individual as a member of a species, genus, and instantiating any of the ten 
categories? From the epistemic side, it becomes clear that the doctrine of simple 
apprehension is actually quite complex.  
Recall from the last chapter that each of the five sense modalities perceives only 
what is proper to it, the ‘proper sensibles’: “I call by the name of special object of this or 
that sense that which cannot be perceived by any other sense than that one and in respect 
of which no error is possible; in this sense colour is the special object of sight, sound of 
hearing, flavour of taste.”453
                                                 
453  De Anima II, 6 418a, 11-14. 
 Now, on Aristotle’s account, one cannot be in error about 
one’s perception of a special object of sense, whether a color, sound, flavor, texture, or 
smell. Thus, with respect to one’s contact with the external world, one cannot be in error. 
But this basic correctness of perception pertains to a very narrow slice of reality. For 
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instance, we have to distinguish the bare or crude perception of some special object of 
sense from even the assertion that this thing here is just that perceived quality: “for while 
the perception that there is white before us cannot be false, the perception that what is 
white is this or that may be false.”454 In Aquinas’ commentary on De Anima, he explains 
the matter in an even more direct way: “For when what is seen is white, the senses do not 
lie. But if what is white is taken as this or that, in short, snow, flour or anything of this 
sort, in this case it is grasped in such a way to deceive the senses as with large or distant 
things.”455
However, these proper sensibles carry very little representational content, i.e., 
they tell us very little about the world. We can see this by differentiating the proper 
sensibles from the common sensibles. The common sensibles, Aristotle says, are 
“movement, rest, number, figure, magnitude; these are not special to any one sense, but 
are common to all. There are at any rate certain kinds of movement which are perceptible 
 The reason for this becomes clear from what we have already said: once I 
attribute any sensible quality to a determinate piece of matter, I am claiming that the 
quality inheres in a substance as either an essential or accidental attribute. Whether or not 
my eyes see white cannot be a source of error, but whether that white I see is the son of 
Diares, a patch of snow, or something else, is obviously open to error. Proper sensibles, 
then, are apprehended simply and without the possibility for error, insofar as they are 
perceived as bare qualities, and not the qualities of some thing.  
                                                 
454 De Anima, 428b 18-19, 21-22, respectively, Barnes, p. 681 
455 Quod enim album sit quod videtur, non mentitur sensus; sed si album sit hoc aut illud, puta vel 
nix, vel farina vel aliquid huiusmodi, hic iam contingit mentiri sensum, et maxime a remotis. 
Aquinas, In Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commentarium. 
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both by touch and sight.”456 Unlike the proper sensibles, which are perceived by a 
particular sense organ, there is no sense organ for the common sensibles, but a “common 
sensibility [koina aisthêta]” as Aristotle calls it.457 He suggests that this “common sense” 
operates in a similar manner to the way that we conjoin proper sensibles in one object, 
e.g., when we call the coffee black, bitter, and hot or the bile bitter and yellow (a much 
less appetizing example!). As Aquinas makes clear in his commentary, the sensus 
communis does not perceive the common sensibles as if it were a sense organ and they 
were the proper objects of it. Rather, the sensus communis perceives by way of a kind of 
combination of the information received from the sense organs.458 In this way, the 
common sense is not a sense organ, but a power of organization that governs the proper 
sense organs.459 For Aristotle, one must conclude that while it is not possible to err in 
perceiving a proper sensible, one may err in perceiving common sensibles. Indeed, 
Aristotle claims, “[I]t is in respect of these [common sensibles] that the greatest amount 
of sense-illusion is possible.”460
                                                 
456 De Anima II, 6, 418a 17-19. 
  
457 De Anima III, 1, 425a 27. 
458 In Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commentarium, lib. 2, lect. 13: “Sensus enim communis est 
quaedam potentia, ad quam terminantur immutationes omnium sensuum, ut infra patebit. 
Unde impossibile est quod sensus communis habeat aliquod proprium obiectum, quod non sit 
obiectum sensus proprii.” 
459 On the synthesizing role of phantasia, see D. Frede, “The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in 
Aristotle,” in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, 282-87. She describes a kind of supervenience 
relation between phantasia and the special senses, i.e., that it is neither a separate faculty, nor 
reducible to the special senses. In the further discussion of these issues in Sense and 
Sensibilia, Aristotle concedes that if any one sense could perceive the common sensibles, then 
it would be sight (4, 442b 13-14). However, this statement occurs in the context of a 
denunciation of prior philosophers who thought that the common sensibles were perceived by 
a certain sense organ, so it is unlikely to contradict what we have noted above. 
460 De Anima III, 3, 428b 26. 
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This conclusion about the apparent illusory nature of common sensibles seems to 
be a consequence of the principles of Aristotle’s epistemology, where the common 
sensibles require the imagination or phantasia, which is an untrustworthy faculty. As we 
have seen from the last chapter, scholastic Aristotelian psychology characterizes the 
common sense, along with imagination/phantasy and memory, as an ‘internal sense’, 
which is opposed to the ‘external senses’ of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. While 
the external senses perceive objects in a discontinuous and piecemeal way, the common 
sense unites that sensory information into ‘phantasms’ or representations. The act of 
synthesizing, or reintegrating, the information from the internal senses, for Aristotle, is 
prone to inaccuracy. Indeed, it is as if the dissolute sensible species are accurately 
resolved in the imagination when these pieces are naturally fitted together. In the case of 
accurate representation by some phanatasm, the sensory qualities are unified by the 
substantial form of the object. As a consequence, it would be entirely natural for the 
common sense to piece them back together. The sugar is white, granular, and sweet; these 
are properties of its very nature; so when the imagination represents this granular, white, 
and sweet substance as sugar, it does so accurately. Ultimately, the form of the thing is 
reconstituted by the intellect in the perception of an ‘intelligible species’, which as we 
have seen is the proper object of the intellect, and also free from error. Aristotle thus 
begins with error-free perception of discontinuous sensible qualities and ends with error-
free understanding of universals. The whole process is underwritten by the formal unity 
of the individual that can be perceived (though not without difficulty) by the mind. 
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As an aside, I must say that this preference for the epistemic certainty of proper 
sensibles over common sensibles seems quite contrary to ordinary experience. Even 
though there are some cases where perception of common sensibles is inaccurate, as 
when the square tower appears round from a distance, there are a great many more 
examples of illusion in perception of proper sensibles. Colors are notoriously difficult to 
pin down, since they alter in lighting conditions; sounds are frequently difficult to 
determine (“What was that?”); and it is easy to trick the sense of taste, as when you 
follow something sour by something sweet. I think the more intuitively plausible position 
is Descartes’ position, which as we will see inverts the epistemic priority of proper 
sensibles and common sensibles: proper sensibles (secondary qualities) will be 
considered merely apparent and thus in some sense systematically illusory, while 
common sensibles (primary qualities) will be taken as the indubitable constituents of 
material nature. Indeed, Descartes’ material simple natures are, in fact, identical to the 
‘common sensibles’.461
 
 For the moment, let us return to the Aristotelian account and 
discuss, in more detail, the end of the process of cognition, the apprehension of essences. 
Apprehension of essences 
 
Aritsotelian psychology would hold that the senses cannot be in error with respect 
to proper sensibles, since it is just the nature of those faculties to perceive those sensory 
                                                 
461 In this respect at least, Descartes could be reckoned to hold a position like that of Democritus 
who, Aristotle claims, reduces the special sensibles to the common sensibles (Sense and 
Sensibilia, 4, 442b 10-17. 
 430 
qualities. In the Summa Theologicae, Aquinas exploits this functional relation between 
faculty and object in order to explain the pure intellection of simple essences. In Bk. I, Q. 
85 a. 6, on whether the intellect can be false, he claims, “the Philosopher compares the 
intellect with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper object, as sight in 
regard to color.” In the cognition of essences or universals, pure intellection can be 
understood on analogy with sense perception: when each is directed toward its proper 
object, i.e., the object toward which it is per se disposed, it cannot err. 
Now the proper object of the intellect is the “quiddity” of a material thing; and 
hence, properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity; 
whereas it may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence or 
quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as regards composition or division, or 
also in the process of reasoning. Therefore, also in regard to those propositions, 
which are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first principles 
from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific conclusions.462
 
 
The quiddity, essence, ‘what it is’, or universal is the special object of the faculty of pure 
intellection. Ordinarily quiddity is distinguished from essence as a logical concept, 
distinguished from a metaphysical one. In this way, quiddity is identified with the 
definition, formula, or proposition that necessarily refers to all members of a certain 
class. One interesting feature of this is that quiddity cannot be simple in the sense 
required by the Toletus commentary. Thus, just as the senses cannot be in error with 
respect to their special object of sense, so the intellect cannot be in error with respect to 
the quiddity of a thing. So, once we have an adequate definition of some particular thing, 
once we have clearly stated its essence, this cannot be a source of error. For Aquinas, 
error arises chiefly in the perception of accidents and in the attribution of accidents to a 
                                                 
462 Summa Theologica I: 85a6. 
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thing. These accidental properties are the “surroundings of the thing in its essence” as 
described in the passage above. One could be more precise by using the language of 
form: accidental forms are the qualities of things that are unified and organized by the 
substantial form that makes a thing what it is essentially. If we relate this passage back to 
the preceding discussion of internal and external senses, it becomes clear that error arises 
in the recombination, or synthesis, of the imagination or common sense with respect to 
the piecemeal apprehension of accidents and their attribution to a particular subject. As 
we have also seen in the previous chapter, this understanding of the situation explains 
why the intellect is said to be entirely separable from physical sensation. The intellect 
apprehends the form of the thing, its essence, immaterially. But this is made possible by 
virtue of the synthesizing work of the phantasy or common sense. The imagination 
furnishes a kind of “standardized” material, i.e., an imagistic representation of the thing 
that is at once accessible to the intellect for the purposes of rational contemplation, but 
also serviceable for the senses with respect to the particular instances of such a thing. 463
In this picture of cognition, we have confidence in our capacity to perceive the 
world as it really is through the sensory faculties. However, these sensory faculties 
perceive, strictly speaking, a very narrow slice of reality, i.e., pure sensory qualities. In 
order to represent the world in a way that gives us an accurate picture about objects and 
the way they participate in any of the ten categories (e.g., is this white thing here or there, 
of such and such a quality, quantity, etc.), we require some combination and 
representation in the imagination. The standardized mental representation, or phantasm, 
  
                                                 
463 Frede, “The Cognitive Role of Phantasia,” 288-92. 
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can be related to what was frequently called a ‘common nature’, or the set of properties 
shared by some group of individuals. The common nature is a somewhat broader concept 
than species or genus and thus has a wider ranging use, but it generally serves the same 
purpose, i.e., to pick out certain traits that are shared by members of a given class. Here, 
at the level of the imagination and the formation of a concept of common nature, as it 
pertains to perceived objects, we begin to acquire the kind of information about the world 
that can be put in propositional terms. However, precisely at this point, we become liable 
to error. If we attain the level of essences, where the pure intellect apprehends the true 
nature of some thing, then we can also be assured that we have a fix on the truth of 
things. But how do we get from the non-representational, dissolute sensory qualities to 
the level of essences? How do we pass through, and make use of, the representational 
capacities of the imagination without it leading us astray? 
 
Abstractive and intuitive cognition 
 
As we have seen in Aquinas, as soon as the intellect is involved in the process of 
cognition, the object cognized is no longer a particular entity, i.e., something with 
determinate matter under determinate dimensions. Even at the level of the imagination, it 
is not clear that what is imagined has a particular character. Rather it seems to have a 
common character, presenting general natures or qualitites that are present in the 
individual, but in more generic way. The process of “turning to the phantasm” allows for 
the intellect to be determined by the imagination, but it seems to me that this is still a 
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level higher than direct sensory contact with determinate bodies. Toletus argues against 
this reading, however. He claims that the intellect does indeed know sensible singulars. 
The reasons he supplies are somewhat piecemeal: the senses do not know singulars as 
such because, for instance, the senses cannot discriminate the white from the sweet (this 
requires the common sense); the intellect corrects the sense, so the intellect must have 
knowledge of singulars in order to correct sensory information; the intellect reasons about 
propositions that include singular terms; the higher power possesses eminently whatever 
the lower powers know; and prudence, which is practical intellection, is about singulars. 
These conclusions, when taken together, are supposed to show that there are a number of 
instances, and maybe even the principle ones, where the intellect is normally said to have 
knowledge of singulars. Toletus denies that the process of “turning toward the phantasm” 
entails that the intellect is mediated in its contact with sensible particulars. Instead, he 
takes it that the intellect actually knows those particulars, and that by virtue of this it can 
discriminate between individuals of the same species. Toletus considers the intellect to 
know the singular as united with a universal form, but to know the singular all the 
same.464
                                                 
464 Comentarii in de Anima, Lib. III, c. 4, txt. 15, q. 12, 139-140. 
 I do not wish to dispute Toletus’ interpretation of Aquinas, but I would like to 
point out that the issues I have outlined here lead some thinkers to reject Aquinas’ 
interpretation in favor of a more straightforward understanding of the cognition of 
particulars. I will devote some attention to the theory of abstractive and intuitive 
cognition, as it was developed in John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. 
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Duns Scotus is famous for his claim that being is the first object of the intellect. 
His claim is based on the “twofold primacy” of being: being is contained either 
essentially or virtually in any thing that can be known, i.e., being is common to every 
intelligible thing either by virtue of its own existence or the existence of what participates 
in it; and, in both of the cases mentioned, being is the primary concept.465
When the intellect apprehends something, it apprehends it as existing either 
quidditative or virtually. Moreover, this apprehension is immediate, intuitive, and 
evident, by virtue of the simple apprehension of the thing itself. Such a view paves the 
way for conceiving of the other transcendentals (unity, goodness, and truth) as pertaining 
to all intelligible things. Yet, for Scotus, being is unique in that it is not only the most 
general designation, applying to all conceivable things, but a thing’s existence makes it 
 Scotus argues 
that being is univocal, though he concedes that being is predicated differently for those 
concepts that are irreducibly simple (since it cannot be analyzed out of those concepts). 
For all concepts that are not irreducibly simple (such as species, genus, and individual), 
they hold being in common as a designation of their real nature, or in quid. For those that 
are irreducibly simple (such as being itself, substance, and God), these concepts cannot 
be predicated in quid because nothing in the concept can be analyzed out of it (we cannot 
understand God in abstraction from God’s existing). Nonetheless, being can be said to be 
contained in these concepts virtually, or as a quidditative predicate of its effects. In either 
case, Scotus argues that being is the first, most primary and common, object of the 
intellect.  
                                                 
465 Ordinatio I, d. 3, nos. 137-39; following William A. Frank and Allan B. Wolter, Duns Scotus, 
Metaphysician. 
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what it is in a singular, particular way. Thus, Scotus grounds his metaphysics in a concept 
that is the basis of the particular existence of any individual and a universally applicable 
concept. The simple apprehension of being allows the intellect to have general 
knowledge, but also be in direct contact with real entities external to the mind. 
Ockham makes the notion of intuitive cognition, or the direct apprehension of a 
concrete particular more thematic. The idea seems to be that the mind has the capacity for 
direct contact with extra-mental entities in a way that is immediately evident. This kind 
of contact pertains primarily to contingent and temporally dependent truths about 
individuals.466 He contrasts intuitive cognition with abstractive cognition which is not 
about temporally dependent or contingent truths about individuals, but concerns more 
general truths about individuals. In Ockham’s theory of cognition, intuitive cognition is 
about propositions or sentences and not about species, objects, or some other causal 
mechanism. That is, concepts about individuals (either general or contingent) are referred 
to a mental language that is acquired by virtue of the impressions of various objects on 
the mind.467
                                                 
466 See E. Karger, “Ockham’s Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” in 
the Cambridge Companion to Ockham, 210-11. 
 The initial impression generates an intuitive cognition which can then 
become the basis for abstractive cognitions. For Ockham, the linguistic, propositional, or 
logical form of mental language allows for an extension of the concrete, intuitive 
cognition of particulars to a more general metaphysics. In a sense, this view of cognition 
(though sharing some of the same terminology) is quite different than Scotus’. Whereas 
Scotus would hold that being is the first object of the intellect by virtue of its universality, 
467 See Calvin. G. Normore, “The Invention of Singular Thought,” in Forming the Mind, 117. 
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Ockham holds that the first objects of intellection are entirely unique, discrete 
individuals. Unlike Scotus, for whom being is logically primary in the order of 
intellection, Ockham holds the individual as the primary object of the intellect because it 
is causally primary. That is, discrete individuals cause an intuitive cognition, which is in 
turn the logical basis for abstractive cognitions. In either case, however, there is a close 
connection between the putative existence of intelligible essences (insofar as something 
exists as a this, i.e., quidditatively) and the causal primacy of singular entities. Both allow 
for an explanatory metaphysics that short circuits the gap between intelligible essence 
and singular entity that we found in Aquinas.  
 
Simple natures in Aristotelian scientific explanation 
 
This very brief outline of some of the debates surrounding the apprehension of 
essences and singular entities allows us to move to the difficulties involved in scientific 
explanation. The chief difficulty in scientific investigation, for the late scholastic authors 
we are considering, is to distinguish the accidental from the essential properties of a 
thing, the manner in which they are combined and attributed to a particular subject, 
understanding that only those essential properties constitute the quiddity of the thing. 
Whether or not our intellect is capable of grasping the quidditative nature of individuals 
will have a direct consequence for the nature of scientific explanation. The Coimbrian 
commentaries introduce the concept of ‘simple natures’ in just this context, in the 
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commentary on Physics I, 1 (Q. 2, Art. 3). 468
The first book of the Physics, by contrast, enjoys a prolonged discussion in the 
commentary. The passage where they introduce the simple natures occurs in a chapter 
that treats the basic goal of any scientific inquiry, i.e., knowledge of principles, causes, or 
elements, and the method of reaching that goal, i.e., “to start from the things which are 
more knowable and clear to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more 
knowable by nature” (184a 16-17). In a certain way, this passage indicates the close 
relation between epistemological questions and scientific explanations. It is, in a way, 
natural to consider whether there are any simple natures, or simply apprehended qualities 
of things, that could also serve as the starting points of scientific investigation. Of course, 
Physics I, 1 is notoriously difficult to interpret, especially when Aristotle explains what 
he means by this movement from what is known by us to what is known by nature. In 
that famous passage, he says, “Now what is to us plain and clear at first is rather confused 
masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us by analysis. Thus we 
must advance from universals to particulars; for it is a whole that is more knowable to 
sense-perception; and a universal is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within 
it, like parts” (184a 21-25). As the Coimbrians note, this passage created a great deal of 
 It is interesting that the Coimbrians do not 
address the simple natures in their commentaries on De Anima Bk. III, 7, as Toletus had. 
Their commentary on that passage is sparse. Perhaps this reflects a shift in focus, perhaps 
it reflects the way that the concept ‘simple nature’ was historically thematized, or perhaps 
it simply reflects the Coimbran’s deference to Toletus’ De Anima commentary. 
                                                 
468 I refer to the Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu, in octos libros Physicorum 
Aristotelis. 
 438 
controversy and a number of different interpretations (I, 1, Exp., 48). For example, it is 
not clear in what sense “wholes,” which are compared to universals, are perceivable by 
the senses. Furthermore, it would seem that Aristotle has it backwards in this passage, 
claiming that we begin with universals and move to particulars, when universals, i.e., 
principles, causes, or elements, are what is sought in scientific investigation. Thus, the 
commentary spends nearly 30 pages expanding on the brief text of Physics I, 1. 
In the opening explanation of the passage, the Coimbrians confirm our suspicion 
about the passage. The way they put it is that scientific knowledge moves from the minus 
communis to the magis communis, or, from particulars to universals (Exp., 50). This 
movement is accomplished by way of the method of analysis, i.e., by seeking the middle 
term that explains what is less general by what is more general. Next, they make four 
assertions concerning this general rule that are meant to determine the nature of scientific 
knowledge. First, they claim that all philosophers agree that what we know in the first 
place are accidents, not essences. Second, in order to understand the essence of a thing, 
one must know the causa interna, not the causa externa. So, it would seem, our initial 
understanding of the thing per accidens must advance to an understanding per essendi by 
way of an inquiring into the internal cause of the thing’s nature, its intrinsic features. 
Third, the perfect demonstration must refer to an underlying genus, i.e., the categorical 
basis of the thing’s nature. Finally, it is not sufficient to know the cause, one must also 
understand its effects and all those attributes that are essentially connected to it (Exp., 50-
51). Thus, understanding of essences moves from particular to universal by reference to 
the causes that make a thing what it is. However, those causes are not completely 
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understood until one knows all of the effects of that cause, or all of the particulars 
contained under the universal. The Coimbrians thus take the Thomistic line that we have 
seen above, guaranteeing scientific knowledge through reference to the analysis of terms 
and the ways in which they can be said to belong to the ten categories. 
In Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, first principles, which are also said to be 
necessarily true and immediately perceived, are the starting points of scientific 
demonstration: “it is necessary for demonstrative understanding in particular to depend 
on things which are true, primitive, and immediate as well as more familiar than, prior to, 
and explanatory of the conclusion” (Pos. An. 71b 20-23).469
                                                 
469 We should insert some caveats to a strict analogy between Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and 
Descartes’ Regulae on this issue. First, the Posterior Analytics is also the source of the 
doctrine of a division between the sciences. In Bk. I, Ch. 7, Aristotle clearly states, “One 
cannot, therefore, prove anything by crossing from another genus” from which it follows, for 
example, that “one cannot prove by geometry that there is a single science of opposites … nor 
can one prove by any other science the theorems of a different one” (Pos. An. 75a 38 and 75b 
14-16). This is clearly a source of the division of sciences according to subject-matter, which 
is something that Descartes rejects. Second, Aristotle’s epistêmê appears, at least in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, to be strictly distinguished from a science of action, phronêsis, and a 
kind of universal wisdom, sophia (NE Bk. VI, Ch. 5-7). However, in the first rule, Descartes 
seems suggest a strong rapport, if not an identification, between all three: “the sciences are 
nothing other than human wisdom” (AT X, 360) and “If, therefore, someone seriously wants 
to investigate the truth of things … he should … consider simply how to increase the natural 
light of his reason … in order that his intellect should show his will what decision it ought to 
make in each of life’s contingencies” (AT X, 361). 
 These “true, primitive, and 
immediate” things are the “first principles” [archê] of Greek science, which are the 
starting-points of scientific explanation and the most universal objects of knowledge. For 
Aristotle, in the Posterior Analytics, the first principles of science are indemonstrable, 
“immediate” and “primitive,” though it is not possible to have demonstrative 
understanding without possessing an understanding of those principles. In short, 
demonstration from first principles is the essence of scientific knowledge (epistêmê, 
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scientia). Aristotle defines epistêmê as a kind of “demonstrative understanding,” that is, 
an understanding of something that is both aware of the object and the explanation 
through which the object is what it is, such that this understanding cannot be otherwise: 
“whenever we think we are aware both that the explanation because of which the object 
is its explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise” (Pos. An. 71b 10-
11). This is the kind of understanding sought in the Physics and indicated in the 
Coimbrian commentaries.  
Now, the method of arriving at knowledge of first principles is notoriously 
unclear. Aristotle calls it a kind of “induction (epagogê)” in the Posterior Analytics II, 
19, which is a movement from particulars to universals by way of experience 
(empeireia). This movement is probably “dialectical” in the sense that it proceeds by way 
of endoxa, through aporietic reasoning, in order to winnow out those universal truths 
from the mass of unfounded opinions. It is likely that this process of induction can be 
understood along the lines of generality and specificity that I have been discussing in this 
chapter. In other words, there are a number of different avenues available to try to 
discriminate the more general qualities from the less general ones as they are either 
contained or not contained in an individual. These techniques are sometimes linguistic, 
sometimes empirical, and sometimes conceptual. But in every case, it is the underlying 
metaphysical structure of individuals, i.e., that they are organized by a substantial form, 
that ensures that these various tactics all have access to knowledge of the same thing. By 
looking closely at the Coimbrian commentary, we will get a better sense of what is 
involved in this process. 
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 Distinct and confused cognition 
Elaborating on the underlying epistemology that characterizes this approach to 
scientific knowledge, the Coimbrians distinguish two kinds of cognition: cognitione 
distincta and cognitione confusa (Q. II: Quaenam sint nobis notoria cognitione distincte, 
56-64). Distinct cognition is cognition of universals or essences, the former is understood 
as a ranging over particular subjects that are contained in it as parts to the whole, the 
latter is understood as the categorical nature of the thing, i.e., its matter, form, or its 
characterization by the categories of being. Distinct cognition is defined in the following 
way: “we know the whole of the thing and all that is contained in it by plain inspection 
[Distincta est, qua totum omnibus, quae in eo continentur, enucleate inspectis, 
cognoscimus]” (Q. II, A. 1, 57). By contrast, confused cognition is “when we apprehend 
the whole and all that is contained in it indiscriminately as if by an intermingled 
cognition [Confusa est, qua totum iis, quae in eo continentur, promiscue tantum ac 
permixtum cognitis, apprehendimus]” (ibid.). In confused cognition, one grasps the 
nature of the thing imperfectly, initially, and by way of its many aspects rather than its 
essence. Each of these cognitive states can be either actual or potential, and they can 
coexist in the apprehension of a thing. For example, it is possible to have an actually 
distinct cognition and a potentially confused cognition of the same thing at the same time; 
likewise, it is possible to have a potentially distinct, yet actually confused cognition of the 
same thing; but it is not possible to have an actually distinct and confused cognition, nor 
a potentially distinct and confused cognition, of the same thing at the same time. The 
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reason for this is that one may know the internal cause of a thing and thus have a distinct 
cognition of it, but one may not simultaneously know how that cause is differentiated 
from the underlying genus of the thing. One might, for instance, know that rationality 
defines the human being, but not be aware of the fact that rationality differentiates the 
human being as animal, and thus not possess the full definition of the human being. 
Consequently, this knowledge of human beings is potentially confused, since we are not 
at that moment attending to certain aspects of the thing in question. What we want is an 
actually distinct cognition of the whole of the thing, its internal structure, the way that it 
can be predicated according to each of the categories, and the relationship between its 
internal cause, those categories, and all of the effects related to it. 
 
 Simple natures 
At this point, it becomes relevant for the commentary to introduce the concept of 
simple natures, since these were said to be the objects of distinct cognition par 
excellence, i.e., they are entirely simple, indivisible, essences that contain no possibility 
of truth or falsity. But the Coimbrians introduce this concept with a question, namely, “Is 
it thus possible for the simple natures to fall under an actually confused cognition [Etiam 
Naturas Simplices sub cognitionem confusam actualem cadere posse]?” (Q. II, A. 3, 60). 
This question seems to be relevant since the standard for actually distinct cognition is so 
high, and we will see that in fact this does pose a problem for the actually distinct 
cognition of simple natures. To begin with, however, the Coimbrians seem to identify 
simple natures with the categories of being; they refer to them in this way: “the summa 
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genera and other simple natures [genera summa aliaeque simplices naturae]” (ibid.). 
Thus, the simple natures, in addition to being identified with Aristotle’s notion of 
“indivisibles” in De Anima, also appear to have some relation to the highest genera of 
being, or the categories of being. It would seem that they, too, are relevant to gaining a 
distinct cognition of any particular thing, insofar as it can be explained by way of the 
simple natures. Simple natures are also connected to the differentiae of things, but not 
their species or genus. The reason for this is that species and genus are not, strictly 
speaking, simple. A species is defined by reference to its genus and differentia, and thus 
is inherently composed. The same holds true for all genera up to the highest, which of 
course, are not referred to any higher genera and thus are not themselves composed. 
Differentia, by contrast, could be conceived of as simple qualities that cannot be further 
analyzed. 
These final comments highlight the central conundrum of the simple natures for 
the Coimbrians. That is, while the Aristotelian tradition, and particularly Toletus, seem to 
indicate that some things, e.g., essences or universals, are apprehended simply and 
without composition, when one pushes the nature of familiar sorts of essences, one finds 
them to be composed. Even though the Coimbrians acknowledge that many prior 
philosophers had conceived of simple natures as those things that are perceived by a 
distinct cognition (citing Scotus, Ockham, and Gabriel Biel “and no few others”), they 
object to this way of thinking. I cite the whole passage, which is relatively brief.  
However, the contrary proposition of those saying [that simple natures are not 
perceived by an actually confused intellect] is likely more true, namely, that all of 
these things [i.e., the simple natures, the highest genera, and being itself] can be 
perceived by an actually confused cognition. This [confused cognition] is indeed 
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sufficient for acquaintance of this sort and any kind of account of a whole and its 
parts, an account that is discovered in the aforementioned natural kinds. For 
example, substance, by virtue of the word, as is posited by its own definition, 
which is to be a self-persisting entity, in its own way, even if it is improper to say 
so, is made up of parts: insofar as ‘being’470 is conceived in the way of a genus, 
and ‘to persist of itself’, in the way of a differentia. Therefore, he who would 
perceive of substance in terms of these distinctions will be said to know it 
distinctly, and otherwise to be truly confused. It is the same with the summa 
genera, and all the specific differences, both to the extent that they now exist or 
are capable of being produced by a divine power; and lastly all proximate 
significata of being are in some way essential parts of being, which they are by 
virtue of their own nature or their possible nature, distinctly assumed under being, 
as will be discussed elsewhere. If therefore one were able to conceive all of the 
details together (which, however, only God could do), he would have a distinct 
acquaintance with being; just as it would otherwise be confused. What kind of 
knowledge do they form when I hear that they conceive the absolute name of 
being as ‘that which is’, which is called by some according to the word 
‘acquaintance’? By virtue of this [kind of knowledge], the person would attain no 
immediate siginficatum of being in its details.471
 
 
From this passage, it appears as though the Coimbrians advocate a very radical position 
relative to distinct cognition of simples. The passage seems to imply that it is virtually 
impossible for human beings to possess a distinct cognition of anything because it is not 
possible for us to simultaneously grasp the general essence along with all of the details 
relative to its nature. In the case of being itself, only God could do this. In some measure, 
                                                 
470 Reading ens for eus. 
471 Verior tamen est contraria sententia aientium posse hec omnia cognitione confusa actuali 
percipi. Sat est enim ad huiusmodi notitiam qualiscumque ratio totius, et partium; quae ratio in 
praedictis naturis invenitur. Nam substantia, verbi causa, ut patet ex ipsius definitione, quae 
est ens per se subsistens, suo modo, et si improprie, constat partibus; quaetenus eus concipitur 
ad modum generis, per se subsistens, ad modum differentiae. Qui igitur substantiam hac 
adhibita distinctione perceperit, dicetur eam distincte cognoscere; qui vero aliter, confuse. 
Item genera summa, omnesque differentiae specierum, tam quae iam extant, quam quae divina 
virtute produci queunt; et deinque omnia proxima entis significata, sunt quodammodo partes 
essentiales entis, cum sint ipsa ratio, seu potius rationes entis distincte sumpti, ut alibi fusius 
dicetur. Haec ergo si quis particulatim complecti posset, (quod tamen soli Deo competit) si 
distinctam haberet entis notionem; alioqui confusam tantum; qualis est ea, quam formant, qui 
audito entis nomine absolute concipiunt id quod est, quae a quibusdam vocabuli notio 
appellatur; propterea quod nullum immediatum entis significatum particulatim attingat.” In 
octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, I, 1, Q. II, A. III, 60. 
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the passage seems to be motivated by a confrontation with the Scotist and Ockhamist 
positions on intuitive cognition described above. Thus, the passage ends with the 
contention that only God could truly be said to grasp the essence of being in all of the 
details (particulatim), while the person who says that being is simply ‘that which is’ (id 
quod est) has only a confused cognition of it.  
While this may be the case, there are also some important concepts in play that 
need to be fleshed out. In particular, the Coimbrians make the case that a thing cannot be 
said to be conceived distinctly if the way in which it is conceived can be further analyzed. 
The example they give is substance, whose definition as an ens per se subsistens can be 
analyzed into ens and per se subsistens. Here they take ens to be the genus and per se 
subsistens to be the specific difference. In this way, the cognition of substance, unless 
that cognition is aware of the parts contained in its definition, is confused. In a certain 
measure this is a reasonable position. Insofar as we attend to the general nature of thing, 
we allow parts that compose that nature to lapse into obscurity. In fact, it seems 
impossible for human cognition to simultaneously grasp the general essence of a thing 
and its parts, whether those parts are conceptual, i.e., definitional or real. However, the 
Coimbrian position seems to fly in the face of the Aristotelian notion of indivisibles and 
universals outlined above. According to Aristotle in De Anima, a line or a segment of 
time can be conceived of as indivisible even though these are paradigmatic cases of 
things that can be indefinitely divided. In this way, it seems, Aristotle takes ‘indivisible’ 
to mean ‘actually undivided’. If this doctrine were upheld, then we could surely claim, 
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against the Coimbrians, that ‘substance’ is indivisible insofar as it is taken as a whole, 
though of course its definition can be analyzed.  
Moreover, the Coimbrian position seems to collapse into a denial of any distinct 
cognition at all. Cognizing ‘substance’ is said to be confused unless we understand that 
by substance we mean a being that is self-subsistent. But this seems to imply that the 
truly distinct cognition of substance is actually a cognition of many things at once: the 
word ‘substance,’ its definition, the parts of that definition, and the identity between 
them. If this is what is meant by an actually distinct cognition of simples, then such a 
cognition is not simple at all! It is impossible—short of tautology—to provide a 
definition of a thing that is not itself composed of several concepts. Moreover, any 
general essence must range over and refer to many particulars. So, it is difficult to see 
how the Coimbrian position elaborated in this passage does not lead either to outright 
skepticism with respect to distinct cognition or to a view of distinct cognition that is so 
complex it could hardly be called ‘intuitive’.  
In an apparent effort to mitigate the seeming intrasigence of this position, the 
Coimbrians make use of the doctrine of forms and the nature of sensation that we have 
discussed above. Even in the quoted passage, they suggest that the movement from 
particulars to universals depends on unlocking the internal hierarchical relation of 
essence, the ladder of being. This is possible because the essence of an individual 
includes its species, genus, and differentia. Therefore, by considering many individuals, 
and specifying their definitions, one can reconstruct the relationship that exists between 
them. Further in the commentary, they caution that such a move is not mathematical, 
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such that it follows some sequential order. Rather, the order of being is a rank ordering, 
based on the relative nobility of each individual (Commentarium Physicorum I, Art. IV, 
Resp. I). So, they conclude, the chain of being ought not be conceived as a linear 
ascension from lower to higher, neither should God’s omnipotence diminish the nobility 
of any individual, but the complex relations among species define the nobility of any 
individual. So, for instance, human knowledge should not attempt to reach divine 
knowledge, even though this is the highest form of knowledge. Rather, the order of 
knowing ought to reflect the knower’s place in the order of nature (63-64). In this respect, 
the human being is not in an utterly destitute position relative to scientific knowledge. 
Indeed, since perception, as we have seen above, is always of some particular substance, 
and necessarily implies the production of a phantasm, there are a variety of ways that 
human perception lends itself to general conclusions (Q. III, Art. IV). For instance, this 
perception of white admits of at least two types of classification and investigation: with 
respect to the genera ‘color’, and with respect to the ‘this’, e.g., Socrates, i.e., man, i.e., 
rational animal (69-70). The perception of any quality thus admits of investigation into its 
nature and the nature of the substance in which it is perceived to inhere (because it is 
impossible for a human being to perceive a quality without its inhering in a substance). 
To put this all together, one perceives an instance of some quality, or many instances of 
that quality, and from these particulars, one forms a minus universalia, a least general 
abstraction. The perception of this minus universalia is actually distinct, but potentially 
confused, since it is apprehended as such, but its nature is not fully known. It is this 
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perception that precedes and leads to the actually distinct cognition of the magis 
universalia, which encompasses the minus universalia as its part (Q. III, Art. V, 72). 
This strange talk of universalia may be confusing. However, it can be understood 
in a much more general, epistemological way. Our cognition of things is always by 
means of a form or species, i.e., the sensible and intelligible species, which by their very 
nature contain a measure of generality, a naturae communes. The Coimbrians claim: 
“The universal is the object of the intellect, while the singular is the object of the senses 
[Universale est objectum intellectus, singulare objectum sensus]” (73). Thus, the first 
universal that we come to know is the singulare. As long as the Coimbrians maintain that 
the object of sensation is a singular entity whose nature participates in the order of being, 
and thus shares in a more general, common nature, then it is possible for them to claim 
that we can move from the perception of particulars to knowledge of universals. It is by 
virtue of one’s possessing the form of the singular entity, through perception, that one can 
gain a foothold in the order of being, since every entity’s form is defined by relation to its 
genera and specific difference. I think this is what they mean when they invoke the 
cryptic dictum: “The least of the highest is grasped by the highest of the least [infimum 
summi conjungitur summo infimi]” (Q. V, A. I). That is, particular substances are grasped 
by the intellect of human beings. Substances are the highest things to be known, while 
human beings are the lowest of intelligible beings. Thus, even though sensation only 
receives the accidents of things, it is the particular substance itself that is perceived, and it 
is by virtue of this unifying character of individual substances that the intellect has access 
to essences in general. Though this picture may resolve some of the difficulties posed in 
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the previous pages, it commits any epistemological account of scientific investigation to a 
very complex metaphysics. 
 
In this section, we have seen a number of examples of the way that epistemology, 
science, and metaphysics were linked in late scholastic writings. Of particular interest to 
us is the apparent difficulty for traditional Aristotelian commentators (Aquinas, Toletus, 
and the Coimbrians) to account for any direct, intuitive knowledge of particulars. As a 
result, the Aristotelian theory of science relied heavily on a metaphysical picture of the 
world, which understood individuals to participate in a hierarchical structure of species, 
genus, and the categories. The essence of individuals could be discovered by carefully 
discriminating perceived qualities and the way that each participated, either accidentally 
or essentially, in the existence of the thing (on the one hand) and in that overarching 
metaphysical totality. According to this picture of the relationship between metaphysics 
and science, there does not appear to be any place for the direct, intuitive grasp of ‘simple 
natures’. Though Aristotle’s De Anima and Toletus’ commentary seem to suggest that 
such a direct apprehension of natures is possible, that position is severely mitigated by 
the possibility of those simples, grasped intuitively by the intellect, being natures in the 
relevant sense. Indeed, all natures are composites, necessarily, of some substantial form 
and determinate matter. Moreover, all existing forms admit of analysis into species, 
genus, and specific difference. So it seems unlikely that anything like ‘simple natures’ is 
really basic to the Aristotelian theory of science. Nonetheless, we note the existence of 
theories of intuitive cognition in Scotus and Ockham, where there does seem to be some 
 450 
immediate and direct contact between the mind and extra-mental entities. This may be a 
source of the concept of ‘simple natures’, but there is no sustained discussion of simple 
natures in their writings. The belief in truly simple starting points for science seems to be 
a modern invention. 
 
Bacon’s use of simple natures 
 
The attention given to the concept of simple natures in the Coimbrian 
commentary suggests that the term ‘simple nature’ had gained some usage in the 16th 
century. It may have been connected with the idea of “intuitive cognition” or Aristotle’s 
notion of “indivisibles” in De Anima. In either case, the Spanish Jesuits address the issue 
in the context of natural philosophical explanations and come to the conclusion that such 
natures, if they exist, are initially conceived in a confused way. However, Francis Bacon 
suggests a role for the simple natures in his metaphysics. I believe that this is the most 
probable source for Descartes’ use of the term in the Regulae. I imagine that Descartes 
confronted Bacon’s philosophy most earnestly in 1625 when he returned to Paris and 
began working on the Regulae. Bacon’s Novum Organum and his attempt to replace the 
Aristotelian syllogism with a mechanistic method of scientific discovery was well known 
to Mersenne’s Circle after the publication of La Vérité des sciences in 1624. Surely there 
were those in Paris who wondered if the simple natures that Bacon spoke so promisingly 
of could provide a real foundation for mechanistic natural philosophy. Though I cannot 
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prove that this scenario is accurate, it fits the historical information we do have about a 
connection between Bacon and Descartes on the issue of the simple natures. 
 
Historical connections between Bacon and Descartes 
 
Though there are many historical connections between Descartes and Bacon, I 
believe Mersenne to have provided the real impetus behind the “Baconian” elements in 
the Regulae. Isaac Beeckman and Constantijn Huygens also knew of the Novum 
Organum in the early 1620s.472 Huygens expresses the highest praise for Bacon’s Novum 
Organum as early as 1621, but Descartes would not meet him until 1632. Conversely, 
when Beeckman writes a resume of Bacon’s Novum Organum in his journal dated 1623, 
Descartes had already returned to France and would not contact Beeckman again until 
1628. Thus, it is most likely that Descartes heard of Bacon through Mersenne, who would 
publish an extended critique of Bacon’s Novum Organum in 1624 in his La Vérité des 
sciences. 473
                                                 
472 See Paul Dibon’s “Sur le reception de l’oeuvre de F. Bacon en Holland dans la première motié 
du XVIIe siècle,” in Terminologia e Fortuna nel XVII secolo, pp. 91-115. 
 It possible that the Novum Organum was making waves among intellectual 
circles in Holland in the early 1620s and that Descartes had been alerted to the work prior 
to his meeting Mersenne. However, like so many issues central to the early career of 
Descartes, it is in discussions with Mersenne that Descartes would consistently show an 
interest in Baconian philosophy. In their correspondence during the early 1630s, we find 
473 Mersenne, La Vérité des sciences contre les sceptiques ou Pyrrhoniens. 
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several references to Bacon, suggesting a history of discussion between the two men on 
that topic.474
The letter of January 1630 is most suggestive of a terminological inheritance of 
the simple natures from Bacon. In that letter, Descartes thanks Mersenne for giving him a 
list of Aristotle’s categories. But, he says, “I have already made another, larger list: in 
part taken from Bacon, and in part from my own thought. This will be one of the first 
things which I will undertake to explain [in my treatise on physics], and it will not be as 
difficult as one might think, because, having posited the foundations, they follow directly 
from them.”
  
475
A careful student of both Bacon and Descartes, Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), 
offers further suggestion to this supposed connection in his own letters. Spinoza 
reinforces Descartes’ testimony about the similarity between his principles of scientific 
explanation, his categories of material things, and Bacon’s. In a letter to Henry 
Oldenburg, April 1662, he criticizes Boyle for attempting to restate what Descartes and 
Bacon have already proven in a clearer fashion:  
 This letter in particular seems to indicate that the simple natures, which 
clearly describe the “qualities of things” and are so close to the foundations of Descartes’ 
science that they would follow immediately from them, were developed, at least in part, 
with Bacon in mind.  
                                                 
474 The letters to Mersenne of January 1630 (AT I, 109), December 23 1630 (AT I, 195), and May 
10 1632 (AT I, 251), make direct reference to “Virulamus,” while the letter to Golius of May 
19 1635 makes oblique reference to Bacon’s De Augmentis Scientiarum with the phrase “to 
put the sea to the test.” These references were first noted by Gaston Milhaud, Descartes 
savant, see ch. 10. 
475 "Je vous remercie des qualities que vous avez tirées d’Aristote: j’en avais déjà fait une autre 
plus grande liste, partie tirée de Verulamio, partie de ma tête, et c’est une des premières choses 
que je tâcherai d’expliquer, et cela ne sera si difficile qu’on pourrait croire, car les fondements 
étant pose, elles fuient d’elles-mêmes" (AT I, 109). 
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... the very illustrious Mr. Boyle is trying to show that all tactile qualities depend 
only on motion, shape, and the remaining mechanical states. But, since these 
proofs are not put forward by the very illustrious Mr. Boyle as mathematical [i.e., 
in the form of a geometrical proof], there is no need to see whether they are 
completely convincing. But in the meanwhile I do not know why the very 
illustrious Mr. Boyle is so anxious to conclude this from this experiment of his; 
for this has already been proved sufficiently and more than sufficiently by 
Verulam and afterwards by Descartes.476
 
  
The idea here seems to be that Bacon and Descartes have both provided sufficient 
arguments for understanding the qualities of material things only insofar as these conform 
to mechanical principles. For Spinoza, Boyle’s experiments on nitre (potassium nitrate) 
add nothing to these arguments. So, there is some confirmation from a careful (and 
relatively contemporary) student of Descartes’ and Bacon’s that they had both established 
a list of qualities of material things according to the principles of mechanics; indeed, that 
Descartes had done so after Bacon [jam a Verulamio, et postea a Cartesio] (the Latin 
suggesting not only a temporal sequence, but possibly a conceptual one as well).  
Now, it is not clear that Bacon’s list of simple natures (if he would have ever 
produced one) would resemble Descartes’. In the lists of simple natures that Bacon 
provides, he includes qualities such as color, volatility, maleability, weight, fluidity, 
dissolution, and a variety of textures. Descartes prefers to consider only the underlying 
properties of extension itself that could give rise to these qualities as material simple 
natures. However, the important thing is to realize that both Descartes and Bacon attempt 
to provide a mechanistic framework for understanding the qualities of material things. 
And perhaps it is this unifying feature that Spinoza and Descartes refer to.  
                                                 
476 The Correspondence of Spinoza, 91. 
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Though Bacon and Descartes have very different philosophical projects and 
different systems of natural philosophy, I believe that Descartes considered Bacon to be a 
kind of colleague in the new science of mechanism. His letters always refer to Bacon 
positively and he seems happy to embrace many elements of Bacon’s natural philsophical 
program. Even in part six of the Discours on the Method (AT VI, 63-65), Descartes 
makes positive reference to Bacon’s idea of “natural histories,” calling on others in the 
scientific community to add to the number of observations and experiments on matters 
relevant to natural philosophy. In light of this Baconian connection, I think we can 
appreciate that Descartes was not necessarily (though perhaps for many practical 
purposes) opposed to the kind of collaborative scientific research program we associate 
with Francis Bacon. 
 
Alphabet of simple letters 
 
Bacon had used the term “simple natures” as early as his 1603 Valerius Terminus, 
written in English and published after his death. In that work, he describes metaphysics in 
the following way: 
Metaphysics is . . . the knowledge of the forms of natures simple and not of 
abstract natures, which are firm and permanent. That these natures are as the 
alphabet or simple letters, whereof the variety of things consisteth … [I]n the 
schools by natural philosophy were meant the knowledge of the efficients of 
things concrete; and by metaphysics the knowledge of the forms of natures 
simple; which is a good and fit division of knowledge: but upon examination there 
is no such matter by them intended. That the little inquiry into the production of 
simple natures sheweth well that works were not sought… (Spedding III, 243).477
                                                 
477 The reference is given according to the The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. and trans. Spedding, 
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In this relatively early philosophical work by Bacon, the “natures simple” are taken to be 
elements of the forms sought after in metaphysics. These are said to be “the alphabet or 
simple letters, whereof the variety of things consisteth.” Here Bacon understands simple 
natures to be closely related to forms, though he distinguishes them from mere abstract 
natures. 
He also calls them an “alphabet of simple letters,” a concept that was discussed 
briefly in Chapter 2 with reference to Bacon’s proposed but never completed project of 
outlining an alphabet of “real characters [characteristica realis].” The concept itself is 
most clearly described in The Advancement of Learning (1605), a text that was rewritten 
and expanded in Latin as De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623). The discussion of real 
characters takes place in the outline of the “Transmission of Science,” and there are few 
emendations of this section in the later version of the work. Here Bacon is concerned 
with the best way to illustrate scientific principles through discourse. Indeed, he refers to 
many of the Renaissance concepts of method that we have seen: in particular, he claims 
that the transmission of science (or learning) concerns “the disposition and collocation of 
that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good digest of 
commonplaces” (Spedding III, 398). This language refers to the concept of an ars brevis 
or a compendium of topoi. Indeed, dispositio and collocatio are technical terms from the 
rhetorical tradition pertaining to the organization of knowledge in such a way that it 
would be transparent and easy for recollection and judgment. This is the context in which 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ellis, and Heath. A table of citations of Bacon’s use of “simple natures” can be found in M. 
Fattori, Linguaggio e Filosofia ne Seicento Europa. 
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we discussed classical memory art, whose techniques Bacon acknowledges as necessary 
to shore up the deficiencies of memory. However, he is critical of the tradition of 
mnemotechnics when he says, “An art there is extant of it; but it seemeth to me that there 
are better precepts than that art, and better practices of that art than those received” 
(ibid.).  
Now, real characters, as Bacon conceives of them here, would serve as those 
“better precepts.” They are to be understood on analogy with heiroglyphics and Chinese 
characters which, Bacon thinks, have the common property of representing things or 
concepts directly, rather than through the arbitrary signification of, for example, Latinate 
words. Real characters are not necessarily images or pictorial heiroglyphs, they may be 
established by convention, but the key notion is that they represent the things themselves 
directly, not nominally. 
Moreover, it is well known that in China and the provinces of the farthest East 
there are in use at this day certain real characters, not nominal; characters, I 
mean, which represent neither letters nor words, but things and notions; insomuch 
that a number of nations whose languages are altogether different, but who agree 
in the use of such characters (which are more widely received among them), 
communicate with each other in writing; to such an extent indeed that any book 
written in characters of this kind can be read off by each nation in their own 
language. (Spedding IV, 439; cf. Spedding III, 399-400). 
 
A useful technique, indeed! If scientific learning could be transposed into a language of 
real characters, i.e., characters “which represent neither letters nor words, but things and 
notions,” then we would be in possession of a kind of universal language of concepts that 
could be “read off by each nation in their own language.” Of course, Bacon never 
develops the specifics of such a language, but he seems to hold out hope that such a thing 
could exist. Consider, for instance, the capacities of the inhabitants of the New Atlantis 
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(1624) who, as they tell Bacon, had been given a great gift “conform to that of the 
Apostles in the original Gift of Tongues,” which enabled them to translate any worldly 
language into another (Spedding III, 138-39). It seems that this secret book of translation 
is ingredient to the diffusion and record of knowledge in that venerable House of 
Solomon related in Bacon’s fable. Some of Bacon’s followers attempted to carry out this 
project of describing the real, notional characters, for example, consider John Wilkin’s 
Essay Toward a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (1668). And this idea 
would resonate with Leibniz as we have seen. Though he was unable to fulfill his vision 
for a true language of real characters, Bacon’s objective tokens a more basic belief: 
namely, that the ultimate arbiter (and only remedy for confusion) in matters of language 
is the things themselves, which words are supposed to represent.478
In the Valerius Terminus, Bacon describes the simple natures as an alphabet or 
simple letters, which are “few and permanent” and “whereof the variety of things 
consisteth; or as the colours mingled in the painter’s shell, wherewith he is able to make 
infinite variety of faces or shapes” (quoted above). Thus, he considers there to be some 
underlying natures or elements of things that are permanent and unchanging and through 
which all things can be recreated or represented, just as any given object can be 
 Thus, for Bacon, 
words, thoughts, or concepts are only valued insofar as they accurately represent extra-
mental reality. Moreover, he has a fairly uncomplicated view of how thoughts and 
concepts might relate to reality: true concepts, which would be picked out by real 
characters, denote the elements of natural things. 
                                                 
478 Rossi, Francis Bacon, 166-69. 
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represented by the painter using a limited palate of colors. His hope is that one could 
discover these simple natures and list them, as if in an alphabet, such that anyone would 
be in possession of a true philosophical language of essences. The underlying 
philosophical claim that supports this hope is to be found in Bacon’s theory of forms, 
since it is knowledge of the “forms of simple natures” in which metaphysics consists.  
 
Forms and simple natures 
 
There would certainly be a lot of philosophical work involved in translating the 
forms of things into a systematic philosophical language, but the basic metaphysical idea 
is fairly simple. Bacon believes that there are such eternal essences of things, that these 
are few, and that they can be known by the human intellect. For Bacon, forms are to be 
distinguished from the efficient causes of concrete things, since they are abstract and 
metaphysical. However, there is a relationship already expressed between the forms of 
simple natures and the efficient causes of material effects: he tells us, forms are those 
“laws of motions and alterations by means whereof all works and effects are produced” 
(Spedding III, 244). In Bacon’s estimation, the greatest error of traditional philosophy is 
not to have adequately distinguished the forms, on the one hand, from works and effects, 
on the other. Here Bacon is probably referring to a trend of late scholastic philosophy, 
where the notion of substantial form had largely become identified with its role as an 
“internal efficient cause,” by sustaining and regulating the existence of that which the 
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efficient cause originally produced.479
The full doctrine of the “forms of simple natures” will not be articulated until the 
Novum Organum. But without turning to that work just yet, is it possible to determine 
what the simple natures are for Bacon? First, Bacon indicates that metaphysics is the 
study of “the forms of simple natures.” That metaphysics is the study of forms would 
have been widely acknowledged, but that these forms are the forms of simple natures is 
unique. I think this is ambiguous. Up to this point, I have been speaking of simple natures 
as elements that constitute forms. However, it may be possible to understand the forms as 
types of natures, refering to simple natures as tokens, or instances, of form-types. In 
support of this reading, we can turn to Bacon’s definition of forms as “laws of motion 
and alteration.” Here, the simple natures must be those qualities or elements from which 
one can abstract general laws of motion and alteration. The fact that mercury (quicksilver 
or aqua regis, as it was known) can dissolve gold is a result of the forms of mercury and 
gold. The form describes the law that holds that gold will dissolve mercury. The simple 
natures are those qualities of gold and mercury that Bacon thought would be the basis for 
the laws that govern its interactions. Anything else that possesses these same qualities 
would express the same law of relation, e.g., solubility. On the other hand, if we take the 
view that simple natures are constitutive elements of forms, then it makes sense how 
simple natures are to objects what the letters of the alphabet are to words in a written 
language. On this reading, simple natures would be those qualities or elements that give 
 I propose that Bacon’s doctrine of forms can thus 
be understood as an attempt to clarify this issue. 
                                                 
479 Pasnau, “Form, Substance, and Mechanism,” 33-34. 
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rise to the variety of objects perceived as parts compose a whole. While I will not try to 
decide which of these two readings is more accurate of Bacon, both readings entail that 
simple natures are real, i.e., actually existing material qualities or elements that have 
causal efficacy. Moreover, it is on the basis of these qualities or elements that one can 
discover the forms or laws governing motion and alteration. At this stage, I leave open 
whether simple natures are qualities or elements of things and what the special 
relationship is between simple natures and forms. 
 
Baconian mechanism and method of induction 
 
As Descartes’ letters to Mersenne indicate, the simple natures will be deployed in 
direct contrast to Aristotle’s categories of being as the basic principles of scientific 
explanation. Whereas Aristotle required that all scientific demonstrations demonstrate 
according to some underlying genus, the mechanistic science of the seventeenth century 
ushered in an era of scientific demonstration based on mechanical models to explain 
observed phenomena. In order to be clear about this context for comparison between 
Descartes and Bacon, let me define what I take to be the central tenet of mechanism in 
the seventeenth century.  
Mechanism holds that the qualities and effects of observed physical phenomena 
are the result of unobserved micro-mechanical structures. These structures operate 
according to basic mechanical models: that is, given a mechanical system, the work put 
into that system is different than the work produced by the system. Consider, for 
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example, a lever, whose ends are A and C, and whose fulcrum is B. A given amount of 
work (force times acceleration) applied to A generates a product at C. This product is 
altered by the placement of the fulcrum at B, i.e., its absolute value is increased or 
decreased and its direction changed. Pulleys, hooks, cogs, and wheels perform similar 
functions. It is possible to imagine innumerable micro-mechanical systems that operate 
analogously and produce a variety of different effects simply as the result of some 
quantifiable relation between the components of the system. One can see that Bacon 
holds such a position when he writes, “for seeing that every natural action depends on 
things infinitely small, or at least too small to strike the sense, no one can hope to govern 
or change nature until he has duly comprehended these” (Spedding IV, 124). 
Furthermore, the mechanist only need posit the existence of these microscopic 
“machines” in order to explain all variety of effects. There are no mysterious “forces,” no 
“action at a distance,” and no “metaphysical fictions” like substantial forms, just 
microscopic mechanical configurations of matter. 
It is commonly assumed that mechanical micro-structures must be composed of 
rigid or semi-regid bodies, like our lever, pulley, hook, and wheel examples. However, 
such a view would not easily explain the kinds of phenomena that mechanists typically 
try to explain. Instead, we probably ought to allow for the conception of mechanical 
bodies as non-rigid, largely fluid bodies. In this way a great many more phenomena can 
be explain mechanically: we can conceive of hydrolic forces, “gunky” lubricating bodies, 
swift-moving gaseous bodies, etc. In the case of Bacon, we must add an additional 
caveat. Unlike, for example, Descartes whose material ontology is as parsimonious as 
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one could hope for, Bacon’s metaphysics of nature is quite complex. Indeed, when Bacon 
appeals to “forms,” he appeals to the inner workings of nature that account for the 
material efficacy of natural elements. In this sense, as has been noted by Paolo Rossi, 
Bacon’s debt to alchemy and “magic” is not simply a remnant of a prior superstition but 
is really ingredient to his account of natural elements and their combinations. For 
instance, his concept of spiritus, i.e., those small, active material particles found in 
metals, is one part mechanist and one part alchemist.480
How does this picture of mechanism and alchemy fit with Bacon’s definitive 
description of the forms and simple natures in the Novum Organum? When Bacon sets 
out to publish his Instauratio Magna, of which the Novum Organum is the second part 
(and the only one completed), his goal is to proscribe a new interpretation of nature. In 
fact, the first part of the Novum Organum is dedicated almost entirely to rooting out the 
old interpretation of nature, what Bacon calls “anticipations of nature.” He accomplishes 
his critique of the “anticipations” by identifying the “idols of the mind” that make them 
possible. These are the prejudices or entrenched opinions that cause us to suppose that we 
 In other words, Bacon describes 
natural change and production according to mechanical microstructures, but he also 
maintains a belief that certain natural elements possess far-reaching, even mysterious 
powers. Of course, these powers are described mechanically, but the belief in the natural 
powers of elements suggests a slightly different picture than what may be inferred by the 
description of mechanism above. 
                                                 
480 Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon, Ch. 1. It is important to keep in mind that Bacon’s relationship to 
magic and alchemy is complex. For instance, he is resolutely critical of the hermetic 
traditions’ practice of wrapping their esoteric teachings in obscurity (31). 
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have a grasp of nature’s real essence. There are four kinds: “Idols of the Tribe” (idola 
tribus), which are common to the race; “Idols of the Den” (idola specus), which are 
peculiar to the individual; “Idols of the Marketplace” (idola fori), coming from the 
misuse of language; and “Idols of the Theatre” (idola theatri), which are related to 
speculation about causes (NO I, 39 ff.). In a more general sense, it is Bacon’s task to 
present a new logic that is truly efficacious.  
Like Descartes, Bacon’s position at the end of the sixteenth century gives him the 
perspective of someone critical of scholastic logic, particularly the syllogism, as 
essentially rhetorical or disputatious and lacking any utility for a true method of 
discovery. By contrast with Descartes, Bacon proposes a logic of induction to provide the 
ars inveniendi that the humanistic critics had found lacking in Aristotle. In some sense, 
the term ‘induction’ is misleading, since it is not quite like either modern induction or 
classical induction. In the preface to the Instauratio, Bacon describes his logic as having 
a practical aim, rather than a disputatious one (“not of arguments but of arts” (Spedding 
IV, 24)), as proceeding “regularly and gradually” from the most particular observations to 
the most general axioms, and as accepting as true only what has been tested through 
experimentation (Spedding IV, 23-26).  
This method of induction differs from the Aristotelian concept of induction where 
the intellect comes to rest on its apprehension of the universal at the end of the process. 
Baconian induction, on the other hand, always persists through further refinement in a 
back and forth manner from the awareness of general laws or forms of nature to 
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particular observations of natures.481 Moreover, Baconian induction is not strictly an 
empiricist method of induction. For Bacon, it is not necessary to obtain a large sample of 
observations for the purposes of deriving a general rule, a few noteworthy instances may 
be sufficient. Furthermore, the practice of Baconian induction involves a preliminary 
awareness of the kinds of experiments and observations that are illuminative; one picks 
and chooses among the possible phenomena in order to shortcut the process and to arrive 
at crucial experiments.482 Finally, Bacon’s logic of induction is embedded in a rich and 
complex metaphysics. Indeed, we will see that Bacon’s metaphysics mirrors his method, 
i.e., the method works only because of the putative nature of the forms it seeks to 
understand.483
The method of induction, as it is practiced in the Novum Organum, is the process 
of isolating and identifying discrete “natures” in things: “Therefore a separation and 
solution of bodies must be effected, not by fire indeed, but by reasoning and true 
induction, with experiments to aid; and by comparison with other bodies, and a reduction 
 Though he warns against hasty and habitual judgments about nature, his 
logic is based on an inherent belief that the mind is ultimately capable of revealing 
nature’s essence. Consequently, Baconian induction is complex. It will not be possible to 
outline the inductive procedure in a few steps. Instead, I will try to provide an overview 
of how Bacon’s induction operates in the discovery of the forms of simple natures. 
                                                 
481 Antonio Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science, 266-67. 
482 See Lisa Jaridine, Francis Bacon, 124-26, for a discussion of “prerogative instances” and their 
function in Bacon’s method of induction. 
483 Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science, 7-31, does an admirable job of outlining the 
various critiques of Bacon in the history of secondary literature. He is especially clear that 
charges of incoherence and inconsistency alleged against Baconian induction are the result of 
prevailing contemporary interpretations about method in the physical science and not a result 
of any real inconsistency in Bacon’s writings themselves. 
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to simple natures and their Forms, which meet and mix in the compound” (Spedding IV, 
125; NO II, 7). This process cannot proceed a priori, for Bacon, since he often protests 
that nature is far too subtle for our gross concepts and words (Spedding III, 388; IV, 24; 
IV, 411); if we rely on the analysis of our concepts as a means to knowledge about 
nature, says Bacon, we risk “letting nature slip out of our hands.” Indeed, this is surely a 
motivation behind Bacon’s skepticism about the efficacy of the mathematical sciences: 
they abide in the “spacious liberty of generalities” (Spedding III, 359) without attending 
to the particularities of matter. Yet, neither is Baconian induction the process of 
exhaustively enumerating all instances and then, from these, drawing a general rule. He is 
consistently critical of the conception of inductio as enumeratio in classical rhetoric, 
calling it “childish” and “precarious” likely for the same reason that he dismisses 
conceptual analysis, i.e., nature is too vast and subtle to supposed that we could have an 
adequate enumeration of instances (Spedding I, 137, 205; and IV, 24, 97, 410). Instead, 
Baconian induction incessantly returns to the things themselves, searching for new 
experiments to perform, new ways to test nature in order to reveal its underlying 
structure. This becomes evident when one examines the various inductive methods 
employed in the Novum Organum and discussed in his other works.  
The conceptual basis for Bacon’s method of induction is what he calls a “natural 
history,” i.e., a summary of previous accounts of a given nature, consisting of the 
tabulation of observations, theories, and principles about it. “The investigation of Forms 
proceeds thus: a nature being given, we must first of all have a muster or presentation 
before the understanding of all known instances which agree in the same nature, though 
 466 
in substances most unlike” (Spedding IV, 127; NO II, 11). In our everyday knowledge of 
things, this role is played by memory, but in the investigation of specific natures, these 
lists are likely too vast, and thus must be written down (Spedding III, 552; IV, 127, NO 
II, 10). The result of this process is what Bacon calls “literate experience” (experientia 
literata) (Spedding IV, 96; NO I, 100-03), i.e., it is a species of experience in general, but 
one that is amenable to the kind of ordered investigation that Bacon wants to undertake, 
no mere “groping in the dark” (Spedding IV, 81, 413; NO I, 82).484
Then the process of induction proper begins. Experiments are designed in order to 
isolate the efficacious qualities in the tables of observation. The experiments are 
supposed to exclude accidental or epiphenomenal qualities from the truly efficacious 
ones. Bacon claims that the process of true induction “is not completed till it arrives at an 
affirmative” (Spedding IV, 149; NO II, 19). That is, the process of exclusion must 
continue until one has found an experiment that identifies a particular quality with the 
desired effect. At this point, Bacon inserts a number of heuristic suggestions that imply a 
scientific practitioner with a good deal of experience. He suggests that experiments be 
performed along the following lines: variation in matter, efficient cause, or quantity of 
 From this treasure-
trove of literate experience, one produces tables of observation. There are several 
varieties of tables—tables of presence, absence, and degrees or comparison (Spedding 
IV, 129; NO II, 11-12)—but the purpose of these is to collate the various observations 
with the qualities and effects of the given nature in order to design experiments.  
                                                 
484 Jardine, Francis Bacon, 144, connects “learned experience” with “practical knowledge” and 
“sagacity” as the knowledge informed by ordered experience (cf. Spedding IV, 366, 413, 424; 
III, 164-65) 
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matter; repetition or extension of the experiment; translation of the experiment into 
another form; inversion of the cause; compulsion of the matter through experiment until 
the effect is no longer produced; application of the experiment to some use; conjunction 
of two causes that produce the same effect in order to enhance that effect; and finally, the 
implementation of some chance causes to create the desired effect (Spedding IV, 413-21). 
Though these suggestions appear strange to a contemporary reader, he suggests that these 
variations of experiment enable one to exhaust the nature of the thing. The heuristics are 
vague, however, and it seems to me to imply that Bacon’s idea of the scientific 
practitioner is much more like an artisan than a research scientist. In other words, the 
scientist is supposed to recognize revealing qualities or experiments and exploit these in 
his analysis of nature. 
The result of the foregoing treatment is what Bacon calls the “first vintage.” Once 
one reaches this level, one prepares an “essay” on the matter in question, an “indulgence 
of the understanding” (Spedding IV, 149; NO II, 20), assessing the strength of 
experiments performed, conclusions reached, and matters left untreated. This is only the 
beginning of the true interpretation of the matter in question. Again, in order to further 
examine the first vintage, Bacon describes certain kinds of prerogative instances that can 
be identified in the tables of observation. These are instances that are supposed to shed 
particular light on the nature in question. Like the heuristics of experimentation, the 
prerogative instances are meant to pick out illuminative observations from the many. 
Thus, the process continues by returning to the particular instances and recomposing 
tables of observation; the first vintage is only the first step in the interpretation of nature.  
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It is clear from this brief outline of Baconian induction that the process of 
exclusion does the heavy lifting with respect to isolating the efficacious natures of the 
given phenomena. The inference underlying the exclusion of some qualities from the 
nature sought is essentially modus tollens: p --> q, ~q, so ~p.485
On account of ignited iron and other metals, which communicate heat to other 
bodies and yet lose none of their weight or substance, reject the communication or 
admixture of the substance of another body. (Spedding IV 148; NO II, 18) 
 In this way, the quality or 
principle p can be excluded because one knows that whenever p, q, and one observes ~q. 
One can see that this is the case by looking at an example from Bacon’s table of 
exclusion concerning the quality of heat. 
 
In this passage, I take “the communication or admixture of the substance of another 
body” as p and the “loss of weight or substance in ignited iron and other metals” as q. It 
is thus quite clear that Bacon’s induction relies on an implicit deductive inference. 
Additionally, the heuristics of experimentation and prerogative instances mentioned 
above suggest a kind of analogical understanding of natures, extending one kind of 
experiment to apply to another kind of matter or effect. In this way, Baconian induction 
also depends on a kind of implicit intuition about analogies between some natures and 
others. Perez-Ramos has provided a complete discussion of the nature of Baconian 
induction in this regard, translating Bacon’s inductive principles in contemporary 
logic.486
                                                 
485 This is, in fact, an overly simplistic way of looking at Bacon’s tables of elimination. There are 
a number of different kinds of inferences that can be made, but I use this particular inference 
as an example. 
 Yet, the variety of experiments, and the importance of “prerogative instances” 
and “crucial experiments” for isolating simple natures, implies a scientific practitioner 
486 Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science, Ch. 17 
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that possesses a certain amount of know-how in the application of the Baconian method. 
One cannot eliminate the practitioner’s input in the process. And the scientist is 
continually forced to return to the particulars and refine his conclusions. 
For Bacon, the things themselves, the facts of observation and experiment, and 
ultimately the internal principles of nature itself, determine the nature of scientific truth. 
This is why Baconian induction is never completed in the discovery of first principles. 
Rather, Bacon’s scientific principles—his forms, as we will see—are not the final say on 
the matter; they operate much more like hypotheses, framing the context for further 
scientific investigation. When this is coupled with the deductive aspect of Bacon’s tables 
of exclusion, there is the sense in which Bacon represents a kind of hypothetico-
deductive scientific method. In this schema, the lack of ultimate first principles does not 
impede its practical efficacy. For Bacon, it is not necessary to have arrived at first 
principles in order for the method to be effective; the inductive steps themselves often 
produce the desired results.  
Notably, Baconian induction is coupled with a concept of “superinduction,” 
whereby the same principles of material nature that lead one to discover its internal 
structure allow one to reproduce a given nature. This is why he says, “for you have but to 
follow and as it were hound nature in her wanderings, and you will be able, when you 
like to lead and drive her afterwards to the same place again” (Spedding IV, 296). The 
reason why this is possible is because induction is the discovery of forms, and 
“whosoever knows any Form, knows also the utmost possibility of superinducing that 
nature upon every variety of matter, and so is less restrained and tied in operation, either 
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to the basis of the matter or to the condition of the efficient” (Spedding IV, 362).487 Thus, 
once one is in possession of the forms (of simple natures), one is capable of reproducing 
any effect produced by those forms. This is the ultimate aim of Baconian science—
reproducing desired effects in nature—though to accomplish this end, one must first 
discover forms. It is what Perez-Ramos has called the “maker’s knowledge tradition,” 
namely, the historical tradition (of which Bacon is a notably example) that recognizes the 
practical or productive origins of speculative or theoretical knowledge about nature.488
 
 As 
I understand it, maker’s knowledge is another way of articulating Vico’s maxim, verum 
et factum convertuntur. In this sense, Baconian induction of forms is an induction of a 
maker’s knowledge-type, i.e., a knowledge that is primarily grounded in productive 
capacity of the understanding. 
Baconian metaphysics and the forms of simple natures 
 
What is the metaphysical structure of forms that allows Bacon to posit a transitive 
relation between induction and superinduction, discovery and production? First, it is 
necessary to understand that Bacon’s forms are not the forms of things or even elements, 
but the forms of qualities or simple natures. In this sense, Bacon entirely rejects 
substantial forms, saying that they are “so perplexed, as they are not to be enquired” 
(Spedding III, 355). Moreover, if one thought that Bacon was investigating substantial 
                                                 
487 cf. Perez-Ramos’ definition of forms: “law-like statements conveying the technological know-
how which guarantees the (re)production of particular effects they describe and/or explicate,” 
ibid. 239. 
488 Ibid. especially Ch. 5, 52. 
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forms, it would seem contradictory for him to claim, as he does above, that production by 
way of the form is possible “upon every variety of matter.” If the definition or essence of 
a thing were identified by its “form,” then this form would surely be united to some kind 
of matter (even if it were not of determinate dimensions) and there would be some 
question whether simply any matter whatsoever serve the production of that form. 
However, Bacon denies that matter is fitted in any way to particular forms; instead, 
Bacon seems to think that matter has a general, undifferentiated character, such that it can 
receive any form at all. Moreover, Bacon explicitly denies that “forms give existence” 
(Spedding IV, 120; NO II, 1). Thus, he explicitly contradicts two of the basic tenets of the 
Aristotelian theory of forms. Yet, Bacon is not a Platonist about forms; for Bacon, forms 
do not exist apart from matter. On the contrary, as we have seen, Bacon conceives of the 
forms of natures as necessarily connected to qualities or simple natures in the same way 
as “the form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters” (ibid.). This, of course, 
recalls the analogy between simple letters, or real characters, and the simple natures. It is 
ambiguous, as we have seen, but in either case it does not imply a Platonist view of 
forms. On one reading, the qualities or elements that are identified with simple natures 
are grouped together to constitute forms. Then forms would be made up of material 
qualities as wholes made up of parts. On the other hand, Bacon could conceive of forms 
as describing general relations between the qualities of things. Here, forms would be 
general laws governing the operation and interaction of simple natures. 
On Bacon’s account of forms, however, it is not always easy to determine what 
the form of a particular quality is. For instance, if one determines that the cause of 
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whiteness in some particular material, say froth or snow, is the result of “the subtile 
intermixture of air and water,” one is not yet in possession of the form of whiteness. For 
example, this definition fails to explain the appearance of whiteness in things that are not 
composed of water and air. Still, Bacon claims, there is something noteworthy in our 
observation, because in these particular cases, we have identified the efficient cause of 
whiteness in froth and snow. In other words, it is the subtle intermixture of air and water 
in snow and froth that brings about the quality of whiteness in those cases. Now, Bacon 
says, the efficient cause of whiteness is the vehiculum formae, the carrier of the form 
(Spedding III, 356). He proposes that such efficient causes are the study of physics, while 
the forms governing those efficient causes are the study of metaphysics, i.e., “physical 
causes give light to new invention in simili materia,” but metaphysical causes are 
applicable to “any variety of matter” (Spedding III, 357). 
How is one to understand this relationship between forms and efficient causes, 
and moreover the difference between metaphysical forms and physical causes? The short 
answer to this question, with reference to the example of whiteness above, is that the 
form of whiteness is the angle of reflection that is produced when light strikes the body. 
In the case of froth or snow, this angle of reflection is brought about by the intermixture 
of air and water. But this particular efficient cause is limited to similar materials as froth 
or snow and does not yet reach the level of a formal law. Thus, the particular, efficient 
causes of the natures in question give rise to the qualities perceived; they explain the 
perceived qualities, but only in a restricted sense. True induction does not stop with these 
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particular causes, but tries to extend to the most general laws. In this vein, I quote the 
third aphorism of the second book of the Novum Organum in its entirety: 
If a man be acquainted with the cause of any nature (as whiteness or heat) in 
certain subjects only, his knowledge is imperfect; and if he be able to superinduce 
an effect on certain substances only (of those susceptible of such effect), his 
power is in like manner imperfect. Now if a man’s knowledge be confined to the 
efficient and material causes (which are unstable causes, and merely vehicles 
(vehicula), or causes which convey the form in certain cases) he may arrive at 
new discoveries in reference to those substances in some degree similar to one 
another (materia aliquaetenus simili), and selected beforehand; but he does not 
touch the deeper boundaries of things. But whosoever is acquainted with Forms 
embraces the unity of nature in substances the most unlike; and is able therefore 
to detect and bring to light things never yet done, and such as neither the 
vicissitudes of nature, nor industry in experimenting, nor accident itself, would 
ever have brought into act, and which would never have occurred to the thought 
of man. From the discovery of Forms therefore results truth in speculation and 
freedom in operation. (Spedding IV, 120) 
 
This passage brings together a number of lines of Baconian science that we have been 
discussing: it highlights the symmetry between knowledge of causes and the power of 
production, i.e., that scientia is potentia; it demonstrates the necessity for a metaphysical 
knowledge of forms, beyond the physical knowledge of causes; and it demonstrates the 
ultimate purpose of such a study. If we return to the example of the whiteness of snow 
and froth, then we may be able to understand why grasping the reflective properties of 
light is closer to “the unity of nature in substances most unlike.” Indeed, it seems that 
Bacon must hold that colors are dependent upon the reflective property of light, however 
this is acheived in a particular natural body. Somehow, Bacon suggests, on'e 
understanding of the reflective property of light that produces whiteness would enable 
one to produce whiteness in a variety of different media. 
 474 
What remains to be explained is the metaphysical picture that underlies this 
schematic overview of Bacon’s science. For Bacon, the physical world is composed of 
the following: simple natures, which are the perceived qualities or the gross textures of 
single or compound bodies; latent processes (latentis processi), which are the underlying 
mechanical features of compound bodies, motions, or operations; and latent 
configurations (latentis schematismi), which are the underlying structures or micro-
textures of bodies. In the Novum Organum, Bacon refers to bodies as “a troop or 
collection of simple natures” (Spedding IV, 122). The simple natures do not account for 
the existence of bodies; rather these are simply the assembled qualities present in the 
body. Again, this is why Bacon claims, in sharp contrast with Aristotle, that “forms do 
not give existence. For though in nature nothing really exists besides individual bodies, 
performing pure individual acts according to a fixed law” (Spedding IV, 120). For Bacon, 
the substantial existence of bodies is of little importance; it is the laws governing their 
actions that lend “operative knowledge,” i.e., knowledge of their means of production. 
Thus, simple natures identify the aggregate qualities in bodies that are of special interest. 
It does not matter whether these aggregate qualities may be present in a single body or a 
compound, their presence or absence is sufficient to warrant investigation. Latent 
processes, then, are the natural and gradual alterations of the simple natures that are 
revealed in the scrutiny of natural processes, e.g., growth, development, nutrition, or 
decay. These are what Bacon calls the “particular and special habits of nature” (Spedding 
IV, 123). In other words, these processes are specific to the particular matter under 
investigation and may not extend to all the transformations of simple natures that can be 
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found. Finally, latent configurations are what Bacon calls the “true anatomy” of bodies. 
That is, just like the gross structural anatomy of a body, latent configurations can be 
thought of as the organs and internal microstructures of all bodies; and they are 
discovered through simple experiments, like distillation or dissection. These are, in 
Bacon’s words, “the true textures and configurations of bodies; on which all the occult 
and, as they are called, specific properties and virtues in things depend; and from which 
too the rule of every powerful alteration and transformation is derived” (Spedding IV, 
125). The latent configurations of bodies are composed of a certain quantity and 
configuration of “spirit” and “tangible essence.” It is this underlying structure that gives 
rise to the gross qualities, or simple natures, that can be perceived with the unaided sense. 
It is not entirely clear to me why Bacon concentrates his efforts on simple natures, 
because it seems to me that latent processes and latent configurations are the far more 
powerful concepts. I would think that it would be a more promising avenue to try to 
discover the underlying microstructures of bodies rather than the gross qualities which 
may be only accidentally associated with those microstructures. Indeed, Lisa Jardine 
laments that it is one of the “great failures” of Bacon’s science not to have worked out the 
relation between latent processes and latent configurations.489
                                                 
489 Jardine, Francis Bacon, 143. 
 However, Bacon is clear in 
his preference for simple natures: “It must be said however that this mode of operation 
(which looks to simple natures though in a compound body) proceeds from what in 
nature is constant and eternal and universal, and opens broad roads to human power, such 
as (in the present state of things) human thought can scarcely comprehend or anticipate” 
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(Spedding IV, 122). The only reason I can see for Bacon’s insistence on the centrality of 
simple natures is his confidence in the capacity of perception to reveal the basic structure 
of nature. He seems to shun the skeptical attitude fiercely and to believe that the only 
progress that can be made in the sciences is through perceived qualities.490
The ultimate explanatory principle of simple natures and their underlying 
structures is the form. The form is the “true specific difference, or nature-engendering 
nature (natura naturans), or source of emanation” of any given nature (Spedding IV, 
119). In this sense, the form is a kind of “internal agency” or an “immanent efficient 
causality” of the thing.
 Indeed, the 
simple natures appear to be the necessary starting points of Bacon’s scientific method, 
not in the sense that they are the ultimate or highest principles, but in the sense that they 
define the nature to be investigated, determine the range of experiments to be consulted, 
and are immediately perceivable by the investigator. 
491
                                                 
490 See preface to New Organon (Spedding IV, 13-16) and Rossi, Francis Bacon, 148-51. 
 Thus, the form is the law that determines the relations of latent 
processes and latent configurations. This is why the discovery of forms is so essential to 
Bacon’s science. He conceives of nature as an opus, a work, and thus he conceives of the 
forms of simple natures as the internal, regulating structure of that opus. Again, this 
confirms the operative-theoretical nature of Baconian science: what is discovered through 
scientific investigation is the regulatory framework of production. At first, it would 
appear that this notion of form is entirely out of place with reference to the classical 
notion of form. However, Bacon seems to be trading on a concept of form that was 
prevalent in the humanistic interpretations of late scholasticism. During the fifteenth and 
491 I borrow these phrases from Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science, 91. 
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sixteenth centuries, natural philosophers came to equate form with “internal agency,” or 
with the material structure that enables the efficient cause of a thing, a kind of “internal 
efficient cause.” The reason for this seems to be, in part, an attempt to incorporate an 
experimental science with natural philosophy, and in part, a concession of the existence 
of artificial forms and artificial substances into late scholastic ontologies. Indeed, this 
shift in understanding can be characterized by a shift away from the 
abstract/metaphysical conception of form—in terms of its function, for example—to a 
concrete, efficacious conception. Robert Pasnau explains: “once the doctrine of form lost 
its proper place as an alternative to material and efficient modes of explanation, it became 
easy for the moderns to ignore the metaphysical aspects of the Aristotelian scheme.”492 
Thus, with respect to Bacon, Perez-Ramos elaborates: “Without abandoning the Form 
concept, Bacon is lead to uphold its material translation in terms of ‘configuration’, 
‘structure’ or ‘texture’ of bodies, i.e., in terms of their internal disposition.” 493
The relationship I have been describing between forms and simple natures, latent 
processes, and latent configurations can be verified when we turn to the “first vintage,” or 
 
Consequently, Bacon speaks of the forms of simple natures both in the language of 
genera and specific differences and in the language of “internal agency.” These two 
concepts coalesce in Bacon’s description of form as a “law” of operation governing the 
nature of a thing (NO II, 2). This is why the form can be understood as a general law that 
governs the internal agency of a particular nature on the basis of the internal 
microstructures that define that nature. 
                                                 
492 Pasnau, “Form, Substance, and Mechanism,” 44. 
493 Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science, 92. 
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the first theoretical appraisal of the collected tables of experience and the performed 
exclusionary experiments. In the example of heat, which is the only investigation 
developed in the Novum Organum, Bacon concludes that the form of heat is motion. He 
claims that this is particularly evident in observations of the flame, boiling liquids, in 
bellows and blasts, the rubbing motion that produces heat, and the extinction of fire 
through compression. Thus, Bacon refers to the tabulated experiments of his natural 
history in order to demonstrate that motion is indeed the general law that unites these 
various observed instances. He refines this concept further: “When I say of Motion that it 
is as the genus of which heat is a species, I would be understood to mean, not that heat 
generates motion or that motion generates heat (though both are true in certain cases), but 
that Heat itself, its essence and quiddity, is Motion and nothing else” (Spedding IV, 150; 
NO II, 20). From this, we can infer that when Bacon speaks of the form of a simple 
nature, he is no longer talking on the level of physical causes, such as can be explained 
by the operation of latent processes or latent configurations. Rather, Bacon hopes to 
identify the very essence (quidditas) of the simple nature. In the case of heat, it is not 
sufficient to say that it is a motion, but it is also necessary to enumerate the specific 
differences that identify heat among other kinds of motion (its genus and differentia). 
Bacon goes on to identify four specific differences: heat is (1) an “expansive motion,” (2) 
a motion that expands “towards the circumference” and at the same time “upwards,” (3) a 
motion that is “not uniformly of the whole body together, but in the smaller parts of it,” 
and (4) that this motion in the smaller parts is “rapid and not sluggish, and must proceed 
by particles, minute indeed, yet not the finest of all, but a degree larger” (Spedding IV, 
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151-54). One can see that in identifying the specific nature of the form of heat, Bacon 
returns to his understanding of the latent processes (expansion in varying directions and 
rapid movement of small particles) and the latent configurations (the non-uniform motion 
of large and minute particles) at work in this simple nature.494
 
 As I understand it, the 
form is the law that determines each of these different qualities of the nature. It is not 
clear to me that Bacon has indeed arrived at a single “law” of heat, but he has attempted 
to clarify the kind of motion operating in any body that possesses the quality of heat. 
Let us sum up the picture of Bacon’s notion of simple natures. Recall that 
Bacon’s method of induction begins by identifying some simple nature or quality. This is 
the basis for the tables of experience and the experiments of exclusion that follow. In the 
process of investigating simple natures, latent processes and latent configurations 
naturally arise as the explanatory bases of the simple natures. One attempts to explain as 
thoroughly as possible the various processes operating within many different substances 
that all display the simple nature under investigation. When one has exhausted the 
experimental possibilities and attempted to exclude any epiphenomenal characteristics 
pertaining to the simple nature, one then attempts to define the law that regulates these 
underlying structures. This law is the form of the simple nature. However, one must 
remember that a characterization of the form is achieved in the “first vintage” and thus 
                                                 
494 As Pasnau once pointed out in a seminar, specifying heat in this way is quite odd. While 
Bacon appears to rely on a purely mechanistic understanding of heat, he then specifies this 
character in a way that undermines a purely mechanistic metaphysics. How are the 
metaphors—“expansive,” “upward,” “outward,” and “rapid”—to be understood in a purely 
mechanical way? 
 480 
only at the very beginning of the general statements that can be made on the matter. 
Bacon’s method always returns to particular instances and experiments in order to refine 
that initial characterization. Thus, though Bacon hopes to identify the essence of the 
given nature under investigation, he may only succeed at a proximate description of its 
essence, leaving room for further investigation. Indeed, this is characteristic of Baconian 
science, which is much more a “regulative framework for research” than a “system.”495
 
 
Furthermore, there may be many increments along the step-by-step movement up the 
ladder of generality. There may in fact be forms of forms of natures, or further 
refinements of the form that make it suitable to particular instances and not to others. 
Nonetheless, Bacon’s science is motivated by the belief that, through an ordered program 
of research, the human mind can discover the internal laws of nature. Moreover, these 
internal laws exist, they are connected to perceived qualities, and they determine the 
underlying mechanical structure of nature itself. 
Descartes’ use of simple natures in the Regulae 
 
Though I believe it is likely that Descartes is following Bacon in adopting simple 
natures as the principles of scientific explanation, and Bacon himself represents the first 
such attempt in a mechanistic theory of natural philosophy, there are important and 
indeed fundamental differences between Bacon’s and Descartes’ respective uses of 
simple natures. For Descartes, simple natures are above all considered simple insofar as 
                                                 
495 Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science, 16. 
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they are simply grasped by the mind. Whereas Bacon never attempts to enumerate the list 
of simple natures—indeed, he seems to reject that such a thing is possible—Descartes 
considers his list of simple natures to be a complete enumeration of everything that can 
be known. The most important difference, however, can be observed in the way these 
principles function in each of their natural philosophies. For Descartes, the simple natures 
are the principles of scientific explanation, i.e., only on the basis of simple natures can 
natural phenomena be explained. Simple natures then play the role of primitive notions, 
which Descartes thinks can be categorized in a few concepts and enumerated. For Bacon, 
simple natures are qualities that are attached to material elements and he never attempts 
to determine their number or kinds.  
In order to understand the basic idea behind simples in Descartes, J. L. Beck’s 
phrase “atoms of evidence” is instructive.496
                                                 
496  I get the phrase from J. L. Beck, Method of Descartes, 79, but apparently translates a phrase 
from O. Hammelin, Le Système de Descartes (1921).  
 Beck uses “evidence” here in its purely 
intuitive sense, not in the sense of empirical facts; and he characterizes the “atomic” 
nature of simples by our inability to meaningfully divide them into more simple concepts. 
That is, simple natures are unanalyzable, intuitvely apparent concepts. Descartes 
understands that it is impossible for simple natures to be further reduced or analyzed 
without losing their clarity and distinctness. It is important to remember that these 
simples are conceptual entities, not real substances. They are the conceptual elements 
necessary for demonstrating scientific knowledge. This is quite opposed to Bacon’s 
notion of simple natures, which relies on the putative metaphysical structure of reality, 
namely, that qualitative natures express macroscopic properties whose corollary are 
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invisible microstructures governed by natural laws. The relevant natures in Bacon’s 
science are natural properties that depend on the way phyiscal things are actually 
structured, whereas Descartes largely ignores the metaphysical implications of his 
understanding of simples in the Regulae. Bacon’s simple natures are in fact quite 
complex, while Descartes’ simples are hardly natural. 
Despite these stark differences, there is a broader context in which Bacon and 
Descartes share some common convictions about simple natures. For both, the simple 
natures identify the principle, scientifically determined characteristics of matter in a way 
that conforms to mechanistic explanation. In order to appreciate this similarity, we should 
conceive of scientific explanation in terms of the capacity to reproduce the thing known. 
We will see that Descartes, unlike Bacon, understands scientific explanation in a way that 
is characteristic of his mathematical method of discovery. That is, material simple natures 
describe the basic properties that matter must possess in order for the representation of 
physical phenomena to conform to the mathesis unviersalis. Consequently, for Descartes, 
any relation between simple natures and the qualities of ordinary perception is purely 
arbitrary, i.e., the result of a prior ‘coding’ as we saw in the last chapter. Descartes 
describes scientific explanation in the Regulae as a matter of conceptually reproducing 
the phenomenon by way of a necessary combination of simples. Unlike Bacon, 
Descartes’ reproduction is a conceptual one, but the underlying commitment is the same: 
adequate scientific explanation, for both philosophers, amounts to using basic mechanical 
models to reconstruct or reproduce natural phenomena. As a consequence, scientific 
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knowledge amounts to a kind of production: we have understood a thing if we can 
reproduce its nature and effects (verum et factum convertuntur).  
Moreover, for both Bacon and Descartes of the Regulae, we ought to understand 
this process of explanation through simples in a problematical or pragmatic way. Bacon 
and Descartes are schematic and probablistic in their description of simple natures, 
leaving many of the details up for revision. Though Descartes speaks of deduction and 
demonstration, I believe that he does so in the service of producing desired results. In the 
Regulae, I see Descartes as primarily a scientist and mathematician, consumed with 
immediate problems and seeking pragmatic solutions. Indeed, the Regulae gives us a 
decidedly Baconian Descartes. This is why, I think, Descartes never refers to Bacon 
negatively in his correspondence and seems to embrace the basic thrust of Bacon’s 
framework for scientific research. This, of course, contrasts the caricature of Descartes as 
an “armchair a priorist,” opposed to empirical observation. The contrast will be most 
evident when we explore Descartes’ outline of how to conduct scientific research in light 
of his theory of simple natures. 
We will see that there are two historically and conceptually distinct passages on 
the simple natures, in Rule VI and Rule XII. It is evident that Rule XII is more mature 
and better developed than Rule VI. Between the two Rules we will notice a shift from 
talk of simples as the explanatory terms of a series to categories of simple natures: 
intellectual, material, and common.  Finally, we will observe how the simples operate in 
specifc geometrical and scientific examples: duplicating the cube, describing the curve 
that reflects all rays to a single point, and describing the nature of the magnet. There is a 
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gradual progression from pure mathematics to applied or mixed mathematics, and finally 
to natural philosophy. With these examples, Descartes is attempting to extend the 
mathematical method that he had discovered to explaining physical phenomena. He is 
only partially successful, but following Descartes along this path of thought will 
nonetheless be informative. 
 
Terminological observations in the Regulae and elsewhere 
 
First, we need to clearly indicate the specific locations in the Regulae where 
Descartes appeals to the theory of simple natures and discuss the relevance of this 
terminology for his mature metaphysics. The simple natures appear three times in the 
Regulae, in Rule VI (AT X, 381-84; CSM I, 21-23), Rule XII (AT X, 420-28; CSM I, 45-
50), and briefly in Rule VIII (AT X, 399; CSM I, 32), though the passages in Rule VIII 
are best understood as corrallaries to the passages in Rule VI and XII. The concept of 
simple natures also appears to be central to Descartes’ explanation of mathematical 
solutions in Rule XVI. There are different conceptions of simples represented in these 
passages that we will have to attend to.  
Though the terminology “simple nature” almost entirely disappears from 
Descartes’ lexicon after the Regulae, the list of simples, as it appears in Rule XII 
(intellectual, material, and common), plays a significant role in both the Meditationes497
                                                 
497 J-L Marion takes care to delineate the role of the simple natures, which Descartes’ later 
terminology for “ideas” eventually supersede, in each of the Meditations, focusing especially 
on Meditations II and III, see Questions cartésiennes, (Paris: PUF, 1991), 91-109. 
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and the Principia.498 The sole appearance of the term ‘simple natures’ after the Regulae, 
in the Conversations with Burman of 1648, seems to confirm that, though the term is 
largely abandoned, the concept remains basic to Cartesian metaphysics.499
In another response immediately following the one quoted above, Descartes 
makes a distinction between Mathesis and Physics on similar modal grounds . He 
maintains, “the complete and entire subject-matter of Mathesis [totum et universum 
Matheseos objectum] and all that is considered in it, is a true and real entity and has a true 
and real nature no less than the objects of Physics itself.” However, he says, “Physics 
considers its objects [not only as if] they are true and real entities but as actually and 
really existing.” In contrast, Mathesis only need claim that its objects are “possible and 
not actually existing in space but capable of so existing” (AT V, 160; CSMK, 343). The 
 In response to 
a question concerning the nature and extent of God’s free will in creation, Descartes 
purportedly tells Burman, “[God’s] will is the cause not only of what is actual and to 
come, but also of what is possible and of the simple natures. There is nothing we can 
think of or ought to think of that should not be said to depend on God” (AT V, 160; 
CSMK, 343). This passage appears to align simple natures with possibility, as opposed to 
actuality, or as necessary principles are opposed to contingent principles.  
                                                 
498 In Principles I, §46, Descartes refers to “simple notions,” which are intellectual, material, or 
common. These are developed in §§47-49. 
499 Reference to the Conversations with Burman are made with the usual caveats about that text in 
mind (see Garber, Descartes Embodied, 59, for the sources treating this issue). It may very 
well be the case that Burman simply pulls this word from the early lexicon of Descartes in 
order to describe a later concept. We cannot be sure that Descartes would have used the word 
in this context. Nonetheless, I think that we can take the Conversations in much the same way 
we would take any seventeenth century Cartesian text, i.e., as a description of Descartes’ 
philosophy by a follower attempting to be faithful to the letter and spirit of Descartes’ texts 
themselves. 
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objects of natural philosophy are taken to be actual and real entities, whereas the objects 
of mathesis are possible entities. The former are contingent and materially true, the latter 
are necessary and conceptually true. To put it another way, if an object can be 
represented geometrically, i.e., according to Mathesis, it is possible for that object to exist 
in the physical world. However, the nature of its physical existence is a contingent, 
empirical fact. Claims about physical objects require further, empirical proof.  
In the Principia Philosophia, Descartes deploys the list of material and 
intellectual simple natures as “modes” of created substance (I, §65), whether material or 
intellectual; the two created substances are known through a “principal attribute” (I, §53), 
i.e., extension and thought respectively. Here Descartes reconfigures the intellectual and 
material simple natures under the rubric of the classical concept of substance, such that 
they become modifications or modes of substance whose essence it is to persist without 
the support of any other entity than the concurrence of God. Two things are of particular 
interest here: (1) the simple natures appear to be those essences of things that are the 
eternal and universal properties of substance and (2) these essences are conceived to be 
first and foremost divisible according to intellectual and material substances, i.e., 
according to a distinction between the mental and the material. Furthermore, what were 
formerly called the common simple natures are now diversely classified under “common 
notions” (I, §13),500
                                                 
500  In Descartes much discussed letter to Elizabeth of 18 June 1643, Descartes uses similar 
terminology to describe three “primitive notions,” which include a notion of the body, of the 
mind, and of the mind-body composite in the human being (AT III, 691). 
 these are logical propositions necessary for scientific knowledge, the 
mode under which things exist, e.g., duration, and the way we conceive things to exist, 
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e.g., order and existence (I, §55). It seems that the common notions, along with the truths 
of mathematics, are intended to correspond to the eternal truths, a doctrine that Descartes 
arrived at in correspndence with Mersenne around 1630.501
In the Regulae, it is clear that Rule XII is a more mature and complete 
formulation of the theory of simple natures than Rule VI. The later rule, in effect, 
determines the vocabulary for simples that Descartes will adopt in his mature 
metaphysics. Furthermore, the discussion in Rule XII is much more detailed than the one 
in Rule VI. Whereas, for instance, Rule VI proposes only three points clarifying the 
nature of simples (the third of which is really a reprise of Rule V), Rule XII introduces 
eight points that are thorough and developed, the seventh of which alone has four sub-
categories. In fact, each of the characterizations of simples in Rule VI is taken up by Rule 
XII, expanded and developed (AT X, 381.17-22, 382.2 – 383.10 = 418.2 – 419.5; 383.11 
– 384.7 = 422.7 – 423.1; 384.9 – 385.4 = 427.4 – 26). I will discuss the nature of this 
expansion and incorporation in detail later in this section.  
 If this is the case, the 
common simple natures are effectively set apart as a group of primitive notions intended 
to describe the basic axioms of mathematics and logic. Descartes sets apart those axioms 
from the common ways that distinct substances exist and the common ways that we 
conceive of distinct substances. 
Rule VI shows a clear preference for problems in pure and mixed mathematics 
rather than natural philosophy. There, Descartes presents the example of finding the mean 
                                                 
501 My understanding of this follows from Helen Hattab’s presentation at the Houston Circle on 
Early Modern Philosophy, “Descartes’ Doctrine of Eternal Truts: An Alternate Reading,” 
January 31, 2009. 
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proportional as an application of the simple natures to the solution of a problem. Rule XII 
omits all mathematical examples, presumably setting these aside for their full 
development in Rules XV-XVIII, while alluding to problems in physics and astronomy. 
If we believe that Descartes followed his own method, at least to some degree, then we 
could infer that he applied the method first to the simpler problems in mathematics and 
then applied the method to the more complex problems of natural philosophy. In any 
case, we will discover that the mathematical conception of simples is embedded in the 
methodical application of simples to natural philosophy, as Rule XII indicates. Indeed, 
the example of the anaclastic line (the curve that reflects all rays to a single point) from 
Rule VIII will be instrumental in revealing this relation between mathematics and 
physical science. Finally, as we will see, Rule XII introduces themes that recur in 
Descartes’ most central metaphysical propositions: he suggests a real distinction between 
body and mind (AT X, 415.13-15; 421.26; CSM I, 42 and 46), he claims that it 
necessarily follows from the fact that even if Socrates doubts everything, he knows 
something, namely, that he is doubting and that something is either true or false (AT X, 
421.19-21; CSM I, 46); and finally, he cites the inference that if I exist, then God 
necessarily exists (AT X, 422.3-5; CSM I, 46). Notably, each of these propositions 
remains undeveloped in the Regulae, but they clearly situate the discussion of simple 
natures in the context of his later metaphysics. 
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Descartes’ early use of simples in the Regulae 
 
I have indicated that Descartes’ reference to simple natures in the Regulae is not 
univocal. Indeed, there is a clear development in his use from Rule VI to Rule XII. As 
with much else, however, where we can discern some development, we do not see that 
the later theory annuls or entirely supplants the former. Indeed, as we will see in this 
section, Descartes’ discussion of simple natures early in his composition of the Regulae 
signals why this terminology is so important for him and how he conceives it to announce 
a new basis for scientific knowledge, quite opposed to late scholastic Aristotelian 
philosophy. First, we will see that the idea that the atomic units of scientific explanation, 
or first principles, are simple implies a clear rejection of Aristotle’s categories of being. 
Second, we will see how this notion became central to Descartes’ method for solving 
problems in both mathematics and natural philosophy. We are afforded two noteworthy 
examples in connection with this early use of simple natures: the solution to the problem 
of finding two mean proportionals and the discovery of the anaclastic line. Simples are 
conceived of as the terminal points of a process of reduction or analysis. They are the 
epistimically indivisible starting points for a demonstration that would resolve a 
particular scientific or mathematical problem. 
 
Descartes’ rejection of Aristotle’s genera entis 
The fundamental insight of Rule VI, which is taken up again and expanded in 
Rule XII, is a clear rejection of Aristotle’s “ontological categories [genera entis]” or the 
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way things “exist in reality [revera existunt],” favoring instead to conceive of the simple 
natures by reference to the way things can be “arranged serially… in so far as some 
things can be known on the basis of others” or “in the order that corresponds to our 
knowledge of them” (Rule VI: AT X, 381; CSM I, 21 and Rule XII: AT X, 418; CSM I, 
44). Gilson first notes the importance of this aspect of the simple natures for Descartes’ 
critique of Aristotelianism in his commentary on the Discours de la méthode. He makes 
the following comment in reference to Descartes’ third rule of the method, “to conduct 
my thought in an orderly way, beginning with the objects that are most simple and easiest 
to know, in order to progress, step by step, as if by degrees, up to knowledge of the most 
composite things” (AT VI, 18; CSM I, 120): 
The Cartesian definition of order substitutes for the conceptual classification of 
notions and things under the categories for Aristotle, which was common among 
scholastic philosophy (cf. Reg., VI; t. X, p. 381, l. 7-16), an attitude based on the 
dependence of such oncept in the order of deduction. Truths, ideas, or things, are 
located, from Descartes on, according to an ordered, linear series, where each 
member occupies a place that belongs to it, before it are the ideas that depend on 
it such that it permits one to deduce them, after it are the ideas on which it 
depends in such a way that they are necessarily required in order for its deduction 
to be possible.502
 
 
This confirms that the simple natures are deployed first and foremost with the method of 
investigation in mind, as opposed to having any concern for metaphysical order of things. 
The place of each thing, idea, and concept, in Descartes’ philosophy, is not determined by 
its place in the order of nature, but in the order of explanation. The French of the 
Discours is even clearer than the English translation, referring to an “ordre entre elles” 
which “ne se précèdent point naturellement les unes les autres,” again reminding one of 
                                                 
502 Gilson, Discours, Commentaire, 207. 
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the serial arangement of things such that some things “may be known on the basis of 
others.” This preference for an epistemological order over an ontological order would 
seem to be confirmed by later texts as a truly Cartesian theme. Principia I, §55 implies 
the same insight when it classifies “order and number,” “not as anything separate from 
the things which are ordered and numbered,” but “simply as modes under which we 
consider the things in question” (my emphasis, AT VIIIa, 26; CSM I, 211). This final 
statement is ultimately clearest in the sense that it characterizes order and number as 
modes of thought and not modes of things. Clearly, the simplicity and serial arrangement 
of simples according to their ordered relations is an epistemological rather than 
ontological simplicity. The extreme example, given in Rule XII, that form and extension 
are simples, even though it is logically impossible for one to exist without the other, goes 
a long way toward demonstrating the extent of Descartes’ rejection of the order of things 
(AT X, 418; CSM I, 44). The reason for this, however, will become clear only as we 
continue our analysis. We will see that Descartes conceives of simple natures in this way 
because they conform to his method; his list of simple natures deliberately divides these 
principles of scientific explanation along lines that make nature itself amenable to his 
scientific method.  
When the term “pure and simple nature” first appears in Rule VI, it is identified 
with what Descartes calls “absolute,” that is, “whatever is viewed [consideratur] as being 
independent, a cause, simple, universal, single, equal, similar, straight, and other qualities 
of that sort” (AT X, 381; CSM I, 21). This is to be distinguished from what is “relative,” 
the list of opposing qualities, “dependent, an effect, composite, particular, many, unequal, 
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dissimilar, oblique, etc.” (AT X, 382; CSM I, 21). This opposition of “absolute” and 
“relative” appears to reproduce the Aristotelian opposition between haplos legomena and 
pros ti legomena.503 However, certain obvious differences follow from this initial 
similarity. In Aristotle, both substances and all predicates, taken abstractly, can be 
considered haplos, but substance has a privileged place in this respect. As far as the pros 
ti is concerned, Aristotle considers all what we would call relational properties to be pros 
ti legomena. For example, in the Categories, he says, “we call relatives all such things as 
are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation 
to something else.”504 What follows is a very long discussion of the ways such relations 
can be conceived, according to different kinds: larger than, similar to, unequal, double, or 
half; state, condition, perception, knowledge, and position; contraries, such as virtue and 
vice, knowledge and ignorance, etc.; correlatives that reciprocate, like master and slave; 
even properties of some subject (which relies on an analysis of the Greek language), like 
wing to winged (i.e., bird) and rudder to ruddered (boat). Following that discussion, 
Aristotle concludes, “no substance is relative.” Though Aristotle cautions that this 
conclusion cannot be too definitive, he does seem to restrict what is haplos to substances, 
whether primary or secondary, matter or form.505
                                                 
503 Marion suggests that the list of absolute and relative in Descartes “ré-emploient les exemples 
que donne Aristote pour les seul pros ti legomena” in Categories 7 and Metaphysics VII (D), 
15. Marion’s ultimate thesis, that “Si donc Descartes maintient en apparence le couple 
aristotélicien, il ne conçoit , en fait d’absoluta, que des termes qu’Aristote comprenait déjà à 
l’intérieur des pros ti; ce qui revient à dire que, dès leur dénomination, les absoluta cartésiens 
ne sont plus absolument absolus,” is prudent as we will see (see Marion, Règles, 172; see also 
Marion, “Ordre et relation”). 
 Though this position may need to be 
nuanced by other accounts in Aristotle, it seems that whatever is attributed to the essence 
504 Categories 7, 6a 36. 
505 Ibid. 8b 21, 8a 36-7, and 8a 32, respectively.  
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of a thing, meaning the form and matter that make it what it is, should be considered 
haplos.506
Aristotle’s list of relatives is augmented and clarified by the discussion in 
Metaphysics V (D), 15 (book delta being the book that serves as a glossary of technical 
terms in the Metaphysics). There, Aristotle divides the things that are called relative into: 
that which exceeds and that which is exceeded; the active to the passive; and the 
knowable to the known, or the perceivable to the perceived. The first category is the 
category whose essence it is to be relative, because these are essentially numerical or 
quantitative relations, all of which refer to the unit of measurement. The second category 
refers to capacities and their actualization, since receiving and conferring activity is a 
relation between things. The third are called relative because ‘thinking’, ‘knowing’, and 
‘perceiving’ are transitive operations that necessarily imply an object of relation. Indeed, 
Descartes seems to be aware of this discussion, referring at one point to the fact that 
“Philosophers, of course, recognize that cause and effect are correlatives; but in the 
present case, if we want to know what the effect is, we must know the cause first, and not 
vice versa. Again, equals are correlative with one another, but we can know what things 
are unequal only by comparison with equals and not vice versa, etc.” (AT X, 383; CSM I, 
22). Thus, Descartes seems to acknowledge that cause and effect, as well as numerical 
 This is again perfectly intelligible according to our normal use of these terms: 
non-relational properties are called intrinsic while relational properties are ordinarily 
extrinsic.  
                                                 
506 This seems to be confirmed by Topics I, 5, (Barnes, I, 170), which restricts the pros ti to 
“properties” and “accidents,” but not to genera; and Metaphysics VII (Z), where he states, “ 
And so form and the compound of form and matter would be thought to be substance” (1029a 
29-30). 
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relations, are correlative. But he denies that this makes the cause itself a relative term, 
since the effect is what it is because of its cause, and not vice versa. 
It is difficult to derive some general characterization of Descartes’ list. Perhaps 
we can see “equal, similar, and straight” as the units of quantitative measurement. The 
notions of independence, simplicity, and single-ness (not to say singularity which is 
usually reserved for the particular material nature of an individual) seem to relate to the 
sense in which these are “simples” in the strict sense. And then there remains: cause and 
universal. I wonder if these final “absolute” simples are the ones that really unify the 
others. That is to say, I wonder if the simples in Rule VI are archai in the Greek sense, as 
both cause and principle. In effect, this interpretation would mesh quite well with the 
description I have given above where the “simples” are the “principles” of scientific 
explanation. Moreover, it is a perfectly classical notion that the special objects of the pure 
intellect are causes and universals. Therefore, whether these principles are the units of 
quantitative measurement or the simple elements of a given problem, they are the 
principles of scientific explanation. 
This would seem to be confirmed by the fact that Descartes understands what is 
absolute or relative purely in reference to its explanatory power. That is, what is absolute 
can explain the nature of what is relative, though what is relative may not necessarily 
explain what is absolute. This seems to follow more closely what Aristotle says about 
contraries in De Anima: “one element in each pair of contraries will suffice to enable it to 
discern both that element itself and its contrary. By means of the straight line we know 
both itself and the curved—the carpenter’s rule enables us to test both—but what is 
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curved does not enable us to distinguish either itself or the straight.” 507
The upshot of this, as Marion has shown, is that Descartes privileges the pros ti, 
or relational properties of things, over the haplos, or non-relational properties of things, 
to such an extent that even what is taken as absolute must sometimes be considered 
relative. Ultimately, Marion contends that for Descartes some terms may be more 
absolute than others, but all terms are understood first in relation to order and then in 
relation to consciousness.
 It seems that if 
we know the simple or absolute elements, we can explain the nature of their contraries, 
while relatives cannot explain the nature of absolutes. Thus, only the former can serve as 
starting points of demonstrations, while the latter are always dependent on some prior 
premise. However, for Descartes, this distinction itself ought not to be taken absolutely, 
since the “secret technique [artis secretum]” of the method, consists in being able to 
distinguish properly the absolute from the relative, since “some things are more absolute 
than others from one point of view, yet more relative from a different point of view 
[aliter spectata]” (AT X, 382; CSM I, 21). 
508 On this reading, there is nothing that exists apart from what 
is methodically ordered or consciously perceived. Thus, the ultimate non-relational 
property of all things, ousia, or substance, necessarily drops out of Descartes’ categories, 
as they are presented in Rule VI.509
                                                 
507 De Anima I, 5, 411a 3-7 
 Moreover, the excision of Aristotle’s categories of 
being, and above all of ousia, as the category of being par excellence, derives from what 
508 “Si donc cette universelle référence au point de vue de la science se dit selon notre manière de 
spectare, et si le relatif se dit bien respectivus, il faut en conclure que les natures (ousiai) 
solitaires (khoristai) deviennent relatives, de par leur relation au savoir même.” Marion, Sur 
l’ontologie grise, p. 80. 
509 J.-L. Marion Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes, 4th edition (Paris: J. Vrin, 2000), pp. 78-85. 
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Marion has elsewhere called the Cartesian principle of nominalism, i.e., economy of 
explanation.510 This is essentially what makes Descartes’ science so attractive to 
contemporary philosophers: his ontology is parsimonious and pragmatic, unencumbered 
by the complex systems of the classical philosophers. If the easiest and simplest way to 
explain the nature of things is by following the order in which they are arranged 
according to thought, then reference to the categories of being would fall outside of what 
is necessary for explanation. Hence, we should apply “Ockham’s razor” to eliminate such 
entities from our demonstrations.511
The reason why Descartes can take such a pragmatic, or problematical, approach 
to simple natures is that he does not consider them to be elements of reality in the sense 
of constituting substances. Rather, Descartes considers simple natures to be the bases of 
scientific explanation in the sense that they provide the elements for our scientific 
understanding of nature. Simple natures allow Descartes to organize and enumerate the 
conceptually basic elements to any mechanistic explanation as he conceived it. In this 
way, Descartes no longer explains natural phenomena by specifying the metaphysical 
nature of entities. Instead, he proposes some conceptually simple mechanical principles 
that he then uses as a model to reproduce the nature of particular phenomena. Quite 
rightly, such principles ought to be characterized by their epistemic character, i.e., insofar 
as they are known, not as they are per se. This is the fundamental insight of the “pure and 
simple natures” of Rule VI. However, the enumeration of simples in Rule VI seems ad 
hoc and incomplete. Descartes seems to be pulling bits and pieces from what he may 
 
                                                 
510 Marion, “Ordre et Relation,” 252.  
511 See Eustachius St. Paul, Sum phil I, 86-87 as a possible source for Descartes’ notion. 
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have studied in his school textbooks without a clear sense of outlining a new set of 
categories. Rule XII will much more closely approximate a complete enumeration of the 
bases of scientific explanation in a way that the mature Descartes will continue to 
support. But before we turn to that later treatment of simples, it will be useful to see how 
Descartes proposes to use simples in the solution of particular problems. Indeed, problem 
solving is the primary reason for positing such simple natures and these examples 
demonstrate the pragmatic rather than dogmatic features of Descartes’ science that set it 
apart from the Aristotelian schools. 
 
 Simple natures and the problem of finding two mean proportionals 
In Rule VI Descartes appears to be describing the principle relations that allow 
one to solve problems in mathematics and physics, rather than the intrinsic natures of 
things themselves. In Rule XII, by contrast, he has moved to a characterization of the 
categories of things, though these categories end up being relational properties as well. In 
order to understand the importance of relations in Descartes’ theory of simples, it will be 
useful to look at the mathematical example of a geometrical series of numbers that is 
supposed to explicate these simple natures in Rule VI. I have treated the concept of a 
geometrical series and its importance for Descartes’ mathematical method in the Chapter 
2. Now it will be my task simply to explain how this concept provides the kind of 
scientific explanation that Descartes is after.  
The principle of a geometrical series is the ratio or proportion that exists between 
any number in the series and its immediate successor. This is what is sought as the causal 
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explanation of this series. Thus, when Descartes is looking for the “mean proportional” 
between two numbers, he is looking for a ratio whose property is the following: a/x = x/b, 
where a and b are the given numbers and x is the mean number sought. This is the form 
of the algebraic method of comparison that I have identified with the mathesis 
universalis. Again, this method is the following: (1) every problem has some unknown 
which is sought, (2) this unknown must be determined in some way, thus (3) one must 
find the relation that pertains between the known and the unknown in the way that it is 
determined. As I have shown in the example of the mean proportional, the relation sought 
is a ratio of numbers.  
The presentation in Rule VI begins by showing the proportional relations in a 
geometrical series of numbers. The key is to indicate “what points we may usefully 
concentrate on discovering first” (AT X, 384; CMS I, 23). Descartes continues: 
For example, say the thought occurs to me that the number 6 is twice 3: I may 
then ask what twice 6 is, viz., 12; I may, if I like, go on to ask what twice 12 is, 
viz., 24, and what twice 24 is, viz., 48, etc. It would then be easy for me to deduce 
that there is the same ratio between 3 and 6 as between 6 and 12, and again the 
same ratio between 12 and 24, etc., and hence that the numbers 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 
etc. are continued proportionals. All of this is so clear as to seem almost childish; 
neverthelesss when I think carefully about it, I can see what sort of complications 
are involved in all the questions one can ask about the proportions or relations 
between things, and in what order the questinos should be investigated. This one 
point encompasses the essential core of the entire science of pure mathematics 
[purae mathematicae]. (AT X, 384-85; CSM I, 23) 
 
 Here Descartes outlines the nature of a geometrical series and identifies the ratio or 
proportion between successive members of the series as the principle to be discovered. 
He goes on to claim that understanding the appropriate ratio or proportion is the 
“essential core of the entire science of pure mathematics.” From Chapter 2, we can 
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surmise that this claim follows from Descartes’ early work in mathematics and 
proportional relations when he conceived of the mesolabe compass as an instrument for 
finding mean proportionals. From his work on algebra, he knew these mean proportionals 
to be the roots of algebraic equations. And he would see the discovery of a general 
technique for finding the roots of equations as the highest achievement in mathematics at 
that time. 
As Descartes acknowledges, there is nothing particularly difficult in constructing 
a geometrical series if a person starts with a given number and knows the ratio that 
determines its successor. The problem becomes difficult when one starts with two 
numbers that are not successive numbers in the series and attempts to find the missing 
proportional numbers: “when the extreme terms 3 and 12 were given, I could not find just 
as easily the mean proportional, 6” (AT X, 385; CSM I, 23). Descartes describes the 
difficulty in cognitive terms: “we must attend at the same time to the two extreme terms 
and the ratio between them, in order to obtain a new ratio by dividing this one” (AT X, 
385; CSM I, 23-24). In other words, we have to consider simultaneously the numbers 3 
and 12 as well as the ratios between each of these numbers and the missing mean 
proportional. We know the two ratios to be equal, but the problem is obviously more 
difficult. Later in the rule, Descartes identifies the first probem as a “direct” sort of 
problem, while the second problem is “indirect” (AT X, 386; CSM I, 24). Indirect 
problems are identified with division and root extraction because they involve searching 
for a term that is only indirectly determined by the numbers given. In the text, Descartes 
goes on to describe the problem of finding two mean proportionals (e.g., two numbers in 
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a geometrical series between 3 and 24) and three mean proportionals (e.g., three numbers 
in a geometrical series between 3 and 48). The problem of finding three mean 
proportionals, Descartes claims, can actually be “split up and made easier” (AT X, 286; 
CSM I, 24). In effect, this problem amounts to three problems of the first kind: find the 
mean proportional between 3 and 48, i.e., 24, then find the mean proportional between 3 
and 24 and the mean proportional between 24 and 48. This reduces the problem of 
finding three mean proportionals to three problems of finding one mean proportional. 
This is clearly a heuristic, rather than algorithmic, method and it shows that Descartes is 
focusing his attention on the properties of numbers with a view to discovering the 
underlying principles that would allow him to find solutions to classical problems in 
Arithmetic and Geometry. In the case of Rule VI, Descartes identifies the ratio or 
proportion between successive numbers in a series as the ultimate principle, or simple 
nature, that allows one to solve any sort of problem related to that series. In effect, 
knowing this ratio allows one to generate any term of the series. 
One can see an analogous method in Rule XVI, which shows the utility of 
employing symbols in the mathematical method in order to better represent the nature of 
the problem under investigation. The full title suggests that this ‘algebraic’ use of 
symbols surpasses the reliance on memory, which was often seen as the linchpin of the 
method of discovery for the humanists. Descartes opens his demonstration with the 
following introduction; “we should note first that arithmeticians usually represent 
individual magnitudes by means of several units or by some number, whereas in this 
context we are abstracting just as much from numbers as we did from geometrical figures 
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a little while back—or from any matter whatsoever” (AT X 455-56; CSM I, 67). This 
introduction makes it clear that the following demonstration belongs in the context of the 
mathesis universalis. It also shows the kind of reduction that we recognized in Rule VI. 
He says: “if the problem is to find the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle whose sides 
are 9 and 12, the arithmetician will say that it is √225 or 15. We on the other hand will 
substitute a and b for 9 and 12, and will find the hypotenuse to be √a2 + b2, which keeps 
the two parts a2 and b2 which the numerical expression conflates” (AT X, 456; CSM I, 
67-68). What is so useful about the algebraic representation is that it shows the relation 
between the sides. Indeed, a contemporary reader may recognize c = √a2 + b2 as an 
expression of the Pythagorean theorem. What this means is that the algebraic form 
presents the theoretical rule or law underlying the solution to the problem, whether it be 
arithmetical or geometrical. “Accordingly,” Descartes says, “once we have investigated 
the problem expressed in general terms [i.e., algebraically], we should re-express it in 
terms of given numbers, to see whether these might provide us with a simple solution” 
(AT X, 457; CSM I, 68). Indeed, it may be the case that certain problems may be more 
easily solved by looking at the numbers rather than the algebraic form. At the end of the 
rule, Descartes suggests that the same problem may be expressed as a figure, with sides 
AB and BC, being represented by a and b, or 9 and 12, respectively.  
The point is that Descartes remains neutral about which representation is best. He 
leaves it open whether he will represent the problem in numbers, figures, or symbols. But 
the principle that allows Descartes to move back and forth between the arithmetical and 
geometrical representations is the mathesis universalis, i.e., the proposition that these two 
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kinds of expression can be conceived reciprocally. Moreover, the algebraic expression 
shows the relation that each of these numbers or magnitudes bears to the others in the 
expression of the problem, and the algebraic expression preserves the path of discovery, 
or the method of analysis used to arrive at the solution, namely, by virtue of the relation 
expressed. 
Now, Descartes clearly thinks that his simples of Rule VI extend beyond mere 
mathematics (that is why he includes the straight and curved, cause and effect, universal 
and particular among his list of simples). It seems to me that these notions enumerate the 
kinds of relations that pertain between knowns and unknowns in a natural science. Let me 
be clear, it seems that Descartes has determined a number of principal relations that are 
sought in any scientific inquiry: namely, relations of quantitative measurement, relations 
of a single thing to a multitude of things, relations of cause to effect, and relations of 
universal to particular. It seems plausible to me that one could work out a mechanistic 
science of matter on the basis of these four relations. And I think that this is why 
Descartes is confident that imperfect problems (those that require further inquiry into the 
nature of the problem) can be reduced to perfect ones (those problems where the object of 
sought is well-defined and the relation it bears to known quantities determined). 
Moreover, he seems to believe that he can extend his algebraic method of comparison 
and the principles of the mathesis universalis to problems in natural philosophy. Thus, 
Descartes has a relational, non-intrinsic, understanding of the principles of scientific 
explanation. In the final section, we will see how this is characterized in Rule XII and 
how this notion of simples ultimately meshes with Descartes’ method. 
 503 
 
 Simple natures and the discovery of the anaclastic line 
In Rule VIII, Descartes uses his discovery of the anaclastic line, i.e., a line that 
describes the shape of a lens that would refract parallel rays of light to a single point, in 
order to demonstrate the utility of his method. He tells us that solving this problem 
requires one to analyze or reduce it into its constituent elements. Only by determining 
which elements are primary, or most simple, can we discovery the underlying principles 
governing the problem and thereby demonstrate its solution. Our examination of this 
passage will help link Descartes’ insights on method to his discoveries in mathematics as 
they were applied to problems in natural philosophy.512
Now take someone whose studies are not confined to mathematics [i.e., someone 
who has an understanding of natural philosophy] and who, following Rule One, 
eagerly seeks the truth on any question that arises: if he is faced with the same 
problem [i.e., the anaclastic], he will discover when he goes into it that the ratio 
between the angles of incidence and the angles of refraction depends upon the 
changes in these angles brought about by differences in the media. He will see 
that these changes depend on the manner in which a ray passes through the entire 
transparent body, and that knowledge of this process presupposes also knowledge 
of the nature of the action of light. Lastly, he will see that to understand the latter 
process he must know what a natural power in general is—this last being the most 
absolute term in this whole series. Once he has clearly ascertained this through 
mental intuition, he will, in accordance with Rule Five, retrace his course through 
the same steps. (AT X, 394-95; CSM I, 29) 
 I quote the relevant passage at 
length: 
 
For Descartes, it is not sufficient (nor perhaps even necessary) to know the nature of the 
thing in question as defined by its genus, species, and specific difference. Instead, one 
must understand the general mechanical principles at work in that thing. With respect to 
                                                 
512 See Garber’s essay “Descartes and Method in 1637,” Descartes’ Embodied, 33-51, for a 
discussion of the importance of this problem for Descartes’ method. 
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the anaclastic line, these principles must explain: the effect the material has on the path of 
light, the process whereby light is transmitted through transparent bodies, the basic nature 
and action of light, and ultimately what a natural power is. This ultimate term is a bit 
perplexing since it seems to imply some power inherent in natural bodies, which is 
contrary to a strictly mechanistic conception of matter.  
In the Dioptrique, however, Descartes treats the natural power of bodies more 
explicitly. There, he stipulates that motion is the only acceptable natural power. We will 
see that motion is one of the material simple natures, so it is reasonable that this ultimate 
term would turn out to be a simple nature. In the Dioptrique, Descartes describes the 
power of light using analogies from everyday moving bodies, e.g., the bouncing ball, the 
blind man with a stick, and the moving grape skins in the wine vat (AT VI, 81-105). 
Though the Dioptrique was written in the early 1630s, it is remarkably similar to a 
passage from Rule IX, which outlines this exact technique for discovering what a natural 
power is. Here is the passage from Rule IX: 
If, for example, I wish to inquire whether a natural power can travel 
instantaneously to a distant place, passing through the whole intervening space, I 
shall not immediately turn my attention to the magnetic force, or the influence of 
stars, or even the speed of light, to see whether actions such as these might occur 
instantaneously; for I would find it more difficult to settle that sort of question 
than the one at issue. I shall, rather, reflect upon the local motion of bodies, since 
there can be nothing in this whole area that is more readily perceivable by the 
senses. And I shall realize that, while a stone cannot pass instantaneously from 
one place to another, since it is a body, a power similar to the one which moves 
the stone must be transmitted instantaneously if it is to pass, in its bare state, from 
one object to another. For instance, if I move one end of a stick, however long it 
may be, I can easily conceive that the power which moves that part of the stick 
necessarily moves every other part of it instantaneously, because it is the bare 
power which is transmitted at that moment, and not the power as it exists in some 
body, such as a stone which carries it along. (AT X, 402; CSM I, 34) 
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This notion of “instantaneous motion” is perhaps a remnant of the “hydrostatic papers” in 
the Physico-Mathematica, where Descartes’ unique contribution to the hydrostatic 
paradox is to conceive of the force applied by the water’s pressure on the base is 
conceived an incremental, momentary force. The principles of micromechanical motion, 
which originated in that work with Beeckman, are thus related to the method in this 
example. Moreover, it develops the characteristic Cartesian conception of the power of 
light, the animal spirits, and in general any power that appears to have an instantaneous 
effect over a distance. The basic methodological import of this example is that the nature 
of something even as perplexing as the instantaneous transmission of light, the attraction 
of a magnet, or the influence of the stars, can be resolved by considering the mechanical 
structure of nature and supposing that this underlying mechanism conforms to analogous 
movements of more mundane objects easily perceivable by the senses.513
We can now return to the first passage from Rule VIII where Descartes applies his 
method to the problem of the shape of a lens that would refract all rays of light to a single 
point. Garber has provided an interpretation of this passage in terms of Descartes’ method 
 So, for 
Descartes, discovering what a “natural power” is ought not be mysterious. Instead, it 
should be approached in exactly the way that other problems are approached: by 
determining the essential terms of the problem, understanding the relationship between 
those terms, and producing mechanical models that explain those relations. 
                                                 
513 A similar claim is made in Rule VIII, “we should, where the objects of inquiry are equally 
simple, always begin our investigation with those which are more useful” (AT X, 397). The 
notion of utility, here, should be taken in the sense of ‘useful to explain the phenomenon in 
question’. Indeed this claim is expanded with the very suggestive example of the blacksmith, 
who uses the same method of fabrication to construct the tools that he will ultimately use in 
the practice of his craft. 
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that is clear and concise.514 I will use this reading as a starting point, though I wish to 
modify it somewhat in order to illustrate some of the nuances in Descartes’ application of 
mathematics to natural philosophy. Garber conceives of the “reduction” mentioned in 
Rule VII as a series of questions, where the answer to each question is presupposed by 
the answer to a logically prior question: “Q1 is reduced to Q2 if and only if we must 
answer Q2 before we can answer Q1.”515
Garber claims that the reductive process “ends” at these ultimate terms and that 
“at this point, Descartes seems to think that we can ‘clearly see through an intuition of the 
 Thus, the former question can be “reduced” to 
the latter, since the latter provides the basis for a response to the former. In effect, we 
must trace our way back to the logical foundation of our investigation, determine the 
answer to this foundational question, and then retrace our steps back to the original 
qiestion. At the end of the series of questions, Descartes arrives at two unnerving 
questions, each of which seems to block further investigation: “what is the nature of the 
action of light?” and “what is a natural power, in general?” The answers to these 
questions are the fundamental insights that will inform Descartes’ answer to the question 
“What is the shape of the lens that reflects light rays to a single point?” They are the 
simple or absolute terms of the series and form the explanatory basis for resolving the 
whole problem. Briefly, the answer to the first is the sine-law of refraction and the 
answer to the second is motion, as we have seen above. But how does he arrive at these 
insights? 
                                                 
514 Descartes Embodied, 88 and 37 provide the relevant table. 
515 Ibid. 89. 
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mind’ what a natural power is.”516
Bret Doyle’s interpretation is helpful in responding to these issues: he understands 
the passage in terms of its exposition, namely, in the sense of an inquirer looking into the 
nature of the anaclastic. He finds that “on Descartes’ account, at two points in the course 
of this inquiry we come across things which it seems ‘our intellect is unable to intuit 
sufficiently well...’ [392]. So at each of these points we might think we have reached a 
 On what basis would Descartes claim to have an 
intuition of a natural power? In the Regulae, he seems committed to the idea that 
intuitions are reserved for simple and evident truths, like the axioms of arithmetic and 
geometry. In what sense can we understand a “natural power” in this way? As we have 
seen, the very idea that natural bodies have powers seems to cut against the grain of 
Descartes’ mechanism. Garber’s account is insightful because it displays the anaclastic 
example in terms of a reduction to and composition from simples. What it lacks is an 
explanation of how our knowledge of a “natural power” or the “movement of light 
through a body” is supposed to be a simple and evident intuition. The normal account of 
simple natures is that they are the special objects of the intellect, and thus intuited straight 
off. However, the chief issue with the anaclastic is that “the problem before [the inquirer] 
is composite and relative, and it is possible to have experiential knowledge which is 
certain [i.e., scientia, cf. Rule II] only of things which are entirely simple and absolute” 
(AT X, 394; CSM I, 29). So, the reductive series of questions is supposed to arrive at a 
simple, but at this stage, the problem is still complex, i.e., there is no intuitive access to 
the explanatory principles of this particular phenomenon.  
                                                 
516 Ibid. 88. 
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limit beyond which it is impossible for human cognition to proceed. However, it turns out 
that there is a way around both of these obstacles.”517 Doyle suggests that what blocks the 
inquirer at each stage is that he has the wrong idea about the nature of scientific 
knowledge. In particular, this inquirer conceives of the knowledge of physical 
phenomena to be of a different kind than mathematics, and thus ignores the dictum of 
Rule I: “that the sciences as a whole are nothing other than human wisdom” (AT X, 360; 
CSM I, 9). Doyle postulates that the principles necessary for solving problems in natural 
philosophy are established by “suppositions” or “hypotheses” that conform to the limits 
of our mental powers. As I understand it, this means that the mechanical microstructures 
of physical phenomena are hypothetically chosen to fit the capacities of my mind, i.e., the 
limits of one’s mental powers. Doyle puts it this way: “the Regulae is solely concerned 
with elaborating effective procedures of discovery that ‘measure up’ (or are adequate) to 
our (quite narrowly limited) cognitive powers.”518
                                                 
517 The Logic of Descartes’ Method, 375. 
  If I understand this correctly, the 
restriction of scientific knowledge to the limits of our mental powers is precisely the role 
played by the mathesis universalis. By that I mean that the method of mathesis is applied 
to a restricted domain of entities, those that admit of order and measure. These entities 
conform to the idea-type of mathesis; they can be easily and completely comprehended 
by the human intellect. In a wholly analogous way, I will claim that the material simple 
518 The Logic of Descartes’ Method, 379. To me, Doyle’s phrasing sounds like he understands 
Descartes to redefine the nature of truth in a way that recalls Husserl’s idea of noetic 
adequation. I prefer to read this in terms of the mechanistic project, as I have outlined it above. 
I’m not sure we can talk about anything like a transcendental notion of adequation at this stage 
in Descartes. I am convinced that Descartes is a realist about his natural philosophy; the 
“hypotheses” are not yet so severe. 
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natures describe the kind of entities that fall under the mathesis idea-type and thus are a 
complete enumeration of possible physical substances that can be grasped by our 
cognitive powers. 
So Doyle has set us on the right track. Let us now return to the passage in order to 
fill out the picture of what is actually going on in Descartes’ discovery of the solution to 
the anaclastic. First of all, I propose to return to the text of paragraph 3 (commentators 
tend to focus on the meat of the problem in paragraph 4). Descartes states: 
If, say, someone whose studies are confined to mathematics [mathematicae] tries 
to find the line called the ‘anaclastic’ in optics—the line from which parallel rays 
are so refracted that they intersect at a single point—he will easily see, by 
following Rules V and VI, that the determination of this line depends on the ratio 
of the angles of refraction to the angles of incidence. But he will not be able to 
find out what this ratio is, since it has to do with physics rather than with 
mathesis. So he will be compelled to stop short right at the outset. (AT X, 393-94; 
CSM I, 28-29) 
 
This passage contains the only other use of the word ‘mathesis’ in the Regulae apart from 
Rule IV-B. Moreover, it clearly links its discussion of method with Rules V and VI. 
Recall that Rule V is the rule that recalls a reduction of complex things to simples and a 
step-by-step recomposition of those simples according to a deduction; Rule VI is the first 
mention of the “pure and simple natures,” a rule we have discussed above with reference 
to the mean proportional. This passage recalls a person schooled in mathematics, whose 
concept of method would be restricted to mathesis, i.e., that learning or way of study 
common to the mathematical sciences.  
Here, Descartes suggests that this person would be unable to find the ratio needed 
to describe the anaclastic line. Why? Because the sine law expresses the ratio of the angle 
of incidence to the angle of refraction as a function of the sine of the angle, i.e., sin t = n 
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(sin r); and Descartes tells us later that “the angle of refraction depends upon the changes 
in these angles brought about by differences in the media” (AT X, 394; CSM I, 29). The 
constant ‘n’ in the ratio of the angle of incidence and the angle of refraction changes 
based on the kind of material the light passes through. This constant differs if one 
considers glass, water, or some other transparent medium. Thus, without experimenting 
with different kinds of material, the student of mathematics, the follower of mathesis, 
would not have been able to find the solution to this problem. Unlike the case of the mean 
proportionals, the sine law is a mathematical law of nature, i.e., an application of 
mathesis to natural philosophy. This passage reflects Descartes’ growing understanding 
of natural philosophy. He realizes that purely mathematical methods of analysis will not 
reveal the core principles necessary for resolving certain problems in natural philosophy. 
These problems must be aided by empirical observation. In fact, one could suggest that 
this passage—and not Rule IV-A—reflects Descartes’ real movement beyond the 
mathesis universalis and it is a very clear instance of a tension in his universal method.  
In a way, what Garber’s schematic misses is the way mathesis is applied to 
natural philosophy. He has it right that this “workable procedure” for discovering the 
basic intuition about physical phenomena ensures a return along the path of discovery 
through a process of deduction. Since the relationship that exists between each question is 
one of a necessary foundation, the deduction from the final “intuition” that responds to 
the most absolute question in the series ensures a deduction back to the initial question. 
This procedure allows Descartes to preserve and expand scientia, Garber rightly 
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claims.519
Let us return to Descartes’ questions, as outlined by Garber: Q1) What is the 
shape of a line that focuses parallel rays of light to the same point? This is what we would 
like to know. Q2) What is the relation between the angle of incidence and the angle of 
refraction? This question is informed by Rule VI, where Descartes demonstrates that the 
simple nature sought ought to be expressed as a ratio between knowns and unknowns. 
However, in Garber’s scheme, he writes “(i.e., the sine law of refraction).” This is where 
I am not entirely satisfied with Garber’s account. Remember that the reason why a person 
trained in mathesis is unsuited to discover the ratio between the angle of incidence and 
the angle of refraction (unlike the mean proportionals) is because this ratio requires 
experimental knowledge. In other words, the sine law of refraction is not a purely 
mathematical law; discovery of the sine law requires additional information. How is this 
additional information to be acquired? Through experiment and observation.
 Scientia is preserved just in case cognition is certain and evident; this is only 
possible if the explanation of the phenomenon is based on intuition and deduction, and 
thus is free from doubt. However, as I have noted, it is not entirely clear how one 
acquires the intuitions related to the sine-law and the nature of the power of light in 
Garber’s schema. It seems that what must be missing is the natural scientific application 
of mathematics.  
520
                                                 
519 Descartes Embodied, 91-93. 
 Thus, 
520 To be fair, Garber is very sensitive to this issue. He points out that “experiment is somehow 
supposed to help us find the right deductions, the ones that pertain to our world and to the 
phenomena that concern us. In this way, experiments seem not to replace deductions, but to 
aid us in making the proper deductions” Descartes Embodied, 93. But this insight comes 
when Garber is addressing the Discours and Essais, not the Regulae (he says that “Experiment 
comes up at best only implicitly in the anaclastic line example,” 94).  
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step two in the reduction requires a supplemental step, namely, the requisite observations 
of light passing through various media in order to establish this relation as a constant that 
depends on specifying the medium through which the light refracts. Similarly, the next 
three questions all require some analogical reasoning that is, strictly speaking, beyond the 
bounds of strictly mathematical fields: Q3) How is refraction caused by light passing 
from one medium into another? Q4) How does a ray of light penetrate a transparent body? 
And Q5) What is light? There are no “intuitions”—at least no mathematical intuitions—
corresponding directly to these questions. Each answer requires a physico-mechanical 
model that is proposed on analogy with the problem as stated. 
The analogical nature of these answers is different than the answer to Q2. In the 
Dioptrique, Descartes will answer Q4 by referring to “small balls rolling in the pores of 
earthly bodies” (AT VI, 331); he will answer Q5 with his theory of instantaneous 
propagation. These answers depend on Descartes’ method in a slightly different way. 
They offer a mechanical explanation of the nature of light by making a comparison 
between the putative mechanical forces in the action of light and macroscopic phenomena 
(e.g., small balls, sticks, or a writing quill). Realize that none of these answers is a 
“simple nature” per se; but each of the macroscopic models falls under the categories of 
extension, shape, and motion. So they are supposed to be analogous to the microscopic 
mechanical forces at work in light. This supposition is based on the idea that there is only 
extension, shape, and motion all the way down. Thus, it is not quite right to say that the 
end of this reductive procedure is the discovery of simple natures. Rather, the result of 
each reductive step is an intuition that conforms to the theory of simple natures. Indeed, 
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this kind of explanation fits the two criteria that I have identified for Descartes’ 
mechanical framework in the Regulae: these mechanical structures are, in some sense, 
hypothetical; and they are posited on analogy with observed phenomena. So, in a certain 
sense, the method of discovering each of the final three intuitions that answers this 
explanation still conforms to the general scientific method that I have been outlining. 
However, these physical intuitions import a basic thesis of mechanism into the process: 
namely, macroscopic phenomena can be explained by reference to invisible micro-
mechanical systems; and they connect Descartes’ understanding of his mathematical 
method to an experimental-mechanical approach to natural philosophy. 
Again, we can understand this application of mathematics to natural philosophy in 
terms of the mathesis universalis: the mathesis determines the idea-type of mechanical 
representations, it provides the logical rules of inference necessary to make the analogies 
that will inform our description of the phenomenon, and it provides a method of 
discovery that allows Descartes to determine the mathematical natural laws that govern 
the phenomenon. The example of the anaclastic line shows Descartes to be working with 
a very complex procedure of discovery: one that employs reductive steps to simples and 
that utilizes the algebraic method of comparison along with a mechanistic explanatory 
framework and empirical observations to arrive at the insights at each level of deduction. 
This example has revealed an important relationship between the purely mathematical 
aspect of this method and the experimental aspect. Indeed, they seem to be mutually 
dependent and each indispensable to the discovery of the laws of natural philosophy.521
                                                 
521 I think this is the right way to understand the relationship between mathematics and physics; in 
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In essence, we have determined that there is a necessary relationship between three 
different methods of the Regulae: the method of the mathesis universalis (Descartes’ 
algebra), the method of reduction, and the experimental method.  
 
Descartes’ later use of simples in the Regulae 
 
If we turn to the more mature use of simple natures in the Regulae, we will find a 
clearer explanation of the philosophical theory behind the application of simples to 
natural philosophy that is suggested by the discovery of the anaclastic line. Though the 
discussion will still leave some questions unanswered, we will try to think of the simple 
natures as simple notions that are arived at through the process of analysis. I believe that 
they are the primitive axioms of a deductive explanation of natural philosophical 
phenomena. In effect, they are the first principles of Descartes’ Regulae. Though the 
mature Descartes will see substance—particularly infinite substance, God—as the 
ultimate first principle of scientific knowledge, the simple natures remain a necessary 
step along the way to that idea. Indeed, when we understand Descartes’ use of the simple 
natures in the Regulae, we will appreciate how they fit into Descartes’ mature 
metaphysics. We will note that the simple natures of the Regulae are already divided into 
intellectual, material, and common natures, and they are conceived in a way that is 
entirely consistent with his concept of substance. In other words, Descartes is already 
                                                                                                                                                 
effect, Descartes has oversold his case when he claims that “imperfect problems can be 
reduced to perfect ones” (AT X, 431). That mathematics is indispensable for natural 
philosophy does not imply that the latter can be reduced to the former. 
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conceiving of some basic conceptual distinction between material and intellectual entities 
and he is conceiving of these entities in a way that is consistent with his mature 
distinction between body and mind. 
We will discuss the intellectual and common simple natures, though Descartes 
does not elaborate on them in the Regulae. Nevertheless, he makes a number of 
provocative claims that suggest a kinship to key concepts in his mature philosophy. 
Conversely, the material simple natures are the real discovery of the Regulae. The later 
metaphysics surpasses and founds the material simple natures discovered in this text on 
natural philosophy. Material simples function as the categorical bases of Cartesian natural 
philosophy: all physical entities are understood as a combination of these causally 
primary types.  
With the mature list of simple natures, Descartes is beginning to clarify the basic 
metaphysical categories that he thinks best correspond to his philosophical project. What 
will be most noteworthy for our investigation is why he enumerates the simples in the 
way he does, how this operates in his concept of scientific explanation, and what 
relationship this bears to his mature metaphysical dualism 
 
 
 
Simple natures as primitive notions or ultimate determinables 
I believe that it is most helpful to understand Descartes’ idea of simples as the 
final terms of an analysis. This is why I call them primitive notions. They are primitive in 
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classical sense of first principles, i.e., they are the result of a dialectical process, passing 
from what is known to us immediately to what is known by nature in the most elementary 
and basic sense. In Chapter 2, we explored the influence of this kind of method on 
Descartes’ Regulae. In particular, we saw that Descartes was seriously engaged in a 
search for a true analytic art of discovery during the formative period of 1618-1628. 
Although I use the phrase ‘dialectical process’ here to describe the method of arriving at 
simple natures, Descartes is quite dismissive of dialectic in the Regulae. We have seen, 
however, that this attitude is a consequence of a historical reaction to late scholastic logic. 
Nonetheless, there is an analogous concept to dialectic in Descartes’ thought. Descartes’ 
interest in mathematics lead him to conceive of the process of discovery in mathematics 
as “analysis,” which was explicitly referred back to Proclus’ idea of an upward 
movement of thought. Moreover, he conceives of his method of upward ascension and 
discovery as proceding by way of a reduction to simples and a recombination of those 
simples in a deductive, or necessary, way. The discovery of the principles, or simple 
natures, is a process of analysis, while the recombination of simples provides an 
explanation.  
The Latin terms reduco and compositio were closely allied with the Greek 
analysis and synthêsis. Goclenius describes the term reducere as “that motion by which 
one ascends to causes [reducere notat motum, ait Scal. de caus.].” 522
                                                 
522 Goclenius, Lexicon Latinus, 965. 
 He even cites as an 
example of reduction the discovery of two mean proportionals in order to solve the 
problem of duplicating the cube. For Goclenius, the mean proportionals, or roots of a 
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quadratic equation, are the final terms or propositions compared by the intellect when it 
discovers the solution to this problem.523
Returning to Goclenius, the encyclopedist cites as one definition of the many 
ways in which ‘compositio’ is understood: “that act by which the intellect conjoins 
accepted simple notions [ut actio intellectus simplices notiones consentaneas 
conjungens].”
 We have already seen that, in Descartes, the 
solution to the problem of finding two mean proportionals lies in determining the ratio 
between successive terms in the series. This ratio is the simple nature or ultimate term 
that explains the nature of the series. Such a process, in classical Geometry, was called 
‘analysis’. As a seeming historical confirmation of this connection, Beeckman’s Journal 
reproduces Descartes’ construction of two mean proportionals, using a circle and 
parabola with the Greek words, “Analytikôs” and “Sunthetikôs.” The analytikôs relates 
the proportional relations between the line segments and draws the figure representing 
those relations. The sunthetikôs explains the result (AT X, 342-344).  
524
                                                 
523 “Geometrae voce Reductionis etiam utuntur pro Translatione. Reducere enum unum problem 
vel Theorema ad aliud est trasferre aad aliud, quo cognito & percepto comparatoque, etiam id, 
quod primo propositum est, sit manifestum: ut quando duplicationem cubi investigant, 
quaesitionem suius propositionis ad aliam propositionem, quaehanc sequitut, transtulerunt, 
nempe Invenite duas medias rectas proportionales, & quod restabat, investigarunt: qua ratione 
datis duabas rectis duae mediae inveniri possint proportionales” (965). 
 When he dscribes the process of composition, Goclenius distinguishes 
the knowledge attained through composition from the knowledge of axioms or primitive 
notions. While the former is apprehended through a simple operation of the intellect, the 
latter relies on the certainty of the argument that conjoins axioms or simple notions. In 
the former, there is no possibility of falsehood, he says, while the latter is either true or 
524 Ibid., 421. 
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false.525
This connection is nowhere clearer than at the beginning of Rule XII where 
Descartes claims that by the term “simple” he means “only those things which we know 
so clearly and distinctly that they cannot be divided by the mind into others which are 
more distinctly known” (AT X, 418; CSM I, 44). This seems to confirm the idea that 
simples are the final terms of a process of analysis or reduction: they cannot be 
conceptually divided into distinct parts; they are the most simple and utterly clear ideas. 
The conceptual nature of this division or analysis is primary. To illustrate, Descartes 
considers a body with extension and shape. While he admits that “with respect to the 
thing itself, it is one single and simple entity,” he will consider it as “a composite made 
up of these three natures [corporeal nature, extension, and shape], because we understood 
 These descriptions of the cognitive apprehension of simple and conjoined 
natures reflect Descartes’ understanding of the cognitive apprehension of simples in the 
Regulae. As we have seen, Descartes claims that simple natures are apprehended with 
complete intellectual clarity, while explaining problems in terms of those simples 
requires deduction in order for them to be necessarily true. All of this suggests a close 
linguistic similarity in the seventeenth century between analysis and reduction, synthesis 
and composition. I believe that this is the case because both conceptual analysis and 
methodical reduction lead to simple natures while deduction and combination produce 
explanatory models of physical phenomena. 
                                                 
525 “De Compositione Enuntiativa seu Axiomatica: Haec opponitu Intellectioni indivisibilium, id 
est, operationi intellectus simplici, qua res ipsas apprehendimus. Est igitur compositio 
conceptuum intellectus, cum ipsas res componimus mente faciendo propositionem. Est 
argumenti cum argumento ad formandam affirmationem, veluti amica quedam conjunctio … 
Inter has operationes dupliex est discrimen: Alterum est, quod in prima operatione non est ulla 
falsitas: At in secunda est Verum, vel Falsum” (422). 
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each of them separately before we were in a position to judge that the three of them are 
encountered at the same time in one and the same subject” (AT X, 418; CSM I, 44).526
One might wonder what concepts cannot be divided in this way. Isn’t any 
proposition composed of words or propositional components analyzable? Descartes 
claims that the analysis must stop at the point where further division results in a loss of 
clarity and distinctness. Moreover, the analysis involved is conceptual, rather than 
linguistic. While every concept can be understood in terms of its definition, and every 
definition is articulated in propositions that may be analyzed, Descartes seems to think 
that some concepts lose their conceptual integrity through such analysis. When we 
analyze the definitions of some concepts, the parts of those definitions no longer relate to 
the whole in a way that explains the nature of the whole in the relevant way. Just below 
the example of the body with extension and shape, Descartes considers whether the 
concept ‘shape’ can be further analyzed into, for example, ‘limit’. Shape can be defined 
as the boundary, or limit, of a geometrical body. Thus, one could analyze the definition of 
the concept ‘shape’ into the concepts ‘limit’ and ‘geometrical body’. When we consider 
the concept ‘limit’, does it explain the nature of the concept ‘shape’ in the relevant way? 
What is relevant to the concept ‘shape’? For Descartes of the Regulae, the idea of shape 
 
Here, one single entity is understood as a composite of three simple natures since it is 
possible to conceive or understand these three natures apart from and prior experience of 
the entity.  
                                                 
526 This distinction in the natures “corporeal nature” and “extension” ought to be distinguished 
from the inseparability of these two natures when they are adequately represented in the 
imagination, see Rule XIV (AT X, 444-445; CSM I, 60-61). 
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supposed to explain the nature of bodies. But he thinks that all bodies, insofar as they are 
conceived as merely extended and corporeal, can be represented geometrically. So, the 
only relevant concept of limit for explaining the concept of body is the limit of a 
geometrical body. When we consider the concept ‘limit’ apart from ‘geometrical body’ 
we may think of a period of time, for instance. But Descartes thinks that when limit is so 
conceived (as ambigiously applied to material entities, intellectual entities, and common 
entities), it loses its clarity and distinctness (AT X, 418-19; CSM I, 44). This suggests that 
Descartes already conceives of distinct categories of things, each with their highest, or 
most simple notions.527
I believe that the relationship between simple natures and the kinds of things they 
explain can best be understood along the lines of the determinate-determinable 
distinction. 
 Descartes takes shape to be one of the simplest notions that refers 
to material entities because any further analysis of the concept results in a concept that 
refers ambiguously to material and intellectual entities.  
528
                                                 
527 See Marion’s notion of “simplification” in Sur l’ontologie grise, 131-36 and Gaukroger, 
Descartes, 180-81. 
 The determinate-determinable distinction will make perfect sense of why 
‘shape’ cannot be explained by ‘limit’. This distinction is ordinarily brought to bear on 
propositions like ‘red is a color’. It is noted that these propositions involve a different sort 
of claim than, for instance, ‘Paul is wealthy’ or ‘Paul is a man’. In the latter two cases, 
wealth and humanity are attributed to Paul as a property or predicate is attributed to a 
subject. But the relationship between red and color is different. Color does not predicate 
the red; it is not a property of red, not even an essential property. Yet it is impossible for 
528 This distinction originates in W.E. Johnson’s Logic and was notably advanced by John Searle. 
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a thing to be red without its being colored. Contemporary philosophers understand this 
relationship as one of a determinate (red) to a determinable (color). Red determines the 
color of the object. In turn, red can be understood as a determinable in relation to 
determinates maroon, scarlet, or crimson. If we return to our example of simple natures, 
we can see that the paricular shaped body is determined in extension, shape, and in being 
corporeal. Without specifying each of these determinables, we would not be able to 
uniquely understand the particular body. One must imagine that the body itself has a 
determinate extension, certain shape, and coporeal nature. Leaving out any of these 
determining factors would render our concept of the object vague or ambiguous. 
Conversely, if we try to imagine shape as determining limit, we find our understanding 
confused. A triangle determines shape, but does shape determine any concept that is less 
determinate than it? Except perhaps in very special fields of mathematics, we do not 
normally conceive of limit as a concept that requires determination by either shapes or 
durations. There is no concept that is either shaped or temporally extended in the same 
way as a shape is either triangle or square. So, it seems that when we conceive of the 
simple natures as describing the least determined concepts, i.e., the ultimate 
determinable, relating to a certain category of entities (intellectual, material, or common) 
then we have a fairly good grasp of why Descartes speaks the way he does about those 
simple natures.  
The determinate-determinable relationship is similar to, but much more flexible 
than the ontology of species and genera. Different determinates (say, red and blue) 
specify the determinable ‘color’, but they do not need to be considered species of the 
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genus color. Color is not a natural kind that must then be further specified into other 
natural kinds. The determinate-determinable relation does not have the ontological 
weight of genera-species distinction. Nor is color a property of the red, so we do not have 
to conceive of objects in terms of the subject-predicate or substance-property way that 
they are normally understood. One way to understand this is to see determinates and 
determinables as purely conceptual distinctions. Whereas the species-genus distinction 
requires a physical and metaphysical ground in order to explain it, the determinate-
determinable relation seeks no such ground. In this way, the determinate-determinable 
distinction preserves the hypothetical and schematic way that Descartes approaches 
natural philosophical explanation. Nonetheless, when Descartes’ simple natures are 
understood to be the highest determinables, there is an analogy to be made with 
Aristotle’s categories, the highest genera. In both cases, the list of concepts is the result of 
an analysis taken to its ultimate term.  
Indeed, when the simple natures are understood in this way, it is easy to see why 
the list of simple natures from Rule XII reccurs in Descartes’ lists of the modes of 
substances. Jorge Secada has recently offered a very insightful interpretation of 
Descartes’ concept of substance along just these lines: “Descartes undestood the 
inherence of a real property in a subject as the actual determination of a determinable 
nature by one of its determinates. Substance is an existing ultimate subject, a 
determinable essence which is not itself determinate.”529
                                                 
529 Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics, 190. 
 Thus, we only need to 
understand Descartes’ mature concept of substance as taking an additional step back from 
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the ultimate determinables of intellectual, material and common simple natures to the 
determinable that each of these categories determine, i.e., substance. Substance is either 
intellectual or material. If we understand Descartes’ mature concept of substance in this 
way, we can see why common simples will have to be classed in a different category: 
there is no common substance. Thus, these simples are diversely classified as logical 
primitives, common modes of existence, and modes of conception. In this respect, 
Descartes’ later metaphysics confirms our suspicion that there is a similarity with an 
important difference between Descartes’ notion of categories and Aristotle’s (where the 
ultimate category is substance). 
This way of conceiving of Descartes’ metaphysics is quite instructive. As Secada 
points out, the idea that properties or attributes are determinations of substance allows 
Descartes to incorporate the vocabulary of substance, attribute, mode, and the various 
distinctions from his scholastic predecessors, but to understand these concepts in an 
entirely new way. In Secada’s language, Descartes is an “essentialist” while the 
scholastic Aristotelians were “existentialists.” What this somewhat obscure terminology 
means is simply a restatement of one of the most fundamentally Cartesian insights: 
knowledge of what a thing is (quid est) precedes knowledge of its existence (an sit). For 
Descartes, one cannot know that a thing exists unless one specifies its nature. Conversely, 
the scholastic Aristotelians held that one cannot know what a thing is unless one knows 
that it exists.530
                                                 
530 Ibid., 7-10. 
 These broad claims do admit of nuance (Descartes is certain of the 
existence of the “I” before he knows what it is and he knows that God exists without 
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comprehending God’s nature, while Aquinas will acknowledge that in order to know that 
a thing exists one must have “some account” of its nature). However, the difference is 
quite striking and really goes to the heart of the Cartesian break from the tradition. 
According to this interpretation, understanding what a thing is amounts to 
determining it according to the categories—the ultimate determinables. In the later 
metaphysics, this ultimate category, the ultimate determinable is substance. 531 By 
contrast, the Regulae stops with the simple natures. Once Descartes has the idea of 
substance, he no longer needs the simple natures. He can treat all conceptally distinct 
entities as “ideas” and distinguish these according to their ontological nature. The idea of 
substance becomes the most “real” or fundamental idea, and hence the foundation of 
what are no longer understood as simple natures (cf. AT VII, 40; CSM II, 27-28).532
Correlatively, the process of determining the essence of an entity is the process of 
recomposition or “conjunction.” In the Regulae, Descartes distinguishes between 
necessary and contingent conjunction of simples. Simples are necessarily conjoined if the 
concepts they express are logically contained in the concept of the entity. Descartes gives 
us some examples of this sort of logical containment: the concept ‘extension’ is contained 
in the concept ‘shape’, the concept ‘duration’ is contained in the concept ‘motion’, the 
concepts ‘4’ and ‘3’ are contained in the concept ‘7’, ‘Socrates understanding something’ 
is contained in ‘Socrates doubting’, ‘God exists’ is contained in ‘I exist’, ‘I have a mind 
distinct from my body’ is contained in ‘I understand’. Logical containment is a one-way 
  
                                                 
531 A good place to start to develop this interpretation would be with Marion, Sur la théologie 
blanche, 110-139. 
532 Marion, Questions cartésiennes. 81, claims that “la doctrine cartésiennes de l’idée ne met pas 
d’abord en jeu le terme même d’idée, mais son substitut ... la nature simple.”  
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relation, he tells us. Even though ‘God exists’ is contained in ‘I exist’, ‘I exist’ is not 
contained in the concept ‘God exists’. Indeed, my existence is merely contingent, given 
God’s existence. Examples of contingent conjunction are the relaionship between ‘body’ 
and ‘animate’ or ‘man’ and ‘being dressed’ (AT X, 421-422; CSM I, 45-46). I do not 
wish to dwell on the validity of Descartes’ claims here. Rather, I only wish to point out 
that Descartes thinks that the necessary composition of simples is a kind of logical 
implication. Whenever simples are composed in a way that is logically implied by given 
simples he thinks that our knowledge of the entity so determined is true. 
This composition of simples that determines the nature of an entity is supposed to 
coincide with the perception of the entity. So Descartes claims, “those natures we call 
‘composite’ are known to us either because we learn from experience what sort they are, 
or because we ourselves put them together” (AT X, 422; CSM I, 46). By experience here 
he means sensory experience. One might expect Descartes to think that it is simply 
impossible to trust the experience of the senses, but this is not what he says. In fact, he 
claims, “the intellect can never be deceived by any experience, provided that when the 
object is presented to it, it intuits it in a fashion exactly corresponding to the way in 
which it possesses the object” (AT X, 423; CSM I, 47). So, the senses are reliable, but 
only in exactly that way in which they relate the information to the intellect. This seems 
to follow from Descartes’ account of perceptual cognition. The reliability of the senses is 
certified by the causal connection between the sensory organs and real objects. Bearing in 
mind the nature of this causal connection, we ought not to presume that the senses present 
the object the way it exists on its own. In such cases, “we are liable to go wrong . . . as 
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someone who has jaundice does when, owing to the yellow tinge of his eyes, he thinks 
everything is coloured yellow” (AT X, 423; CSM I, 47). The “wise man,” presumably the 
one who has trained his ingenium in just the way that the rules instruct, will recognize 
that the image presented to the intellect by the imagination is already composed in a 
certain way out of the causal connection between the sensory faculties and the external 
world. Thus, the yellow could be a property of the object, or the yellow could be a 
property of the eye. We will not assume that the senses give us direct access to the object, 
but we will realize that the senses are mediated in the their causal connection to the 
object.  
This sort of example leads Descartes to suggest that there are three different sorts 
of composition: impulse, conjecture, and deduction. Composition by impulse is the 
immediate and, we might say, instinctive judgments we make about the world. These can 
be the result of our nature, thus placed in us by a “superior power,” or it could be an 
engrained disposition of the corporeal imagination, as in the case of an acquired reflexive 
reaction, or as a result of our “free will,” which seems obscure and is given no 
explanation, though Descartes thinks it is “rarely” a source of error (AT X, 423-424; 
CSM I, 47). Conjectures are those suppositions we make about things we have no direct 
experience of but presume to have a nature similar to the things we do have an experience 
of. Descartes is distrustful of this sort of combination, leaving him with deduction as the 
“sole means of compounding things in a way that enables us to be certain of their truth” 
(AT X, 424, CSM I, 48). The way to ensure that deductive composition is valid is to 
“intuit that the conjuction of the one [term] with the other is wholly necessary” (AT X, 
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425; CSM I, 48). Thus, deductive or necessary composition is certified by intuition in the 
same way as the “chain of deductions” is certified by the intuition that each link in the 
chain is securely fastened to the next one. Descartes promises to tell us more about this 
process of deduction, presumably to work out a variety of different kinds of valid 
deductions, but he abandons the task and leaves us only with the basic foundation for this 
concept of necessary deduction (cf. AT X, 428; CSM I, 50).533
 
 
Simple natures in Rule XII: intellectual and common 
Where Rule VI begins by saying that it “contains the principle secret of my art 
[praecipuum tamen continet artis secretum],” the second half of Rule XII begins: “our 
aim here is to distinguish carefully the notions of simple things from those which are 
composed of them and to see in both cases where there exists a possibility of error, so 
that we may guard against it, and what it is possible to know for certain, so that we can 
concern ourselves solely with that” (AT X, 417; CSM I, 43). The former reflects 
Descartes’ belief that the scientific method would be a kind of intellectual art, while the 
latter develops a sophisticated analogy between our guarding against error and our 
concern solely with what can be known for certain. This reflects a change in focus on the 
nature of the scientific method: the former is reminiscent of the humanistic tradition, 
while the latter implies an attempt to provide foundations for knowledge. The simple 
natures are thus carried through to the beginnings of Descartes’ thought on the 
                                                 
533 The La Logique ou L’art de penser of A. Arnauld and P. Nicole would seem to advance some 
of these objectives (Paris: 1662). 
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foundations of knowledge. This is part of the reason why I believe they continue to be 
central concepts in our understanding of Descartes’ philosophy. 
Furthermore, the second half of Rule XII offers a rather remarkable concession to 
the nature of the scientific knowledge that will be discussed in the remainder of the rule, 
i.e., the doctrine of the simple natures. He says: 
... as we have done above,534
 
 we will now need to make certain assumptions 
which perhaps not everyone will accept. But even if they are thought to be no 
more real than the imaginary circles which astronomers use to describe the 
phenomena they study, this matters little, provided they help us to pick out the 
kind of apprehension of any given thing that may be true and to distinguish it 
from the kind of thing that may be false [qualis de qualibet re cognitio vera esse 
possit aut falsa, distinguatis]. (AT X 417; CSM I, 43-44) 
This introduces the notion of hypothesis in Descartes’ scientific method, which we 
discussed in depth in the last chapter. Unlike the “hypothetical” character of Bacon’s 
scientific method, where the principles are hypothetical in the sense that they could be 
surpassed by more accurate principles, Descartes’ principles are a priori hypothetical, 
i.e., they are assumed. Of course, this could be characteristic of Descartes’ concession to 
the men of the church who had educated him and whom he would not want to appear to 
contradict. However, it is also possible that Descartes realized that his principles of 
scientific explanation, insofar as they involved elaborate mechanistic models for the 
explanation of material things, did rest on hypotheses about the material universe and the 
method appropriate for natural philosophy.535
                                                 
534 I believe this refers to AT X 410-11. 
 Indeed, Descartes willingly eliminates a 
number of concepts essential to scholastic natural philosophy from his natural 
535 Doyle, The Logic of Descartes’ Method, 5.2, suggests that the aim of suppositions is to delimit 
the realm of genuine scientia by restricting the mental powers from attempting to understand 
things that are beyond its grasp, like the essences of natural things. 
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philosophical explanation. He does not have any reason to support this arbitrary 
elimination of things like substantial forms or final causes except that his principles are 
clearer and easier to apply to experiment and observation. The nature of a “supposition” 
or “hypothesis” seems to capture this quite neatly: in his scientific method, Descartes has 
explicitly and a priori excluded certain kinds of entities from consideration. He has 
deliberately represented the world in such a way that it conforms to his scientific method, 
in particular, to order and measure; and this could only be accomplished ex hypothesi. 
After a resume of the essential insights about simples that we have already 
discussed—that they conform to the order of cognition rather than the order of being, and 
that they are the product of a process of conceptual analysis—Descartes’ introduces his 
list of simple natures: intellectual (e.g., corporeal ideas, knowledge, doubt, ignorance, 
volition, etc.), material (e.g., shape, extension, motion, etc.), common simples (i.e., 
existence, unity, and duration), and common notions (the basic rules of inference). I will 
treat the intellectual and common simple natures first because they can be treated 
quickly: Descartes does very little to elaborate on the nature of these simples. 
Conversely, nearly the entire Rule XII is devoted to outlining the role of the material 
simple natures. Thus, extended reflection on these is warranted. 
In short, the intellectual simple natures are the faculties of the mind. Marion notes 
that Descartes’ categorization of intellectual simples is the result of a reflection, which 
captures the essence of Aristotle’s notion of parergon, i.e., an action “next to 
consciousness … meaning the consciousness of consciousness and its modalities.”536
                                                 
536 Sur l’ontologie grise, 137. The complete references to Aristotle are: De Anima II, g, 418a 17-
 The 
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importance of this comment is that it reveals the intellectual simple natures to be known 
through an entirely different means than the material simples. Whereas the latter are the 
results of a conceptual analysis of the properties of material bodies, as representations of 
the mind, the former are available only when the mind represents to itself its own acts of 
cognition, i.e., through self-reflection. Thus, the access to intellectual simples differs 
from access to material simples. Indeed, when Descartes reexamines the issue in the 
Meditationes, this difference in access will eventually determine the intellectual simples 
to be more fundamental than the material simples. While the latter are subject to doubt, it 
is not possible to doubt that one is thinking, willing, imagining, or perceiving, insofar as 
one is actually thinking.537 The manner of access to consciousness and its modalities, an 
awareness of concsiousness alongside consciousness, is different than the consciousness 
of external objects. In the Regulae, Descartes provides no account of the nature of the 
intellectual simples.538
There is only one element of the passage that could give someone a clue to the 
underlying nature of the intellectual simples. Descartes says, “Those simple natures 
which the intellect recognizes by means of a sort of innate light, without the aid of any 
corporeal image, are purely intellectual” (my emphasis: AT X, 419; CSM I, 44). That 
these simples are recognized by a sort of “innate light” and thus require no “corporeal 
 It is unfortunate that he does not, because this would greatly 
clarify the doctrine of the simple natures, and perhaps even determine the relationship 
between the different kinds of simples.  
                                                                                                                                                 
18; III, 1, 425a 16. See also III, 3, 428b 22; On Sense and Sensebilia 1, 437a 9; 4, 442b 5-7; 
On Dreams 1, 458b 4-6; On Memory 452b 7-14; 450a 9-10. 
537 Marion, Questions cartésiennes, 86-87 
538 Questions cartésiennes, 81-88. 
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image” seems to imply something like the claim that these simples are known in a 
different way than the material simples. This language also refers back to Descartes’ 
account of perception earlier in the rule, namely, that up to a certain point, images are 
considered inform the mind in exactly the same way as a wax receives the imprint of a 
seal, but at the point when the mind perceives ideas without the aid of a corporeal image, 
the model is purely analogical (AT X, 412; CSM I, 40). In other words, corporeal images 
are impressions on the flesh of the brain, in the place where the brain receives “common 
sensibles.”539
                                                 
539 See also Rule XIV where corporeal things require the “aid of the imagination” in order be 
certain about their nature. In short, they determine the nature of the “code” of “representative 
ideas” about corporeal matter. See Marion, Questions cartésiennes, 75-81, for the 
identification between “idea” and “simple nature” in Descartes’ terminology. One must, 
however, distinguish between those ideas that are the product of self-reflection and those that 
are the product of representation, those that are innate and those that are corporeal. 
 Descartes clearly thinks that the purely incorporeal power of thought (vis 
cognoscens) has no need for impressions in the brain and the ideas pertaining to this 
power of thought indicate this fact. These two brief passages suggest that Descartes 
conceived of the explanatory bases of thought in a fundamentally different way than 
those of matter. Indeed, as we saw in the last section, the concept of ‘shape’ cannot be 
further analyzed because the analysis leads to an ambiguity between something that is 
represented spatially (the limit of a geometrical body) and something that requires no 
spatial representation (the limit of a duration). That the material simple natures require a 
corporeal image would seem to reinforce the upper limit of analysis at the point where 
further conceptual distinction results in an ambiguity between spatial, corporeal 
representation and non-spatial, or non-corporeal representation. We will have to wait for 
the Discours and Meditationes in order to gain access to that special realm of thought. 
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However, the division between what physical and mental already suggests what 
Descartes’ method of doubt will reveal: one level of knowledge is susceptible to ordinary 
doubt (the ‘dream hypothesis’ and the ‘madness hypothesis’), while another is hyperbolic 
(mathematical truths), and a final level is utterly immune to doubt (the cogito and its 
ideas). The utility of doubt for revealing this stratification of knowledge appears to be 
part of Descartes’ discoveries c. 1630. 
What about the common simple natures? This last category is somewhat 
confused. Clearly, Descartes understands that there are some principles of scientific 
explanation that underlie and potentially unite the intellectual and material simples. On 
the one hand, it seems clear that the rules of inference, which he elsewhere calls 
“common notions,” can serve as “the links which connect other simple natures together” 
(AT X, 419; CSM I, 45). On the other hand, universals like unity, existence, and duration, 
seem to be leftover simple notions from Rule VI, without a clear application to either 
material or intellectual natures, which are nonetheless basic to scientific explanation. 
Gaukroger has shown that these common simples actually fail Descartes’ test for 
simplicity. 540
                                                 
540 Gaukroger, Descartes, 181. 
 The argument that disqualifies ‘limit’ as a simple nature, i.e., that it is 
ambiguously applied to both extension and duration, would also hold for the common 
simple natures. Does it mean the same thing when a concept like ‘unity’ is applied to a 
watch, an animal, the human mind, or God? On Descartes’ more mature metaphysics, 
clearly not: the human mind is an entirely different kind of thing than a watch or an 
animal, while the unity of God’s existence exceeds comprehension. So, the common 
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simples do not appear to be simple in the required sense for Rule XII. It is likely, as 
Gaukroger concludes, that Descartes is trying to accomplish more with these concepts 
than he has the resources to prove. In particular, Descartes is trying to provide a 
legitimatory framework for his mechanistic physics and the application of his scientific 
method. By the time of the Principia, as we have seen, he is much more clear about the 
common notions, or logical simples, as a distinct sort of concept from the common ways 
that things exist or are conceived. Descartes’ project in the Regulae is focused much 
more carefully on the material simples and their connection to each other, for these are 
actually the explanatory principles of Descartes’ science. These simples are, in a sense, 
perfectly self-contained and provide a framework for understanding the application of 
Descartes’ mathesis universalis to natural philosophy. The set of common notions are 
leftover logical concepts that connect the other simple natures together; they provide the 
“cement” that binds together the “basic building blocks” which compose the physical 
world.541
 
  
 Material simples as categorical bases of natural philosophy 
                                                 
541 I borrow this useful image from J. Cottingham’s A Descartes Dictionary. However, I restrict it 
to the material simples, since I do not think that Cottingham’s “brick and mortar” picture 
holds for the intellectual simples. In particular, the mind is not composed of the will, senses, 
imagination, memory, etc. These are the acts or modes of the mind. Moreover, when Descartes 
does analyze some of the mind’s ideas—e.g., the ideas of cold and hot, or of substance—these 
ideas are analyzed by reference to a theory of ideas that is not based on the intellectual simple 
natures in the same way as Descartes’ explanation of physical phenomena is based on the 
material simples. That is, what simple nature gives rise to the objective/formal distinction that 
is essential to the analysis of Descartes’ ideas in the Meditations? Our determinate-
determinable interpretation of the simples seems distinct from Cottingham’s brick and mortar 
picture.  
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In what sense do the simple natures play the role of the categories, or ultimate 
principles, of scientific explanation? I contend that these simples are the categorical bases 
of scientific explanation. That is, they explain the phenomena by virtue of certain 
fundamental, causally efficacious properties or elements that are present universally. 
They are categorical in the sense of having an unrestricted application. However, they are 
also all relational. Consider the list of material simples: motion, shape, and extension. 
Surely, each of these categories admits of greater and lesser and, moreover, can only be 
specified by relation to a unit of measure. Again, the intellectual simples are knowledge, 
ignorance, imagination, and volition. But each of these “faculties” of the mind can only 
be understood in terms of their intentional direction toward an object, and thus they, too, 
are relational properties. Therefore, we can add another argument in favor of Marion’s 
thesis that Descartes privileges the pros ti legomena over the haplos, namely, that his 
categorical bases are relational properties.  
In Chapter 2, I determined that the mathesis universalis sets up the standard for 
representation to which Descartes’ picture of the material world conforms. Let us put this 
thesis to work in favor of our interpretation of the simple natures: we will say that the 
mathesis determines the idea-type to which the basic categories of material entities must 
conform. In this respect, the material simples clearly conform to a mathesis idea-type: 
motion, extension, and shape each admit of order and measure, and even more 
profoundly, they are each commensurable with a unit of measure. Thus, the material 
simple natures enumerate the kinds of things that can be treated by the mathesis 
universalis. When we return to the examples of “common notions,” their relation to the 
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mathesis becomes immediately apparent: Descartes says that common notions include 
‘Things that are the same as a third thing are the same as each other’ and ‘things that 
cannot be related in the same way to a third thing are different in some respect’ (AT X, 
419; CSM I, 45). In one sense, these examples are not noteworthy; they are simply two 
different ways of articulating the principle that ‘equals plus equals are equal’. One would 
assume that other principles of logic would be contained in this category. In another 
sense, however, these two examples are illuminating: these are precisely the principles 
that legitimate what I have been calling the algebraic method of comparison. In other 
words, Descartes takes special care to note two principles of logic that have direct 
bearing on his scientific method of the Regulae. Put another way, while the material 
simple natures enumerate the properties of things that conform to the mathesis idea-type, 
the common notions highlight logical principles that are basic to the method of 
mathesis.542
One question that ought to be addressed first is: why are these categorical simples 
preferable to the relational simples of Rule VI? One possible reason is that they are much 
easier to sort and apply to real phenomena. Another reason could also be that these 
categories surpass the explanatory power of the absolute and relative terms of Rule VI. 
For example, what is universal and particular? With respect to material substance, the 
particulars are the physical things and the universals are the simple natures.
 The way that this is cashed out in the examples given in Rule XII, will be 
discussed in a moment. 
543
                                                 
542 This confirms the thesis of Marion, Questions cartésiennes, 83.  
 What 
543 ‘Universal’ ought to be taken in the sense of ‘determinable’ as I have explained above. This is 
surely one thing that Descartes has in common with Bacon: both Bacon and Descartes of the 
 536 
about cause and effect? In the mature metaphysical account, of course, the ultimate cause 
is God, but this will only enter into the discussion after Descartes’ discovery of the idea 
of substance and the argument for God’s existence following the method of doubt. With 
respect to the physical world and the laws of nature, extension, motion, and shape are the 
only material causes in Descartes’ metaphysics. So, in essence, the categorical bases do 
the work. But what about the equal, similar, and straight? Well, as we determined above, 
these are the units of quantitative measurement. Furthermore, it seems that with these 
simples, Descartes is striving for an enumeration of the various principles of order and 
measure. But the science that treats order and measure is, of course, the mathesis 
universalis. So we can understand the simples of Rule XII as a more mature, complete, 
and scientifically desirable account of simples than Rule VI. In Rule XII, we have an 
account of simples as the basis of scientific explanation. The material simple natures are 
the categorical bases of Descartes’ natural philosophy. However, these categorical bases 
are somewhat unique: they are relational, determinable properties of corporeal bodies. 
 
 
 Simple natures and the explanation of the magnet 
In Rule XII, Descartes poses the magnet, a much more complex phenomenon, as a 
natural phenomenon that would provide an application of simple natures in natural 
philosophy. This example will reveal how Descartes’ incorporates experiment into his 
method in the Regulae. In short, we will find that Descartes’ analogical method of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Regulae provide a metaphysical account, i.e., a higher order explanation, of the principles of 
mechanistic science, just as Spinoza recognizes in his letter to Oldenburg. 
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mechanical explanation conforms to Bacon’s method of scientific discovery. However, 
we will have to go well beyond the Regulae to see how Descartes explains the nature of 
the magnet. 
These kinds of problems, i.e., those that require an application of mathesis to 
physical phenomena through experimentation, are what Descartes’ calls “imperfect 
problems.” Recall that Descartes thinks the algebraic method of comparison applies 
equally well to both perfect and imperfect problems, both purely mathematical and 
physical inquiries: “these conditions hold also for imperfect problems” (AT X, 430; CSM 
I, 52). However, physical problems require the supposition of a mechanical framework of 
explanation (one that conforms to the mathesis idea-type) and they require some 
experimentation in order to test our intuitions or our mechanical models used to explain 
the particular nature in question. The paradigmatic example of this kind of reasoning in 
the Regulae is the nature of the magnet. Descartes refers to the magnet in several 
different places in the Regulae. It seems as though this particular phenomenon posed a 
peculiar problem for Descartes and was something he hoped to explain by means of his 
method. In Rule IX, the magnet is identified as a phenomenon that is difficult to 
understand in a passage we have seen above:  
If, for example, I wish to inquire whether a natural power [potentia naturalis] can 
travel instantaneously to a distant place, passing through the whole intervening 
space, I shall not immediately turn my mind to the power of a magnet, or the 
influence of the stars, or even to the speed of light, to see whether actions such as 
these might occur instantaneously... (AT X, 402; CSM I, 34) 
 
The magnet is here identified with other occult powers, such as the influence of the stars, 
and it is deferred as an object of study until more basic and simpler questions can be 
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resolved. In Rules XIII and XIV, however, Descartes seems more bold than cautious. In 
these rules, he suggests that the magnet is a phenomenon that is tractable according to his 
method. Rule XIII suggests that Gilbert’s studies on magnetism can be consulted as an 
example of “perfect problems,” i.e., problems whose components are entirely known. 
Clearly, the physical problem of defining the nature and power of the magnet is 
“imperfect,” since the relevant nature cannot be seen and is not known. However, 
Descartes seems to suggest that one could begin by studying Gilbert’s investigations into 
the magnet, and that these may lead one on the path to discovering the magnet’s true 
nature. At the end of the same paragraph, Descartes suggests that one’s investigation into 
the nature of the magnet be restricted: “once we have decided to investigate specific 
observations relating solely to the magnet, we no longer have any difficulty in dismissing 
all other observations from our mind” (AT X, 431; CSM I, 52). This word of caution 
suggests that we restrict the investigation solely to observations concerning the lodestone 
and not allow it to extend to the imagined effects of magnetism or other similar 
phenomena. In Rule XIV, Descartes again limits the scope of inquiry. However, this time 
he gives some indication as to the kind of knowledge that is possible concerning the 
magnet’s nature. 
[I]f in the magnet there were some kind of entity [genera entis], the like of which 
our intellect had never before perceived, it is pointless to hope that we shall ever 
get to know it simply by reasoning; for that we would either need to be endowed 
with some new sense or with a divine mind. But if we perceive most distinctly a 
combination of those known entities or natures which produce the same effects 
that appear in the magnet, then we shall credit ourselves with having attained 
whatever it is possible for the human mind to attain in this matter. (AT X, 439; 
CSM I, 39) 
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In other words, instead of trying to posit some new kind of entity to explain the nature of 
the magnet, we need to return to the categorical bases of all natural phenomena and try to 
reconstruct the same set of effects observed in the magnet as a combination of material 
simple natures. Appealing to some kind of thing that we have never seen or cannot know 
is, he claims, like trying to teach a person who was blind from birth the nature of colors. 
Since the doctrine of simple natures has already enumerated the kinds of entities that are 
readily apparent, we should begin by reconstructing the properties of the magnet using 
these. Moreover, once one has performed such a reconstruction, one can be sure that one 
has attained all that is possible for the human mind to attain on the matter 
Indeed, this is precisely the method that is suggested in Rule XII. In that rule, 
Descartes claims, “the whole of human scientia consists uniquely in our achieving a 
distinct perception of how all these simple natures contribute to the composition of other 
things” (AT X, 427; CSM I, 49). The reason why he can claim this is that any entity that 
does not conform to the simple natures is not an entity that can be known by the human 
mind: “for that we would either need to be endowed with some new sense or with a 
divine mind.” Again, Descartes recognizes that the inquiry into physical phenomena will 
present some obstacle, and “almost everyone gets stuck right at the outset, uncertain as to 
which thoughts he ought to concentrate his mind on, yet quite convinced that he ought to 
seek some new kind of entity previously unknown to him” (ibid.). This is where Doyle’s 
suggestion, noted in the Anaclastic example above, is very helpful. Instead of searching 
after new kinds of entities, we should restrict our investigation to what can be known, 
and to try to determine what is sought according to its relationship to what is already 
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known. “Thus,” Descartes continues, “if the question concerns the nature of the magnet, 
foreseeing that the topic will prove inaccessible and difficult, he turns his mind away 
from everything that is evident, and immediately directs it at all the most difficult points, 
in the vague expectation that by rambling through the barren field of manifold causes he 
will hit upon something new” (ibid.). Indeed, the magnet seems to present just the kind of 
nature that would lead one to posit a “soul” or motive force in the material itself that 
gives the stone its strange power of “action at a distance.” However, we should not 
simply “ramble through the barren field of manifold sensations,” or “wander blindly” (as 
Bacon would have said). Rather, we must remember the method of investigation that 
Descartes has been outlining: “ . . . take someone who thinks that nothing in the magnet 
can be known which does not consist of certain, self-evident, simple natures: he is in no 
doubt about how he should proceed” (ibid.). Let us restate this in the terms that we have 
been using: one realizes that the categorical bases, the ultimate determinables of all 
physical bodies should conform to our mathesis idea-type; one appreciates that the way to 
access the hidden powers of things is by way of a method of comparison; and one reduces 
the initial question to a series of questions whose answers are logically dependent on one 
another; then one will be able to discover the nature of the magnet. 
But Descartes inserts some interesting language at this point that reveals an 
underlying commitment to the experimental framework of Baconian science. He says, 
“First [the investigator] carefully gathers together all the available observations 
[experientia] concerning the stone in question; then he tries to deduce from this what sort 
of mixture of simple natures is necessary for producing all the effects which the magnet 
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is found to have. Once he has discovered this mixture [of simple natures], he is in a 
position to make the bold claim that he has grasped the true nature of the magnet, so far 
as it is humanly possible to discover on the basis of given observations” (ibid.). First of 
all, it is important to note that this passage reproduces the claims of Rules XIII and XIV 
noted above: namely, that the investigation into the magnet should begin by studying the 
“perfect” problem of what observations had already been made (by Gilbert, for instance) 
and that once one has reproduced the set of effects that are observed of the magnet 
through a mixture of simple natures, one has attained whatever is possible for the human 
mind to attain on the matter. What is unique abou the passage in Rule XII it seems to me 
is that it quite clearly refers to the Novum Organum: Descartes refers to the collection of 
experientia and the mixture of simple natures that would be distinguished in that 
collection, ultimately with the aim to determine the true nature of the magnet. I suggest 
that this language implicitly cites Bacon and, for that reason, obscures Descartes’ point to 
a degree. In short, it is Bacon who speaks of material bodies as “a troop of simple 
natures”; but Descartes does not conceive of bodies as a collection or mixture of qualities 
and elements that he calls simple natures. Rather, the “mixture” of simple natures in 
Descartes’ method is a result of reconstructing the effects found in the entity according to 
a determination of the underlying determinable bases of material natures. Just as we saw 
in the case of the anaclastic, one does not discover particular simple natures by way of a 
reduction of the problem to its constituent components. What one discovers is a 
mechanical description of the phenomenon, or a mathematical description of the 
phenomenon, that determines the phenomenon in a precise way according to simple 
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natures. In short, the explanatory terms apply Descartes’ scientific reasoning to the 
particular phenomenon in conformity with the simple natures, but not by virtue of the 
simple natures. (On Cottingham’s analogy, the simple natures are not the “building 
blocks,” but they define the kind of building blocks we are looking for.) 
Unfortunately, Descartes never carries out an investigation into the nature of the 
magnet in the Regulae. We will have to wait until the Principia where he publishes that 
account. It is not our task here to explain the nature of the magnet, as it is presented in the 
Principia. Indeed, Descartes has a grand story to tell about the nature of the magnet as a 
species of the nature of terrestrial phenomena. I simply want to verify the hypothesis that 
the nature of the magnet elicits an application of Descartes’ mathematical method of 
discovery in an experimental framework that conforms to the Baconian method of 
discovery. One phrase from the preceding paragraph ought to give us confidence that this 
hypothesis will be borne out by the facts: Descartes claims that the true nature of the 
magnet will be discovered “on the basis of given observations [ex datis experimentis 
potuit inveniri].” That is, there is an indispensable experimental basis for the discovery of 
the nature of physical phenomena, like the magnet.  
In the Principia, the magnet is described in terms of Descartes’ hypothesis that all 
earthly matter contains pores of different shapes and sizes. He assumes that the magnet 
has some such striated pores, which he likens to the threads of a screw or the shell of a 
snail, which can receive small particles that are fitted to such pores in one direction but 
not the other. Then Descartes imagines that such small particles are continually circling 
the earth and passing through the earth along its axis, from North to South. Thus, when a 
 543 
magnet is freely suspended, it tends to point North because it is bombarded by these 
small particles passing in that direction and the interior striations in the magnet are one-
directional, like the threads on a screw, so that the magnet aligns itself with the passing 
particles. Descartes takes the magnetic rock to be a special remnant of the metallic 
interior of the earth, a piece of earth’s interior that preserves the original shape and 
orientation of the pores. Thus, he explains the special relationship between magnets and 
iron, since iron is the metal containing the largest particles of matter and thus still 
contains the pores that are peculiar to the magnet, though these pores are often 
misdirected and irregular in iron ore. What is remarkable about the passages in the 
Principia, treating the nature of the magnet, is that Descartes not only seeks to explain 
the nature of the lodestone itself according to mechanical principles, but he has 
assimilated this particular phenomenon into an entire story about the formation of the 
earth and various metals found in it. This reaches far beyond the cautious framework of 
the Regulae, where Descartes suggests investigating the nature of the magnet in 
abstraction from all other phenomena. 
However, §145 of the Principia does list various observations about the nature of 
the magnet that, in effect, provides the history of experiments on the magnet that he 
requests in the Regulae. Sections 146-186 provide an interpretation of each of these 
experiments in turn. Adam and Tannery note that this list reproduces a list that Mersenne 
had sent Descartes in 1639, though they also note that such a list of experiments had been 
published by other authors, including Althonius Kircher in his De Magnete (1641).  In the 
introduction to the section explaining the history of observations, Descartes writes, “I 
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now hope to show that all of the properties that the most curious experiments of admirers 
of the magnet have been able to discover up to now can so easily be explained in such a 
way that only this would be necessary to convince one of their truth, even though they 
would not be deduced from first principles of nature” (AT IX-b, 280).544
Clearly the Principia present Descartes’ systematic natural philosophy in a way 
that he did not possess at the time of the Regulae. However, the method underlying this 
story, the reason why it can be considered scientia, is that it conforms precisely to the 
regulatory framework of the Regulae. As we have seen, Descartes’ scientific method 
enables an extension of certain and evident cognition to physical phenomena through a 
reduction of the initial investigation into constituent, more fundamental, inquiries. The 
answers to these queries are provided by Descartes’ method of comparison. In specifying 
the nature of any given physical phenomenon, Descartes requires an experimental step in 
 In other words, 
this list of experiments or observations on the nature of the magnet can be explained by 
Descartes’ mechanical reproduction of the magnet’s nature and thus they verify the 
accuracy of Descartes’ mechanical suppositions. This, combined with the fact that the 
explanation itself is deduced from first principles, proves that the explanation is correct. I 
believe that this is precisely what Descartes indicates in the Regulae as an application of 
his method to “imperfect” problems. Though the story is much more complex in the 
Principia, he considers his mechanistic picture to be deduced from first principles and 
verified by experiment.  
                                                 
544 “. . . j’espère maintenant faire voir que toutes celles de ces proprietez que les plus curieuses experiences 
des admirateurs de l’aymant ont pû découvrir jusques à present, peuvent si facilement estre expliqués 
par leur moyen, que cela seul suffiroit pour persuader qu’elles sont vrayes, encore qu’ells n’auroient 
point esté déduites des premiers principes de la nature.” 
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order to specify our intuitions about the nature of the phenomenon, according to its 
effects.545
Whereas Bacon conceives of the simple natures as the qualities of natural things 
on the basis of which laws of nature operate, Descartes clearly conceives of the material 
simple natures as the ideal categorical bases for any scientific explanation. Whatever 
Descartes’ explanation of natural phenomena, it must be an explanation that determines 
the entity according to its extension, shape, and motion. He restricts his explanation to 
these kinds of explanatory principles because he thinks that any other basis for 
explanation would surpass the mind’s capacities for clear and distinct cognition. One 
might even suggest that these simple natures transcend the variety of particular 
explanations; in Kantian language, they are the transcendental conditions of the 
 Also, in the background of some of these deductive steps, we have seen 
Descartes’ mathematical method. That is, he determines mathematical laws of nature 
through an application of his mathematical method of discovery to experiment. The 
Principia shows that Descartes has, in effect, reconstructed the natural world—he has 
supplied us with a systematic mechanical explanation of natural phenomena—according 
to his principles of scientific explanation, his material simple natures, and the logic of 
comparison that links them together. In this sense, Descartes performs a conceptual 
reproduction of the matter in question. This differs from Bacon’s “superinduction,” to be 
sure, but the methodical application of mechanical principles of explanation to 
experiment and observation is markedly similar. 
                                                 
545 In Sur l’ontologie grise, 144-45, Marion correlates the recomposition of simple natures 
through necessary and certain deduction with the expansion of the domain of experientia 
certa, in other words, the definition of scientia from Rule II. 
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possibility of any mechanical explanation. When Descartes performs his reduction, he 
does not discover simple natures, rather he discovers particular mechanical substructures, 
which are only intelligible because they conform to the mind’s powers. Descartes 
willingly concedes that his simple natures do not describe nature’s essence; they are 
“hypothetical.” Nonetheless, this hypothesis does not diminish the efficacy of the 
explanation. Indeed, Descartes believes that through careful experiment and observation, 
one can gain the right kind of insight into the mechanical structures that operate in nature 
and produce perceived effects. He borrows Bacon’s method of experimentation 
wholesale, with its tables of comparison and its natural histories, because these conform 
perfectly to his objective. He seeks to amass as much information about particular 
phenomena as possible in order to ensure that the mechanical explanation he offers 
actually explains the matter in question. However, Descartes has no need for Baconian 
induction and superinduction, or Bacon’s “forms of simple natures.” These rely on 
metaphysical claims about nature’s essence that have no place in Descartes’ method. 
Where Bacon was open to the possibility that nature did, in fact, possess hidden powers 
that the trained scientific practitioner could harness, Descartes reminds us that knowledge 
of these powers exceeds our mental powers. Instead, he prefers to investigate nature 
according to what is simple and easy to understand. It is this epistemological framework 
of science that I take to signal Descartes’ deep and abiding interest in the nature of the 
mind, the cognitive powers, and the mind’s place as the fundamental ground of first 
philosophy. 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this dissertation has been to discover the origins of Descartes’ 
concept of mind. On the way to this goal, we have sought to place Descartes’ earliest 
treatise, the Regulae ad directionem ingenii, in its proper historical context. As a result, 
we have come to understand Descartes’ concept of mind as a concept that develops out of 
his engagement with traditional, Aristotelian philosophy, in an effort to set the new 
science of mechanism on a firm and independent foundation. The Regulae is a relic of 
Descartes’ first efforts to provide the foundations of mechanistic natural philosophy. We 
have seen that as early as 1618-1620, with Descartes’ initial apprenticeship with Isaac 
Beeckman in Holland, he turned his attention to the possibility of an entirely new science, 
applying the principles of mathematics to problems in natural philosophy. This 
application of mathematics to natural philosophy required Descartes, along with 
Beeckman, to conceive of physical nature, or matter, as essentially quantifiable. This 
working hypothesis, which was so fundamental to the origins of modern science, required 
an equally fundamental rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics. Ultimately, this 
confrontation with Aristotle would determine the parameters of Descartes’ concept of 
mind. 
That Descartes conceives of providing a secure foundation for science by writing 
a treatise on method was a direct consequence of the project of scholastic reform in the 
16th century. The Renaissance authors had thought to reform Aristotle’s metaphysical 
system by ordering the metaphysical categories in terms of a conceptually simple system. 
This movement was born out of a number of different influences: the tradition of memory 
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art, the Neoplatonic understanding of intellect and its relation to nature, a belief that the 
classical syllogism could not lead to new knowledge but only rhetorical disputations, and 
a practical concern for pedagogy. These elements led thinkers to attempt to compose a 
shortened compendium of knowledge, an ars brevis. Descartes’ signals his interest in 
these writings, exploring the art of Ramon Llull, and studying a German treatise of 
mnemotechnics by Lambert Shenkel. However, Descartes does not seem convinced that 
prior authors had added anything to classical Aristotelianism. Instead, he believed that by 
concentrating on an algebraic method of discovery in mathematics, and applying this 
method to the natural sciences, he could solve any problem in natural philosophy. This 
vision is the essential aim of the Regulae, and it is best captured by the phrase, mathesis 
universalis, a universal science or learning based on the principles of mathematics. There 
were limitations to this science; it was not an entirely universal science. But Descartes 
thought he could easily apply the prinicples of mathematics and the method of algebraic 
comparison to problems in natural philosophy by conceiving of natural bodies as as 
nothing more than determinately quantifiable features. Though the Regulae does not yet 
contain Descartes’ full-blown theory of matter (an achievement that would come several 
years later, with Le Monde), it nonetheless demonstrates the core insights that led to that 
matter theory: all objects should be understood only insofar as they are determined by 
their extension, shape, and motion. 
This vision of natural philosophy is both a product of and holds important 
consequences for Descartes’ theory of mind. First, the supposed essence of corporeal 
nature, namely, as extended matter, is chosen because this is the easiest and clearest way 
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to conceive of matter. When Descartes goes on to describe the nature of the brain and 
sensory faculties, he shows why the brain has a limited capacity to conceive complex 
things. In particular, he holds that the locus of all thought, or the seat of the soul, is only a 
very small organ in the center of the brain. Thus, in order for the mind to accurately 
conceive things in the imagination, it must conceive them  as simply as possible. Second, 
Descartes consistently warns against overreaching the bounds of what the intellect can 
conceive clearly. He is more concerned to guard against error than to assure readers that 
he has discovered the nature of the most mysterious phenomena. This methodological 
concern is a direct consequence of the way Descartes conceives of the mind to be in 
contact with the external world. He understands that contact to be direct and immediate, 
as though all senses were a kind of touch, where the point of contact is extremely small. 
Thus, we need not be concerned that we do not have an accurate picture of reality; rather, 
we need to be concerned that we restrict our judgments about reality to what we actually 
have access to. This picture of Descartes’ early epistemology should be a word of caution 
to those who see Descartes as deeply skeptical about our knowledge of the external 
world. 
In the Regulae, Descartes’ account of perception and cognition provides an 
epistemological foundation for his science. Though Descartes denies that the things we 
see, hear, touch, taste, and smell resemble the things themselves, he does account for a 
causal connection between mental ideas and extra-mental realities. This distinction 
between sensible qualities and the nature of external bodies foreshadows an important 
modern distinction that, following Locke, we call the primary/secondary quality 
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distinction. For Descartes, primary qualities (shape, extension, motion, etc.) are the real, 
mathematically representable, features of the external world. Secondary qualities (color, 
sound, flavor, temperature, etc.), by contrast, do not accurately represent the external 
world. Instead, these sensory qualities are arbitrarily linked to the external world by 
virtue of our embodied state. This is the way minded bodies see the world; it is entirely 
contingent on the unique union of mind and body that human beings possess. 
We see that Descartes actually separates those primary qualities, which will serve 
as the categorical bases for scientific explanation, from mental acts and mental content. 
The latter are understood through “intellectual” simple natures, while the former 
understood in terms of “material” simple natures. In a sense, both are products of ideas, 
since we have seen that Descartes’ concept of extra-mental reality is informed by a 
certain idea of science and a certain goal for scientific knowledge. Yet, Descartes is clear 
that there is little connection between the two realms. This, I believe, is the real origin of 
Descartes’ claim for mind-body distinctness. It arises from a desire to set mechanistic 
natural philosophy on a firm foundation in contradistinction to traditional, Aristotelian 
metaphysics. In order to do so, Descartes must set aside all of the phenomenal features of 
mental experience (the colors, sounds, tastes, etc. that define our everyday experience) 
and establish clear boundaries for an investigation into extra-mental reality. Descartes 
divides the mental from the physical primarily because his predecessors had seemingly 
not provided a way for a mathematical science of the natural world to truly explain 
natural phenomena. Their science of explanation had divided all things according to 
forms and categories that were determined by sensory qualities, regardless of whether 
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these qualities could be represented mathematically. Mathematics was thought to be 
derivative on this, more basic, qualitative understanding of nature. In Descartes’ effort to 
describe a mathematical method of discovery in natural philosophy, he had to separate 
the mathematically representable features of science from those that could not be so 
represented. In his later metaphysics, he will simply call the one res extensa and the other 
res cogitans. 
If this study has helped us to understand better Descartes’ claims about substance 
dualism, I think it must make us aware that this distinction between entities (rei) is not 
easily dismissed, nor does it emerge from a naïve conception of objects. Rather, 
Descartes’ subject in the Regulae is an entity that is deeply engaged with objects; it is 
seeking to understand those objects. What Descartes recognizes is that the entity that 
seeks to understand is a unique sort of entity. Indeed, he thinks that the kinds of 
explanatory terms we use to talk about this entity will be entirely different than the way 
we speak about objects in the physical world. The distinction is apparent and it has had 
an enduring impact on philosophy and science, as is evident from the fact that still today 
we have no good answer to the question ‘what is consciousness?’. We are still unable to 
say what it is to be conscious in a way that unifies our understanding of consciousness 
with the natural world that consciousness understands. In the Regulae, we see that 
Descartes is already quite aware of this problem. His solutions are schematic and 
piecemeal, but his general approach appears consistent with his mature philosophy. 
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